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It’s not a question of whether one believes in God or not. Rather, it’s a
question of if, in the absence of God, we can have belief, any belief.
“If you live today,” wrote Flannery O’Connor, “you breathe in nihilism.”
Whether “religious” or “secular,” it is “the very gas you breathe.” Both
within and without the academy, there is an air common to both decon-
struction and scientism — both might be described as species of
reductionism. The dominance of these modes of knowledge in popular
and professional discourse is quite incontestable, perhaps no more so
where questions of theological import are often subjugated to the mar-
gins of intellectual respectability. Yet it is precisely the proponents and
defenders of religious belief in an age of nihilism that are often — unwit-
tingly or not — among those most complicit in this very reduction. In
these latter cases, one frequently spies an accommodationist impulse,
whereby our concepts must be first submitted to a prior philosophical
court of appeal in order for them to render any intellectual value. To cite
one particularly salient example, debates over the origins, nature, and
ends of human life are routinely partitioned off into categories of
“evolutionism” and “creationism,” often with little nuance. Where at-
tempts to mediate these arguments are to be found, frequently the strat-
egy is that of a kind of accommodation: How can we adapt our belief in
creation to an already established evolutionary metaphysic, or, how can
we have our evolutionary cake and eat it too? It is sadly the case that, de-
spite the best intentions of such “intellectual ecumenism,” the distinctive
voice of theology is the first one to succumb to aphonia — either from
impetuous overuse or from a deliberate silencing.
The books in this unique new series propose no such simple accom-
modation. They rather seek and perform tactical interventions in such
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debates in a manner that problematizes the accepted terms of such de-
bates. They propose something altogether more demanding: through a
kind of refusal of the disciplinary isolation now standard in modern uni-
versities, a genuinely interdisciplinary series of mediations of crucial
concepts and key figures in contemporary thought. These volumes will
attempt to discuss these topics as they are articulated within their own
field, including their historical emergence and cultural significance,
which will provide a way into seemingly abstract discussions. At the
same time, they aim to analyze what consequences such thinking may
have for theology, both positive and negative, and, in light of these new
perspectives, to develop an effective response — one that will better situ-
ate students of theology and professional theologians alike within the
most vital debates informing Western society, and so increase their un-
derstanding of, participation in, and contribution to these.
To a generation brought up on a diet of deconstruction, on the one
hand, and scientism, on the other, Interventions offers an alternative
that is otherwise than nihilistic — doing so by approaching well-worn
questions and topics, as well as historical and contemporary figures,
from an original and interdisciplinary angle, and so avoiding having to
steer a course between the aforementioned Scylla and Charybdis.
This series will also seek to navigate not just through these twin dan-
gers, but also through the dangerous “and” that joins them. That is to say,
it will attempt to be genuinely interdisciplinary in avoiding the conjunc-
tive approach to such topics that takes as paradigmatic a relationship of
“theology and phenomenology” or “religion and science.” Instead, the
volumes in this series will, in general, attempt to treat such discourses
not as discrete disciplines unto themselves, but as moments within a
distended theological performance. Above all, they will hopefully con-
tribute to a renewed atmosphere shared by theologians and philoso-
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Every doctrine which does not reach the one thing necessary, every
separated philosophy, will remain deceived by false appearances. It
will be a doctrine, it will not be Philosophy.
Maurice Blondel, 1861-1949
This book series is the product of the work carried out at the Centre of
Theology and Philosophy (COTP), at the University of Nottingham.
The COTP is a research-led institution organized at the interstices of
theology and philosophy. It is founded on the conviction that these two
disciplines cannot be adequately understood or further developed, save
with reference to each other. This is true in historical terms, since we
cannot comprehend our Western cultural legacy unless we acknowledge
the interaction of the Hebraic and Hellenic traditions. It is also true con-
ceptually, since reasoning is not fully separable from faith and hope, or
conceptual reflection from revelatory disclosure. The reverse also holds,
in either case.
The Centre is concerned with:
• the historical interaction between theology and philosophy.
• the current relation between the two disciplines.
• attempts to overcome the analytic/continental divide in philosophy.
• the question of the status of “metaphysics”: Is the term used equivo-
cally? Is it now at an end? Or have twentieth-century attempts to
have a postmetaphysical philosophy themselves come to an end?
• the construction of a rich Catholic humanism.
I am very glad to be associated with the endeavors of this ex-
tremely important Centre that helps to further work of enormous
importance. Among its concerns is the question whether modernity
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is more an interim than a completion — an interim between a
premodernity in which the porosity between theology and philoso-
phy was granted, perhaps taken for granted, and a postmodernity
where their porosity must be unclogged and enacted anew.
Through the work of leading theologians of international stature
and philosophers whose writings bear on this porosity, the Centre
offers an exciting forum to advance in diverse ways this challeng-
ing, entirely needful, and cutting-edge work.
Professor William Desmond, Leuven
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Foreword
John Milbank
This is a remarkable work that breaks new ground in both philosophical
and political theology. In his book Adrian Pabst achieves two things.
First of all, he successfully recasts the terms in which the history of the
metaphysics of individuation has been written. Second, he outlines more
precisely than hitherto the links between ontological individuation, on
the one hand, and the political understanding of the human individual,
on the other hand.
The first achievement is the most extensively realized. Broadly
speaking, philosophical treatments of individuation, while they may ges-
ture towards the Platonic theory of forms, tend to deal with it in strictly
immanentist terms. How and why things occur always in an individual
mode is seen as a strictly this-worldly problem. Pabst, however, carefully
delineates the genealogy of this approach, from Avicenna and Gilbert
Porreta in the eleventh and the twelfth centuries through the late scho-
lasticism of John Duns Scotus and William of Ockham to Suárez,
Spinoza, Kant, and even some contemporary thinkers such as Husserl
and Heidegger. Correspondingly, he argues that the main axis of division
within the treatment of this topic has lain historically between those
who treat it theologically and those who effectively bracket God out of
the picture — even if they do so for paradoxically theological reasons.
He first of all sets up this division through a contrast of Aristotle with
Plato. In Aristotle one has the germs of the immanentist approach. Indi-
viduation concerns the coming together of form with matter (and here
Pabst rightly eschews over-simplistic readings of this in terms of matter
alone as the individuating factor) within an individual concrete sub-
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while it is the final lure of actualization, it is not the generative source of
temporal actuality or form. In consequence, individuation is a kind of
‘autonomous’ achievement rather than being defined relationally. On the
latter conception, by contrast, the ‘individuality’ of a thing is essentially
its positioning in relation to other things. It is this model that Plato em-
braces, just because he understands the transcendent realm governed by
the Good as ‘giving itself ’ ecstatically to finitude in an original relation
whose reverse face is the ‘participation’ of temporal things in the realm
of the forms which alone brings about their particular existence.
This account is as simple and original as it is scholarly, careful, and
nuanced. Pabst is also quick to do justice to Aristotle: Plato cannot really
explain the role of matter in individuation, and here Aristotle’s language
of potency and act is indispensable. But he is surely right to argue that
the Christian and pagan Neo-Platonist synthesis of Plato with Aristotle
conserved the Platonic priority of relation over substance. Linked to this
is the notion of the first principle as generative and self-giving. Pabst
stresses other metaphysical nuances that survive all the way from Plato
to Aquinas. For example, ‘individuality’ is linked to transcendental unity,
such that God himself is hyper-individual and therefore it is not so much
that something general is problematically converted into something
specific as rather that a supreme mode of united ‘definiteness’ (yliatim
for Aquinas in his commentary on the Liber de Causis) is channeled into
a more limited mode of the same thing. Thus, the Neo-Platonist meta-
physics of individuation shows how the unique individuality of each and
every particular human being really is the image and likeness of God in
which we are all created. The hierarchy of Creator and creation fuses the
ontological difference with radical equality amongst creatures and their
— supernaturally infused — natural desire for the supernatural good in
God of which they partake.
Here he rightly speaks against both monism and ‘postmodern’ plu-
ralism in the name of a certain mediation between the one and the many.
This is already present in Plato as the aesthetic interplay between the
One and the Dyad or as the ‘horizontal’ participation amongst the forms
themselves, which constitutes their mutual positioning or ‘individua-
tion.’ Pabst brings out the way in which, already for Plato, this ‘relational
positioning’ belongs in the transcendent realm of the forms and consti-
tutes the precondition for participation, which can be understood as an
asymmetrical one-way pure relationship of dependence.
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priority of relation within Platonism is the most fundamental reason
why the Neo-Platonist (Platonic-Aristotelian) legacy is a constitutive as-
pect of Christianity — as Pope Benedict XVI has repeatedly suggested.
For clearly the doctrine of the Trinity tends to accentuate just this prior-
ity, as Pabst recounts in his reading of Augustine and Boethius. Augus-
tine shows that creation ex nihilo newly brings matter itself within the
scope of originating asymmetrical relationality, while the supremacy of
relation over substance in the case of the Godhead itself is affirmed by
Boethius.
Pabst’s choice of authors and texts over a long historical stretch is
exemplary. Clearly Augustine had to be dealt with, but Boethius also
proves crucial for two reasons. First of all, he newly reintegrated Aris-
totle within Augustine’s vision, in terms of the priority of act and the no-
tion that the creative relation with finite particularity is most of all a giv-
ing of a share in being or actuality itself. But second, while Aquinas
stressed this ‘existential’ aspect of Boethius, he was read in an opposite
sense (deemed by Pabst to be wrong) by the influential Gilbert Porreta,
who argued in his commentary on the Roman author for a priority of es-
sence over existence.
The book shows that Gilbert’s ‘Mathematical Platonism’ or ‘Platon-
ism of essence’ (after Porphyry), rather than of transcendental being or
unity, helped to shape both a turn to the primacy of logic and semantics
over metaphysics and a more immanentist construal of individuation.
Instead of the latter being seen as a limited ‘share’ of divine unity, it is
now seen either as a transcendentally necessary logical category or as a
state of affairs simply willed by God and telling us nothing of the inner
divine reality at all. Here there are striking parallels with some aspects of
key Islamic philosophers and theologians, as Pabst shows more clearly
than most other scholars.
Essentially he contends that a long line of thinkers elaborated varia-
tions on these twin themes — from Duns Scotus and the nominalists
such as Ockham via Baroque scholastics like Suárez and early modern
figures such as Descartes and Spinoza to Wolff and Kant, and also virtu-
ally all of their contemporary disciples (including Deleuze and Derrida).
Once creation is no longer seen as participation, it is gradually reduced
to efficient causality, which means that particularity is regarded as ei-
ther a simple result of a divine fiat or as something brought about by an
individual thing itself under a transcendental compulsion (or both at the
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mystery, but, on the other hand, it ceases to be something that requires
explanation at all, because ‘being individual’ is now seen as the tran-
scendental condition for existing or making sense in any fashion whatso-
ever. Thus by the time one reaches Suárez in the late sixteenth and early
seventeenth centuries, individuality has an absolute ontological priority
and all things ‘are’ in themselves before they enter into relation with each
other. This also means that an individual thing, even though it is caused
by God as existing, is not thought of as created with especial respect to
its individual nature. For this is no longer seen as a participation in di-
vine unity but instead as a state of affairs that makes complete sense in
finite terms alone, bracketing God out of the picture.
Pabst therefore argues that the more ‘secular,’ immanentist ap-
proach to individuation was itself the paradoxical result both of a ‘Pla-
tonism of essence’ in a line from Porphyry through Gilbert, and of a fide-
istic and voluntarist theology — which can be found in both Christian
and Muslim thinkers, as chapter 4 documents. At many points in his
monograph he ably points out the metaphysical arbitrariness of such an
approach and hence its questionability on objective philosophical
grounds.
At the center of the book lies the exposition of Aquinas, who is seen
here as elaborating Boethius. Pabst clearly demonstrates that individua-
tion for Aquinas is not simply carried out by matter alone or even by the
matter/form complex alone, as for Aristotle, but rather by the act of par-
ticipation in being which realizes form. Hence Aquinas’s account is en-
tirely relational and theological, and it restores Neo-Platonist metaphys-
ics to the heart of Christian theology against the logicized ‘Platonism of
essence’ — an argument that has perhaps never been made so clearly
hitherto.
By contrast, the tradition that stretches from Gilbert via Scotus and
Ockham to Suárez eschews metaphysics in favor of ontology, which is es-
sentially a transcendental science of what can be known about univocal
being. This includes Spinoza, who is seen as developing some late scho-
lastic problematics and as representing the emergence of a ‘secular’
treatment of the problem now within an avowedly immanentist meta-
physics. Here Pabst adroitly shows that, without transcendence, particu-
larity cannot really be explained relationally, and therefore that finitude
must here remain a surd mystery. This verdict then falls back upon the
earlier writers since Scotus: viewed nonrelationally, individuation lacks
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whatsoever and is grounded in a blind belief that foregrounds a narrow
natural rationality cut off from any infusion of supernatural faith. Para-
doxically, both rationalism and fideism are from the outset wedded to
the nominalist and voluntarist ontology that displaced the realist and
intellectualist metaphysics of Christian Neo-Platonism.
The book’s second achievement is to indicate some of the political
corollaries of all this. Pabst’s main political argument concerns the re-
moval of God from the political sphere, and he wishes to show that this is
itself grounded in the metaphysical removal of God from individuation
as such. Thus from Aristotle through to Suárez, he shows how the indi-
vidual prior to relation will generate a politics of either individual or col-
lective autonomy, deficient in any true sense of a sharing in a common
good and the primacy of a specific set of relations and reciprocal duties
over individual rights — which can only be abstract and empty when not
referred to such a context. A polity not acknowledging its relation to God
(in receptivity and gratitude) will prove to be a polity without true hu-
man relations — bound either to disintegrate or else to submit to an en-
forced tyrannical unity. Pabst successfully shows how, even in the case of
Spinoza, advocated democracy is but a desperate and second-best de-
vice designed to make the competitions of ignorant individuals balance
each other out. (This claim runs strongly against the dominant consen-
sus of Spinoza scholarship.)
This is an incredibly ambitious undertaking for a first monograph.
But the astonishing thing is that Pabst has brought it off and in a rela-
tively short compass. His scholarship is exemplary and on the whole
cautious; his mastery of many languages evident. The very original main
argument emerges as it were organically, almost by stealth and entirely
without swagger — namely, that the Christian Neo-Platonist theory of
individuation is ‘relational and positional’ only because it is theological.
This got abandoned for a logicized (and de-Platonized Aristotelian) the-
ory that posits a substantive ‘self-individuation’ because it brackets God,
even though it did so for initially theological reasons.
This is the philosophical novelty of this book. But it also possesses a
theological one: with extraordinary simplicity and directness Pabst
shows here, more clearly I think than anyone else hitherto, just how Trini-
tarian theology and a theology of creation as participation hang together
under the category of relation. An awful lot has been written in recent
years about the primacy of relation by Christian theologians. Pabst con-





Monday, January 16, 2012 2:51:37 PM
Color profile: Disabled
Composite  140 lpi at 45 degrees
paltry stuff it mostly is: especially in terms of the dismissal of Plato, Au-
gustine, and Aquinas, who are perhaps the main heroes of his account.
Pabst’s arguments are equally significant for contemporary political
theology, particularly with respect to the post-Schmittian theory of sov-
ereignty and the debate between Jürgen Habermas and Joseph Cardinal
Ratzinger (now Pope Benedict XVI) regarding the foundations of the
democratic state and the place of religion therein.1 He has been explor-
ing the thesis common to both the latter — that we are now in a
‘postsecular’ phase where religious and other ideological bodies should
be able to express themselves directly in their own terms within the pub-
lic square. However, for Habermas the norms to regulate this debate re-
main procedural and majoritarian. For Ratzinger, by contrast, there
must be a plural search for a shared common good, which notably he
does not say is merely pregiven in a readily known natural law. Thus in
the latter case a reinvention of constitutional corporatism in a more plu-
ralist guise against modern liberalism is linked to an insistence on fun-
damental metaphysical relationality and basic social units above the
level of the individual — such as communities, groups, and associations
that constitute the realm of civil society, which should embed both the
central state and the free market.
Equally it is linked to a stress, encouraged by other Catholic thinkers
like Robert Spaemann, Luigi Giussanni, and Alasdair MacIntyre, that ed-
ucation as the transmission and exploration of the truth is as fundamen-
tal a dimension of politics as the will of a democratic majority. The mod-
ern political right has always focused on the absolute power of the one
and the arbitrary right to decide on the state of exception, while the
modern left has insisted on an equally absolute right of the many to
found and withdraw legitimacy. Thus both can be taken to ignore the
primacy of natural and cultural relation, and of the mediating role of ‘the
few’ concerned with truth and virtue. A politics focused on the latter
would be a more theological politics, which would define the secular
realm as concerned with things in time and with necessary coercion,
only through its ultimate outlook towards transcendent norms that
alone supply ultimate standards beyond the will either of the one or of
the many.
By investigating these new proposals, Pabst is asking nothing less
xx
JOHN MILBANK
1. See Adrian Pabst, “Modern Sovereignty in Question: Theology, Democracy and
Capitalism,” Modern Theology 26, no. 4 (October 2010): 570-602.
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than “whether our politics of ‘right and left’ remains caught within
shared secular, liberal axioms — axioms that are also those of theocratic
fundamentalisms since they too deal in a politics of the indifferent will,
inherited — as is ultimately the case for liberalism — from the theologi-
cal voluntarism of the late Middle Ages.” Further, he continues:
This is not at all to search for a new political center; on the contrary, it
is to search for a way that cannot be charted on our current concep-
tual map. It is to investigate again notions of fundamental relation-
ality, of the common good and economic reciprocity, and of principles
that can determine appropriate ‘mixtures’ of government as between
the one, the few, and the many; the center and localities; political gov-
ernment and prepolitical society; international community and na-
tions; education in time and government in space; absolute right and
free decision; economic freedom and just distribution; and finally, sec-
ular and religious authorities. In short, it is to investigate whether we
might enter into a new sort of postsecular politics beyond modern lib-
eral norms. (Conclusion, p. 449)
This enterprise is of the greatest possible relevance for questions of
the relationship of faith to politics and encourages thinking that refuses
both religious fundamentalism and secular dogmatism. Pabst is endeav-
oring to explore ways in which some degree of shared metaphysics and
religious vision across faiths can help to shape a new political agenda,
while also trying to work out both the possibilities and limits of areas of
valid autonomy for different religious groups. Like the current patriarchs
of Rome, Moscow, and Canterbury, he tends to see ‘pluralism of sover-
eignty’ as both a political position shared by different faith groupings and
one that will allow a certain social play to their differences.
This book does nothing less than to set new standards in combin-
ing philosophical with political theology. Pabst’s argument about rela-
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P R E FACE
From Individuality to Relationality
This essay seeks to retrieve metaphysics and reveal its theological na-
ture. It shows how ancient and modern conceptions of being in terms of
individual substance fail to account for the irreducible, ontological rela-
tions that bind immanent, finite beings to each other and to their tran-
scendent, infinite source in God. Instead of some abstract ‘individuality’
that begs the question, the essay suggests that a thing’s unique form is
both existentially and essentially its metaphysical positioning in relation
to other things. In turn, the relational ordering of all things suggests a
priority of relation over substance, which intimates a first principle and
final end that is itself relational — the creative relationality of the three
divine persons that brings everything out of nothing into actuality and
gives all beings a share of Trinitarian being in which the created order
participates. Based on a genealogical account of rival theories of cre-
ation and individuation from Plato to ‘postmodernism,’ the essay argues
that the Christian Neo-Platonic fusion of biblical revelation with Greco-
Roman philosophy developed Hellenic Judaism in the direction of a
theological metaphysic that fulfills and surpasses ancient, modern, and
contemporary ontologies and conceptions of individuality.
The essay attempts to radicalize the theological turn of philosophy
by extending the ‘rehellenization’ of theology in a metaphysical sense. Its
chosen focus is the dual question of individuation in metaphysics and in-
dividuality in politics. My argument is that the individuation of sub-
stances in general and of persons in particular cannot be explained in
secular, immanentist terms as some autonomous achievement owing to
substantiality but is best construed as the imperfect reception and re-
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this argument hopes to derive its logic is that of patristic and medieval
Christian Neo-Platonism, a tradition that preserved and expanded the
original hellenization of Christianity.
The primacy of relation over substance within Platonism is the most
fundamental reason why the Neo-Platonic legacy is a constitutive aspect
of Christendom in both East and West. The notion that theology can dis-
pense with metaphysics is just as misguided as the notion that meta-
physics is not also theological. It is similarly erroneous to claim that
metaphysics ever ended (each critique or deconstruction of metaphysics
is always in the end another metaphysic) or that it cannot be restored to
the heart of the arts, humanities, and the sciences. My contention is that
the renewed visibility of religion and the greater presence of theology in
academic as well as public debate will help sustain the resurgence of a
Christian metaphysic that never ceased to be at the center of creedal
Christianity.
Why metaphysics and why hierarchy? By linking the relational po-
sitioning of all individual substances to their shared source in God, my
argument is that only a theological metaphysic can position being in
the intermediary realm of ‘the between’ (Plato’s metaxu). In this realm,
the original relation among the divine persons and the participatory
relation between creation and creator intersect without however col-
lapsing into one another. As such, ‘the between’ reflects the double hi-
erarchy in creation and the creator. The created order of being fuses
‘monarchic’ with ‘egalitarian’ elements in such a way that the hierarchy
of substances according to their degrees of being and goodness is coex-
tensive with the equality of all finite things — compared with the per-
fection of infinite, divine being. In Dionysius who coined the term
hierarchia (½erarq¾a), receiving divine illumination and the sacraments
marks the perfection of our God-given unique form and the elevation
(anagZg3) to union with the Trinitarian monarchia. Hierarchy and
anagogy describe the ascending movement whose original, reverse
movement is kenosis in the divine humanity of Jesus Christ. In this
manner, ‘the between’ of Christian metaphysics can perhaps be de-
picted as a spiral paradox whereby individual substances are individu-
ated relationally by participating in the substantive relationality of the
triune God.
Since being so construed upholds both analogia entis and the ‘onto-
logical difference,’ the account advanced here refuses the dominant
modern solutions of monism, dualism, or pluralism, for all three refuse
xxv
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any mediation between the infinite one and the finite many. It will also
be suggested that relationality cuts across other perennial binaries char-
acterizing philosophy both past and present: the actual and the virtual;
the process of individuation and the event of the individual as represent-
able res; absolute, immaterial reason and unreasoning, material reality.
Thus, the theological metaphysic which this essay describes outflanks
the modern science of transcendental ontology and various late (or
post)modern attempts to construct ontologies of pure immanence.
My account draws on two specific strands of Christian theology.
First, the Neo-Platonic conception of the infinite Good or One which
‘gives itself ’ ecstatically to finitude in a primary relation whose volte-face
is the participation of immanent things in the transcendent source of
universal being — in God — which alone brings about their particular
existence. Second, the biblical idea — developed by the Church Fathers
and Doctors — of a personal creator who actualizes everything out of
nothing and in so doing imparts particular shares of universal being. The
latter can be understood as part of the divine unity of transcendentals in
which finite, immanent things participate by way of an asymmetric rela-
tion that encompasses matter and not just form. Under the ‘meta-form’
or ‘meta-category’ of relation, it will be argued that the Christian Neo-
Platonic theology of creation ex nihilo and the Trinity offers an account
of individuation that avoids both Aristotle’s theo-ontology and the idola-
try of onto-theology inaugurated by John Duns Scotus.
In terms that will become clearer as the analysis unfolds, the essay
traces a series of shifts from a metaphysics of creation and individuation
to an ontology of generation and individuality. The main traits of these
shifts and their implications for the twin thematic of what it is that
makes an individual an individual constitute the primary object of this
research. As such, the essay is not a historical survey of rival, metaphysi-
cal theories of individuality1 and selfhood2 (or individualism3). Nor is it a
xxvi
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1. E.g., Jorge J. E. Gracia, Individuality: An Essay on the Foundations of Metaphysics (Al-
bany: State University of New York Press, 1988).
2. Recent examples include Charles Taylor, Sources of the Self: The Making of Modern
Identity (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1989); and Jerrold E. Seigel, The Idea of
the Self: Thought and Experience in Western Europe Since the Seventeenth Century (Cam-
bridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005).
3. Cf. Alan Macfarlane, The Origins of English Individualism: The Family, Property and
Social Transition (Oxford: Blackwell, 1978); Louis Dumont, Essais sur l’individualisme. Une
perspective anthropologique sur l’idéologie moderne (Paris: Éditions du Seuil, 1983).
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speculative treatise on a new principle of individuation.4 Rather, it com-
bines a genealogical inquiry into the formation of two rival accounts
with a theological critique of ancient and modern philosophy as well as a
wider argument in favor of a theological metaphysic that overcomes the
unresolved tension between the one and the many bequeathed by both
antiquity and modernity.
Why the chosen problem of individuation? Traditionally, the one
and the many have been held in opposition, at least since the Greek phi-
losopher Parmenides elevated the unity of essence over the multiplicity
of appearance. Variations of this duality between unity and diversity are
recurrent in the history of philosophy and theology — the universal and
the particular, the intelligible and the sensible, the substantial and the
accidental, the cosmic and the psychic, the first cause and secondary ef-
fects, the collective and the individual, the realm of transcendence and
that of immanence. The opposition of the one and the many seems pe-
rennial and perhaps even indelible. However, to oppose them is simply to
assert that they represent contrary principles and that as such they are
incompatible, producing conflict and violence. This opposition is based
upon the undemonstrated and unwarranted assumption that substance
is prior to relation and that individuality is absolute. So configured, ev-
ery individual is indeterminately and indiscernibly equivalent to every
other individual. To subordinate reciprocal relation to individual sub-
stance is to elevate the self-identity of individuals over above the com-
monality of being in which all things seem to share. And to conceive indi-
viduality in this manner is to ignore particular specificities that are only
manifest in the positioning of individuals in mutual relations with each
other and their shared source of being.
Moreover, the primacy of substance over relation shifts the onus of
individuation onto the individual entity itself, as transcendent causality
is excluded from the actualization of individual substances. The first
cause acts either as the ultimate telos to which individuals are drawn or
as the transcendental warrant for their unity. But causality so construed
cannot explain how particular sensible things are individuated or why
the pure actuality of the one would wish to be allied to the pure potency
xxvii
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4. See, among many others, Gilbert Simondon, L’individu et sa genèse physico-
biologique (l’individuation à la lumière des notions de forme et d’information) (Paris: Presses
Universitaires de France, 1964); and Carl G. Jung’s analytic psychology in his Memories,
Dreams, Reflections, ed. C. Winston, trans. R. Winston (New York: Random House, 1989).
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of matter. This essay shows that only the concept of a Trinitarian Creator
God can account for the individuation of things in ways that uphold both
the absolute unity of their shared source of being and the diverse multi-
plicity of their particular instantiation.
Content and Structure
The first part of the essay traces the original shift between metaphysics
and ontology. The key locus will be identified with Plato and Aristotle.
Chapter 1 begins with Aristotle, for it is he who introduces a wedge be-
tween theology and ontology. By sundering the actuality of the First
Mover or God (Metaphysics L 7) from the generation and evolution of in-
dividual substances and also from the abstraction and predication of in-
dividual substantial form, the Stagirite separates the divine from tempo-
ral being and knowing. Since the First Mover only acts as final cause and
is not the generative source of temporal actuality or form, the ultimate
‘cause’ of individuation is immanent, and individuality is equated with the
autonomous sovereignty of the sublunary world and all things therein. At
the same time, the genetic and epistemic modalities of individuation are
over-determined by a dependency on the self-contemplation of the di-
vine First Mover who is “thought thinking itself ” and as such acts exclu-
sively as the final cause that all intelligent substances endeavor to emu-
late. (In this sense, Aristotle foregrounds a theo-ontology whose reverse
face is the onto-theology inaugurated by John Duns Scotus, as I shall ar-
gue in chapter 6.)
By contrast, Plato links the constitutive relation between the Good
and all the other (numerically indeterminate) forms to the participatory
relation among eternal forms as well as between them and temporal
things. There is thus in his metaphysics the priority of the relational ‘giv-
ing’ of presence over participation wherein the Good infuses all things
with goodness. It is this generative presence in immanent things that en-
ables them to participate in the universal forms and perfect their given
goodness. Human beings do so by partaking of the good life within the
republic governed by laws and virtues.
Chapter 2 describes how patristic theology fuses Greco-Roman phi-
losophy with biblical revelation to produce an integral account of being
that mirrors the Trinitarian economy of the divine mind. Both Gregory of
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direction of the Creator God and Trinitarian relationality. The Christian
Neo-Platonist synthesis of Plato and Aristotle conserves the Platonic pri-
ority of relation over the Aristotelian category of substance. The doctrine
of creation ex nihilo and the Trinity tends to accentuate this priority, as
divine creation of everything out of nothing brings matter itself within
the scope of the originating asymmetrical relationality between creator
and creatures — brilliantly described by Augustine in his subtle com-
mentary on the Book of Genesis.
Likewise, the primacy of relation over substance in the case of the
triune Godhead itself is affirmed by Augustine and further developed
Boethius, who shows that divine substantiality is unreservedly rela-
tional, as chapter 3 argues. Beyond the Nicene language of substance,
Augustine and Boethius argue that individuation marks the positioning
of particular things in relation to other particular things, the whole cos-
mos, and their shared source of being in God. For this reason, individua-
tion is not concerned with the generation of individuals within the con-
fines of pure immanence but rather the actualization of particulars who
always already participate in the transcendent actuality of God’s good-
ness. Being created in the image and likeness of God describes our share
in the relationality of the Trinitarian economy. In the work of Dionysius
the Areopagite briefly discussed at the end of chapter 3, creation and in-
dividuation are construed as our elevation to union with God and our
ever-greater participation in the relational hierarchy of infinite being.
Part II of the essay is an inquiry into a series of medieval shifts from
the Neo-Platonic metaphysics of creation and individuation to an
Aristotelianized ontology of generation and individuality. The work of
Boethius discussed in chapter 3 is pivotal. Chapter 4 shows how as early
as the tenth and eleventh centuries, various Muslim philosophers and
Christian theologians argued for the priority of essence over existence.
Building on Porphyry’s logicized Aristotelianism, Avicenna was first to
elevate possibility over actuality and to introduce an onto-logic of neces-
sity into the doctrine of free creation. Likewise, the influential twelfth-
century theologian Gilbert Porreta (Gilbert of Poitiers) defended in his
commentary on Boethius’ theological tractates the primacy of essence
vis-à-vis existence rather than the idea of transcendental being or unity.
Crucially, Porreta’s ‘Mathematical Platonism’ or ‘Platonism of essence’
(after Porphyry) engenders a turn to the supremacy of logic and seman-
tics and also a more immanentist construal of individuation. Instead of
the latter being seen as a limited ‘share’ of divine unity, it is now seen ei-
xxix
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ther as a transcendentally necessary logical category or as a state of af-
fairs simply willed by God and telling us nothing of the inner divine real-
ity.
By contrast, Thomas Aquinas restores the Boethian primacy of act
over potency and further develops early scholastic theology in the direc-
tion of a Neo-Platonic metaphysic of creation and individuation, as
chapter 5 explores. Individuation for Aquinas is neither simply the result
of materia designata nor the form/matter complex, as for Aristotle. In-
stead, the first and final ‘reason’ for individuation is the divine act of pure
esse and the creative act of participating in being which realizes form in
matter. In this manner, Aquinas blends the Neo-Platonist metaphysics of
the Fathers with Aristotle’s language of act and potency in order to de-
fend the primacy of divine act against not just Porreta’s and Avicenna’s
shared Platonism of essence but also against the priority of philosophy
over theology in twelfth- and early-thirteenth-century radical Aristote-
lianism (increasingly influential at the universities of Oxford and Paris).
For Thomas, just as the intra-Trinitarian relations individuate the sub-
stances of the three divine persons and draw in the whole of creation, so
too God’s creative act of being is the ultimate cause of individuation (and
created matter its principle). Likewise, the self-diffusive, supernatural
Good in God constitutes the source for the interconnectedness of all be-
ings throughout the cosmos, channeling divine hyper-individuality into
more limited shares of the same modes (rather than somehow convert-
ing universality into particularity). The divine act makes all beings good
and enables them to perfect their given goodness by participating in God
through the practice of relations with other beings. The common good
that all beings can share in provides the link between Aquinas’s meta-
physics and his conception of politics.
Chapter 6 explores how John Duns Scotus, William of Ockham, and
Jean Buridan intensify the twelfth-century separation of theology from
philosophy and the importance of logic and semantics as the founda-
tion of metaphysics. In spite of some significant differences, Scotus,
Ockham, and Buridan share the idea that individuality is more real than
universality and that material substances are in the final instance self-
individuating. The elimination of God from actuality entails the exclu-
sion of divine creative action from the actualization and individuation
of particular sensible things. This marks a fundamental rupture from
the metaphysics of creation, relationality, and participation — the vi-
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God’s absolute power (potentia Dei absoluta). At the same time, the uni-
verse and the polity become autonomous from God’s creative action, a
shift largely internal to theology that foreshadows the transition from
scholasticism to modernity.
The third part of the essay charts some key early modern moments in
the shift from metaphysics to ontology. In chapter 7, it is argued that Fran-
cisco Suárez consecrates general metaphysics as an all-encompassing
system that replaces the theological metaphysics of the Fathers and the
Doctors. Metaphysically, the individuality of substances holds sway over
mutual relations with other substances or their common source in God.
Politically, inalienable individual rights and human sovereignty are ele-
vated over and above communal discernment and the pursuit of the com-
mon good in accordance with the mediate presence of God’s transcen-
dence. This shift eschews the idea of individuating relations between a
transcendent God and his immanent creation in favor of an alternative
theory of individuation that revolves around two tenets of early modern
metaphysics: first, the transcendental dependence of effects upon their
cause and the self-individuation of entities (Suárez); second, the imma-
nent generation of individual beings and their individuation in a perpet-
ual rivalry with other individual beings (Spinoza). In this sense, Suárez’s
transcendentalism and Spinoza’s immanentism represent two sides of
modern philosophy and politics.
Chapter 8 traces Spinoza’s invention of pure immanence and his the-
ory of individuation. The mark of Spinoza’s ontology is that he rejects the
idea of creation ex nihilo altogether and invents a realm of pure imma-
nence where the oneness of the substance determines the diversity of fi-
nite modes. In the natural order all finite modes are equal and there is no
hierarchy. But both his ontology of single substance and his politics of
plural democracy are defined along essentially negative lines. The single
substance is infinite and auto-productive, but this begs the question of
why it would choose to express itself in finite modes. Likewise, democ-
racy is a necessary consequence of the nature of individual knowledge —
the limits on human understanding according to which individuals ig-
nore their own particular station in the communal order and fail to
grasp the universal fixed laws of the eternal universe. The result is that
individuals confound their own self-interest with the common sharing in
the substance. As such, democracy is constitutively incapable of resolv-
ing the conflict between clusters of individual finite modes. All of which
underscores the absence of mediation in early modern philosophy.
xxxi
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Chapter 9 concludes this essay by way of a thematic inquiry into the
modern conception and institution of metaphysics as a transcendental
science of ontology and the concomitant substitution of immanent indi-
vidual generation for transcendent individuating creation. Key to this
process is the invention of a new science of the individual that replaces a
metaphysics of the relation between universals and particulars. Several
strands can be distinguished: the rationalist mechanism of Descartes
and Leibniz; the materialism and atomism of Hobbes and Locke; the
transcendental immanence of Wolff and Kant. What binds them all to-
gether is the modern science of ontology which collapses either into
transcendentalism or into positivism or into both at once, trapped as it
is in a binary dialectic of the one and the many. The alternative, which
chapter 9 briefly outlines, is a theological metaphysic of creation and in-
dividuation that locates being in the ‘between’ that is produced in the di-
vine act of creation and its eternal unfolding — the fusion of the divine
with the human elevating the entire cosmos to union with God, as re-
vealed and renewed by the unique event of the Incarnation of the rela-
tional Logos (John 1:1).
Beyond the modern and contemporary opposition between the one
and the many, I argue that individuals are constituted relationally by the
transcendent universal Good in the pure relationality of the one triune
God. By focusing on the reception and transformation of Greek meta-
physics by Christian Neo-Platonism, I aim to show that some premodern
accounts of the link between the one and the many blend self-identity,
differentiation, and relationality. These conceptions reject absolute du-
alism, arbitrary monism, and indiscriminate pluralism. Instead, they ar-
gue for a mediating relation between unity and diversity. As a result, they
surpass modern and contemporary theories and provide the only coher-





Monday, January 16, 2012 2:51:38 PM
Color profile: Disabled
Composite  140 lpi at 45 degrees
PART I
Substance and Relation
The belief upon which our science rests remains a metaphysical be-
lief. We seekers after knowledge today, we godless ones and anti-
metaphysicians, we too continue to take our flame from that fire
ignited by a belief which is millennia old, that Christian belief,
which was also Plato’s belief, that God is the truth, that the truth is
divine. . . .
Friedrich Nietzsche1
From its inception, Plato’s metaphysics came under attack for essentially
the same reason: an unresolved ontological and epistemological dualism
between the visible realm of things and the invisible realm of ideas. Be-
ginning with Aristotle, philosophers and theologians from Tatian and
Tertullian to Heidegger and Derrida wrongly contended that in Plato the
transcendence of the Good is divorced from the immanence of the
world. Linked to this is the unwarranted claim that Platonist forms are
unintelligible to the human mind, except if we hold to the blind belief in
the immortality of the soul. It was of course Nietzsche who derided
Christianity for being little more than popular Platonism — a desperate
worship of otherworldliness for fear of real change and revolutionary
transformation. By importing Plato’s eternal forms, so Nietzsche’s ar-
gument goes, Christian theology took a fatal metaphysical turn that led
to an idolatry of abstract concepts and a hatred of the becoming of be-
1
1. Friedrich Nietzsche, On the Genealogy of Morals, trans. Douglas Smith (Oxford: Ox-
ford University Press, 1996), Essay III, para. 24, p. 127 (original italics).
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ing.2 In consequence, Christianity is nihilistic because it embraces the
Platonist priority of the timeless ideal vis-à-vis the changing real and as
such inverts the primacy of life over death. To praise God’s eternity and
the divine source of life is for Nietzsche to celebrate the stasis of nature
and the human will to nothingness.3 As such, Christianity’s Platonist
metaphysics marks the death of God and the end of religion.
In the first part of this essay, I seek to rehabilitate Plato’s metaphys-
ics as a prolegomenon to Christian theology. Prior to Aristotle, Plato had
already outlined a metaphysics of relationality and participation that
avoids an ontological dualism, pluralism, or atomism without lapsing
into monism. The Platonist distinction of the world of things and the
world of ideas is qualified by the higher unity of the Good and the partic-
ipation of immanent particulars in transcendent universal forms. As the
form of all forms, the Good is best understood as a relational absolute
that orders the other universals. Matter-form compounds are best de-
scribed as relational beings that are endowed with existence and essence
by the Good. Moreover, against the pre-Socratic poets and philosophers
Aristotle followed Plato’s cosmological argument in favor of the exis-
tence of a single immaterial first cause: just as Plato’s Good is the Form of
all forms that orders everything in the world of things (The Republic VI
505 a 1-10; 509 b 6), so Aristotle’s Prime Mover is the final end of all sub-
stances in the sublunary world (Metaphysics L 7). But both Aristotelian
metaphysics and politics shift away from the Platonist synthesis towards
a more dualistic system. The separation of the primary cause from all
secondary effects removes the actuality of the Unmoved Mover from the
heavens and the sublunary world and devalues particular beings
therein. For the sole telos of everything is to emulate the self-reflexivity of
the Prime Mover. On the contrary, Plato views particulars as unique and
irreplaceable instantiations of the universal Good.
2
SUBSTANCE AND RELATION
2. Friedrich Nietzsche, The Twilight of the Idols, trans. Duncan Large (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1998), “Reason in Philosophy,” para. 1-2, pp. 16-17.
3. In the Antichrist, Nietzsche famously writes that “The Christian concept of God . . .
is one of the most corrupt concepts of God ever arrived at on earth: it probably touches
low-water mark in the ebbing evolution of the God-type. God degenerated into the contra-
diction of life. Instead of being its transfiguration and eternal Yea! In him war is declared
on life, on nature, on the will to live! God becomes the formula for every slander upon the
‘here and now,’ and for every lie about the ‘beyond’! In him nothingness is deified, and the
will to nothingness is made holy.” Friedrich Nietzsche, The Antichrist, trans. Thomas Com-
mon (Mineola, NY: Dover Publications, 2004), para. 18, p. 88 (translation modified).
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For Plato, forms are relational in the sense that they are ordered by
the Good, the form of all forms. Likewise, individual composites are rela-
tional in the sense that they depend for their essence, their existence,
and their continuous being on the Good. The presence of the Good in
particulars makes them relational and enables them to participate in the
universal forms and in goodness itself. Individuals are actualized and in-
dividuated by relations with other individuals and their orientation to-
wards the Good. They can perfect their individual form through the
highest instance of relation, the praxis of justice in the polis.
My argument is that Plato’s individuals are not ‘bare and basic units’
(Marilyn McCabe). Nor are they simply given and self-evident. Rather,
things are generated as individuals by other individuals and further indi-
viduated not only by their proximate causes but also by the action of the
first principle and final end of all, which is the Good. In Plato’s metaphys-
ics and politics, the ecstatic plenitude and the self-diffusion of the Good
can explain why there are a diverse reality and a multiplicity of individual
composites. I conclude that Plato’s Good provides a richer metaphysical
account of relationality than Aristotle’s Prime Mover. However, Plato ex-
cludes matter from the essence of concrete composites and is thus un-
able to explain how and why materiality matters to their individuation.
In chapters 2 and 3, I explore the work of St. Augustine, St. Gregory of
Nyssa, Boethius, and Dionysius the Areopagite on creation and individu-
ation. The crucial points of divergence with both Plato and Aristotle in-
clude the ontological difference between the Creator and creation, the
idea of creatio ex nihilo, and the real relation of the world to God (though
not of God to the world, as nothing is or possibly could be outside the di-
vine orbit). At the same time, these (and other) patristic figures pro-
duced the first systematic synthesis of biblical revelation with ancient
philosophy that gave rise to the tradition of Christian Neo-Platonism.
Metaphysically, creation ex nihilo is amenable to natural reason and
fuses the Christian idea of the Trinitarian donum of life with the
Platonist notion of the Good as ‘giving itself ’ ecstatically to finitude in an
original relationality whose reverse face is the ‘participation’ of temporal
things in the realm of the forms which alone brings about their particu-
lar existence.
For this reason, the ‘real ideal’ of creation — as revealed in the com-
plex interplay of the Book of Nature, the Book of Scripture, and the Book
of History — leads Augustine and Boethius to reconfigure substance and
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the image and likeness of God’s relational substance. I also argue that the
ecstatic plenitude of divine relationality can explain not only how and
why composite substances are individual but also to what end they are
individuated. In this sense, the patristic (onto)-logic of creation builds on
Plato’s metaphysics of the Good and Aristotle’s indispensable language
of act and potency in order to surpass the ancient (heno)-logic of the one
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CHAPTER 1
The Primacy of Relation over Substance
1. Introduction: The Legacy of
Pre-Socratic Poetry and Philosophy
The opposition of the one and the many is the hallmark of pre-Socratic
poetry and philosophy. None of the dominant schools or thinkers could
reconcile the apparent contradiction of unity and diversity in the world
of material things and immaterial ideas. For instance, Hesiod’s poem
Theogony describes how out of the infinite nothingness of chaos emerges
a single divine cosmos, generated and maintained by the omnipotent
Zeus. Even though it acts as the first cause and final end of the natural
order, the power of the gods is wholly unintelligible to the human mind
and a matter of blind belief.1 (This myth is invoked by Plotinus to de-
scribe the eternal procession of the many from the One, as we shall see in
chapter 2.) In Hesiod, as in Homer’s Odyssey, the presence of gods is ab-
solute and divine intervention in the world is arbitrary.2
Early pre-Socratic philosophers, by contrast, contended that the
perceptible world of nature can be cognized and explained in terms of its
own inherent principles. This argument eschews cosmic fatalism in fa-
vor of rational knowledge and human agency. However, it leaves the
problem of the opposition between the one and the many unresolved.3
5
1. Hesiod, Theogony, trans. S. Lombardo (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1993).
2. Homer, The Odyssey, rev. ed., trans. E. V. Rieu (London: Penguin Classics, 2003).
3. Michael C. Stokes, One and Many in Pre-Socratic Philosophy (Cambridge, MA: Har-
vard University Press, 1972).
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Faced with the simultaneous occurrence of being and nonbeing, the
physicists, for example, searched for some fundamental principle ({rq©)
that could explain the multiplicity of things within the overarching cos-
mos — water in Thales, air in Anaximenes, or the indefinite/borderless
(to apeiron) in Anaximander.4 But they could not solve the paradox of
stability and change over time and across space that characterizes the
single enduring material stuff which was thought to be both the origin of
all things and the cause of their continuing existence. By positing some
basic constituent of materiality that is itself eternal and underlies all
change (one or several of the four elements), they reduced the whole of
reality to a single substratum and advocated a form of material monism.
The problem with this sort of monism is that it fails to explain how a
multiplicity of things can emerge out of the oneness of the underlying
principle and how the immaterial mind can know the material world in
both its diversity and unity. As such, material monism is unable to ac-
count for the unity of matter itself.
Later pre-Socratic philosophers like Xenophanes, Heraclitus, and
Parmenides defended an immaterial monism, arguing that there is
something like a first principle which is unitary and permanent and
which contrasts with the multiple and transitory nature of the living cos-
mos. Xenophanes writes that “[o]ne god is greatest among gods and
men, not at all like mortals in body or in thought.”5 Likewise, Heraclitus
refers in the opening lines of his book to the “logos which holds forever,”6
a law-like principle that embodies the divine order and rules all things
within the universe and therefore can be known by the human mind.
And since nothing comes from nothing, as Parmenides held, that which
is either is necessary or is contingent. Necessary being is necessarily
“ungenerated and imperishable; Whole, single-limbed, steadfast and
complete; nor was [it] once, nor will [it] be, since it is, now, all together,
One, continuous.”7 For Parmenides, as for Xenophanes and Heraclitus,
6
SUBSTANCE AND RELATION
4. W. K. C. Guthrie, A History of Greek Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1965), vol. 1; Jonathan Barnes, The Presocratic Philosophers, 2nd ed. (London:
Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1982).
5. James H. Lesher, Xenophanes of Colophon: Fragments (Toronto: University of To-
ronto Press, 1992), fragment 23, p. 31.
6. T. M. Robinson, Heraclitus: Fragments (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1991),
fragment 1, p. 11.
7. David Galop, Parmenides of Elea: Fragments (Toronto: University of Toronto Press,
1991), fragment 8, p. 63.
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the unity of the primary principle subsumes the diversity of the second-
ary reality that comes into being and passes away. The problem with this
kind of immaterial monism is that it cannot demonstrate how the mind
alone can have access to being without the import of the senses. Nor can
it give a reason why the oneness of true reality (that which is) would be
allied to the void (that which is not) in order to produce the multiplicity
of the universe (kËsmov) that hovers between being and nonbeing.8
Neither pluralism nor atomism resolved the opposition between the
one and the many bequeathed by the physicists and left unresolved by
Parmenides’ Eleatic monism. Anaxagoras and Empedocles replaced a
single immaterial substratum as the source of being with a plurality of
material elements, but both had to appeal to the operation of the mind
or intellect (noØv) — a unitary, separate, cosmic, intelligent force that
brings the mixture of elements into rotation and holds the universe to-
gether. As a result, the pluralism of Anaxagoras and Empedocles comple-
ments Parmenides’ emphasis on the absolute unity of being with an irre-
ducible multiplicity of material stuffs. The (pre-)Socratic atomists
Leucippus and Democritus went further than the pluralists by arguing
that all forms of union are illusory and that every whole is reducible to
its parts. Yet at the same time, all atoms are made of the same founda-
tional matter and (unlike in Parmenides) true reality is not limited to be-
ing but extends to the void, defined as that which individuates atoms
and distinguishes them from one another. Thus, both the pluralist and
the atomist schools maintained a strict division of unity and diversity by
positing a cause or principle of individuation that is separate from plural
material elements or bare atoms.
7
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8. Here I do not follow W. K. C. Guthrie’s reading of Parmenides as a strict monist
(see, supra, note 4). Nor do I accept Bertrand Russell’s and G. E. L. Owen’s logical-
dialectical interpretation or Patricia Curd’s characterization of Parmenidean metaphys-
ics in terms of “predicational monism,” which combines Jonathan Barnes’s claim of a nu-
merical plurality of “Parmenidean Beings” with the assertion that each thing that is can
only be one thing. Rather, my argument is that Parmenides’ metaphysics is beset by an ir-
reducible dualism between that which is and cannot-not-be and that which may be but
could not be. As such, Parmenides did not anticipate Plato’s metaphysics. Instead, Plato’s
concept of relationality and participation corrected Parmenides’ ontological monism, as
this chapter will show. Cf. Bertrand Russell, A History of Western Philosophy (London:
Routledge, 2004; orig. pub. 1945), pp. 55-59; G. E. L. Owen, “Eleatic Questions,” The Classical
Quarterly, n.s. 10 (1960): 84-102; Barnes, The Presocratic Philosophers, pp. 122-81; Patricia
Curd, The Legacy of Parmenides: Eleatic Monism and Later Presocratic Thought (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1998).
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In short, material and immaterial monism is unable to account for
the unity of matter and the plurality of finite things, whereas pluralism
and atomism need to appeal to a unitary force that secures the oneness
of the cosmos. As such, they all mask an ontological and epistemological
dualism between the one and the many. The reason is metaphysical and
theological: the link between the universe and its source remains hid-
den, since pre-Socratic poetry and philosophy view the gods as external
to the world and divinity as unintelligible to the human mind. Funda-
mentally, the infinite incomprehensible origin of being and the finite
perceptible world of beings are coterminous not consubstantial: being
and beings do not belong to separate realms, but nor do they share in the
same substance. Rather, they are like two parallel galaxies linked by the
arbitrary and absolute power of the divine. This is equally true for the
material substratum in the physicists, the noØv in Anaxagoras and
Empedocles, the greatest god in Xenophanes, reason (lËgov) in Hera-
clitus, and true reality (or the “What Is”) in Parmenides. In consequence,
the relation between form and materiality is unresolved, since matter is
finite but eternal, whereas form is infinite but immanent. Moreover,
there is no real, discernible relation between the sensible and the intelli-
gible realm. The implication is that infinite being and finite beings are
divorced from each other, leaving the unique individuality of each mate-
rial thing unexplained. Are different particular beings merely copies of
one and the same universal form, differentiated by accidental properties
rather than substantial essences? If each individual being has its own
unique form, is form particular or universal? If form is universal, is it in-
dividuated by eternal general matter? Or is eternal general matter par-
ticularized by substantial form?
Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle agreed with their forebears that pure
materiality approximates nonbeing and lacks order. Beyond pre-
Socratic poetry and philosophy, they sought to show that transcendent
universal form gives being to matter (rather than some immanent mate-
rial principle), that the divine is unitary (rather than multiple), and that
the oneness of immaterial form is paradoxically embodied in the plural-
ity of material things (rather than corrupted and destroyed). For Plato,
material things are imperfect copies of immaterial forms and only exist
by participation. Similarly, for Aristotle the being or actuality of form —
essence — brings the nonbeing or potency of matter into existence. As a
result of the relation between form and matter, concrete things consti-
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via the senses. However, Aristotle rejected Plato’s theory of forms be-
cause, according to the Stagirite, it is confused and fails to overcome the
pre-Socratic dualism between the empirical and the ideal. Aristotle was
the first to assert that Plato’s separation of timeless forms from
preexistent matter can neither solve the problem of motion and rest nor
explain the unity of body and soul. Moreover, Plato was unable — so Ar-
istotle’s argument goes — to demonstrate how and why the human mind
can cognize the presence of transcendent eternal structures in imma-
nent ephemeral phenomena. Aristotle’s critique of Plato’s metaphysics
led him to abandon the concept of participation and to theorize the rela-
tion between particulars and universals in terms of the union of singular
essence with material substrate, in an attempt to tie matter more closely
to form. The material component of composite substances stands in po-
tency to the actuality of individual substantial form. Similarly, all com-
posites stand in potency to the pure actuality of the Prime Mover. As
such, the unity of the first cause constitutes the final end of the multiplic-
ity of substances in the sublunary world. By arguing that forms do not
stand above and beyond things but that instead being inheres in beings,
it was apparently Aristotle — not Plato — who first resolved the meta-
physical dualism between the one and the many, the universal and the
particular, and the singular and the collective.9
2. The Preeminence of Substance
A. Separating Theology from Ontology
In what follows, I contest this interpretation of Plato and Aristotle. My
argument is that Aristotle’s priority of substance (oÔs¾a) over being (tÌ
În) privileges essentiality over existentiality and drives a wedge between
the science of being qua being (ontology) and the science of the divine
(theology). This in turn entails a metaphysical dualism between particu-
lar beings in the sublunary world and the universal Prime Mover (or
9
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9. In part, this sort of reading explains why much of late modern and contemporary
philosophy, in particular French phenomenology and certain strands of the analytic tradi-
tion, look back to Aristotle in order to challenge the dualism bequeathed by both Des-
cartes and Kant. The reinvention of ontology that characterizes contemporary philoso-
phy and theology is to a significant extent grounded in a rejection of Plato’s metaphysics
and a reinterpretation of Aristotle’s ontology and theology. See, infra, chapter 9.
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God), in the sense that the latter produces the motion of the heavens and
the world of nature but does not bring particular beings into being. As
the pure unreserved actuality of thought and life, the Prime Mover im-
parts intelligibility to both simple and complex substances and is de-
sired as the ultimate end or finality (tŸlov) of all that exists, but equally it
is “separate from sensible things” and does not bestow actuality upon
them.10
In consequence, the actualization of material things is severed from
the actuality of the Prime Mover, and individuation is reduced to the
generation of individuals by individuals.11 Contrary to Plato’s metaphys-
ics of the universal Good as the author of all things (The Republic VI
508 e, 511 b, VII 516 b) which positions all particulars relationally in vir-
tue of its ecstatic overflow, the Prime Mover as the supreme primary
substance whose actuality is thought thinking itself neither brings com-
posite substances into being nor thinks their complex essence of form
and matter (since the noetic activity of Aristotle’s Prime Mover encom-
passes individual substantial form but does not extend to the idea of
matter). As a result, Aristotle’s Prime Mover is ultimately indifferent to
material beings in the sublunary world. Unlike the Platonist Good,
which endows all things with goodness and thereby acts as efficient and
10
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10. Aristotle, Metaphysics L 7, 1072b10-31 (henceforth Met.) and Met. L 7, 1073a5, in The
Complete Works of Aristotle, revised Oxford translation in two volumes, ed. Jonathan
Barnes (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), vol. 2, p. 1695.
11. Past debates on Aristotle’s theory of individuation have wrongly focused on
whether the principle of individuation is either purely material or exclusively formal. On
matter, see, inter alia, Elisabeth Anscombe, “Symposium: The Principle of Individuation
II,” Aristotelian Society suppl. 27 (1953): 83-96; Antony C. Lloyd, “Aristotle’s Principle of Indi-
viduation,” Mind 79, no. 316 (October 1970): 519-29. On form, see, inter alia, Jan Lukasie-
wicz, “Symposium: The Principle of Individuation I,” Aristotelian Society suppl. 27 (1953):
69-82; William Charlton, “Aristotle and the Principle of Individuation,” Phronesis 17 (1973):
239-49; Jennifer E. Whiting, “Form and Individuation in Aristotle,” History of Philosophy
Quarterly 3, no. 4 (October 1986): 359-77. Richard Rorty and Mary Gill are right that, for Ar-
istotle, individuation is neither simply formal nor entirely material but instead marks the
union of individual substantial form and proximate matter. See Richard Rorty, “Genus as
Matter: A Reading of MetaphysicsZ-H,” Phronesis suppl. 1 (1973): 393-420; Mary L. Gill, Aris-
totle on Substance: The Paradox of Unity (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989);
Mary L. Gill, “Individuals and Individuation,” in Unity, Identity, and Explanation in Aris-
totle’s Metaphysics, ed. Theodore Scaltsas, David Charles, Mary L. Gill (Oxford: Clarendon
Press, 1994), pp. 55-71. Beyond Rorty and Gill, I argue in this chapter that Aristotle’s pri-
macy of substance tends to privilege essence over existence and to separate the being of
beings from the actuality of the Prime Mover.
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final cause that is perfective of form, the actuality of the Prime Mover
does not inhere in individual substances that exist in the sublunary
world but instead is a distant tŸlov that merely acts as final causality.
Moreover, it is not clear in Aristotle’s ontology and theology whether
the actuality of individual substantial form is at all related to the pure ac-
tuality of the Prime Mover. The latter is but a remote cause that imparts
motion to composite substances exclusively by final causality and not by
efficient causality. Once the first cause is limited to final causality, the ac-
tualization and perfection of composites are cut off from the Prime
Mover. Joseph Owens rightly argues that “he [Aristotle] does not seem to
have any means of explaining how the actual contact is made between
separate substance and material substance.”12 My critique of Aristotle’s
philosophy, and particularly his theory of individuation, must therefore
begin with his account of substance.
Aristotle’s distinction between being and substance is absolutely
central to his conception of ontology and theology. First of all, the notion
of being has multiple meanings and the reality of being is different in di-
verse things (just like the good and the one).13 In consequence, being is
not synonymous and univocal, as advocates of analytical univocalism
like Bertrand Russell, W. V. O. Quine, Morton White, and more recently
Peter van Inwagen have wrongly claimed.14 Second, even though there is
not a single type of ‘being’ that can be predicated of everything that is (tÌ
›st¾n), it does not follow for Aristotle that being is homonymous and
equivocal. For being is that which is “common to all things” (Met. G 3,
1005a27), yet at the same time particular and distinct in each single sub-
stance (whether simple or composite).15 Third, the commonality of be-
ing in all that exists cannot be conceived exclusively in terms of unity in
analogical difference or unity through foundation in an immutable es-
sence. For Aristotle subordinates the analogy of being to the categories
11
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12. Joseph Owens, “The Relation of God to the World in the Metaphysics,” in Études sur
la Métaphysique d’Aristote, ed. Pierre Aubenque (Paris: Vrin, 1979), p. 217, note 18. Cf. Julia
Annas, “Forms and First Principles,” Phronesis 19 (1974): 257-83.
13. Aristotle, Categories I 1a1 (henceforth Cat.); Eudemian Ethics I 8, 1217b20-26 (hence-
forth Eud. Eth.); Topics I 15, 106a9 (henceforth Top.).
14. For an overview and critique of analytical univocalism, see Enrico Berti, “Multi-
plicity and Unity of Being in Aristotle,” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 101 (2000):
185-207, esp. pp. 185-89.
15. Met. G 2. Cf. Cat. VII 17a40-b1; Parts of Animals 644a24-25 (henceforth Pa. An.); Met.
Z 8, 1034a5-8; Z 11, 1036a26-28; Z 13, 1038b10-12.
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and views substance as the substrate for all beings, though the categorial
term of substance implies substantial change and cannot be seen as
static or foundationalist in a proto-modern transcendentalist manner
(as Frege, Husserl, Heidegger, and others rightly argue).
Fourth, Aristotle restricts the link between the primary substance of
the Unmoved Mover and being to final causality (whereas for Plato the
Good also acts as efficient and formal cause). Just as the divine first
mover is a special purely intelligible substance separate from the general
category of substance, so theology is a special science of one kind of being
(the divine) cut off from the universal science of being as such (or ontol-
ogy). As such, Aristotle inaugurates not so much ‘onto-theology’ as ‘theo-
ontology’ and divides the study of being qua being from the study of the
Prime Mover. In this way, he lays down the main conceptual foundations
for Porphyry’s logicized Neo-Platonist ontology and the later scholastic
distinction of metaphysica specialis and metaphysica generalis that mu-
tated into the modern supremacy of ontology over theology.16
B. Elevating Substance over Being
For now let us return to Aristotle’s account of the preeminence of sub-
stance relative to being. Being qua being (Ïn âv În) is not generic and
does not constitute an immutable substance that could serve as the uni-
versal essence to all things that are: “Being does not act as essence to any
existing thing, for what it is is not a genus.”17 Since “the genera of the be-
ings are different,” it follows for Aristotle that “none of the [principles]
common [to all beings] is such that from them everything can be
proved.”18 In other words, there is no universal science of being qua be-
12
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16. Very briefly: what is common to the three breaks in medieval theology that gave
rise to modern philosophy (i.e., first, the primacy of essence vis-à-vis existence in
Avicenna and Gilbert Porreta; second, the shift from analogy and the real distinction to
univocity and the formal distinction in John Duns Scotus; third, the denial of the presence
of universals in things in William of Ockham) is the — predominantly Franciscan — focus
on Aristotelian substance at the expense of Neo-Platonist relationality and the subsump-
tion of theology under ontology, a development resisted by Aquinas and other Domini-
cans (as I shall argue in chapters 4-6).
17. “tÌ d’ eÅnai oÔk oÔs¾a oÔden¾,” Posterior Analytics II 7, 92b13-14 (henceforth Post.
An.), in The Complete Works of Aristotle, vol. 1, p. 152.
18. Post. An. I 32, 88a36-b2, in The Complete Works of Aristotle, vol. 1, p. 145 (translation
modified). Cf. Top. VI 12, 149b18-23.
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ing that includes both the Prime Mover and secondary substances. And
since the Prime Mover is not prior in theoretical knowledge to all exist-
ing things, theology is not synonymous with ‘first philosophy’ or meta-
physics. Thus there is no single science that encompasses each and ev-
ery kind of being, including the divine first mover — just as the latter is
not the real good in virtue of which all other goods exist by participation,
a solution that Aristotle famously dismissed as a Platonic myth.19 That is
why Aristotle contrasts Platonic forms with his system of categories of
beings — an alternative that Kant in his Critique of Pure Reason §10 no
less famously dismissed as a rhapsody. From the outset of post-Socratic
philosophy, there is a crucial point of contrast between Plato’s theologi-
cal metaphysics of the Good and other forms, on the one hand, and Aris-
totle’s meta-logical ontology of substance and the rest of the categories,
on the other hand.
It is true that Aristotle ties the logical terms of species, genera, and
differentia to the higher ontological unity of substance and the other
categorial terms. The analogy of being is the ontological correlate of the
unity of epistemological theorems in universal science, as all things are
governed by analogical units such as the three elements (matter, form,
privation) and the four analogically related causes (material, formal, fi-
nal, and efficient).20 As such, different kinds of existing beings are united
by analogy: “[T]hings that are not all in one genus are one by analogy”
(Met. V 6, 1017a2-3). In this way, analogy describes how things exist under
the different categories and how the categorial terms relate to one an-
other. However, to say that being is analogous cannot explain why any-
thing exists in the first place and why there would be a definitive number
of categorial terms. Nor does the analogy of being account for the para-
doxical and ultimately aporetic grounding (prÌv ¥n) of a multiplicity of
categories in the unity of groundless being, as Pierre Aubenque has ex-
13
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19. “If a number of things are in accord with a single [Platonic] idea, there is also a
single science of them; hence [if there were a Platonic idea of good], there would be a sin-
gle science of all goods. But in fact there are many sciences even of the goods under one
category,” Nicomachean Ethics I 6, 1096a29-32 [henceforth Nic. Eth.], in The Complete Works
of Aristotle, vol. 2, p. 1732 (translation modified). Cf. Eud. Eth. I 8, 1217b33-a2.
20. “. . . they [the first principles] are all like chance associations, since they are coin-
cidental, but appropriate to one another, and one by analogy. For in each category of be-
ing there is the analogous thing; as the straight line is in length, so is the plane in surface,
the odd perhaps in number, and the white in color,” Met. XIV 6, 1093b16-20, in The Complete
Works of Aristotle, vol. 2, p. 1728 (translation modified).
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tensively documented.21 Perhaps most importantly of all, the analogical
ordering of being does not provide answers to the question of why things
come into being and why they are directed towards the final cause in the
divine first mover.
Aristotle sidesteps this aporia by saying that analogical being has a
focal meaning and a nuclear realization in substance, as G. E. L. Owen
and Donald MacKinnon indicate. Owen writes that “all the senses of on
must be defined in terms of ousia, substance.”22 Drawing upon Aristotle’s
notorious example of the link between the multiple meanings of being
healthy and health itself in Metaphysics G 2, MacKinnon explains that “it
is this relation of other manifestations to the nuclear realization of
health that gives to those other manifestations what I have called their
relativity. So it is with being in relation to substance.”23 According to
Owen and MacKinnon, Aristotle posits an asymmetric relation between
substance and being: substance exists per se, whereas everything else is
relative to substance. Aristotle also suggests that substance inheres in all
beings that actually exist and makes them what they are. In relation to
individuation, the question is whether universal substance or essence is
particularized by concrete being, as he appears to suggest in the Catego-
ries, or whether individual substance or essence individuates general be-
ing, as he seems to argue in the Metaphysics.
In fact, it is neither. Aristotle’s account of individual substance is no-
toriously complex and controversial, and it is best understood in the
context of his critique of Plato’s theory of forms. As C. D. C. Reeves notes,
Aristotle’s objection to Plato’s metaphysics is less concerned with the re-
lation between the one form and the many things or the ‘third man’
problem of the infinite regress of ideas. Instead, the main thrust of his
critique can be expressed in terms of the following two, closely related
questions. First, how can a single thing be both ontologically particular
(a particular ‘this’) and noetically universal (a universal ‘such’), for other-
14
SUBSTANCE AND RELATION
21. Pierre Aubenque, Le problème de l’être chez Aristote. Essai sur la problématique
aristotélicienne (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1997; orig. pub. 1962), pp. 134-250.
22. G. E. L. Owen, “Logic and Metaphysics in Some Early Works of Aristotle,” in Aris-
totle and Plato in the Mid-Fourth Century: Papers of the Symposium Aristotelicum Held at
Oxford in August 1957, ed. Ingemar Düring and G. E. L. Owen (Göttingen-Stockholm-
Uppsala: Elanders, 1960), pp. 162-90 (184 note 16).
23. Donald MacKinnon, “Aristotle’s Conception of Substance,” in New Essays on Plato
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wise “any proposed definition will fragment the unitary definiendum into
all the different particulars [if man or animal is seen as a particular ‘this’]
that appear in the definiens”?24 Second, how can both an individual sub-
stance and its essence be ontologically and epistemologically primary,
for otherwise either the unity of the thing is threatened or — if substance
and essence are detached from one another — substance is unknowable
and essence does not exist?25 In other words, Aristotle claims that Plato’s
metaphysics of the Good as the form of all forms cannot explain how one
and the same thing — individual substance — is both universal and par-
ticular. As we shall see, his own solution is to say that beyond the Pla-
tonic fallacy of particular things participating in the universal forms,
real substantive things are composed of individual universal form and
proximate matter. In virtue of their universal formal aspect, they desire
the ultimate actuality of the Prime Mover’s unique primary substance.
By contrast, Plato views things as instantiations of the universal forms
and forms as “themselves ‘things’ in the most eminent possible sense.”26
How does Aristotle arrive at his proposed solution of individual sub-
stances that are both universal and particular? In the Categories, he
maintains that substance is the first in the hierarchy of categories of be-
ing and that as such it is universal and general, not particular and indi-
vidual. By the time he writes the later books of the Metaphysics (espe-
cially Z and H, but also L),27 he has modified this position and replaced
universal substance with primary substance, which (at least in matter-
form compounds) is individual essence. This shift is the result of his in-
vestigation of substantial change in the Physics and his analysis of physi-
cal objects in terms of matter and form. So what is primary substance?
In Metaphysics Z 1, substance is defined as the ‘what-ness’ of being, “that
which is primarily and is simply (not is something).”28 Primary sub-
15
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24. Met. III 6, 1003a7-17. Cf. C. D. C. Reeve, Substantial Knowledge: Aristotle’s
Metaphysics (Indianapolis: Hackett, 2000), pp. 13-15 (15).
25. Met. VII, 6, 1031a25-b14. Cf. Reeve, Substantial Knowledge, pp. 15-17; A. R. Lacey,
“OÔs¾a and Form in Aristotle,” Phronesis 10 (1965): 54-69.
26. John Milbank, “Only Theology Saves Metaphysics: On the Modalities of Terror,” in
Belief and Metaphysics, ed. Conor Cunningham and Peter M. Candler Jr. (London: SCM,
2007), pp. 452-500 (465).
27. On the chronology of Met. L, see Günther Patzig, “Theology and Ontology in Aris-
totle’s Metaphysics,” in Articles on Aristotle, ed. Jonathan Barnes, Malcolm Schofield, and
Richard Sorabji (London: Duckworth, 1979), vol. 3, pp. 33-49.
28. Met. Z 1, 1028a30, in The Complete Works of Aristotle, vol. 2, p. 1623.
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stance is self-subsistent and provides the formal, ontological substratum
for all other categories to exist. Against Plato, who is said to posit three
types of substance (the Forms, the objects of mathematics, and the sub-
stance of sensible bodies), Aristotle insists that substance is one and in-
dividual (Met. Z 2, 1028b19-21) and that it is a thing’s essence because oth-
erwise an infinite regress would ensue (Met. Z 6, 1032a4; L 3, 1070a1-3).
Since the primary substance that underpins all things is individual, each
and every thing is generated as an individual and entertains links with
other things and also with the Prime Mover, links that are purely
categorial — not metaphysical. In other words, the existence of things is
individual, not relational. Likewise, the ties that pertain among things
and between things and the divine first mover are predicated on the indi-
viduality of the substance to which all other categories are subordinated.
Relation is just another categorial term that describes how a thing ex-
ists, not a metaphysically constitutive principle that helps explain why
something is in the first place and why it might be generated by the
Prime Mover.
C. The Priority of Essence over Existence
This primacy of substance over relation in Aristotle’s ontology entails a
division of essence and existence within composites and a separation of
the first mover’s actuality from the being of beings. In this way, sub-
stances are generated by other substances, and not ultimately by the
Prime Mover. As such, substances self-individuate (as I will explain).
There are at least three reasons for this. First of all, in Metaphysics Z 13
the argument that essence or substance is prior to universals prompts
Aristotle to reject Plato’s metaphysics of participation. The Stagirite de-
fines Platonist universals as “a this” (tËde ti) or a quality (poiËn). So
conceived, universals are predicable of things that participate in them,
yet at the same time universals are definite and actual entities that are
prior to and separate from their participants — forms that exist. The
reason why Aristotle repudiates Plato’s universals is that they threaten
the unity of primary substances. Universals or qualities (poi}) are
viewed as components of substance and therefore prior to substance.
But for Aristotle nothing can be prior to substance, for without sub-
stance there is nothing and nothing is apart from or outside substance
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Aristotle himself concludes, “[N]o universal attribute is a substance,
and this is also plain from the fact that no common predicate indicates
a ‘this,’ but rather a ‘such.’ ”29 So, contrary to Plato (and Christian Neo-
Platonists like Augustine, Boethius, Dionysius, and Aquinas), universals
are not transcendentally convertible in Aristotle’s philosophy. They are
properties of substance that ‘owe’ their existence to substance. In other
words, Aristotle drives a wedge between substance, universals, and par-
ticulars by making the latter two unilaterally dependent on the former.
Aristotle’s Prime Mover is not present in other substances but instead
acts as their final cause. Plato’s Good, on the other hand, is relational
vis-à-vis other forms and things in the sense that it is present in them,
so that they may participate in it — though the participants can of
course never exhaust the range of the participable Good and the other
participable forms.
The second reason is that the Prime Mover only acts as final cause
and not as efficient cause, as I have repeatedly hinted at.30 Aristotle
writes in Metaphysics L that the Prime Mover produces “the primary
eternal and single movement” (Met. L 8, 1073a25-26), and in the same
paragraph he explains that this movement is the end of all other kinds of
movement in the heavens and in the sublunary world. Likewise, the
Prime Mover as the pure actuality of thought and life is the end that all
things desire. Again in Metaphysics L where Aristotle likens the link be-
tween the Prime Mover and the sublunary world to the relation between
a general and his army, he states that things are connected with one an-
other, “for all are ordered together to one end” (Met. L 10, 1075a17-18).
There is kinetic movement in the heavens and in the world of nature, and
17
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29. Met. Z 13, 1038b35-1039a2, in The Complete Works of Aristotle, vol. 2, p. 1640.
30. Whether the causative power of Aristotle’s Prime Mover is exclusively final or also
efficient has been the subject of an intense controversy. On the former, see Owens, “The
Relation of God to the World in the Metaphysics,” pp. 207-28; and Lloyd P. Gerson, God and
Greek Philosophy: Studies in the Early History of Natural Theology (London: Routledge,
1990), pp. 120-41. On the latter, see W. J. Verdenius, “Traditional and Personal Elements in
Aristotle’s Religion,” Phronesis 5 (1960): 56-70; Thomas De Koninck, “La ‘Pensée de la
Pensée’ chez Aristote,” in La question de Dieu chez Aristote et Hegel, ed. Thomas De
Koninck (Paris: P.U.F., 1991), pp. 69-151; Sarah Broadie, “Que fait le premier moteur
d’Aristote?” Revue philosophique 183 (1993): 375-411; David Bradshaw, Aristotle East and
West: Metaphysics and the Division of Christendom (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 2004), pp. 24-44. For an overview of earlier rival accounts, see Leo Elders, Aristotle’s
Theology: A Commentary on Book L of the Metaphysics (Assen: Van Gorcum, 1972), pp. 1-43.
Cf. H. J. Easterling, “The Unmoved Mover in Early Aristotle,” Phronesis 21 (1976): 252-65.
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there is also noetic activity among intelligent substances because all
things are ordered to the supreme tŸlov in the Prime Mover whose actu-
ality somehow elicits the desire of everything that exists.31 In conse-
quence, the actuality of the Prime Mover is severed from the actuality of
primary substance or essence. This raises the question of why form
would at all ‘wish’ to be allied to matter and how the pure potency of
matter can be ‘lured’ to the unreserved actuality of form — a question I
will return to in the following sections.
Third, primary substance is always already individual and singular,
as I have already indicated. For this reason, universals such as the good
and the beautiful do not individuate things. They are properties that act
as nonessential qualities in things. Moreover, as the following section
shows, the individuation of composites marks the unity between individ-
ual substantial form and proximate matter. If, as Aristotle also holds,
form makes a thing what it is, then this raises the question of whether
matter is part of the complex form of a composite or whether matter
merely differentiates the essentially identical members of a species.
3. Can Substances Self-Individuate?
Coupled with the primacy of substance, the critique of Plato’s metaphys-
ics of participation leads Aristotle to develop an alternative account of
the relation between universal immaterial essences and particular mate-
rial things in terms of the unity of individual substantial form and proxi-
mate matter.32 From the outset of the Metaphysics, he emphasizes the
oneness of composites, for each matter-form compound is constituted
by the unity of substantial form and proximate matter. Substantial form
is defined as a ‘this’ (tËde ti), not a ‘such’ (toiËnde), and it is thus individ-
18
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31. David Bradshaw is right to point out that in Met. L 7-10, the actuality of Prime
Mover is not limited to producing kinetic movement but in fact encompasses thought
thinking itself and as such extends to noetic activity. See Bradshaw, Aristotle East and
West, pp. 30-32, 38-44. However, it simply does not follow that Aristotle’s Unmoved Mover
acts as formal and efficient cause. Aristotle repeatedly refers to the latter as the end of all
motion and thought. Substances in the sublunary world are lured forward by the Un-
moved Mover and thereby perfect their unique form through ever more actualization of
their material potency, but neither their coming-into-being nor their continuous exis-
tence is caused by the Prime Mover.
32. Rorty, “Genus as Matter: A Reading of Metaphysics Z-H,” p. 402.
50
G:\Pabst\first corrections
Monday, January 16, 2012 2:51:41 PM
Color profile: Disabled
Composite  140 lpi at 45 degrees
ual, not general.33 Proximate matter is defined as “that which, not being
a ‘this’ actually, is potentially a ‘this,’ ”34 and it is therefore in potency to
the actuality of form. The unity between individual substantial form and
proximate matter is real (rather than merely conceptual), and it consti-
tutes the actuality (›nteleqe¾a) of the composite as a whole (not just of
the formal aspect). This alternative model is grounded in Aristotle’s on-
tology of actuality and potentiality, as detailed in Metaphysics D 2, 4, 7,
and 12. In Metaphysics H (and elsewhere),35 Aristotle connects act and
potency to the question of unity of a composite at a given moment and
over time. The interplay of act (›nŸrgeia) and potency (dÖnamiv) at the
heart of each and every material composite can account for synchronic
as well as diachronic individuation.36 In the case of composites, form
and matter constitute a compound that is both individual and complex.
Form and matter do not represent separate parts but are distinct aspects
of one single entity. Individual substantial form is in actuality what prox-
imate matter is in potency: “. . . the proximate matter and the form are
one and the same thing, the one potentially, the other actually.”37 For in-
stance, in the case of man, individual substantial form is the unique soul
of a certain body, which is the proximate matter of that form.38
Aristotle’s key argument is that form and matter are not separate
from one another. Rather, they are two necessary constituents of the
same one individual composite — proximate matter is potentially what
the substantial individual form is in actuality because the potential and
19
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33. Met. D 8, 1017b25; H 1, 1042a29; J 7, 1049a28-29; L 5, 1071a27-29; On Generation and
Corruption 318b32 (henceforth De Gen. et Corr.). Already in the Categories, Aristotle views
substances as irreducibly individual, e.g., Cat. 2b1-3a33. Cf. Rogers Albritton, “Forms of Par-
ticular Substances in Aristotle’s Metaphysics,” Journal of Philosophy 54 (1957): 699-708; Mi-
chael Frede, “Individuals in Aristotle,” in Michael Frede, Essays in Ancient Philosophy (Ox-
ford: Clarendon Press, 1987), pp. 49-63.
34. Met. H 1, 1041a27-28, in The Complete Works of Aristotle, vol. 2, p. 1645.
35. Ellen Stone Haring, “Substantial Form in Aristotle’s Metaphysics Z,” Review of
Metaphysics 10 (1956-57): 308-32, 482-501, 698-713.
36. For this as well as other reasons, Aristotle’s ontology does account for synchronic
and diachronic individuation, contrary to critics such as Karl Popper and Marc Cohen.
See Karl Popper, “Symposium: The Principle of Individuation III,” Aristotelian Society
suppl. 27 (1953): 97-120, esp. pp. 98-101, 112; S. Marc Cohen, “Aristotle and Individuation,” in
New Essays on Aristotle, ed. Francis J. Pelletier and John King-Farlow (Calgary, AB: Univer-
sity of Calgary Press, 1984), pp. 41-65, esp. 41-44.
37. Met. H 6, 1045b17-19, in The Complete Works of Aristotle, vol. 2, p. 1651.
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the actual constitute a unity (Met. H 6, 1045b21) and the primary meaning
of unity is actuality (De An. II 1, 412b8-9). The actuality (›nteleqe¾a) of in-
dividual composites is the unity of an individual form with determinate
matter. In the case of man, form is the act of a body of a definite kind that
has the potency to be an individuated complex: “[T]he soul is an actual-
ity or account of something that possesses a potentiality of being such.”39
Form is an actuality or a ‘this,’ and matter is a potentiality or a ‘such.’
Composites are form-matter compounds that have two parts, one which
is actual and the other which is potential. Form-matter compounds are
individual precisely because they are the real actual unity of the power of
the individual substantial form that actualizes the capacity of proximate
matter to be this rather than that.
Before I can give a full account of Aristotle’s theory of individuation, I
need to explain his conception of the unity of individual substantial form
and proximate matter. In MetaphysicsH, he defines this unity as follows:
. . . to ask the cause of their [proximate matter and form] being one is
like asking the cause of unity in general; for each thing is a unity, and
the potential and the actual are somehow one. Therefore there is no
other cause here unless there is something which caused the move-
ment from potentiality into actuality.40
However, to say that unity is determined not only by individual sub-
stantial form but also by proximate matter is not to suggest that form
and matter are identical or equivalent. Form is preeminent because it
is universal and actual and as such can realize the potency of matter.
As such, individuality follows from matter when conjoined with form:
the universal is only actual as individuated by matter, for the form of
composites does not exist in actuality without matter. Just as actual-
ization is primarily formal but requires potency in order to bring some-
thing into actuality, so individuation is primarily material but requires
form in order to make real the potentiality of matter to be this rather
than that.
As such, Aristotle’s account of individuation does not entirely rule
out the ‘reality’ of universals. Universality is reconfigured as the particu-
20
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39. De An. II 2, 414a28, in The Complete Works of Aristotle, vol. 1, p. 659.
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larity of forms that are common to many individuals.41 Man is now con-
ceived as a body-soul compound, as an “ensouled body” (De An. I 1,
403a3-25) — the ensouled body is the individual man (De An. II 1, 413a2-3).
As such, man is both particular (this ensouled body rather than that), yet
at the same time universal because “ensouled body” can be predicated of
more than one composite. Aristotle relates particularity and universality
in terms of his understanding of analogy: “If he [Socrates] is simply this
particular soul and this particular body, the individual is analogous to
the universal.”42 Concrete composites are individual because they are
the particular analogue of the universal matter-form compound (the
“ensouled body” in general) that is individual. The individuation of com-
posite substances marks the particularization of universality. In other
words, individuation is the particular manifestation of a universal that is
common to a multiplicity of beings.
The trouble with this conception is that the singularity of individual
substantial form reduces individuation to generation: “The universal
causes . . . do not exist. For the individual is the source of the individuals.
For while man is the cause of man universally, there is no universal man;
but Peleus is the cause of Achilles, and your father of you.”43 In other
words, the origin of individuality is the indwelling of individual substan-
tial form in proximate matter, both of which have immediate causes but
neither of which originates in the first and final cause of the Prime
Mover, as I show in the following section.
4. Aristotle’s ‘Indifferent God’
The primacy of substance implies that an infinite regress in the order of
causes is ontologically impossible. If there is an individual primary sub-
stance that exists and is the condition of possibility for everything else,
then there must be a Prime Mover whose actuality is the final cause.
That is how Aristotle describes the divine or God (jŸov) in Metaphysics
L 7. The first heaven is defined as eternal and set in motion by a superior
movement which does not undergo any change but instead imparts mo-
21
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41. This contrasts with an alternative conception that emphasizes the generality of
species and genera and views individuation in terms of primary matter, which limits spe-
cies form.
42. Met. Z 11, 1037a8-9, in The Complete Works of Aristotle, vol. 2, p. 1637.
43. Met. L 5, 1071a20-22, in The Complete Works of Aristotle, vol. 2, p. 1692.
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tion as an object of desire and through the movement of the first heaven
moves the rest of things.44 He goes on to say that “the primary objects of
desire and thought are the same . . . [in thought] substance is first, and in
substance, that which is simple and exists actually.”45 Substances in the
heavens and in the sublunary world love and desire the Prime Mover as
ultimate first cause. Therefore Aristotle infers that “[o]n such a principle,
then, depend the heavens and the world of nature.”46
But it is not clear how in Aristotle’s metaphysics the actuality of sub-
stantial form is related to that of the Prime Mover. The latter is but a re-
mote first cause that imparts motion exclusively by final causality, not by
efficient causality. The Prime Mover cannot act as efficient cause on the
heavens and the sublunary world because, as Joseph Owens explains, Ar-
istotle’s conception of efficient causality prohibits this:
The action of an efficient cause is not regarded as a further intrinsic
perfection, but rather as a perfection that is always present and that
produces its effect upon contact with the passum and the removal of
hindrances [Physics VIII 4, 255a1-b24]. The new actuality brought
about by its activity lies therefore outside itself as cause. If separate
substances were an efficient cause, then it would be in potentiality to
something else.47
Moreover, in the Metaphysics Aristotle describes the pure actuality and
activity of the Prime Mover as the end which all things desire and to
which they are ordered, as I have already suggested in the previous sec-
tions.
Once the first cause is denied efficient and formal causality and lim-
ited to final causality, the individuation of composites is severed from
the Prime Mover. For this reason, Owens — to quote his remark again —
is right to conclude: “[H]e [Aristotle] does not seem to have any means of
explaining how the actual contact is made between separate substance
and material substance.”48 Notably, in his commentary on Aristotle’s
Metaphysics, St. Thomas Aquinas argues that the finite existence of com-
posites is caused efficiently by the subsistent existence of God and that
22
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44. Owens, “The Relation of God to the World in the Metaphysics,” pp. 210-15.
45. Met. L 7, 1072a27-32, in The Complete Works of Aristotle, vol. 2, p. 1694.
46. Met. L 7, 1072b13-14, in The Complete Works of Aristotle, vol. 2, p. 1695.
47. Owens, “The Relation of God to the World in the Metaphysics,” p. 216.
48. Owens, “The Relation of God to the World in the Metaphysics,” p. 217, note 18.
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therefore God’s actuality is more than simply the final cause of the actu-
ality of creation.49 As a result of limiting God to final causality, Aristotle’s
theology severs the individuation of concrete composites from the caus-
ative action of the Unmoved Mover. Individuality is thus grounded in the
individuals themselves. Aristotle’s God is desired and loved as the ulti-
mate final cause but this God is utterly indifferent to the sublunary
world — “thought thinking itself,” a purely self-directed energy. More-
over, the eternity of matter does not in any way intimate God’s existence
and essence, the pure actuality of form itself. Individuation is
immanentized and reduced to generation, as I have already indicated.
Likewise, individuation is exclusively a function of immediate imma-
nent proximate causes: proximate matter is the material cause and sub-
stantial form is the efficient and formal cause. The matter and form of
composites are presupposed rather than brought into existence by the
first cause: “The natural things which (like some artificial objects) can be
produced spontaneously are those whose matter can be moved even by
itself in the way in which the seed usually moves it; but those things
which have not such matter cannot be produced except by parents.”50 In-
deed, Aristotle writes that “. . . neither the matter nor the form comes to
be — i.e. the proximate matter and form. For everything that changes is
something and is changed by something and into something.”51
In summary, for Aristotle the individuality of concrete composites is
self-grounded and individuation is a function of other individual com-
posites. Therefore, he cannot account for why composites are ultimately
individual and how and why they are individuated. Ultimately, this is be-
cause the Greek form-matter dualism lingers in his work: prime matter
and universal form are simply presupposed and in no way related to the
Prime Mover (Met. L 9, 1074b15-1075a10). As I argue in the remainder of
this chapter, the difference with Plato is that Aristotle lacks any account
of the Prime Mover as the efficient and formal cause which brings every-
thing into being and makes it what it is. Aristotle cannot explain why
God would wish to actualize or individuate anything at all because he
does not envision the Good as that which ‘eminently’ moves matter and
form into place and infuses everything with the form of goodness. As I
23
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49. St. Thomas Aquinas, In duodecim libros Metaphysicorum Aristotelis expositio, 2nd
ed. (Rome: Marietti, 1971), lectura 1, no. 1164.
50. Met. Z 9, 1034b3-7, in The Complete Works of Aristotle, vol. 2, p. 1633.
51. Met. L 3, 1069a35-1070a1, in The Complete Works of Aristotle, vol. 2, p. 1690.
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show in the following two sections, this ontology and theology commit
him to separate human activity within the household (oÅkov) and the
city-state (pËliv) from the wider operation of the universe (kËsmov) and
therefore introduce an unwarranted dualism between practical and in-
tellectual activity.
5. Ontology, Theology, and Politics
At the end of the section in the Metaphysics on the Prime Unmoved
Mover, Aristotle defends the primacy of the first principle and ultimate
end to which everything is ordered. He goes on to quote from the Iliad
II, 204: “The rule of many is not good; let there be one ruler.”52 This pas-
sage is indicative not only of the importance of hierarchy but also of the
link between his account of being and his vision of the polity. In this sec-
tion, I argue that Aristotle’s ontological and theological theory of indi-
viduation has a political correlate. Just as the individuation of beings is
the actualization and perfection of individual form in proximate matter,
so the individuation of ‘political animals’ is the actualization and per-
fection of personal and collective civic virtue. Since God’s causative ac-
tion is absent from the operation of the sublunary world, Aristotle’s vi-
sion of politics and ethics restricts divine presence in the polity by
separating the actuality of God as the final cause from the actuality of
the natural and human realm. In turn, this separation underpins Aris-
totle’s celebration of self-sufficiency and sovereignty at the level of the
individual, the oÅkov, the pËliv, and the kËsmov. This also entails a re-
configuration of action, defined as the prime mode of actualizing and
perfecting form and of attaining the goods that are proper and internal
to each activity. For Aristotle, activity is divided into theoretical and
practical activity, and this division poses problems for the unity and
universality of the good and the particularity and perfection of personal
and collective civic virtue.
Plato and Aristotle challenge the dualism in pre-Socratic metaphys-
ics between the ideal and the real, the intelligible and the sensible, and
the universal and the particular, as I indicated at the beginning of this
chapter. For both, there is a more fundamental unity of being that is
manifest in material beings and, as such, it can be perceived by the
24
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52. Met. L 10, 1076a4, in The Complete Works of Aristotle, vol. 2, p. 1700.
56
G:\Pabst\first corrections
Monday, January 16, 2012 2:51:41 PM
Color profile: Disabled
Composite  140 lpi at 45 degrees
physical senses and grasped by the immaterial mind. According to Aris-
totle, this unity encompasses the cosmos and the polis and also extends
to individuals and their activities, for effects resemble their cause and
everything has a final cause that is unitary. Unity is essential, not acci-
dental, because essence is one, not many. In consequence, unity is tele-
ological and dynamic because a thing’s finality corresponds to that
thing’s particular essence and orders its movement and specific activi-
ties to the highest good which is particular and internal to each and ev-
ery activity. To achieve one’s tŸlov is to be free from any sort of depend-
ency or need: “[T]he final cause and end of a thing is the best, and to be
self-sufficing is the end and the best.”53 The supreme goal of all beings is
unitary because it is to attain autarchy. Likewise, the activity that se-
cures autarchy is also unitary — the contemplative understanding of
the divine. For Aristotle, this is the highest intellectual virtue (Nic. Eth. X
7, 1177a11-1178a8).
In pursuing this telos, beings fulfill their nature and are oriented to-
wards the supreme good, for nature determines what is right for each and
every thing: “[T]hat which is proper to each thing is by nature best and
most pleasant for each thing.”54 Nature (cÖsiv) is both ethical and politi-
cal because it is structured by a hierarchy of goods and virtues.55 So con-
ceived, nature propels all beings to pursue and fulfill their potency to be
as autarchic as possible and to secure the autonomy of the polis (Pol. I 2,
1253a29; VII 3, 1325b14-32). Just as human nature is always already good in-
sofar as it is oriented towards the highest good, so human nature is also
always already political insofar as individual self-sufficiency can only be
achieved within the collective polity.56 (This contrasts sharply with the
modern idea of a prepolitical or apolitical state of nature, whether
Hobbes’s unmediated violence in the state of nature, Locke’s peaceable
order, or Rousseau’s original freedom, as I explore in chapter 9.) In the
words of Aristotle, “The proof that the state is a creation of nature and
25
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53. Politics I 2, 1252a1 (henceforth Pol.), in The Complete Works of Aristotle, vol. 2,
p. 1987.
54. Nic. Eth. X 7, 1178a5-6, in The Complete Works of Aristotle, vol. 2, p. 1862. Cf. Pol. I 2,
1253a2-25.
55. Nic. Eth. I 7, 1097b12; IX 9, 1169b20; Pol. III 6, 1278b19.
56. However, there are two exceptions: first, those who are human without being in
the polis and those who are in the polis without being properly human. On the latter case,
see John M. Rist, The Mind of Aristotle: A Study in Philosophical Growth (Toronto: University
of Toronto Press, 1989), esp. pp. 249-52.
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prior to the individual is that the individual, when isolated, is not self-
sufficing; and therefore he is like a part in relation to the whole.”57
The tension governing Aristotle’s ethics and politics is then between
the telos of individual self-sufficiency based on the individual contempla-
tion of the divine on the one hand, and the dependency of individuals on
the polis as a result of the political nature of man, on the other hand. The
resulting complex reciprocal relation between nature and politics has far-
reaching implications for the question of individuation. To pursue the
highest good — the virtue of autarchy — is to perfect one’s form and be in-
dividuated, because the highest good is both that which all things desire
and that which actualizes their potency.58 Politics is ultimately at the ser-
vice of individual self-sufficiency and collective autonomy within the
oikos and the polis. This, in essence, is how Aristotle envisions the politi-
cal and ethical correlate of his ontological account of individuation.
Theologically and ontologically, individuation and perfection in the
sublunary world take the form of actualizing potentiality. Composite sub-
stances stand in potency to the higher actuality of separate substances
and ultimately to the pure act of the Prime Mover. However, there is no
link between the Prime Mover and the sublunary world other than by way
of final causality, as I argued in previous sections. Aristotle’s divinity is
loved and desired as the final cause (Met. L 7, 1072a26-1072b31), but God
does not impart motion to matter-form compounds. Efficient causation
is restricted to individual composites themselves and to other compos-
ites that generate them. Material causation is limited to proximate mat-
ter and formal causation to individual substantial form. Given the con-
nection between metaphysics, politics, and ethics (especially in terms of
act and potency), what are the consequences of Aristotle’s causal account
for the individuation of composites in the polis? Aristotle’s God is the telos
of all things, but not the source of their activity, such that the origin of be-
ing remains unexplained.59 For the Stagirite, to love and desire God is to
26
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57. Pol. I 2, 1252a25-27, in The Complete Works of Aristotle, vol. 2, p. 1988.
58. On the link between the ontological and the political dimension of actualization,
see Alasdair MacIntyre, Whose Justice? Which Rationality? (London: Duckworth, 1988),
p. 101. Contra MacIntyre, who argues that Aristotle develops and corrects Platonism, I
contend that Aristotle abandons the transcendence of the Good and embraces an ac-
count of God that severs human activity in the sublunary world from divine activity in the
Prime Mover. See, infra, main text (sections 7-9).
59. This aporia in Aristotle’s theology was instrumental to Neo-Platonic reflections
on the One as generative. See, infra, chapter 2, esp. sections 1 and 2.
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approximate as much as possible God’s autarchy and sovereignty by way
of contemplation. All activities (practical and theoretical) and all virtues
(moral and intellectual) are ordered toward this single end, but they are
not sustained by the actuality of Aristotle’s God.
Politically, this vision implies that the operation of the polis and the
actions of individuals are self-grounded. The telos of politics and ethics is
the pursuit of the highest human good that is inscribed in nature and
common to all individuals, autarchy and sovereignty. The good is dy-
namic because it marks the actualization of form or essence. Therefore
autarchy and sovereignty are not static but instead teleological. Activity
provides the link between Aristotle’s theological, ontological, and politi-
cal account of individuation in particular, as I argued at the beginning of
this section.60 This is because activity (›nŸrgeia) produces actuality
(enteleqe¾a), which is its own end or finality (Met. J 8, 1050a21-23). In the
Poetics, Aristotle writes that the quest for the good is a certain kind of ac-
tivity, not a quality. In the Nicomachean Ethics and the Politics, he argues
that in the case of human beings, activity takes the form of work. Activity
in general (and work in the case of man) is the principal mode of actual-
izing and perfecting individual form: “[W]hile making has an end other
than itself, action cannot; for good action itself is its end.”61 This concep-
tion of activity severs the link between the operation of the polis and the
actuality of God and foregrounds Aristotle’s celebration of autarchy and
sovereignty.
6. Virtue, Autarchy, and Sovereignty
Aristotle divides activity (pr}xiv) into two separate types. First, purely
practical action that is governed by moral virtue. Second, exclusively in-
27
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60. For a detailed exposition of activity in relation to politics and ethics, see Martha
Nussbaum, “Nature, Function, and Capability: Aristotle on Political Distribution,” OSAP
Supplementary Volume (1988): 144-84; Martha Nussbaum, “Human Functioning and Social
Justice: In Defense of Aristotelian Essentialism,” Political Theory 20 (1992): 202-46; Jill Frank,
A Democracy of Distinction: Aristotle and the Work of Politics (Chicago: University of Chicago
Press, 2005), pp. 32-53. Contra Nussbaum, I agree with Frank that Aristotle’s account of na-
ture does not warrant an essentialist and objectivist reading of his vision of politics. In con-
trast with Frank, I argue that Aristotle fails to relate activity in the polis to the actuality of
the Prime Mover, which is the final cause of the sublunary world and all composites
therein. This failure undermines Aristotle’s ontology and his theory of individuation.
61. Nic. Eth. VI 5, 1140b5-7, in The Complete Works of Aristotle, vol. 2, p. 1800.
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tellectual contemplation that is governed by intellectual virtue. Even
though both types are linked via knowledge of first principles ({rqa¾),
only contemplative activity leads to genuine blessedness (eÔdaimon¾a).
For intellection is the only activity that is both self-sufficing and also in
accordance with the highest excellence. By contrast, practical activity
lacks the completeness of intellection, and the virtues that praxis em-
bodies do not attain the excellence of contemplation (jewr¾a).62 Praxis
calls forth contemplation and cannot be grasped without knowledge of
first principles, but it does not mediate divine transcendence nor is it up-
held by the actuality of Aristotle’s God. Only the intellectual virtue of
contemplative understanding has Aristotle’s divinity as its object. The
entire range of practical activity, from farming to handicraft, architec-
ture, poetry, and music, and from warfare to statesmanship, is organized
by a hierarchy of goods and standards of excellence. However, the happi-
ness that the pursuit and perfection of this hierarchy generate is exclu-
sively human and neither intimates nor requires God’s actuality. As
Alasdair MacIntyre remarks, “The happiness achieved in political life is
purely human; the happiness of contemplative activity moves to a higher
level, ‘divine in comparison with human life’ [Nic. Eth. X 7, 1177b32].”63 The
separation of human practical from divine contemplative activity is the
result of denying God’s transcendence any presence in the immanence of
the world. This is because the self-sufficiency of the Prime Mover is such
that “the gods and the universe . . . have no external actions over and
above their own energies.”64 Aristotle’s divinity is self-directed and ut-
terly indifferent to the sublunary world and all things therein.
To the extent that the human mind contemplates the divine, it itself
becomes self-sufficient and self-directed: “thoughts and contemplations
. . . are independent and complete in themselves.”65 The principle, virtue,
and excellence of autarchy and sovereignty are not limited to theology,
ontology, and epistemology but extend to politics. Because the highest
good is defined in terms of self-sufficiency,66 Aristotle envisages the pos-
sibility of fully autarchic states “which are cut off from others and choose
to live alone.”67 While autarchy is not the only desirable condition, Aris-
28
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62. On intellection, see Nic. Eth. X 7, 1177a11-18. On praxis, see Pol. VII 3, 1325b14-32.
63. MacIntyre, Whose Justice? Which Rationality? p. 108.
64. Pol. VII 3, 1325b29-30, in The Complete Works of Aristotle, vol. 2, p. 2104.
65. Pol. VII 3, 1325b19-20, in The Complete Works of Aristotle, vol. 2, p. 2104.
66. See, supra, note 53.
67. Pol. VII 3, 1325b22-24, in The Complete Works of Aristotle, vol. 2, p. 2104.
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totle’s defense of it implies that the relations between politai are not es-
sential to their individual welfare. For each polis is a whole composed of
parts, and mirrors the completeness of the cosmos. As such, even rela-
tively small city-states can approximate autarchy — just as in the case of
individual souls it is practical wisdom or prudence (crËnhsiv) that seeks
to balance the passions by using reason but without producing any rela-
tional activity with other intelligent substances. This is the result of Aris-
totle’s claim that individuality is self-grounded in substances rather than
generated by a relational Prime Mover, as I have already shown. For this
reason, individuation is a function of self-actualization and self-
perfection. Indeed, immediately following his point about autarchic
states he writes that
. . . activity, as well as other things, may take place by sections; there
are many ways in which the sections of a state act upon one another.
The same thing is equally true of every individual. If this were other-
wise, the gods and the universe, who have no external actions over
and above their own energies, would be far enough from perfection.
Hence it is evident that the same life is best for each individual, and
for states and for mankind collectively.68
However, my argument seems to meet easy refutation. Does not Ar-
istotle’s rejection of dualism and his emphasis on the unity of the cosmos
guard against self-individuating substances and the autarchy of self-
activity? Does not the idea of justice as a quest for personal and collec-
tive excellence suggest an overcoming of the false dichotomy of the indi-
vidual and the communal? For Aristotle, the cosmos is the ultimate order
of things and frames the operation of each and every polis. As such, there
is a cosmic counterweight to autarchy and sovereignty, not least because
heavenly bodies impart motion to the world and therefore constitute the
efficient causes of all sublunary movement.69 But Aristotle presupposes
the existence of heavenly bodies and therefore does not explain why they
exist and why they cause movement in the sublunary world. By contrast
with Plato’s idea of the Good as the ordering principle of the universe,
within Aristotle’s theology and politics it is not clear what the cosmic di-
mension of justice might be. In fact, he seems to locate the exercise of
29
The Primacy of Relation over Substance
68. Pol. VII 3, 1325b24-32, in The Complete Works of Aristotle, vol. 2, p. 2104 (my italics).
69. Owens, “The Relation of God to the World in the Metaphysics,” pp. 215-19.
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justice exclusively at the level of the polis. Within the polity, justice is
transcendent and inclusive, in that it involves judgment and praxis be-
yond ethnic, social, and economic division.70 In this sense, justice is indi-
viduating because it binds together a multiplicity of diverse individuals
and strengthens their moral and intellectual virtues (Pol. III 2, 1277b12-
21). For justice is a virtuous activity that aims at actualizing the potency
of all individuals and the polis as a whole in order to attain the highest
good. Only a shared polity that is not ruled by arbitrary force based on
absolute power or by a social contract based on individual volition but
instead governed by the exercise of virtues can hope to achieve the high-
est good — a contemplative understanding of God as the final cause of
all that is.
To practice the virtue of justice (dikaiosÖnh) is to promote corrective
and distributive justice in relation with other citizens. This consists in
restoring and extending a harmonious order as well as fostering obedi-
ence to the principle of distribution that governs the just order secured
by corrective justice.71 As such, justice is relational because it is both in-
dividual and communal and directs the relations between particular citi-
zens and the entire community, structuring the polis towards unity:
“[J]ustice is the bond of men in states; for the administration of justice,
which is the determination of what is just, is the principle of order in po-
litical society.”72 The faculty of judgment involved in practical wisdom or
prudence (crËnhsiv) — an intellectual virtue cutting across the divide
between theory and praxis — is indispensable to the exercise of justice.
Aristotle defines justice as the proper application of right reason (kat~
tÌn orjËn lÉgon [Nic. Eth. VI 1, 1038b25]). Thus, justice is the ordering
norm of ethics in politics — the deployment of justice is impossible out-
side relations within the polis.
However, the virtues that a good life in a just polity embodies are
purely human and secondary to the ultimate telos — the contemplation
of an impersonal unchanging divinity which, as MacIntyre argues, “can
itself take no interest in the merely human . . . [and] is nothing other than
thought timelessly thinking itself and conscious of nothing but itself.”73
30
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70. For a defense of Aristotle concerning the status of slaves and foreigners in the
polis, see Frank, A Democracy of Distinction, pp. 26-32.
71. MacIntyre, Whose Justice? Which Rationality? pp. 103-23.
72. Pol. I 2, 1253a37-40, in The Complete Works of Aristotle, vol. 2, p. 1988.
73. Alasdair MacIntyre, After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory, 2nd ed. (London:
Duckworth, 1985), p. 158.
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To the extent that human beings approximate this telos, they become
both self-sufficing and sovereign. In so doing, they turn away from prac-
tical activity and embrace abstract contemplation. Just as at the meta-
physical level the supreme telos is the autarchy and sovereignty of the in-
dividual (within the oikos and the polis) by a sort of disjunctive echo that
paradoxically cuts humans off from the divine exactly to the extent that
they imitate it, so at the political level the highest good is also the autar-
chy and sovereignty of the polity by a similar sort of disjunctive echo that
paradoxically separates polities from each other and the rest of the uni-
verse to the extent that each excels in different activities and all would
benefit from mutual cooperation and solidarity.
At both levels, it is clear for Aristotle that individuals cannot be fully
self-sufficing because they require practical activities within the oikos
and the polis to secure basic needs. However, these and other needs are
covered by the oikos and the polis, which are structured according to the
secondary goods of the purely human sphere. This is why MacIntyre is
right to conclude that “[t]he household and the city-state make the
metaphysical human project possible; but the goods which they provide
are, although necessary, and although themselves part of that whole hu-
man life, subordinate from the metaphysical standpoint.”74 Precisely be-
cause of the oikos and the polis and their self-sufficiency and sover-
eignty, certain individuals discard this purely human realm and focus
exclusively on the divine. In so doing, they become like God and turn
away from the activity of the city-state. Aristotle’s celebration of self-
sufficiency and sovereignty separates the operation of the polis from the
movement of the cosmos and ultimately from the pure actuality of God.
As such, Aristotle’s divinity as the final cause makes no difference to the
ordering relations of justice within the city-state. Everything in the
household and the city-state is at the service of abstract contemplation,
but contemplative understanding of the timeless lËgov does not trans-
form the polity or the dispensation of justice. Aristotle’s vision of meta-
physics and politics thus marks a departure from Plato’s ideal of
philosopher-king (even though at the end of the Politics Aristotle talks
about the ideal rule of a single supremely good man). It is therefore to
Plato that I finally turn in the remainder of this chapter.
31
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74. MacIntyre, After Virtue, p. 158.
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7. The Primacy of Relation
It was Plato who first argued that the universe marks the ordering of cha-
otic matter by perfect form. The Socratic and Platonist revolution was to
discern the presence of perennial structures in ephemeral phenomena
and to theorize this presence in terms of the participation of particular
things in universal forms.75 Prior to Aristotle, Plato had already chal-
lenged the dualism between the empirical and the ideal.76 Indeed, he
sought to demonstrate that all binaries are qualified by a more funda-
mental unity which is phenomenally visible. As such, it can be perceived
by the senses and grasped by the mind. Even though this unity is neither
fully manifest nor comprehensively intelligible, it is disclosed in all those
things that are individually beautiful and collectively form a harmonious
whole, for beauty is the first visible effect of the Good in the world.77
Thus the Good is present in forms and things, positioning them in mu-
tual, real relations.
Key to Plato’s metaphysics is his account of ‘relationality’
(met}sqesiv) and participation (mŸjexiv) because it explains how and why
universal forms are present in particular things. Why relationality and
not just participation? The reason is not that Plato fails to provide a single
definition of the concept of participation, prompting Aristotle’s unwar-
ranted charge of “empty talk” and “poetic metaphor.”78 Much rather, Plato
deploys other notions such as presence (parous¾a) and communion
(koinwn¾a), which exceed the notion of particulars participating in univer-
32
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75. Pace Joseph Owens, who writes: “He [Plato] saw that the Idea had to be both im-
manent and transcendent. . . . Because its nature involved being, it could not be immanent
and transcendent at the same time. The difficulty was frankly acknowledged, but no solu-
tion was ever offered by Plato.” Owens, “The Relation of God to the World in the
Metaphysics,” p. 221.
76. The charge of dualism tends to be based on Plato’s account of the body and the soul
in the Phaedo, especially the idea that the soul seeks to liberate itself from the constricting
shackles of the body in order to dwell in the realm of timeless forms (Phaedo 78 b 4–84 b 8
[henceforth Phaed.]). This sort of selective reading ignores the wider argument in the
Phaedo and elsewhere in the Platonic corpus, as I will argue below.
77. Phaedrus 250 c-d (henceforth Phaedr.).
78. Met. A 9, 991a20-23, in The Complete Works of Aristotle, vol. 2, p. 1566. Cf. Met. A 9,
992a26-29; M 5, 1079b24-26. See Gail Fine, “Relational Entities,” Archiv für Geschichte der
Philosophie 65 (1983): 235; Gail Fine, “Forms as Causes: Plato and Aristotle,” in Mathematics
and Metaphysics in Aristotle/Mathematik und Metaphysik bei Aristoteles, ed. Andreas
Graeser (Bern: Haupt, 1987), p. 85.
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sals because they suggest that forms are somehow present in things. The
relation that brings on form is inextricably intertwined with the partici-
pation in forms that things receive and that makes them what they are.
This raises two questions. First, how can immanent particulars partici-
pate in transcendent universals? Second, why would forms ‘wish’ to be
participated in? Plato’s answer to both questions is that the Good as the
“form of forms” and the “author of all things” is in all other forms and in all
particulars.79 Even though Plato does not deploy these exact terms, there
is in his metaphysics the priority of the relational giving of presence over
participation: the Good ‘gives’ itself ecstatically in such a way that it in-
fuses all things with goodness, and it is this generative presence in imma-
nent things that enables them to participate in the universal forms and
thus perfect their given goodness. As such, Plato distinguishes the
relationality of forms to other forms and the Good (the participation of
forms in the Dyad, e.g., Phaed. 101c) from the relation that brings on form
and imparts being in which things participate (e.g., Phaed. 100d; cf. The
Republic IV, 437e; The Sophist 247a, 248c, and 248e). In this way, he posi-
tions being in the intermediary realm of ‘the between’ (metaxÖ, e.g., Sym-
posium 202b5) where the original relation among the Good and all the
forms and the participatory relation between things and forms intersect
without, however, collapsing into one another.
This account is analogous to the argument that for Plato, form acqui-
sition in some important sense precedes and enables form possession.80
Both relationality (met}sqesiv) and participation (mŸjexiv) derive from
the same root ‘to participate’ (metŸqein). The grammatical difference is
that the former indicates acquisition while the latter connotes posses-
sion. If, as Plato believed, forms are present in things, then the presence of
forms includes both dimensions — acquisition and possession, ‘relation-
ality’ and participation. In response to possible misunderstandings aris-
ing from the notion of participation, Plato opts in the Parmenides and the
Philebus for the language of likeness of particulars to forms. Likeness in-
dicates that particulars are reflections of originals. As such, likeness is the
‘form’ of the presence of universals in particulars. Particulars are rela-
tional because they depend on universal forms for their existence, es-
sence, and continuous being. Instead of being self-generating and self-
33
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79. Euthydemus 281 e (henceforth Euthyd.); The Republic VI 508 e, 511 b, VII 516 b
(henceforth Rep.); Philebus 64 e, 65 a 3-5, 66 a-b (henceforth Phileb.).
80. Inter alia, Phaed. 101 c 2-4. Cf. Fine, “Forms as Causes: Plato and Aristotle,” p. 93.
65
G:\Pabst\first corrections
Monday, January 16, 2012 2:51:43 PM
Color profile: Disabled
Composite  140 lpi at 45 degrees
subsistent substances, they are caused and sustained by forms (Phaed.
100 c-d). There is an asymmetric relation between immanent particulars
and transcendent universals. Universals are not self-sufficient either be-
cause they are coextensive with other universals — being, beauty, unity
are all coterminous. There is thus a symmetric relation amongst forms.
Moreover, universals are themselves relational because they all proceed
in some sense from the Good, the form of forms. Finally, there is an asym-
metric relation between the forms and the Good. So particulars are rela-
tional because the forms that are present in particulars and in which the
particulars participate are constituted relationally by the Good which is
transcendent and infuses everything with goodness. For Plato, individua-
tion marks the preservation and perfection of relationality through
knowledge of the Good and the praxis of justice in the polis. In this sense,
individuation is both metaphysical and political.
At first, it would appear that my reading meets easy refutation. Ac-
cording to David Armstrong, Plato’s theory of universals is relational and
therefore open to Aristotle’s critique of the ‘third man’ and infinite re-
gress.81 On this view, Aristotle’s alternative is superior because in his
metaphysics “although particularity and universality are inseparable as-
pects of all existence, they are neither reducible to each other, nor are
they related. Though distinct, their union is closer than relation.”82 If this
is true, then Plato’s conception of particulars and universals (and the re-
lation that pertains between them) suffers from the problem of the ‘third
man’ and from the fallacy of the infinite regress. Moreover, the inferiority
of Plato’s conception of universals is often thought to be the result of sep-
arating transcendent forms from immanent particulars. As Gareth
Matthews and Marc Cohen maintain in an influential article, this sepa-
34
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81. On the controversy surrounding the ‘third man’ argument and the critique of an
infinite regress in Plato, see Gregory Vlastos, “The Third Man Argument in the
Parmenides,” Philosophical Review 63 (1954): 319-49; Wilfrid Sellars, “Vlastos and the Third
Man,” Philosophical Review 64 (1955): 405-37; Gregory Vlastos, “Addenda to the TMA: Reply
to Professor Sellars,” Philosophical Review 64 (1955): 438-48; Peter T. Geach, “The Third
Man Again,” Philosophical Review 65 (1956): 72-82; G. Vlastos, “Postscript to the TMA: Reply
to Professor Geach,” Philosophical Review 65 (1956): 83-94; A. L. Peck, “Plato versus
Parmenides,” Philosophical Review 71 (1962): 159-84; John M. Rist, “The Immanence and
Transcendence of the Platonic Form,” Philologus 108 (1964): 217-32; Gail Fine, On Ideas: Ar-
istotle’s Criticism of Plato’s Theory of Forms (Oxford: Clarendon, 1993), pp. 203-41; Mary M.
McCabe, Plato’s Individuals (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994), pp. 83-90.
82. David M. Armstrong, Universals and Scientific Realism (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1978), vol. 2, p. 3.
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ration has the effect that Plato is left either with ‘bare particulars’ that
stand apart from forms or with ‘mere relational entities’ that depend on
other entities for their existence and their essence.83
The problem with this sort of argument is that it asserts rather than
demonstrates an absolute gulf between immaterial intelligible forms
and material sensible particulars in Plato’s metaphysics. Mary McCabe
rightly contends that concrete individual compounds are basic units
that are individuated by relations with other such compounds. As she
has documented, individuality is central to Plato’s metaphysics not only
because both universal forms and concrete particulars are individual,
but also and above all because for Plato, to be is to be one and being one
is being an individual.84 Since nothing in the sensible world is in or by it-
self, individual sensible particulars call forth an explanation in terms of
universal causes or forms. McCabe goes on to show that the aporiai of
the theory of forms (as exposed most clearly in the Parmenides,
Theaetetus, Timaeus, and the first part of The Sophist) lead Plato (in the
remainder of The Sophist, Philebus, and Politicus) to envision the cosmos
and all therein as a collection of “basic items, their properties and the re-
lations between them.” In consequence, sensible particulars are individ-
uated by being individuals in their own right, having relations with other
individuals and being differentiated from other individuals, a process
that McCabe terms a “context-relative account of individuation.”85
However, my reading differs from hers insofar as I maintain that for
Plato individuation concerns the very nature of beings and is therefore
not simply a matter of ‘context’ (even though the polis is a kind of con-
text). Compared with the pre-Socratic physicists, Plato’s innovation is to
demonstrate that individuality and relationality are inextricably linked
because neither substance nor accidents can account for identity over
time and across space. Rather than merely showing that individuals are
“bare and basic units” (McCabe) that entertain nonessential relations
with other such units, Plato’s metaphysics attempts to explain why
things are individual and what the finality of individuation might be.86
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83. Gareth B. Matthews and Marc S. Cohen, “The One and the Many,” Review of
Metaphysics 21 (1967-68): 630-55, esp. pp. 634-35, 643-44.
84. McCabe, Plato’s Individuals, pp. 3-5. The convertibility of being and oneness fore-
shadowed the Neo-Platonic emphasis on the generative One, as I shall argue in the next
chapter. See, infra, chapter 2, section 5.
85. McCabe, Plato’s Individuals, p. 5.
86. Cf. McCabe, Plato’s Individuals, pp. 3-21, 221-62, 301-8.
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The relations that individual particulars participate in are essential, not
accidental or contextual, because the essential properties of particulars
are fully relational, as has been argued independently by Héctor-Neri
Castañeda and Gail Fine.87 According to Castañeda’s reading of the
Phaedo, Plato, instead of positing “bare particulars,”88 defends the idea
that particulars are relational in two distinct yet connected ways. First,
particulars can participate in universal forms because the latter can be
participated in. Second, particulars are related to one another because
they participate in forms that are interconnected with each other. In
consequence, the relation between particulars reflects — albeit imper-
fectly — the relation amongst forms.89 Fine rightly argues that Plato
rules out the existence of “bare particulars” because material things in
the world are more than passive receptacles, for each particular has es-
sential properties by being connected to form. As such, all particulars
have essential properties relationally.
But Fine wrongly concludes that this account is similar to Aristotle’s
theory in the sense that concrete compounds are what they are in virtue
of being related to form or substance: “Platonic particulars are copies of
model forms; but they are also roughly independently identifiable
spatio-temporal continuants. In just the same way, Aristotelian primary
substances are roughly independently identifiable spatio-temporal con-
tinuants — even if they bear essential connection to other things, and so
do not exist independently of everything else.”90 Leaving aside Fine’s
point about the convergence of Plato and Aristotle, her reading does not
as yet explain why forms are participable and why particulars are partic-
ipatory. Nor does it account for why particulars can be relational vis-à-
vis other particulars. Beyond Castañeda and Fine, I contend that individ-
ual particulars are relational not only in the sense of having ‘essential
properties relationally,’ but also and above all in the sense of having indi-
vidual forms which are themselves relational because they are ultimately
brought into existence and sustained in being by the Good — the form of
all forms. Before I set out the implications of the self-emanating Good for
36
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87. Héctor-Neri Castañeda, “Plato’s Phaedo Theory of Relations,” Journal of Philosoph-
ical Logic 1 (1972): 467-80; Fine, “Relational Entities,” pp. 225-49.
88. On “bare particulars,” see Robert Stalnaker, “Anti-Essentialism,” Midwest Studies
in Philosophy 4 (1979): 343-55; Michael J. Loux, Substance and Attribute: A Study in Ontology
(Dordrecht: Reidel, 1978), pp. 140-52.
89. Castañeda, “Plato’s Phaedo Theory of Relations,” pp. 470-71.
90. Fine, “Relational Entities,” p. 248.
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the individuation of concrete particulars, I examine particulars and ‘re-
lational forms’ in the following section.
8. Relational Form
For Socrates and Plato, the realm of all things visible and invisible dis-
closes at once the unity of the cosmos and the diversity of its constitu-
ents. As such, our experience of reality raises the problem of the relation
between the one and the many. Both reject the idea that the perceptible
world and everything therein is either illusory or self-evident. Instead,
there are causes that explain the being and the becoming of all that is,
seen and unseen (e.g., Phaed. 95 e 9–96 a 1). In discerning intelligible
structures at the heart of sensible phenomena, Socrates and Plato seek
to identify universal explanatory factors that can account for the one-
ness of reality and the plurality of particulars. In the Euthyphro, Socrates
wonders about the holy and searches for “the general idea which makes
all pious things to be pious.”91 Likewise, in the Theaetetus, Socrates’ ob-
jection to his interlocutor’s numerous examples reflects this same quest:
“When I asked you for one thing you have given me many; when I asked
you for something simple, you gave me what is complex.”92
These and other passages indicate that Plato is no less concerned
with the overarching unity of the universe and everything therein than
Aristotle, but his solution to the question of how individual things can
(be said to) be both universal and particular differs significantly from his
pupil’s. Contrary to Aristotle’s definite list of categories, principles, and
causes, Plato’s meditations on the exact number of forms and on the
presence of multiple forms in particular things remains inconclusive, as
John Milbank has remarked.93 This reflects a more fundamental differ-
ence between Aristotle’s focus on the generation and evolution of things,
on the one hand, and Plato’s concentration on the derivation and origi-
nation of things, on the other hand. While Aristotle separates God’s pri-
mary substance from the being of beings and describes how individuals
37
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91. Euthyphro 6 D (henceforth Euthy.), in The Dialogues of Plato, trans. B. Jowett in two
volumes (New York: Random House, 1937), vol. 1, p. 387.
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are generated by other individuals, Plato views the Good as the source
and author of all things and shows why the existence of everything can
be traced to the ecstatic outflow and relational self-giving of the Good in
which all participate. (This is developed significantly by the [Christian]
Neo-Platonist synthesis of Plato and Aristotle, as I will suggest in subse-
quent chapters.) Arguably then, Plato provides a more compelling ac-
count of how things are actualized and individuated precisely because
he insists on the priority of the ‘why’ of relationality and participation
over the ‘how’ of substance and form-matter union. It is only because the
Good positions all things relationally that things are ordered to the tran-
scendent final cause they always already desire (though Aristotle’s the-
ory of causation and the concept of act and potency is indispensable for
a proper understanding of exactly how things undergo substantial
change without losing their unique station in the order of being).
On this basis I wish to make a number of points about Plato’s theologi-
cal metaphysics and metaphysical epistemology. First of all, Plato does not
advocate a turn away from sensible ephemeral particulars in the percepti-
ble world of things towards transcendent timeless forms in the invisible
world of ideas. Even though forms are themselves ‘things’ in “the most em-
inent way” (a conception that Christian Neo-Platonists developed in the
direction of divine ideas in God’s intellect),94 nothing in reality is except by
participation in the self-giving relational Good and the other forms.95 Sec-
ond, Plato locates the unity of particulars in the particulars themselves,
even though the ultimate source of this unity transcends each particular.
Already in the Phaedo, when he objects to Anaxagoras’ explanation of gen-
eration and corruption (Phaed. 97 c–99 b), Plato puts forward the alterna-
tive of particulars participating in forms (Phaed. 100 c 4-6, 101 c 2-4) by
pointing to the communion or presence of forms in particulars: “[N]othing
makes a thing beautiful but the presence or the communion of beauty (or
whatever the manner and nature of the relation may be); as I do not go so
far as to affirm that, but only that it is by the beautiful that all beautiful
things are beautiful.”96
Third, in the Phaedo 101 c 2-4 Plato uses the verb ‘to participate’ but
draws the distinction between the present and the aorist in order to em-
38
SUBSTANCE AND RELATION
94. Milbank, “Only Theology Saves Metaphysics,” p. 465.
95. On the question of separation and the immanence of forms in Plato, see Gail Fine,
“Separation,” OSAP 2 (1984): 31-87; Gail Fine, “Immanence,” OSAP 4 (1986): 71-97.
96. Phaed. 100 d 4–e 3, in The Dialogues of Plato, vol. 1, p. 484.
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phasize the difference between form possession and form acquisition.
For example, something is hot because fire is in it and brings on the form
of heat.97 In other words, particulars can participate in forms precisely
because forms are always already present in particulars, as I have previ-
ously indicated. For this reason, my fourth point is that there is within
the Platonic corpus a priority of metaphysics over epistemology. The ac-
tual, real presence of forms in things explains why things exist in the first
place and how the hyper-substantive Good engenders formalized mate-
rial beings. To grasp universal forms in particular things is therefore to
know a thing’s essence and existence.
I will delay addressing the key question of how Plato theorizes
knowledge of forms in things. For now, a fifth point needs to be made
about Plato’s realist metaphysics. Why and how can universal immate-
rial form be in particular material things? The starting point of the the-
ory of forms and the metaphysics of relationality is the shape of particu-
lars. For Plato, the shape of particulars intimates the presence of
universals. This presence is manifest in the beauty of sensible particu-
lars, which is mediated via the senses. Beauty is “shining in clearness
through the clearest aperture of sense. For sight is the most piercing of
our bodily senses . . . this is the privilege of beauty, that being the loveliest
she is also the most palpable to sight.”98 But in itself, the appeal to beauty
does not explain how universal forms might be present in particular
things. That is why Plato’s enquiry is not limited to separate causes that
explain the existence of discrete things but extends to the reality of par-
ticulars and to that which constitutes particulars qua particulars. It is
this enquiry that leads him to embark upon his “second voyage” (Phaed.
99 d 1-2)99 — the quest for a different conception of causation that binds
together efficient, formal, and final causes (a¼t¾ai) and relates everything
to the ultimate first principle and final end, the Good.
In this quest, Plato confronts the problem of one essential form and
multiple accidental forms in particulars. He begins by arguing that each
particular is constituted by a single form: “[i]f a man . . . does away with
ideas of things and will not admit that every individual thing has its own
determinate idea which is always one and the same, he will have nothing
39
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97. Fine, “Forms as Causes: Plato and Aristotle,” p. 89, note 41.
98. Phaed. 250 d, in The Dialogues of Plato, vol. 1, pp. 254-55.
99. Cf. Seth Bernadete, Socrates’ Second Sailing: On Plato’s Republic (Chicago: Univer-
sity of Chicago Press, 1989).
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on which his mind can rest; and so he will utterly destroy the power of
reasoning.”100 Only a single form which is proper to a particular being
can explain that being’s identity in difference and the stable unique iden-
tity over time and across space (e.g., Phaed. 103 B). Single form, Plato
continues, is not a product of the mind in the mind for the mind but in-
stead is manifest in each and every particular. As such it is perceptible to
the senses and intelligible to the mind. Why? Just as the eyes of the body
can glimpse the beauty of single unified forms (Phaedr. 250 a), so the
eyes of the mind can grasp the forms themselves which are mediated in
sensible particulars (Rep. VI 510 b 4-9, 511 b 3–c 2; VII 532 d).
At this juncture, I need to say something about Plato’s epistemology,
which avoids both proto-Cartesian innate ideas and hyper-Aristotelian
mental abstraction from sense perception. In fact, these two extreme po-
sitions put the emphasis on human intellectual agency at the expense of
divine illumination and the natural desire for knowledge of the supernat-
ural Good in God. Since sensory experience of the physical world awak-
ens the soul to the presence of intelligible forms in sensible things, Pla-
tonic knowledge of ideas exceeds mere recollection ({n}mnhsiv) of what
the soul had contemplated before its descent from heavenly heights of
eternity to the earthly embodiment in temporality, as Jean-Louis
Chrétien has documented.101 In fact, the process of {n}mnhsiv is best de-
scribed as a gradual awakening that does not consist in remembering in-
nate ideas and enabling the soul to overcome bodily entrapment
through abstract contemplation but rather encompasses the natural de-
sire to know, the senses that mediate perceptions, and an intellect that
has the capacity to receive species forms. Even the formation of concepts
to theorize the inherence of forms in things can be traced to the creative
and self-diffusive Good.102 Thus Plato describes a double movement
whereby the presence of infinite logos in finite reason enables and rein-
forces the participation of finite reason in the infinite logos — a realist-
idealist paradox beyond materialist dialectics and nihilist rationalism.
40
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Taken together, Plato’s realist metaphysics and his metaphysical
epistemology help explain why and how forms are relational and can be
known as such. What is it that the senses perceive and the mind
cognizes when they are directed by beauty towards particular things? It
is the relationality of material particulars to immaterial forms. Just as
the thought or concept of beauty points to the Form of Beauty, so the
sensible particular intimates the universal form. But why is the form,
which is proper to a particular, relational? How can it be so without un-
dermining the unity and identity of itself and of that same particular?
Julia Annas disputes that Plato’s theory in the Phaedo (and thereafter) is
teleological and causal. She argues that “goodness does not enter into it
[Plato’s theory]” and that “it is not a causal explanation.” Instead, “what
is being explained, is why a thing has a quality F; the Form explains this
with no reference to any particular processes or events of a thing’s com-
ing or ceasing to be F. Plato, in fact, has changed the subject.”103 Gail Fine
contends that Plato views forms as constituents rather than causes. The
link between forms and particulars in terms of bringing on the form in
the particular can (but does not necessarily) involve efficient causality,
in the sense that forms are constituents of events and states of affairs
that cause change.104 I agree with Fine that forms cannot be equated
with efficient causes because they exceed efficient causality and all types
of causation, since forms account for the constitution of particulars and
the entire cosmos. I also share her analysis of Plato’s teleology of the
Good. First, she is right in her critique of Gregory Vlastos, who wrongly
claims that final causes are confined to the actions of minds and souls,
when in fact for Plato they extend to material things.105 Second, she is
right in her argument that the form of the Good acts as a final cause not
only in the ‘realm’ of the physical (as the ordering principle of the
Demiurge’s creative activity in the Timaeus and the form of life in the
Phaedo 106 d 5-7) but also in the ‘realm’ of the ethical and the political (as
the ordering principle of all virtues in The Republic, the Symposium, and
the Phaedrus).106 As such, Plato’s account of the causation of forms can
41
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104. Fine, “Forms as Cause: Plato and Aristotle,” p. 102.
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only be understood in relation to the Good, which as the final cause
brings everything into being and orders it to its proper finality.
Beyond Fine, my contention is that for Plato forms in particulars are
not universal forms but instead particular reflections of universals — the
real presence of universal forms in particular things. The ‘meta-logic’ of
Plato’s metaphysics is not a relation between the one whole and its many
parts but instead — I would argue — the idea of relationality, which fol-
lows from the transcendence and radiance of the Good throughout the
cosmos. So configured, the Good enables the participation of diverse par-
ticulars in the one and only universal (I delay until the following section
my discussion of Plato’s vision of the Good). Unlike Fine, who restricts
relationality to some essential properties, I argue that the essence of a
particular as a whole is relational because it cannot exist independently
of the universal form, which is in each particular and imparts to all par-
ticulars their proper singular form. The presence of universal forms in
particulars also explains how and why particulars are one and individ-
ual. They are so because universals are one and individual and preserve
their oneness and individuality in particulars (though not their simplic-
ity). So the difference between universals and particulars is not oneness
or individuality but simplicity and complexity (or compound-ness).
If this is accurate, then how does Plato understand the relationality
of particulars in connection with forms? If not in terms of many parts to
the one whole, which idea best describes the link between sensible par-
ticulars and universal forms? As R. E. Allen has argued, already in the
‘middle dialogues’ Plato’s theory of forms rests on the metaphysical dif-
ference between forms and particulars and the analogy of “relation-to-
standard,” for forms function as paradigms that particulars imitate.107
The crux is the exact meaning and metaphysical status of “paradigm”
and “imitation.” Plato does not say that particulars resemble forms and
that their telos is to become like them in the sense of absolute identity.
He views particulars as manifold diverse reflections of universal forms.
This is important, as the link between an original and its reflections is
not the same as the connection between a model and its copies or a
42
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whole and its parts. Rather, the ‘being’ of a reflection is wholly relational
because it is utterly dependent upon the ‘being’ of the original. Yet at the
same time, the ‘being’ of the original is totally other than the ‘being’ of its
reflection (Tim. 50 d). The particular exists only as a resemblance, like a
shadow or an image in the mirror (though not, of course, a mirror im-
age). Put differently, particulars do not entertain symmetric relations
with universals, for this would introduce an intermediary instance be-
tween binary terms. Instead, particulars are constituted by universals
and as such are relational entities. Allen puts this well:
The reflection does not resemble the original; rather, it is a resem-
blance of the original. This is its nature, and the whole of its nature.
“Resemblances of ” are quasi-substantial; relational entities, not rela-
tions. They stand to their originals as the dependent to the indepen-
dent, as the less real to the more real. Plato’s metaphor of imitation
brilliantly expresses a community between different orders of objects,
different levels of reality; it does not, as his recent critics have main-
tained, collapse that order.108
In consequence, forms are not commutative universals, in the sense of
attributes that can be instantiated in material substrates. Rather, forms
refract across the cosmos, and particulars are ‘refractions of forms’ that
stand in analogous relation to the original source. Particulars mark
unique manifestations of universals in materiality.
This account implies that there is no relation between particulars
and forms, since an infinite regress would ensue. Instead, particulars as
exemplifications are irreducibly relational to forms as exemplars (Tim.
29 b). Particulars only imitate universals insofar as they share in them,
which is why particulars cannot be autonomous and universals do not
stand apart from their diverse reflections. As such, there can be neither
shared attributes nor a univocal community of being between sensible
particulars and universal forms. For particulars only exist to the extent
that they are in universals which are present in them, both existentially
and essentially (so to speak). Here we can go further than R. E. Allen. To
43
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recognize that each and every particular is relational is to know that all
particulars are only in relation to the universal forms they participate in.
Universal forms are themselves relational, in the sense that they depend
on a first principle and final end — the Good — which (as I shall argue)
constitutes them qua forms and which also constitutes particulars qua
particulars. To cognize the Good is to know that the Good is “the first
principle of the whole.”109 If this is true, then two further questions can
be raised which I address in the following section. First, why and how is
the Good self-exteriorizing? Second, is the Good purely teleological or
does it also act as the efficient cause of concrete particulars?
9. The Individuating Power of Plato’s Good
Aristotle claims that Plato’s idea of a self-subsistent form of the Good
which acts as a formal cause is untenable and must be abandoned in fa-
vor of a conception of the Good in terms of ultimate end (tŸlov) that is
the final cause of all things. Aristotle’s understanding of cause is “that
which is sought as an end” (tÌ d! oß ¥neka âv tŸlov).110 Consequently,
the Good is “that at which all things aim.”111 As I argued in sections 4 and
5 of the present chapter, the Good so configured by Aristotle does not im-
part actuality to the sublunary world and all things therein. As a result, it
cannot account for the preservation and perfection of individual sub-
stantial form. Likewise, the separation of the Prime Mover from the
world and the emphasis on the self-sufficiency of the supreme telos
shapes Aristotle’s account of politics, leading him to privilege the autar-
chy of the city-state, champion the sovereignty of individuals, and focus
on the goods that are purely human.
By contrast, Plato’s form of Good is “the good itself ” (aÔtÌ tÌ
{gajËn), a universal which is coextensive with all forms because all
forms are in virtue of the ecstatic self-exteriorizing ‘being’ of the Good.
The idea that the Good is “beyond being” (›p’ ›keÀna t«v oÔs¾av) ex-
presses its superabundance and plenitude, not its separation from being.
As such, the Good governs all forms and actualizes all particulars. By
analogy with the sun, the Good is “not only the author of visibility in all
44
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visible things, but of generation and nourishment and growth.”112 Unlike
Aristotle’s Prime Mover, Plato’s Good acts as formal and final cause and
co-acts as efficient cause because it is the source whence all forms derive
and all particulars are generated. It is also the telos to which all forms re-
fer and all particulars are ordered. The power of the Good to individuate
particulars operates both at the ontological and the epistemological
level. Just as the sun illuminates all things, so the Good enables the mind
to know particulars as relational. The Good does so by instilling the de-
sire to know the ultimate origin of all that is via the presence of beauty in
the physical world — an argument of Plato’s to which I alluded above and
which I discuss in greater detail below. For Plato, knowledge of the Good
is knowledge that the Good is in all and all is in the Good. To cognize the
Good as “the first principle of the whole” is to know that everything is re-
lational to the Good and that particulars are connected to one another
by sharing in the interrelation of forms. I first examine the implications
of relationality for the individuation of particulars before turning to the
interrelation of forms.
Already in the Phaedo Plato looks to the form of the Good (Phaed. 99
b-c) as he embarks upon his “second voyage in quest of the ultimate
causes” (Phaed. 99 d 1-2). To say that the Good is the form of forms is to
say that the Good makes all entities good (e.g., Rep. VII 533 c 9). In the
Timaeus, he characterizes the Demiurge as good, free from jealousy,
seeking to order materiality as beautifully as possible in accordance with
the highest Good (Tim. 28 a–47 d, esp. 29 e). In the words of Plato, “God
desired that all things should be good.”113 For the Good refracts across
the cosmos (Rep. VI 505 a 1-10; 509 b 6) and in so doing orders matter to
form. How can this be? According to Plato, the (relative) nonbeing and
privation of matter, which is the opposite of unity (Soph. 251 c–253 c),
serves as a passive receptacle for the reception of universal forms in par-
ticulars (Tim. 49 a, 51 a). This would seem to suggest that matter individ-
uates form, as the ‘this-ness’ of the material substrate imposes limits on
the ‘such-ness’ of form (Tim. 49 c–50 a). Yet at the same time, matter is
described as “formless, and free from the impress of any of those shapes
which it is hereafter to receive from without.”114 To define matter as be-
ing “devoid of any particular form” (Tim. 51 a) would appear to suggest
45
The Primacy of Relation over Substance
112. Rep. VI 509 b, in The Dialogues of Plato, vol. 1, p. 770.
113. Tim. 30 a, in The Dialogues of Plato, vol. 2, p. 14.
114. Tim. 50 c, in The Dialogues of Plato, vol. 2, p. 31.
77
G:\Pabst\first corrections
Monday, January 16, 2012 2:51:44 PM
Color profile: Disabled
Composite  140 lpi at 45 degrees
that form individuates matter. But since matter limits form on account
of its relative nonbeing or privation, matter ‘acts’ as an ultimate
ungenerated substrate and must exist if forms are to be reflected at
all.115 Plato views matter as irrational because it is neither sensible nor
intelligible and can only be apprehended by “a kind of spurious reason”
(Tim. 52 b). As such, matter remains unexplained because its necessary
existence is presupposed, not demonstrated. This conception of matter
shifts the onus of individuality and individuation onto form. That which
makes composites particular and secures their identity over time is their
form, not the composition of matter-form (as Aristotle argued). Matter
only matters to individuation insofar as it has been ordered by form and
thus dimly reflects the being and goodness of the Good.
However, Plato’s account of individuation is not fatally undermined
by his claim that matter is unintelligible and inexplicable. Here the
Philebus is crucial because it makes clear that universal forms are not
opposed to particular things. Instead, forms introduce limits into the
unlimited and thus constitute individuals (Phileb. 26 d 9-10). Referring
to Philebus 25 a 8–b 1, Kenneth Sayre argues that forms do so by provid-
ing “ ‘proportions of numbers and measures’ by which Limit is imposed
upon the Unlimited. To put it summarily, Forms are the numbers and
measures by which the Great and (the) Small is made definite and de-
terminate.”116 Limits consist of that which relates as number to number
or measure to measure. Opposites in the Unlimited are made intelligible
and harmonious by the introduction of numbers and measures (Phileb.
25 b 1–e 2). For Plato, individuals are constituted and individuated by
the interaction of the unity of forms with the divisions of matter. What
individuates concrete compounds is the diverse particular refraction of
the universal Good in particular entities composed of both form and
matter.
This underlines the importance of beauty in the phenomenal un-
folding of the Good. In the Timaeus, Plato also describes beauty as the
standard for the Good (Tim. 87 c 4-5). As the Phaedrus makes clear,
beauty is the prime medium through which the mind via the senses is
alerted to the presence of the Good in the physical world. For beauty
46
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shines forth within the visibility of the material and thus stirs up love for
the Good (Phaedr. 250 c).117 This love moves the soul away from the pas-
sions for the merely physical and uplifts the mind towards knowledge of
beauty and goodness. It also induces the praxis of justice, which pre-
serves the Good and operates its extension in the polis. The Good does
not merely manifest itself locally but is the very appearance and visibility
of phenomena (Phaedr. 250 d). Therefore, the Good is analogous to the
sun, which does not simply shed light onto things but is itself light and
luminosity. Such is the ecstatic plenitude of the Good that it is not by it-
self but acts “in that in which it exists and which it affects.”118 As Hans-
Georg Gadamer remarks, Plato described in the Philebus how the Good
via the beautiful constitutes and individuates the entire cosmic order,
which is
raised out of the limitless flowing away of mere genesis and raised up
into ousia (being). Its having been raised to ousia constitutes the intelli-
gibility (nous), or dis-concealedness (al3theia), of the cosmic order. In all
these instances the eidetic-ideal can be discerned, picked out, because
it is contained in them (heur3sein gar enousan [ for (it is) to be found ex-
isting therein]) (Phileb. 16 D). . . . To this extent the beautiful is the same
as the good, which provides everything that is with its true being —
with the being, namely, that we have called here eidetic-ideal.119
In summary, all particulars are relational because they depend for their
essence, their existence, and their continuous being on the Good. Like-
wise, forms are relational because they are united by the Good and the
Good is coextensive with each and every form, for all the forms intimate
the Good and the Good unifies all the forms.
For Plato, it is beauty in the physical world that propels us to seek the
Good which we desire. He describes the ascent of the mind from the per-
47
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ception (aÂsjhsiv) of sensible particulars via knowledge of forms by way
of concepts (nËhma) towards the cognition (nËhsiv) of the Good (Rep. VI
510 b 4-9; 511 b 3–c 2). Following this ascent (Symp. 210 a), the mind sees
first of all the relationality of each and every particular because nothing
comes from nothing and nothing can sustain itself in being. The mind
also discerns that particulars are ultimately constituted by the Good and
shaped by diverse forms that are interrelated (Soph. 252 d–254 b). Knowl-
edge of particulars and forms as relational and of the Good as the ‘first
principle of the whole’ individuates the knower insofar as the telos of hu-
man beings is to fulfill their desire to know. Likewise, knowledge in some
sense individuates the things known because the telos of all things is to re-
flect the plenitude of the Good. So being is coextensive with knowing and
knowledge perfects being.
Already in The Republic but also in later dialogues like the Theaetetus
and The Sophist, Plato emphasizes the interrelation of forms.120 This
idea implies not only that individuals participate in a variety of forms
when they participate in one form, but also that there is a reflection of
the interrelation of forms in the physical world — the interrelation of
particulars. Relations amongst individuals in the polis individuate each
and every participant, especially in the communal discernment and ex-
ercise of justice. The power of the Good generates and sustains the indi-
viduating effects of relations between individuals. The love of beauty,
which is elicited by the beautiful forms of particulars in the physical
world, awakens the desire to know the forms and their ultimate source.
The philosopher who knows forms seeks to preserve forms in the sensi-
ble world and to defend and extend the goodness present in all particu-
lars. As John Rist notes, in the Symposium
[h]is [the philosopher’s] object of love is Beauty itself, and, since he
knows the Forms, he cannot but create and beget true virtue. Love of
Beauty must make the philosopher creative. His creativity is the out-
come of his vision of the world of Forms; it is not desired for any ulte-
rior motive of obtaining immortality. Is it then unreasonable to call
such activity ‘overflowing,’ and is not such overflowing the culmina-
tion and effect of 1Erwv ? There can be no reasonable doubt that the
48
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120. Rep. VI 510 b, 511 b, VII 517 b-c, 519 c-d, 526 e ; Theaet. 206 c–208 b; Soph. 259 e,
263 e–264 a. Cf. Alexander Nehamas, “Participation and Predication in Plato’s Late Dia-
logues,” Review of Metaphysics 32 (1982): 343-74.
80
G:\Pabst\first corrections
Monday, January 16, 2012 2:51:44 PM
Color profile: Disabled
Composite  140 lpi at 45 degrees
1Erwv of the philosopher ‘overflows’ into creation in a way that cannot
possibly be dismissed as simply appetitive.121
The recognition of goodness in the beauty of the physical world leads the
philosopher to search for the form of justice and to make it real in the
polis, by helping to create order out of chaos upon the return to the Cave
(Rep. VII 520 c). He does so by modeling institutions and practices ac-
cording to the form of justice and the virtues embodying them.122 The
unity of the polis and of a virtuous good life is secured by the unity of the
Good which informs the knowledge of forms and sustains the action to
make the ideal of the Good real in the cosmos. This for Plato is what it is
to be a more fully individuated particular being.
10. Conclusion: Matter Matters
Plato’s metaphysics surpasses Aristotle’s ontology by refusing any sepa-
ration between the divine first principle which is also the final end and
all the immanent beings that are oriented towards their transcendent
source. However, the Good as the form of all forms orders chaotic mat-
ter; it does not create it.123 Plato presumes rather than demonstrates the
preexistence of matter. In consequence, Plato’s metaphysics fails to ex-
plain how matter comes into being and why it would ‘desire’ to be
formed. Aristotle’s account of matter is more philosophically developed
but no less theologically problematic. To identify form or essence with
substance is to run into an impasse, as Richard Rorty remarks, because
concrete substances are generated out of matter and contain matter, but
as pure potency matter is not (Met. Z 7, 1032a15-23). The problem is that
form is the sole cause of substances, yet at the same time form requires
49
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121. Rist, Eros and Psyche, p. 36 (original italics).
122. A longer exposition of Plato’s metaphysical politics is beyond the scope of this
chapter. See Zdravko Planinc, Plato’s Political Philosophy: Prudence in the Republic and the
Laws (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 1991); Lloyd P. Gerson, Knowing Persons: A
Study in Plato (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), pp. 148-275; Dominic O’Meara,
Platonopolis: Platonic Political Philosophy in Late Antiquity (Oxford: Clarendon Press,
2003); Catherine Pickstock, “Justice and Prudence: Principles of Order in the Platonic
City,” Telos 119 (Spring 2001): 3-17; Catherine Pickstock, Theory, Religion and Idiom in Pla-
tonic Philosophy (Oxford: Blackwell, forthcoming).
123. Eslick, “The Material Substrate,” pp. 39-54.
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matter, which is purely passive. This is compounded by Aristotle’s use of
two different meanings of substance in the Metaphysics — substance as
essence and substance as a form-matter compound. Moreover, matter is
part of the formula (lËgov) of composite substances (Met. Z 7, 1033a6).124
This raises two questions. First, how can the pure potency of matter be
capable of being actualized? Second, how can matter be part of a thing’s
essence and definition? Aristotle addresses both questions by rejecting
the idea of form and matter as separate parts of a unified whole in favor
of the idea that matter and form are one and the same thing, the former
potentially and the latter actually:
[T]he proximate matter and the form are one and the same thing, the
one potentially, the other actually. Therefore to ask the cause of their
being one is like asking the cause of unity in general; for each thing is a
unity, and the potential and the actual are somehow one.125
Matter and form are unified by the efficient cause, defined as that which
actualizes the potency of matter to be this rather than that. So config-
ured, matter is a proximate material cause. As such, matter can act as a
material cause for other composites, yet at the same time it can be par-
ticular to a single substance: “[T]here is a matter proper to each
[thing].”126 Aristotle maintains that matter is integral to the essence of
individual unified composites by arguing that proximate matter is po-
tentially what individual substantial form is actually. In consequence, in-
dividual substantial form and proximate matter constitute a unity which
is one and individual.
But to say that matter acts as material cause whereas form acts as
formal and efficient cause and to say that conjointly they produce indi-
vidual composites raises a second set of problems, in particular the
metaphysical status of matter as potency.127 Aristotle’s understanding
50
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124. Rorty, “Genus as Matter: A Reading of Metaphysics Z-H,” esp. p. 404.
125. Met. H 6, 1045b17-21, in The Complete Works of Aristotle, vol. 2, p. 1651.
126. Met. H 4, 1044a17, in The Complete Works of Aristotle, vol. 2, p. 1648.
127. On Aristotle’s account of matter in relation to form, see Harold F. Cherniss, Aris-
totle’s Criticism of Plato and the Academy (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press,
1944), pp. 83-173, 376-479; John J. FitzGerald, “ ‘Matter’ in Nature and Knowledge of Nature:
Aristotle and the Aristotelian Tradition,” in McMullin, ed., The Concept of Matter in Greek
and Medieval Philosophy, pp. 59-78, esp. pp. 69-74; Norbert Luyten, “Matter as Potency,” in
The Concept of Matter in Greek and Medieval Philosophy, pp. 102-23, esp. pp. 105-10; Joseph
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of matter in relation to the problem of individuation seems to be am-
bivalent at best and contradictory at worst. Matter is variably con-
ceived as either prior to form because it is the subject for form and ex-
ists before and after substantial change (e.g., Phys. I 7, 191a8-12) or
posterior to form because nothing can be in actuality without the act
of form (e.g., Met. Z 8, 1033a24–1033b19). Aristotle attempts to solve this
conundrum with the following two arguments. First, proximate matter
is coextensive with individual substantial form in the sense that form
and matter are somehow both in being — both constitute equally the
matter-form complex that determines what a thing is. Second, proxi-
mate matter cannot exist or be what it is independently of the form of
the object — the material composite is fully determined what it is by
its form. However, this solution solves nothing because it fails to spec-
ify the genesis of proximate matter and the reasons for its capacity to
be this particular composite rather than that particular composite. For
Aristotle, the origin and change of proximate matter is a function of
other instances of proximate matter that act as agents. For example,
man engenders man and all plants are generated from seeds.128 In or-
der to guard against an infinite regress, Aristotle needs to posit the ex-
istence of matter as pure potency which is eternal and the existence of
substantial form which ultimately derives from the pure actuality of an
indifferent God.
My critique of Aristotle’s ontology and theology centers on his un-
demonstrated presupposition that matter is the formless ground of ma-
terial reality (Phys. I 7, 191a8-12). Matter thus conceived is neither individ-
ual nor universal but rather void of all determinations. Therefore, matter
does not come from nothing, but it tends towards nothing. It persists
throughout substantial change and remains after all forms have been re-
moved. As such, it is the substrate for generation and corruption (GC I 4,
320a2-5). Matter is defined in the Metaphysics as “that which in itself is
neither a particular thing nor of a certain quantity nor assigned to any
other of the categories by which being is determined.”129 But the eternity
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Owens, “Matter and Predication in Aristotle,” in The Concept of Matter in Greek and Medi-
eval Philosophy, pp. 79-101, esp. pp. 79-93; Rorty, “Genus as Matter: A Reading of
Metaphysics Z-H,” pp. 397-420; Mary L. Gill, “Perceptible Substances in Metaphysics H 1-5,”
in Aristoteles, Metaphysik, die Substanzbücher ([Zeta], [Eta], [Theta]), ed. Christof Rapp
(Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 1996), pp. 209-28.
128. See, inter alia, Phys. I 7, 190b1-4; Met. Z 8, 1033b29-33.
129. Met. Z 3, 1029a20-22, in The Complete Works of Aristotle, vol. 2, p. 1625. Cf. Jean Ma-
83
G:\Pabst\first corrections
Monday, January 16, 2012 2:51:45 PM
Color profile: Disabled
Composite  140 lpi at 45 degrees
and formlessness of matter deprive Aristotle’s ontology of an account of
material capacity to receive form and be actualized. If all that is stands
in potency to the Prime Mover as the final cause and if there is no formal
mediation of actuality, then Aristotle cannot explain how the realm of
form-matter compounds comes into existence and is sustained in being.
He can only presuppose a kind of drive of material potentiality towards
the final telos for which his idea of matter as pure potency gives no war-
rant. Indeed, the actuality of the first mover does not act as efficient
cause for the sublunary world and thus cannot explain how and why in-
dividual composites are actualized and individuated. From the pure pas-
sivity of matter it follows that Aristotle shifts the onus of individuation
onto individual substantial form because the actuality of substantial
form is the efficient and formal cause of concrete composites. In short,
Aristotle’s account of matter as pure potency is philosophically superior
to Plato’s idea of matter as formless chaos, but Aristotle’s indifferent God
is theologically regressive compared with Plato’s vision of an ecstatic
Good that infuses all things with goodness.
To recapitulate: I have shown that in Aristotle’s first philosophy the
exclusively causal link that pertains between the Prime Mover and the
sublunary world rules out any cosmic transcendence of the Good and
privileges the justice of certain ‘aristocratic’ virtues. The result is that the
divine is eliminated from ‘lower’ practical activities and thereby from the
individuation of human beings who actualize and perfect their form by
engaging in such activities. Thus, the individuality and individuation of
concrete composites is ultimately severed from the pure actuality of Ar-
istotle’s divinity. By contrast, for Plato the individuation of composites is
the relationality of particulars to forms and ultimately the Good. I have
also shown that only the Good so configured can account for the
relationality of particulars. This is because particulars depend for their
existence, their essence, and their continuous being on forms and the
Good as the form of forms which constitutes them relationally. For Plato,
what individuates individual compounds is the participation in the rela-
tions amongst forms and the praxis of relations with other individual
compounds. Unlike Aristotle’s Prime Mover, Plato’s Good constitutes the
52
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rie Le Blond, Logique et méthode chez Aristote: Étude sur la recherche des principes dans la
physique aristotélicienne (Paris: Vrin, 1939); William Norris Clarke, “The Limitation of Act
by Potency in St. Thomas: Aristotelianism or Neo-Platonism,” New Scholasticism 26 (1952):
167-94, esp. pp. 178-83.
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final, formal, and efficient cause of all that is; yet at the same time, the
Good is beyond causality because it constitutes the cosmos as a whole
and sustains everything within it in being. As a result, the Good is in all
things and all things are in the Good. Only the ecstatic plenitude and
self-exteriorization of the Good across the entire cosmos explain why
particulars and forms are relational.
Plato’s argument in the Philebus about forms providing limits in
terms of numbers and measures is significant for three reasons. First of
all, it implies that matter (conceived as a receptacle) does not individu-
ate universal form because form is always already individuated and ex-
ists in particulars. As such, individual beings reflect in particulars and
diverse ways the manifold mediation of universal forms and the form of
forms. Accordingly, matter merely accounts for the numerical diversity
of particulars which share in the same form, but materiality is excluded
from the essence of matter-form compounds. Second, Plato’s conception
of unintelligible matter which functions as a receptacle does not explain
how and why in particular sensible things matter is part of essence and
can be known as such. Aristotle’s definition of matter as pure potency
marks an improvement but also fails to explain why there is any materi-
ality in the first place. By contrast, Christian theology provides an ac-
count of matter in terms of creation ex nihilo and explains why matter is
part of the essence of compounds, as I will suggest throughout this essay.
Third, this account is based on Plato’s idea of forms as numbers and
measures and as thoughts in the divine mind.130 This vision is later re-
trieved and transformed by patristic and medieval theologians such as
Gregory of Nyssa, Augustine, Boethius, and Aquinas in their account of
the individuation of concrete composites. By fusing the biblical idea of
creation ex nihilo with Plato’s metaphysics of the Good and Aristotle’s on-
tology of act and potency, Christian Neo-Platonism ties the divine to the
cosmic and the human and thus overcomes the dualism between the one
and the many left unresolved by pre-Socratic poetry and philosophy.
That is what I argue in the following chapters.
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130. Rep. VI 510 b 4-9, 511 b 3–c 2; Tim. 29 e 1-3, 30 c 2–31 a 1.
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CHAPTER 2
Trinitarian God and Triadic Cosmos
1. Introduction: Ancient Philosophy and Biblical Revelation
In the autumn of 1947, Albert Camus wrote the following entry in his
notebook: “If, to outgrow nihilism, one must return to Christianity, one
may well follow the impulse and outgrow Christianity in Hellenism.”1 A
few years later, Camus restated his belief that Greek philosophy is the
only genuine alternative to both Christianity and modernity: “Go back to
the passage from Hellenism to Christianity, the true and only turning
point in history.”2 Camus’s claim that the Christian tradition usurps and
diminishes the universality of Greek philosophy is at odds with an earlier
work of his titled Christian Metaphysics and Neoplatonism, where he
(rightly) argues that “Greece is continued in Christianity. And Christian-
ity is prefigured in Hellenic thought.”3 This brings into sharp focus the
nature of the link between ancient philosophy and biblical revelation.
The recent and current debate on this link is commonly associated
with the work of Adolf von Harnack (1851-1930), in particular his asser-
tion that the encounter between Hellenic thought and the Christian faith
led to a distortion of Jesus’ “plain and simple teaching”4 and of Paul’s
Christocentric theology: “The decisive thing was the conversion of the
54
1. Albert Camus, Notebooks 1942-1951, trans. Justin O’Brien (New York: Paragon House,
1991), p. 183.
2. Camus, Notebooks 1942-1951, p. 267.
3. Albert Camus, Christian Metaphysics and Neoplatonism, trans. Ronald D. Srigley
(Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 2007), p. 43.
4. Adolf von Harnack, History of Dogma, 3rd ed., trans. Neil Buchanan (London: Wil-
liams & Norgate, 1897), vol. 1, p. 61.
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Gospel into a doctrine, into an absolute philosophy of religion.”5 More re-
cently, Pope Benedict XVI in his controversial Regensburg lecture on the
hellenization and de-hellenization of Christianity has provided a power-
ful and compelling refutation of Harnack’s view. Benedict’s argument is
that there is a profound harmony between Greek enquiry and biblical
faith, and that the rapprochement between the two was not a matter of
chance but instead responded to an intrinsic necessity to explore the
dual meaning of Logos as both reason and word.6 Far from reactionary
nostalgia, the Pope’s intervention seeks to recover and extend the shared
Hebraic and Hellenic emphasis on the rational intelligibility of the di-
vinely created cosmos. This ancient legacy was accomplished by the bib-
lical revelation that God is the incarnate Logos and that faith intensifies
reason through universal divine grace and love — a revelation mediated
in and through the complex interplay of the Book of Scripture, the Book
of Nature, and the Book of History, as the Church Fathers and Doctors in
both East and West demonstrated.7
Notably, Benedict contends that the premodern tradition of theo-
logical intellectualism and metaphysical realism was aborted by the
(predominantly Franciscan) conception and institution of voluntarism
and nominalism. In turn, advocates of a voluntarist and nominalist the-
ology in the late Middle Ages such as John Duns Scotus (c. 1265/66-1308)
and William of Ockham (c. 1288/89-1349) inaugurated the modern secu-
lar separation of nature from the supernatural and the concomitant di-
vorce of philosophy, physics, and ethics from theology that was rein-
forced by influential early modern figures such as Francisco Suárez
55
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5. Harnack, History of Dogma, vol. 1, p. 252. For a useful account of Harnack’s position,
see William V. Rowe, “Adolf von Harnack and the Concept of Hellenization,” in
Hellenization Revisited, ed. Wendy Hellman (Lanham, MD: University Press of America,
1994), pp. 69-98.
6. Pope Benedict XVI, “Glaube, Vernunft und Universität. Erinnerungen und
Reflexionen,” lecture at the University of Regensburg on 12 September 2006, published as
Glaube und Vernunft. Die Regensburger Vorlesung (Freiburg: Herder, 2006); The Regensburg
Lecture, trans. James V. Schall, SJ (Chicago: St. Augustine’s Press, 2007).
7. Henri de Lubac, Exégèse Médiévale: Les Quatre sens de L’Écriture, 4 vols. (Paris:
Aubier-Montaigne, 1959-1961), première partie, chs. 1, 2 and 5, pp. 56-74, 100-118; ch. 3, pp.
171-220; ch. 5, pp. 305-72. Cf. Dom Gregory Dix, The ‘Hellenization’ of the Gospel (Uppsala:
Almqvist & Wiksell, 1953); Alois Grillmeier, “Hellenisierung-Judaisierung des Christen-
tums als Deuteprinzipien der Geschichte des kirchlichen Dogmas,” in Grillmeier, Mit ihm
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(1548-1616), as I will discuss in chapters 6 and 7. This legacy is fiercely
guarded and faithfully perpetuated by the Pope’s neo-scholastic (and
theo-conservative/neo-liberal) critics, including George Weigel, Mi-
chael Novak, Ralph McInerny, and Romano Cesario, OP, who pour scorn
on Benedict’s defense of nouvelle théologie against neo-scholasticism
and advance modern readings of patristic and medieval theology.8
What these and other papal despisers ignore is the Pope’s point about
the equation of de-hellenization and secularization: in the long and
nonlinear passage to modernity, faith was sundered from reason and
reason was gradually reduced to the narrow rationality of logical deduc-
tion, mathematical calculation, and scientific experimentation.9 As a
result, the patristic and medieval account of human reason in terms of
illumined cognition of the presence of the Creator God in all created
things was abandoned in favor of innate ideas of the divine. Such a con-
ception is entirely compatible with both theism and deism, as the his-
tory of modernity attests.
By contrast, catholic orthodox Christianity always viewed reason it-
self as a gift of God that is elevated by revelation and faith. As I shall ar-
gue in the present chapter, St. Augustine of Hippo argued against the
Skeptics that the proper exercise of reason involves a kind of prerational
trust or faith (pistis) in the senses, the imagination, and the intellect pre-
cisely because even after the Fall the created mind is always already at-
tuned to the Good in all things. For many, this will be cause for dismiss-
ing Augustine’s theology as little more than a partially Christianized
variant of Neo-Platonist idealism. But Augustine outflanks all his critics
by developing the Platonic account of beauty as the first effect of the
Good in the world (Phaedrus 250 c-d) in a Trinitarian direction. He does
so by showing that the triadic structures of self and the world — high-
56
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8. For example, see Ralph McInerny, Being and Predication: Thomistic Interpretations
(Washington, DC: Catholic University of America Press, 1986) and Aquinas and Analogy
(Washington, DC: Catholic University of America Press, 1996).
9. For detailed accounts that corroborate the Pope’s distinction between the
premodern hellenization of Christianity and its modern de-hellenization, see, inter alia,
Romano Guardini, Das End der Neuzeit (Würzburg: Werkbund-Verlag, 1950); Hans
Blumenberg, Die Legitimität der Neuzeit (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1996 [1966]);
Amos Funkenstein, Theology and the Scientific Imagination from the Middle Ages to the Sev-
enteenth Century (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986); Louis Dupré, Passage to
Modernity: An Essay in the Hermeneutics of Nature and Culture (New Haven, CT: Yale Uni-
versity Press, 1993); Catherine Pickstock, After Writing: On the Liturgical Consummation of
Philosophy (Oxford: Blackwell, 1998), pp. 121-66.
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lighted in the Neo-Platonism of Plotinus (c. 204/5-270) and Iamblichus
(c. 240-325) — mirror the triune nature of God. Knowledge of the Trini-
tarian vestiges in the world is available to fallen man precisely because
Christ’s unique nature and personhood discloses the filial relation with
the Father and the workings of the Spirit.10 Through an awakening
({n}mnhsiv) of the intellect to the presence of God’s wisdom, which or-
ders all things according to the triadic structure of measure, number,
and weight (as Scripture alerts us to in the Book of Wisdom 11:20-21),
Christ restored mediate cognition of God in the human mind through di-
vine illumination, an account that differs fundamentally from Cartesian
innate ideas (as I have already hinted).11
This chapter also suggests that for Augustine, faith habituates rea-
son to see the effects of God in all things, just as reason helps ‘faith seek-
ing understanding’ (De Trin. XV.li [prayer]) by relating the natural desire
for the supernatural Good in God to the whole of creation, which reflects
the Creator in diverse ways that no single finite mind can ever be equal
to. Hence faith upholds reason and broadens its scope while reason
binds faith to cognition and thereby ties together perception and imagi-
nation (‘lower reason’) with intellectual vision (‘higher reason’) so that
knowledge of the world (scientia) and knowledge of God (sapientia) con-
verge and prepare man for the beatific vision in the life to come.
My argument in this chapter is therefore twofold. First, Augustine’s
synthesis of Neo-Platonist metaphysics and the biblical doctrine of cre-
ation ex nihilo does not compromise the autonomy of philosophy or dis-
tort the integrity of theology. To the contrary, it fulfills the insights of Neo-
Platonism and elucidates the truth of scriptural revelation. Just as only
Trinitarian theology can explain why the whole of reality is ordered in
triadic ways, so too only the sacred triads of Neo-Platonism can explain
how the vestiges of the Trinity are mediated in this world. Second, Augus-
tine’s account of creation and individuation is neither a proto-Cartesian
antecedent of the modern obsession with the subjectivity of the self nor a
regressive return to the dualism of Plato, which in any case is a distortion
of Plato (as I suggested in the previous chapter). Much rather, Augustine’s
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10. St. Augustine, De Trinitate XIII.xi.15; XII.x.14 (henceforth De Trin.).
11. On Augustine’s theological epistemology, see Lydia Schumacher, Divine Illumina-
tion: The History and Future of Augustine’s Theory of Knowledge (Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell,
2011). Cf. Adrian Pabst, “Wisdom and the Art of Politics,” in Encounter between Eastern Or-
thodoxy and Radical Orthodoxy: Transfiguring the World Through the Word, ed. Adrian
Pabst and Christoph Schneider (Aldershot, UK: Ashgate, 2009), pp. 109-37.
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Trinitarian theology accentuates the priority of ‘relational positioning’
that is already intimated in the horizontal participation amongst the
forms themselves in Plato, the aesthetic interplay of the One and the
Dyad in Plotinus, and the hierarchical, triadic groupings in Iamblichus
(and later Proclus). By relating the individuation of creation to the triune
Creator, Augustine brings matter itself within the scope of the vertical
asymmetrical relationality that forms the precondition for the participa-
tion of all that exists in the original source of being in God. As such, the
theological metaphysics of Christian Neo-Platonists like Augustine,
which informs the Pope’s narrative in the Regensburg address, offers a
rich and as yet unrealized potential for an alternative modernity where
both the rationalism of militant secularists and the fideism of religious
fundamentalists are abandoned in favor of the ‘grandeur of reason’ and a
new kind of engagement between all faiths and cultures.
In what follows, I begin by arguing that the early Christian fusion of
ancient philosophy with biblical revelation surpasses both the Hellenic
and the Hebraic account of the link between the one and the many and
provides an account of individuation in terms of a theological metaphys-
ics of creation ex nihilo. This synthesis can be traced to the Apostolic Fa-
thers, the Apologists, and the Cappadocians, especially Gregory of Nyssa
(sections 2-4). It finds its first full expression in the work of Augustine
(sections 5-10). Gregory’s and Augustine’s contributions to patristic re-
flections on the paradox of divine unity and diversity and the participa-
tion of creation in the Trinitarian relationality of the Godhead were com-
plementary and critical to the development of pre- and post-Nicene
Christian theology in both East and West. Building upon the scholarship
of Rowan Williams and Lewis Ayres, one of my arguments is that the op-
position between ‘western’ Latin monistic and ‘eastern’ Greek pluralistic
conceptions of the Trinity is misleading and fails to recognize the shared
theological-philosophical framework that underpinned Roman and
Byzantine Christendom.
2. (Neo-)Platonism and Christian Metaphysics
A. The Hellenization of Christianity
From the dawn of the Church, Christian thinkers in both East and West de-
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tween biblical revelation and ancient philosophy did of course not date
from the times of the earliest Christians but can be traced to those Jewish
communities in whose midst emerged Hellenized Judaism. This is perhaps
most of all true for Philo of Alexandria (20 bc–ad 50), who was a contem-
porary of Jesus and argued for an allegorical interpretation of Scripture
that drew on ancient mythology and philosophy — an experience that
foreshadowed the ‘inculturation’ of Christianity in pagan societies.12 In-
deed, both Jesus himself and the Apostles were rooted in the Hellenic tra-
dition of Judaism, as were the Apostolic Fathers and the Apologists who
viewed Greek and Roman thought as preparatio evangelica. But among the
Jewish people there were those like the Maccabees and the Zealots who
opposed any rapprochement with Hellenism. Likewise, among Christians
there were those like Tatian (c. 110-180) and Tertullian (c. 160-220) who
equated ancient philosophy with unbelief and heresy: “What has Athens
to do with Jerusalem?” Tertullian asked provocatively.13 “Wretched Aris-
totle,” he proclaimed, “God has spoken to us: it is no longer necessary for
us to philosophize. Revelation is all that is required. He who merely be-
lieves in the word of God knows more than the greatest philosophers have
ever known concerning the only matter of vital importance.”14
Instead of such a binary opposition, the Fathers and Doctors of the
Church who integrated both Hellenized Judaism and the Greco-Roman
tradition into Christianity developed a symbiotic relation: just as Chris-
tian theology fulfills ancient philosophy, so ancient philosophy assists
Christian ‘faith seeking understanding’ — exploring the paradox of
Christ’s full divinity and humanity and making the unknowable mystery
of the Incarnation and the Resurrection rationally intelligible.15 Nowhere
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12. On Philo, see Matthew J. Bullimore, “Government by Transcendence: The Analogy
of the Soul, the City and the Cosmos in Plato, Philo and St Paul” (University of Cambridge
Ph.D. thesis, 2007). Cf. Martin Hengel, Juden, Griechen und Barbaren. Aspekte der
Hellenisierung des Judentums in vorchristlicher Zeit, Stuttgarter Bibelstudien 76 (Stuttgart:
Katholisches Bibelwerk, 1976), English translation: Jews, Greeks and Barbarians: Aspects of
the Hellenization of Judaism in the Pre-Christian Period, trans. John Bowden (Philadelphia:
Fortress, 1980); Martin Hengel, The ‘Hellenization’ of Judea in the First Century after Christ,
trans. John Bowden (Philadelphia: Trinity, 1989).
13. Tertullian, De praescriptione haereticorum, in The Ante-Nicene Fathers, ed. Alexan-
der Robertson, James Donaldson, and Arthur Cleveland Coxe (New York: Cosimo, 2007;
orig. pub. 1885), vol. 3: Latin Christianity, p. 246.
14. Tertullian, De praescriptione haereticorum, p. 246 (translation modified).
15. On the status of ancient philosophy in Christian theology, see, inter alia, A. H.
Armstrong and R. A. Markus, Christian Faith and Greek Philosophy (London: Darton,
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was this synthesis more decisive in the formative period of Christian the-
ology than in the process leading to the Council of Nicaea in 325 and the
formation of a post-Nicene ‘theological culture’ composed of a diversity of
strands binding together different accounts of metaphysics, cosmology,
epistemology, anthropology, and exegesis, as Lewis Ayres has compre-
hensively documented.16 In this complex and nonlinear development, a
wide range of theologians in both East and West transformed (Neo-)Pla-
tonism and other traditions of ancient philosophy into Christian meta-
physics, which helped address some of the Christological and Trinitarian
disputes and thereby made a critical contribution to the emergence of an
orthodox catholic Christian theology.17 The Christianized (Neo-)Platon-
ism of Church Fathers such as Justin, Clement, Origen, Gregory, and Au-
gustine did not simply correct the philosophical and theological errors of
Plato (the preexistence of chaotic matter; the creation of formal order out
of material chaos, etc.) and Plotinus (equating matter with absolute evil;
the tension between the absolute unity of the One and the plurality of its
products; the relation between the One and the metaphysical hierarchy of
the world, etc.). Much rather, Christian (Neo-)Platonists modified ancient
philosophy precisely in order to develop the theology of Creation and In-
carnation. As such, the Platonist metaphysics of relational participation
and the Neo-Platonist theology of sacred triads helped elucidate the na-
ture of Christ’s hypostatic union, the relations within the triune Godhead,
and the participation of creation in Trinitarian self-giving. In the next
subsection, I briefly show just how instrumental Plato’s metaphysics was
for the hellenization of early patristic theology and Christian theology in
the run-up to, and after, the Nicene Council.
B. St. Justin Martyr and Clement of Alexandria
Following St. Paul, it was St. Justin Martyr (c. 100-165) who first showed
how the theology of the New Testament fulfills the promise of the Old
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Testament and the ancient philosophy of the Logos. For Justin, paganism
produces a partial knowledge of the Logos or Divine Person of the Word,
the highest truth of God in God through God. By contrast, Christian the-
ology has received in Christ the Logos itself. In the Second Apology, Justin
suggests that Socrates knew Christ partially because Christ was and is
the omnipresent Word (II Apol. X.8).18 Likewise, the Stoics established
an ethics on the basis of just and universal principles because the seed of
the Word is innate in the whole of mankind. But only in Christ is the
Word fully revealed and only through Christ can the Word be known.
This idea of a partial knowledge of God and the seed of the Word goes
back to Justin’s theory of logos spermatikos (the seed of the Logos), “seeds
of truth, sent down to humanity” (Dial. II.1; I Apol. XLIV; II Apol. VIII). Re-
inforced by the supernatural gift of faith, human reason itself partici-
pates in the divine Word incarnate in Christ and as such can have ap-
proximate knowledge of God.19
Justin’s theory of logos spermatikos draws on two distinct yet comple-
mentary philosophical traditions. First, the Platonist framework of par-
ticipation in the Good and the natural desire to know truth, beauty, and
unity, described as “not radically different from Christianity but not
quite the same” (II Apol. XIII). Second, the Stoic theory that knowledge of
truth is indispensable to a just and virtuous life and the idea that there is
one set of universal natural laws. Justin develops these two philosophical
traditions in a distinctly Christian direction by arguing that it is the
Word made flesh which acts in us and, analogically speaking, plants the
seeds of the divine Logos in our mind. Contrary to Descartes, Justin does
not suggest that the human intellect achieves cognition of God based on
innate ideas. Instead, it is the action of the Word within each intelligent
creature that enables us to know God. For this reason, the truths already
known by Socrates, Plato, and the Stoics are indebted to divine Revela-
tion. The philosophers’ quest for truth, beauty, and goodness follows
natural principles that are encapsulated by the prophets and embodied
in Christ, leading Justin to speak of “Christians before Christ.” In this
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sense, philosophy was and is never independent or self-sufficient but al-
ways already linked to theology (I Apol. XLIV.9). Moreover, Justin’s knowl-
edge of the Platonist metaphysics of relationality and participation rein-
forces his conviction that the difference or ‘otherness’ of the incarnate
Logos as distinct from God the Father does not involve either a transfer-
ence or a loss of divinity from Father to Son because the principle of ‘un-
diminished giving’ implies an equivalence of God the Father and God the
Son (Dial. 61.2; 128.4). As we shall see, the logic of gift-giving and gift-
exchange that underpins Justin’s theology will be critical to the develop-
ment of pre- and post-Nicene Christology and Trinitarianism.
Like Justin in the Latin ‘West,’ Clement of Alexandria (c. 153-220) and
Origen of Alexandria (c. 185-254) in the Greek ‘East’ also viewed philoso-
phy as a preparation for the truth of the gospel. In the Stromata, Clement
sketches a pyramidal ordering of the sciences wherein philosophy is the
handmaid to theology, the queen of wisdom and of all sciences: “But as
encyclical branches of study [rhetoric, grammar, music, and geometry]
contribute to philosophy, which is their mistress; so also philosophy it-
self cooperates for the acquisition of wisdom. For philosophy is the study
of wisdom, and wisdom is the knowledge of things divine and human;
and their causes.”20 Since knowledge of causes points to the ultimate
source of all that is, philosophy’s love of wisdom and pursuit of universal
truth points to God’s Logos, revealed in the Book of Nature and the Book
of Scripture. As such, philosophy has the noble task of serving as hand-
maid to theology. Clement bequeathed this theological ordering of sci-
ences to Boethius and Aquinas, who both integrated important Aristote-
lian elements within this wider Christian Platonist framework, as I will
suggest in chapters 3 and 5.
C. Origen of Alexandria and Nicaea
For his part, Origen’s unique contribution to the formation of Christian
metaphysics was precisely to fuse Aristotle with Plato. Endowed with an
extensive knowledge of Greek philosophy (Platonist, Aristotelian, Stoic,
and Epicurean), Origen adopted the basic elements of Plato’s cosmology
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and psychology while borrowing terminology and definitions from the
work of Aristotle. St. Gregory Thaumaturgus (c. 210-260), one of his stu-
dents, said of him:
He deemed those worthy to philosophize who with every energy had
read all the writings of the ancient philosophers and poets, neither ex-
cluding nor disdaining (since not yet able to discriminate), except
those which belong to the atheists who, since they have abandoned
common human beliefs, say that there is no God or providence. . . . But
[he did think it worthwhile] to take up and become conversant with
all the rest, neither biased in favor of one nation or philosophic doc-
trine, nor yet prejudiced against it, whether Hellenic or barbarian, but
listening to all. . . . He gathered and presented to us everything which
was useful and was true from each of the philosophers but excluded
what was false.21
Beyond Justin and others before him, Origen argues that Logos and
Sophia are not just agents of God’s creation and providence within the
divine oikonomia but eternal and intrinsic to the triune Godhead. And
since it is in the nature of God to be Trinitarian (and not only in his econ-
omy), human knowledge of the divine cannot be confined to an abstract
belief in the Trinity as an article of faith but in fact extends to experience
of God’s eternal triune being in his temporal creation, as Mark Edwards
has demonstrated.22 But here one can go beyond Edwards and suggest
that Origen combines Plato with Aristotle to demonstrate that the cre-
ated world dimly reflects the triune Creator and that temporality medi-
ates eternity.
Far from importing pagan philosophy into Christian theology,
Origen bases this account on the scriptural injunction that the word and
wisdom of God are essential to his nature (Peri ArchZn I.2.3). As the
Logos, God is the Word or Idea, and the substance of the Godhead is the
mind. For this reason, God’s creative activity is to think ideas or logikoi,
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intelligible paradigms that govern all things at every station in the order
of being, such that knowledge of any given concrete individual thing re-
quires and presupposes the ability to comprehend logikoi. There is thus
an analogy between created human minds and God’s uncreated mind.
As such, cognition of the ultimate origin and end of all things is ratio-
nally intelligible. Even the Trinity, as I have already indicated, is for
Origen not simply an article of faith but can in some sense be discerned
in creation — albeit partially and imperfectly. Indeed, he draws a further
analogy between the structure of rational creatures and the Trinitarian
being of their Creator: God is mind (ideas), soul (Logos), and matter
(Spirit), disclosing his creative presence in the created order. Drawing on
Plato’s theological metaphysics and St. Paul’s philosophical theology,
Origen affirms that man is a triadic unity of body, soul, and mind that
dimly reflects the triune nature of the Godhead.
Unlike earlier theologians including Tertullian (c. 160-220) and St.
Hippolytus of Rome (c. 170-236), for whom the three divine persons are
only manifest in God’s created temporal economy, Origen also insists
that the Son and the Holy Spirit are divine persons from all eternity.
Since personhood serves to differentiate each of the three persons from
each other and their equally shared divine substance, the term ‘person’
(hypostasis) is of greater metaphysical importance than the term ‘es-
sence’ (ousia) in describing the triune Godhead who surpasses human
understanding. Notably, Origen ascribes to hypostasis individual subsis-
tence. So if a person is an individual existent, then the Son is ‘other in
subsistence than the Father,’ that is to say, a distinct person which is a
real existent from all eternity who nevertheless shares the same essence
as the Father. All of which was critical in the emergence of pro-Nicene
Christology and Trinitarianism, in particular the Nicene Creed which
was of course first to codify the church’s teaching that Christ is begotten,
not made, and that he is ‘of one being’ (homo-ousion) with the Father.23
As a result, the Council of Nicaea affirmed the eternal procession of the
Son from the Father and the full divinity of Christ.
However, Nicaea raised a number of metaphysical problems and
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questions. First of all, an overreliance on (the predominantly Aristotelian
language of ) substance, which emphasizes the different natures of
Christ in terms that could be misconstrued as inversely related. Second,
a failure to specify the Son in terms of the filial relation (rather than sub-
stantiality) and the converse union of the finitude of creation and the in-
finity of the Creator. For these reasons, the grammar of Nicaea centered
on substance was unable to specify that the unity of Christ’s filiation is
the metaphysical ground of difference because the maior dissimilitudo is
constituted in the oneness of his relation to the Father, such that union is
the first term of difference. As Aaron Riches has shown, it was Cyril of Al-
exandria (c. 378-444) who first clarified these issues and framed the ‘nor-
mative standard’ of Christological doctrine at the Council of Ephesus
(431).24 Moreover, the Council of Chalcedon (451) must be read as being
organically rooted in Ephesus and as anticipating the specifications and
supplementations of the Councils of Constantinople I (553) and Con-
stantinople II (680-81). In this sense, the Definition of Faith codified at
Chalcedon was not a synthesis between the School of Alexandria and the
School of Antioch — a misguided interpretation that has given credence
to a quasi-Nestorian reading of the Definitio fidei. Rather, the Cyrilline
account puts the emphasis firmly on the eternal personhood of the Son
and the synergistic mode of the unity between his fully divine and his
fully human nature. At the heart of these complex doctrinal develop-
ments were controversies over the status of divine substance or essence
in connection with the triple bond of divine person, filial relation, and
Trinitarian relationality.
In the following two sections, I will suggest that within the context of
‘Cappadocian theology’ Gregory of Nyssa is instrumental in transforming
pagan Neo-Platonist metaphysics in the direction of Trinitarianism by
making an important contribution to the early patristic understanding of
personhood that foreshadows some of the achievements at Ephesus,
Chalcedon, and Constantinople. Fusing the biblical revelation of a God
who creates everything ex nihilo with Plato’s metaphysics of relational po-
sitioning and Iamblichus’ Neo-Platonist metaphysics of hierarchical and
triadic structures, Gregory challenges the Aristotelian categorial primacy
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of substance over relation and the Nicene overemphasis on the unity of
the divine essence at the expense of the distinctness of each divine per-
son. He also proposes an analogy between the individuating relations
within the Trinity and the individuation of human persons. As such, he of-
fers a Trinitarian theology that outwits in advance the misleading opposi-
tion between the social, pluralistic Trinitarianism of the Greek East and
the psychological, unitary Trinitarianism of the Latin West.
3. The Priority of Person over Essence
according to Gregory of Nyssa
In this and the following section, I offer a close analysis of Ad Petrum:
On the difference between substance and person (or Epistula XXXVIII [Ep.
38]).25 Wrongly attributed to Basil of Caesarea (c. 329-379), this letter
was in reality composed by Basil’s brother Gregory of Nyssa (c. 335-395)
in 369 or 370.26 Ever since Gregory’s authorship of his letter was estab-
lished beyond any reasonable doubt, scholars like Reinhard Hübner,
Lewis Ayres, Lucian Turcescu, and Johannes Zachhuber have debated
whether his account of substance and person is shaped either by the Ar-
istotelian distinction between individual and species or by the Stoic dis-
tinction between individual or common qualification or indeed by both.
Aristotelian and Stoic elements are certainly present in Gregory’s theol-
ogy, but my contention is that such and similar interpretations fail to
acknowledge the influence of Platonism and Neo-Platonism on his ar-
gument that the Christian conception of divine person avoids the ten-
sion between universal essence and individual particularity that is char-
acteristic of Aristotle’s ontology and Stoic philosophy alike.
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Moreover, contrary to the assertion in much of modern biblical and
patristic scholarship that essence/substance (ousia) and person
(hypostasis) are grammatically synonymous and ontologically coexten-
sive, Gregory’s fusion of Platonist metaphysics with Pauline theology
shifts the emphasis away from substance towards person and crucially
towards the filial relation of the Son with the Father. As such, this more
orthodox Christology (and Trinitarianism) enables Gregory to show how
the “mysterious doctrine of the Trinity” blends the substantial real unity
of the divine substance or essence with the irreducible diversity and dis-
tinctness of each divine person or hypostasis. This also leads him to de-
velop a more theological and philosophical account of the link between
the triunity of the Creator God and the triadic ordering of creation.
Gregory begins his reflections by drawing a distinction between sub-
stance and person. Substance is a thing’s essence, that which makes it
participate in a certain genus or species. As such, substance does not dif-
ferentiate between different members of the same genus or species. By
contrast, person is the nature or subsistence that is present in a given be-
ing. So Paul is Paul on account of ‘Paulness’ — that which makes him
Paul rather than Peter. According to Gregory, individuality or particular-
ity is not on account of properties or accidents but instead in virtue of a
unique given form (197-203). Notably, Gregory does not follow either the
Aristotelian concept of individual substantial form (and proximate mat-
ter) or the Stoic distinction between general essence and individuating
characteristics (or bundles of properties). Instead, he edges in a more
distinctly Platonist direction by ascribing individuality neither to formal
essence nor to material accidents but rather to the individuating rela-
tions that exist among individual forms and between created forms and
their divine warrant. Properly construed, form is relational vis-à-vis
other forms because each unique thing entertains individuating rela-
tions with other things and its creative source. As such, individuation
cannot be attributed to substance but instead is linked to personhood.
By analogy, this argument — Gregory suggests — also applies to the
Godhead: “Accordingly, if you transfer to divine dogmas the principle of
differentiation which you recognize as applying to substance and person
in human affairs, you will not go astray” (203). Although God is “beyond
all conception,” the same conception of Being can be attributed to God
the Father and to the Son and to the Holy Spirit because all three are
equally divine. Here Gregory makes the important point that not even di-
vine being can be said to be univocal, as the Father “proceeds from no
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other principle” (207) and is the ultimate source whence both the Son
and the Holy Spirit proceed. Moreover, the second and the third person
of the Trinity are also ontologically differentiated insofar as the Son
“shines forth as the only begotten from the unbegotten light,” whereas
the Holy Spirit “is produced after the Son and with Him and He has His
subsistence from the Father” (207). There is thus an intra-Trinitarian dif-
ferentiation within the unity of the divine substance or essence. In fact,
Gregory goes beyond the (Aristotelian) language of substance and cause
by speaking of “a certain continuous and uninterrupted community
[which] appears in [the three divine persons]” and an “inner harmony of
the divine essence” that excludes any “interposition of some outside
thing” and any “void, in the form of an interspace in which there is no
subsistence, between the three Persons” (209). Only the Trinity, Gregory
concludes, blends unity and diversity, oneness and plurality, communion
and unicity. And since the Trinitarian persons are not somehow con-
fined to God’s oikonomia but are in reality intrinsic to the eternal God-
head (as Justin Martyr and Origen had already suggested), the Holy Trin-
ity is the ultimate origin and end of unity and diversity within divine
creation.
Far from “general speculation,” this theological metaphysics of
relationality outlined by Gregory is grounded both in the Book of Scrip-
ture and the Book of Nature. Scripture, he suggests, alerts us to the divine
power of grace that orders all things (1 Cor. 12:11) and teaches us that all
things were made by God and in him cohere (John 1:3):
Then when we have been lifted up to that conception, we are again led
on by the divinely-inspired guidance and taught that through this
power all things are brought into being from not-being; not, however,
even by this power without a beginning; nay, there is a power which
exists without generation or beginning, and this is the cause of all
things that exist. For the Son, by whom all things are, and with whom
the Holy Spirit must always be conceived as inseparably associated, is
of the Father. (205-7)
Since all three have their unique “distinguishing notes” (207), Gregory ar-
gues that God always already makes himself known to us both in terms
of each individuated divine person and the community of the single uni-
fied divine substance: “. . . the individuality of the persons of the God-
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for each is apprehended separately by means of its own particular distin-
guishing notes” (207-9). At the same time, Gregory insists that the faith-
inspired conception of the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit points to
the Trinitarian communion they form:
But he who has conceived the Father, and conceived of Him apart by
Himself, has at the same time mentally accepted the Son also; and he
who lays hold of the Son does not dismember the Spirit from the Son,
but in due sequence, so far as their order is concerned, yet unitedly
[sic], as regards their natures, forms within himself an image of the
faith that is a blending of the three in the same way . . . there is appre-
hended among these three a certain ineffable and inconceivable com-
munion and at the same time distinction, with neither the difference
between the persons disintegrating the continuity of their nature, nor
this community of substance confounding the individual character of
their distinguishing notes . . . we devise a strange and paradoxical sort
of united separation and disunited connection. Indeed, unless you are
listening to what I say in a contentious and spiteful spirit, even among
things perceptible to the senses a similar phenomenon may be found.
(209-13)
In other words, Gregory argues that scriptural revelation itself points to
God’s self-manifestation in nature. There is no dualism opposing the
Book of Scripture to the Book of Nature, as both are complementary
modes of human cognition and in this sense mutually reinforcing.
Gregory also contends that we can infer the ontological coincidence
of unity and distinction “by analogy from things which appear to our
sense-perception” (213). Here his indebtedness to Platonist metaphysics
is critical. In the well-known Myth of the Cave (Rep. VII, 514 a–520 a),
Plato describes the Good as the sun that is both light itself and illumi-
nates everything that is. Thus, the Good infuses all things with goodness
and in so doing individuates each being relationally — as I argued in the
previous chapter. Similarly, Gregory depicts the Holy Trinity in analogi-
cal terms as a rainbow that manifests all the different colors in their indi-
vidual distinctness and in their inseparable unity. Like Plato’s allegory
that emphasizes the natural desire for knowledge of the supernatural
Good, Gregory’s analogy focuses not just on what Trinitarian unity-in-
difference is but also on how and why we come to know it. Arguably, he
chooses the image of the rainbow in order to suggest that we can appre-
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hend the Trinity not because there might be possibilities of a ‘social’
analogy but because there is a ‘natural’ ontological and epistemological
analogy through which the triune God makes himself known to the mind
via the senses within the divine economy of creation.
The image of the rainbow serves as an analogical approximation of
the Holy Trinity. Indeed, the formation of a rainbow involves a paradoxi-
cal bending of the light and its return upon itself, as sunbeams refract
across the mixture of moisture and air and are thrown back upon them-
selves. By analogy then, we can know the Trinity not itself and as such,
but rather we can catch a glimpse of it — so to speak — on its way back
to itself. In Augustine’s and Aquinas’s words, we know God on his return
(reditus) to himself, as I will discuss in the present chapter and also in
chapter 5.
Reverting for the moment to Gregory, it is clear from his depiction
that when we see a rainbow we do not see light itself and as such. Nor do
we discern any intervening space between all the different, separate col-
ors. Rather, what we discover is the unity of all the colors as well as their
individual distinctness — an ‘appropriate’ natural analogy of the incom-
prehensible supernatural Holy Trinity:
Just as, therefore, in the illustration we distinguish clearly the different
colours and yet cannot perceive by our senses any interval that sepa-
rates the one from the other, conclude, I pray, that you may in the
same way draw inferences from analogy regarding the divine dogmas.
You may thus reason: that the individual traits of the Person, which
may be compared with a particular hue of the colours of the rainbow,
flash their light upon each of those whom we believe to constitute the
Holy Trinity; that, however, no difference can be perceived in the indi-
vidual character of the nature of one as compared with another, al-
though together with their community of substance the distinguish-
ing characteristic traits of each shine forth. (217)
Of course Gregory does not suggest that rainbows themselves represent
natural traces of the supernatural Holy Trinity, for that would be a form
of pagan pantheism. Instead, just as the natural phenomenon of a rain-
bow elucidates the nature of light which nevertheless we cannot fully
grasp, so too supernatural faith illuminates the apostolic teaching on the
unity of the three divine persons which nonetheless remains incompre-
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for just as in the case of things which appear to our eyes experience
seems better than a theory of causation, so too in the case of dogmas
which transcend our comprehension faith is better than apprehen-
sion through processes of reasoning, for faith teaches us to under-
stand that which is separated in person but at the same time united in
substance. (217)
Since divine substance is both one and three and can be known as such
by the fusion of faith with reason, Gregory has already subverted the Ar-
istotelian terminology of substance and causation in the direction of
Trinitarian relationality and eternal gift-exchange — a theological trans-
formation that is more fully developed in the work of Augustine, as I will
suggest.
4. After Nicaea: Gregory’s Trinitarianism
Nor is Gregory’s insistence on the limits of reason some form of
premodern fideism. His insight that we have to believe — beyond de-
monstrable proof — in divine Incarnation and its disclosure of the infi-
nite reasonableness of God, suggests that a rational affirmation of truth
can only be upheld by faith. Far from supplanting reason, faith itself
must be reasonable in the sense of making beliefs rationally intelligible.
As a result, the exercise of reason itself requires a super-rational trust
(pistis or faith) in its very possibility. Faith in the Holy Trinity is then a
reasoned belief that God is both one and three and that we cannot un-
derstand either the triune Godhead or the three individual divine per-
sons separately and in or by themselves but only in relation to God as a
whole and to each of the persons. In turn, the fusion of reason and faith
elucidates scriptural revelation and helps us grasp the true meaning of
the apostolic witness handed down within the living tradition of the
Church. The example Gregory chooses is Hebrews 1:3, where the writer
uses the word hypostasis in order “to establish the true sonship, the indi-
visibility, and the intimacy of the relationship of the Son to the Father . . .
he [the writer] defines the glory of the Only-begotten as ‘the brightness
of the glory’ of the Father, causing the Son to be associated inseparably
with the Father in our thoughts by making use of the light by way of illus-
tration” (221).
Once more, the influence of Plato on Gregory is striking. By con-
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ceiving the Good as the Form of all forms which endows all things with
goodness, Plato outlines a metaphysics of relationality and participa-
tion that avoids in advance any crass dualism between the world of
things and the world of ideas. Moreover, Plato anticipates Aristotle’s
theory of analogy by attribution, as goodness in things is the result of
endowment by the Good itself — as expressed by the allegory of the sun
that illuminates all things and renders them visible — all of which I
showed in the previous chapter. Taken together, Plato’s metaphysics
and the Platonist-Aristotelian principle of analogy provide the founda-
tion for patristic (and subsequently medieval) accounts of the relation
between Creator and creation. Like Plato before him, Gregory uses the
image of the light to suggest that God is always already present in the
world and that the world reflects and describes its divine origin and
end. God ‘enfolds’ the entire spectrum of creative possibilities, which
‘unfold’ in the history of creation. We can know this not because we are
created with innate a priori ideas or because we are endowed with a
mind that reflects on a posteriori sense impressions. Rather, we can
know the Creator because God has made himself known to us in and
through his incarnate Son: “[H]e who gazes intently with his soul’s eyes
upon the ‘figure’ of the Only-begotten at the same time becomes keenly
aware of the ‘hypostasis’ or person of the Father” (223). This passage
strongly resonates with John 14:9, where it is said that “[h]e who has
seen me has seen the Father.”
That is why Gregory plays on the dual meaning of the term ‘imprint’
(qarakt©r) in the concluding part of Ad Petrum. On one level, ‘imprint’
means ‘figure’ or ‘exterior form,’ and in this case Gregory’s argument is
that the Son is “the figure of His (that is, the Father’s) person” (225). This
applies not just to John 14:9 but also to Colossians 1:15 and Wisdom 7:26
where the writer speaks of the Son as the image of the invisible God and
as the image of His goodness. On another level, ‘imprint’ refers to ‘image,’
which means that the Son does not merely disclose the Father but is in
reality the image of the Father. With this dual use Gregory underscores
both the distinctness of each divine person and the unity of Father and
Son through the filial relation that individuates both, “for all the attrib-
utes of the Father are beheld in the Son, and all the attributes of the Son
belong to the Father, in so much as the Son abides wholly in the Father
and in turn has the Father wholly in Himself ” (227) — an argument that
echoes and elucidates John 14:10 where Jesus responds to his disciples’
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me? The words I speak to you, I speak not of myself. But the Father who
abides in me, he does the works.”
In the final instance then, Gregory combines the Platonist meta-
physics of relationality and participation (and the Platonist-Aristotelian
theory of analogy) with the biblical revelation of creation ex nihilo and
God’s Incarnation in order to argue that the whole of creation intimates
the triune Creator, as creaturely goodness is the product of the inflowing
of divine creative grace by the self-diffusive Good of God in which we can
all participate.27 Conversely, Gregory’s reasoning about intra-Trinitarian
relations of individuation suggests that creation itself dimly discloses the
ontological coextensionality of unity and diversity, as no single creature
alone can reflect God’s goodness or be equal to God’s revelation. The link
between the triune Creator and his creation is divine goodness ‘giving it-
self ’ ecstatically to finitude in an original relation whose reverse face is
the ‘participation’ of temporal things God who alone brings about their
particular existence unchanged.
In conclusion of the previous section and this one, I want to suggest
that Gregory’s account of relational personhood overcomes the overem-
phasis on substance at Nicaea and the tendency to specify the unity of
Christ’s two natures in terms of dual, separate substances held together
by the divine hypostasis of the Son caused by the Father. By conceiving
the unity of Christ’s dual nature in terms of the irreducible union of
personhood and the filial relation with the Father, Gregory moves be-
yond the limits of Nicaea and contributes to the formation of the ‘theo-
logical culture’ (Lewis Ayres) that paved the way for the discussions lead-
ing to the First Council of Constantinople (381), the Council of Ephesus
(431), and the Council of Chalcedon (453).28 Specifically, Gregory es-
chews the Aristotelian primacy of substance in favor of personhood,
thereby shifting the emphasis away from individuation by individual
substantial form towards the individuating relationality of the three di-
vine persons. The crucial theological implication is that the Son and the
Holy Spirit proceed eternally from the Father within the triune Godhead,
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28. On Gregory’s contribution to post-Nicene Trinitarian theology, see Ayres, Nicaea
and Its Legacy, pp. 344-63; Michel René Barnes, The Power of God: Dunamis in Gregory of
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which blends the uniqueness of each divine person with their Trinitarian
communion. Since human beings are created in the image and likeness
of God, Gregory concludes that we can infer analogically from the infi-
nite relationality within the Trinity to the relational nature of the human
person.
In the remainder of this chapter, I argue that the theological meta-
physics of relationality and the philosophical theology of the Trinity out-
lined by Gregory are more fully developed in the work of Augustine.
Against Porphyry’s more Aristotelianized Neo-Platonism, Augustine re-
trieved and extended the Plotinian focus on the creative activity of the
One and the hierarchical ordering of the many. Beyond the misleading
opposition between a psychological, unitary, and typically ‘western’ Trin-
itarianism on the one hand and a social, pluralistic, and typically ‘east-
ern’ Trinitarianism on the other hand, Augustine’s Trinitarian theology
combines reasoned faith in infinite Trinitarian relationality with a dis-
covery of the triadic ordering of creation.
5. Augustine’s Neo-Platonist Theology
A. The Errors of Augustine’s Critics
The philosophy and the theology of Augustine (354-430) have come un-
der attack for essentially the same reason. The charge is that his Neo-
Platonist ideas led him to embrace a metaphysics that privileges the one
at the expense of the many, and to develop a theology that prioritizes
God’s unity over the Holy Trinity. The prominence of Neo-Platonism in
patristic thought in general and in the Latin Church Fathers in particu-
lar also seems to preclude any significant knowledge of Aristotle prior to
Boethius (c. 480-524).29 Coupled with the conviction that reflections on
the nature of individuality and on the cause of individuation are simply
absent from Augustine’s works,30 the claim is that Augustine does not
engage with Aristotelian logic and metaphysics. Even after his conver-
sion to Christianity, the Neo-Platonist legacy is thought to hold Augus-
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29. Vernon J. Bourke, Augustine’s View of Reality (Villanova, PA: Villanova University
Press, 1964), pp. 98, 131.
30. Jorge J. E. Gracia, Introduction to the Problem of Individuation in the Early Middle
Ages (Munich: Philosophia Verlag, 1984), p. 13.
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tine hostage to philosophical ideas that are contrary to his new theologi-
cal commitments. For instance, due to his fixation upon Plotinian
oneness, Augustine’s philosophy stands accused of favoring abstract
form and neglecting plurality, particularity, and materiality.31
Moreover, Augustine is said simply to assert the truth of the doctrine
of creation ex nihilo rather than attempting to give a rationally intelligi-
ble account of it. Equally, as a result of his alleged obsession with divine
simplicity, Augustine’s theology has been questioned, especially his al-
leged modalism and his insufficiently Trinitarian understanding of
God.32 Others who do not brand him a modalist nevertheless argue that
his depiction of the Trinity prioritizes divine and human inwardness at
the expense of God’s creative and salvific activity and man’s communal
and transformative response.33 Yet others have seen in Augustine’s con-
ception of the ego the prototype for Descartes’s cogito. Thus, Augustine is
held responsible for the turn to subjectivism in western philosophy and
the fascination with self-reflexivity and solipsism.34
In what follows, I argue that such and similar interpretations of Au-
gustine are mistaken because they contain a number of undemonstrated
and untenable presuppositions and assertions — chief of all the claim
that his Neo-Platonism commits him to the substantiality of God and the
purification of the immaterial inner self from outer material reality. This
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31. Stephen C. Layman, “Tritheism and the Trinity,” Faith and Philosophy 5 (1988): 291-
98.
32. Colin E. Gunton, Enlightenment and Alienation: An Essay towards a Trinitarian
Theology (Basingstoke, UK: Marshall, Morgan & Scott, 1985); John D. Zizioulas, Being as
Communion: Studies in Personhood and the Church (Crestwood, NY: St. Vladimir’s Sem-
inary Press, 1985); Cornelius Plantinga, “Social Trinity and Tritheism,” in Trinity, Incarna-
tion and Atonement: Philosophical and Theological Essays, ed. Cornelius Plantinga and
Ronald Feenstra (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1989), pp. 21-47; Colin E.
Gunton, The Promise of Trinitarian Theology (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1991); Richard
Swinburne, The Christian God (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994).
33. David Brown, “Trinitarian Personhood and Individuality,” in Plantinga and
Feenstra, eds., Trinity, Incarnation and Atonement, pp. 48-78; Catherine M. LaCugna, God
for Us: The Trinity and Christian Life (San Francisco: HarperSanFrancisco, 1991).
34. Stephen P. Menn, Descartes and Augustine (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1998); Charles Taylor, Sources of the Self: The Making of Modern Identity (Cambridge,
MA: Harvard University Press, 1989); Gareth B. Matthews, Thought’s Ego in Augustine and
Descartes (Ithaca, NY, and London: Cornell University Press, 1992); Phillip Carey, Augus-
tine’s Invention of the Inner Self: The Legacy of a Christian Platonist (Oxford: Oxford Univer-
sity Press, 2000); Wayne J. Hankey, “Between and Beyond Augustine and Descartes: More
Than a Source of the Self,” Augustinian Studies 32 (2001): 65-88.
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claim relies on a misreading of Platonist metaphysics and Augustine’s
transformation of Neo-Platonic ideas (a point I will elaborate on later in
the present section). Since there is no ontological or epistemological du-
alism between the world of things and the world of ideas, Augustine in-
sists that individual material forms ( formae corporeae) exhibit beauty in
themselves and harmony with other forms. Contrary to Aristotle’s auton-
omous individual substances, Augustine develops Plato’s relational
forms in the direction of Trinitarian theology by suggesting that all
things are governed by the numbers and ratios of God’s wisdom. Reality
as a whole is numerically and proportionally ordered. As such, material
forms are both individual and relational, and the entire cosmos is consti-
tuted by relations among beings and between beings and Being (De Mus.
VI.vii.19; VI.xi.29). This is the fundamental context in which to under-
stand his account of human selfhood.
I also argue that there is an analogy between true knowledge of the
world and true knowledge of the self. For both are ultimately grounded
in God’s creative activity. Knowledge of the world reveals a relational
triadic ordering of all things, which paradoxically intimates the triune
Creator who is unlike his creation. Likewise, self-knowledge discloses a
relational soul that originates from God and seeks an ever-closer union
with him. To know the self is therefore to know that it is created and that
the soul is sustained by God’s wisdom because this is how God commu-
nicates himself to himself and to his creation. To know that the self
stands in irreducible relations with its Creator in whose image and like-
ness it is created is also to know that the triune God is both infinite di-
vine substantiality and unreserved Trinitarian relationality — precisely
because God is wholly unlike our immaterial mind and soul.
However, I do not rehearse all the arguments in favor of Augustine’s
Trinitarian theology.35 Nor do I revisit the debate about the difference
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35. In defense of Augustine’s Trinitarianism, it has been argued that his account
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Augustinian Studies 26 (1995): 51-79; M. R. Barnes, “Rereading Augustine’s Theology of the
Trinity,” in The Trinity: An Interdisciplinary Symposium on the Trinity, ed. Stephen T. Davis,
David Kendall, and Gerald O’Collins (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), pp. 145-76;
Lewis Ayres, “ ‘Remember That You Are Catholic’ (serm. 52.2): Augustine on the Unity of
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between Augustine’s account of the ego and Descartes’s conception of
the cogito.36 Nor does my account of relationality start either with the
Holy Trinity and proceed to the Trinitarian image in the soul,37 or move
from the outward orientation of the self to the relational nature of di-
vine substance.38 Instead, I begin with Augustine’s redescription of the
world as a relational order that manifests God’s creative activity which
sustains all beings. This vision, which is already to some extent articu-
lated in his early writings, distinguishes Augustine’s Christian meta-
physics from ancient skepticism and from the Aristotelian emphasis on
substance and cause in Neo-Platonism.39 Augustine’s experience of the
world as relational was instrumental in the process of his conversion
and led him to discern that the universe and everything therein is cre-
ated (Conf. VII.xvii.23). Only creation can explain how and why all things
have a particular station within the relational order and thus are indi-
viduated in and by relations with God and within the universe. Before I
can make this case, I need to say something about individuation in Au-
gustine and also about his reception and transformation of Neo-
Platonism.
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37. John Milbank, “Sacred Triads: Augustine and the Indo-European Soul,” Modern
Theology 13 (October 1997): 451-74.
38. Rowan Williams, “Sapientia and the Trinity: Reflections on the De Trinitate,” in
Collectanea Augustiniana: Mélanges T. J. von Bavel, ed. Bernard Brunning, Mathijs
Lamberigts, and Jozef van Houtem (Leuven: Leuven University Press, 1990), pp. 317-32.
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B. The Problem of Individuation in Augustine
Jorge Gracia claims that prior to Boethius (c. 480-525) individuation was
not central to patristic philosophy and theology. The reason seems to be
that knowledge of Aristotle was limited to the Categories and did not ex-
tend to the metaphysical conceptuality of act and potency. It was only af-
ter substantial parts of the Organon had been translated and transmitted
to the Latin world in the late fifth and the early sixth century that Chris-
tian theology turned to this question. Since he introduced Aristotle’s
metaphysics into Christian theology, “medieval discussions of the prob-
lem of individuation began with Boethius,”40 so Gracia’s argument goes.
However, to assert — as Gracia does — that Augustine was not con-
cerned with the nature of individuality and the cause of individuation is
to make one of the following unwarranted assumptions. Either the as-
sumption is that Augustine’s knowledge of Aristotle was insignificant
and did not encompass the metaphysical aspects of the Categories or ele-
ments of his metaphysics, in particular, the primacy of substance or es-
sence over relation and the interaction of the actuality of form and the
potency of matter. Or the assumption is that Augustine embraced Plato’s
theory of universal forms in which particular things participate and thus
sided with Plato’s metaphysics of the one (the Good as the form of forms)
against Aristotle’s metaphysics of the many (individual substantial
forms). Or else again the assumption is that Augustine wrote a nonphilo-
sophical theology that altogether failed to address questions about the
nature of individuality or the principle of individuation.
None of these assumptions stand up to serious scrutiny. Augustine
had knowledge of Aristotle’s Categories but rejected the primacy of sub-
stance over relation on philosophical and theological grounds. He was
also familiar with other concepts of Aristotelian metaphysics like act
and potency, and in his commentaries on the Book of Genesis he recon-
figured them in order to produce a rationally intelligible account of cre-
ation ex nihilo in terms of how the potency of seminal reasons (rationes
seminales) is activated by the concurrence of the primary causality of
God and the secondary causality of the natural order. Moreover, he out-
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lined an alternative ‘first philosophy’ that blends the substantiality of es-
sences with the relationality of persons. In so doing, he recast Plato’s idea
of the transcendence and creativity of the Good which constitutes all
things relationally. This alternative, which is indebted to Neo-Platonism
yet constitutes a properly Christian account, lies at the center of his
Trinitarian theology. To say this raises the question of the influence of
Neo-Platonism on Augustine’s account of individuation, to which I now
turn.
C. Augustine’s Neo-Platonism
Between Plato and Augustine stand not only Aristotle and his successors
but also the so-called Middle Platonists, early Christian Platonists like
Clement and Origen, as well as members of the Neo-Platonist school
such as Plotinus (c. 204/5-270) and Porphyry (c. 234-305).41 It has been
claimed that Augustine was significantly influenced by Porphyry, who
shifted the focus from Platonic metaphysics to Aristotelian logic. Por-
phyry’s logicized Neo-Platonism was transmitted to Augustine through a
variety of different channels, including the works of another Christian
convert, Marius Victorinus (c. 280-365). However, as John Rist notes,
“Much of what has been proposed as Porphyrian material in the early
Augustine is indeed Porphyrian but equally Plotinian and often more
generally ‘Platonic.’ ”42
For this reason, one way to distinguish different strands of (Chris-
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41. On the complex interaction of Christian theology and the Platonist tradition in
the fourth century, see John Rist, “Basil’s ‘Neoplatonism’: Its Background and Nature,” in
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in The Cambridge Companion to Plotinus, ed. Lloyd P. Gerson (Cambridge: Cambridge Uni-
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less (London: Routledge, 2000), pp. 37-50.
42. John Rist, “Basil’s ‘Neoplatonism’: Its Background and Nature,” p. 148.
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tian) Neo-Platonism is according to whether they are more Platonist or
more Aristotelian. Since he tends to follow Plotinus rather than Por-
phyry, Augustine’s Neo-Platonism is — broadly speaking — more
Platonist than it is Aristotelian. In the Contra Academicos, Plotinus is de-
scribed as “Plato born again” (Cont. Acad. III.xviii.41). The prominence of
Plotinian Neo-Platonism is true for his ‘philosophical theology’ in gen-
eral and his thinking on individuality in particular, including in his early
works (386-91).43 I will now briefly discuss a number of Plotinus’s con-
cepts which Augustine adapts and integrates into his philosophy before
I turn to the influence of Platonism on his account of individuation.
Augustine shares with Plotinus a critique of Aristotle’s claim that
the self-thinking mind is the first principle of the cosmos.44 For
Plotinus, the One is both ‘interiorizing’ and ‘exteriorizing.’ Because the
One is the universal source of existence, all things at lower levels in the
hierarchy of being can be like it — even though the One is of course
never like them. Just as the One exceeds the self-thinking noØv, so too
souls can exceed themselves and reach beyond the forms of things to
Form itself. Augustine, like Plotinus, argues against Aristotle that the
activity of thinking is not limited to self-reflexivity. To think is to think
of something other than of the self in itself and as such. For this reason,
there is a difference between the thinking subject and the object that is
thought. Following Plotinus, Augustine emphasizes the unlikeness of
the human and the divine mind (De Trin. XIV.iv.15): the human self is not
confined to self-awareness but can go beyond itself, precisely as a result
of the ecstatic self-exteriorization of God’s intellect that upholds our
natural desire to know the truth and directs our mind to its supernatu-
ral end in God. Perhaps most importantly, Augustine associates with
the highest principle not only the unity of divine substance or essence
80
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but also the source of material existence in all its diversity. Instead of
Aristotle’s indifferent God, the creative activity of Augustine’s highest
being (summe est) resembles the ecstatic overflow of Plotinus’s One
which generates all existents and sustains them in being.45 It is Ploti-
nus’s conception of the One as both inward-looking and out-flowing
that helps bring Augustine closer to the radiance of Plato’s Good than to
the self-directed energy of Aristotle’s Prime Mover.
Moreover, Christian Neo-Platonism retrieves and extends two other
ideas that are central in Plotinus: first of all, the infinity of the highest
principle and, second, the participation of particulars in universals, as
William Norris Clarke has indicated.46 This also applies to Augustine. Be-
yond the materialism and the dualism of the Manicheans, Augustine
finds in Neo-Platonism the intellectual resources in order to grasp the ul-
timate reality as transcending all material categories. This enables him
during the process of his conversion to conceptualize ultimate reality as
Being itself: idipsum, ipsum esse or supreme being.47 So conceived, Being
is beyond space, time, and change — it is infinite yet perfect, for its infin-
ity is not of defect but of excess, giving being and goodness to everything
that it brings from the nothingness of potency into the plenitude of actu-
ality.48 The infinity and ecstatic overflow of the Creator is the ontological
difference with his creation. Contrary to the chasm between Aristotle’s
Prime Mover and the sublunary world, Augustine combines the Plotinian
Neo-Platonist focus on participation and on degrees of being/goodness
with the biblical emphasis upon creation ex nihilo and the natural striving
for an ever-closer union with the supernatural Good in God (e.g., Conf.
VII.xi.17). And since in God infinite Being and the perfection of the Good
are coextensive, to be created is to share in the goodness of Being which
81
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‘gives itself ’ ecstatically and in so doing positions all things relationally.49
The biblical and Neo-Platonic conceptual framework is key to Augustine’s
account of creation and individuation, as I show below.
Two further parallels between Plotinian Neo-Platonism and Augus-
tine’s ‘philosophical theology’ are relevant to the question of individua-
tion: first, the presence of triadic structures in material and immaterial
things; second, the centrality of conversion to the divine and the process
of deification or divinization. For example, Augustine deploys the
Plotinian triad in the noØv (existence, living, and thinking)50 in order to
refute the Skeptics’ dyad of doubt and the doubting mind. This is central
to his account of self-knowledge, which is not confined to self-awareness
but issues forth into knowledge of the self as relational, as I will suggest.
Likewise, Augustine draws on Plotinus for the idea of conversion,51 in
the sense of turning to the presence of the divine in oneself and in cre-
ated things (Conf. VII.xvii.23). The emphasis on knowledge of God and
conversion also brings Augustine into engagement with the question of
deification. The self can become like God, even though God could of
course never become like the self. In Augustine, the paradox of likeness
and unlikeness takes the form of an asymmetrical relation between God
and creation, which is partly analogous to the relation between the One
and the soul in Plotinus. To know God through the confluence of faith
and reason is always already to become deified, as contemplation of God
directs the soul to its divine origin and end and also orders relations
within creation according to divine intentionality.
Nor is deification purely theoretical and abstract, as is the case of
contemplation of the Prime Mover in Aristotle. Like Plato and Iambli-
chus (whose works, however, he did not know directly), Augustine asso-
ciates deification with transformative action that is both doxological
and political — worship and civic virtue, in particular the dispensation
of justice, are indispensable to a godly life. As such, Augustine’s synthesis
of ancient philosophy and biblical revelation seeks to combine contem-
plative knowledge and deifying practices. On this crucial point Augus-
tine is much closer to the theurgical Platonism of Iamblichus which em-
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49. Lib. Arb. III.ii.4; Ver. Relig. XI.21 and XLIII.81; Gen. ad Lit. Imp. XVI.57; Nat. Bon. III.
50. For an overview of triadic structures in Augustine’s theory of self-knowledge, see
Edward Booth, “St. Augustine’s ‘notitia sui’ Related to Aristotle and the Early Neo-
Platonists,” Augustiniana 29 (1979): 97-124. On Plotinus, see A. Hilary Armstrong, “Form,
Individual and Person in Plotinus,” Dionysius 1 (1977): 49-68.
51. O’Meara, “The Neoplatonism of Saint Augustine,” p. 38.
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phasizes the soul’s creative mirroring of, and engagement with, the
cosmos than he is to the contemplative Platonism of Porphyry which ad-
vocates the soul’s disengagement and retrenchment from the created
world.52
However, the most fundamental difference between (Plotinian) Neo-
Platonism and Augustine’s theology is a rejection of the idea that chaotic
matter preexists the harmony of the cosmos which was formed by the
Demiurge or emanated from the One. Only creation ex nihilo, Augustine
maintains, can explain not just how but also why we are brought into be-
ing and what temporality, materiality, and mortality might signify. More-
over, Augustine eschews the theory of subordinationism in favor of the
alternative conception codified at Nicaea of the Son’s dual nature within
a unified person and crucially the Son’s filial relation with the Father.
Like Gregory of Nyssa’s Trinitarianism, Augustine’s Trinitarian theology
is wrongly portrayed as psychological, unitary, or ‘western.’ Rather, it de-
velops an account that relates triads in the soul and in the cosmos to in-
finite relationality within the triune Godhead. Neo-Platonist concepts
such as creative activity, infinity, participation, and triads as well as de-
grees of being and goodness are central to his vision of the Trinity and
his theory of individuation, as I argue in the following section.
6. ‘Musical Metaphysics’ and Divine Illumination
A. The Beauty and Harmony of Material Forms
Already in his early writings, including the dialogues composed at
Cassiciacum in 386-87, Augustine offers a description of the world that
differs markedly from Greek and Roman philosophy and foreshadows a
properly Christian metaphysics. In the Confessions, he recalls how his
love for material things sparked reflections on the nature of beauty and
harmony and gave rise to his first treatise, On the Beautiful and the Har-
monious, which is lost.53 Fortunately, some of Augustine’s seminal
83
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52. Gregory Shaw, Theurgy and the Soul: The Neoplatonism of Iamblichus (University
Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1995).
53. Augustine’s first treatise, De pulchro et apto (c. 380-81), was already lost at the time
when he wrote the Confessions (c. 397-400). Cf. Takeshi Katô, “Melodia interior — Sur le
traité De pulchro et apto,” Revue des études augustiniennes 12 (1966): 229-40.
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works such as Confessiones and De Musica preserve and extend these
reflections:
To my friends I would say “Do we love anything but the beautiful?
What then is the beautiful? And what is beauty? What is it that entices
and unites us to the things we love? For unless there were a grace and
beauty in them, they could not possibly attract us to them.” And I re-
flected on this and saw that in material objects themselves there is a
kind of beauty which comes from their forming a whole and another
kind of beauty that comes from mutual fittingness — as the harmony
of one part of the body with its whole, or a shoe with a foot, and so
on.54
As Augustine notes in this passage, material things are not passive enti-
ties that are merely ‘there’ in and by themselves. Rather, they exert an at-
traction upon us in virtue of the beauty of their own individual form and
the harmony of their fitting ties with other forms. Beauty manifests the
unity of a composite, whereas harmony describes the agreement (or ‘mu-
tual fittingness’) with other composites. For this reason, material things
can be said to be both beautiful in themselves and to stand in harmoni-
ous relations with other things — they are individual and relational.
From this and other texts on beauty, it emerges that a thing’s individual-
ity and relationality are not merely logical properties that the mind con-
ceives by abstracting form from matter but rather pertain to a thing’s es-
sence. Since the beauty and harmony of form is translucent and ‘shines
forth,’ it has a phenomenal visibility and discloses itself in a thing’s ap-
pearance. As such, the individuality and the relationality of form are real
84
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54. “. . . dicebam amicis meis. Num amamus aliquid nisi pulchrum? Quid est ergo
pulchrum? Et quid est pulchritudo? Quid est quod nos allicit et conciliat rebus, quas
amamus? Nisi enim esset in eis decus et species, nullo modo nos ad se mouerent. Et
animadvertebam et videbam in ipsis corporibus aliud esse quasi totum et ideo pulchrum,
aliud autem, quod ideo deceret, quoniam apte accommodaretur alicui, sicut pars corporis ad
universum suum aut calciamentum ad pedem et similia” (Conf. IV.xiii.20 [p. 65, translation
modified]). This citation continues as follows: “This realization welled up in my mind
from my innermost heart, and I wrote some books entitled The Beautiful and the Harmoni-
ous, two or three books I think — you know, O God, but it escapes me, for I no longer have
them; they have somehow been lost” (“Et ista consideratio scaturivit in animo meo ex
intimo corde meo, et scripsi libros De Pulchro et Apto, puto, duos aut tres; tu scis, Deus nam
excidit mihi. Non enim habemus eos, sed aberraverunt a nobis nescio quo modo” [Conf.
IV.xiii.20 (p. 65); cf. Conf. IV.xiv.23; IV.xv.24]).
116
G:\Pabst\first corrections
Monday, January 16, 2012 2:51:48 PM
Color profile: Disabled
Composite  140 lpi at 45 degrees
embodied essential characteristics that the senses can somehow per-
ceive and the mind can cognize.
Like Plato, Augustine argues that forms do not stand apart from the
things that embody them but are present in the very materiality of
things. As such, form is not primarily a concept of the mind in the mind
but has a visibility that the senses mediate to the intellect: “My mind
scanned material forms, and I defined and distinguished what was beau-
tiful in itself from what was harmonious because fittingly adapted to
something else, supporting my distinction with material examples.”55 So
to say that a thing is beautiful in itself and harmonious with other things
in virtue of its material form ( forma corporea) is to say that a thing’s ma-
terial form is both individual and relational and can be discerned and
known as such.
In the De Musica (c. 387-391), Augustine suggests that the beauty and
harmony of things is a function of their ‘numberliness’ (numerositas). In
fact, the whole of material and immaterial reality alike is governed by
numbers and ratios which constitute the individual forms and the rela-
tions that pertain between them. But how do we know that this might be
so? By contrast with Aristotle’s ‘mathematical ontology’ and his episte-
mology of formal abstraction, Augustine’s ‘musical metaphysics’ is
linked to his theory of divine illumination. It is precisely because the tri-
une Godhead illumines human cognition and directs the created intel-
lect to its creative source that we can discern the relational ordering of
material creation and the image of the Trinitarian God in ourselves and
in our neighbors. Here Augustine’s ‘incarnational’ philosophy shifts the
Aristotelian emphasis away from individual substantial form towards
universal form instantiated in particular materiality. Theologically and
philosophically, the reality of Creation and Incarnation binds together
form and matter in such a way that a particular material thing uniquely
reflects the universal form it embodies.
This specifically Augustinian focus on the link between form and
matter is not confined to the content of cognition but encompasses the
initial source of cognitive capacity and the process of cognition. Im-
pressed with divinely ordered numbers and ratios, physical organs like
the senses can mediate the presence of immaterial structures in mate-
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55. “ibat animus per formas corporeas et pulchrum, quod per se ipsum, aptum autem,
quod ad aliquid accommodatum deceret, definiebam et distinguebam et exemplis corporeis
astruebam” (Conf. IV.xv.24 [p. 67]).
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rial things to the intellect, thus directing our natural desire for knowl-
edge to forms embodied in matter and to their ultimate origin in God.
What sustains this cognitive dynamic is the free gift of divine wisdom to
all persons so that they may discover the image of the Trinitarian God in
them.
I will now explore the link between Augustine’s ‘musical metaphys-
ics’ and his account of divine illumination in greater detail. Since the
senses themselves are infused with numbers and ratios (De Mus. VI.iii.4–
VI.iv.5), they can delight in the beauty and harmony of ‘material form’:
[T]he very sense of delight could not have been favourable to equal in-
tervals and rejected perturbed ones, unless it itself were imbued with
numbers; then too, the reason laid upon this delight cannot at all judge
of the numbers it has under it, without more powerful numbers.56
In other words, numbers and ratios are not only in objects of knowledge
but also in the senses and in reason. As such, it is not the human mind
that projects categorial structures onto the world. Instead, the senses
and the intellect discern a numerical structure at the heart of reality be-
cause they are endowed with the capacity of recognizing it. But how can
the physical senses delight in something intangible which they do not
themselves fully grasp? How can the immaterial mind rejoice in some-
thing material that it does not as yet know? Why do humans desire that
which they as yet ignore?
Augustine’s proposed solution to this paradox mirrors and develops
Plato’s theory in the Meno where he accounts for our natural desire to
know the unknown in terms of the presence of the Good in us. In his
early works, we can find a theological resolution of the Meno paradox
which frames Augustine’s account of individuation and creation. Far
from advocating a “flight from the physical world,”57 his argument is that
we come to love material things and to desire the beauty and harmony of
material form because the numbers and ratios in objects alert us to the
numbers and ratios in our senses, in our judgment, and ultimately in our
soul. Blending Plato’s metaphysics of relationality and participation with
86
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56. “nisi quibusdam numeris esset ipse delectationis sensus imbutus, nullo modo eum
potuisse annuere paribus intervallis, et perturbata respuere: recte etiam videri potest ratio,
quae huic delectationi superimponitur, nullo modo sine quibusdam numeris vivacioribus, de
numeris quos infra se habet posse iudicare” (De Mus. VI.ix.24 [p. 350]).
57. Menn, Descartes and Augustine, pp. 395-400.
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Aristotle’s ontology of act and potency, Augustine shows how only sen-
sory experience of actual physical beauty and harmony can activate our
sense of beautiful and harmonic proportions in material things and thus
actualize our potency to know beauty and harmony in themselves and as
such (De Mus. VI.ii.2-3).
Augustine’s theological epistemology also operates important modi-
fications of Plato’s theory of {n}mnhsiv and Aristotle’s language of act
and potency. Like Plato in the later dialogues, Augustine maintains that
knowledge of forms exceeds mental recollection because sensory experi-
ence awakens the soul to the presence of intelligible forms in sensible
things.58 Beyond Plato, Augustine denies that the soul itself effects
bodily sensation and the memory. Both sensation and the memory are
activated by the numbers and ratios in objects that kindle our desire for
beauty and harmony (De Mus. VI.iii.4–VI.iv.5). With Aristotle (and
against Plato), Augustine holds that the coming into being of finite mate-
rial things is not the product of a Demiurge which uses form to create or-
der out of chaotic matter but rather the outcome of a formal act of being
which actualizes the potency of matter. Since the senses mediate species
form to the mind, sense perception — not mental abstraction — is at the
origin of knowledge of forms that inhere in matter: “. . . among our senses
also, which the mind uses in acting through the body, there is nothing
more valuable than the eyes, and so in the Holy Scriptures all the objects
of sense are spoken of as visible things.”59 The senses, in particular vi-
sion, are central to Augustine’s account of knowledge because there are
according to him “traces of reason in sensations (vestigia rationis in
sensibus)” (De Ord. II.xi.33). Since both Creation and the Incarnation
mark the instantiation of the intelligible in the sensible, Augustine con-
cludes that to perceive anything sensible is to discern the intelligible
that activates our cognition (Retrac. I.i.1).
Beyond Aristotle, he also contends that matter is not purely passive
but instead always already contains a capacity to receive form, akin to a
seed whose form unfolds in the presence of active forces (De Mus.
VI.xvii.57). Likewise, judgment of beauty and harmony is a capacity that,
like sensation and memory, is triggered by the numbers and ratios in ob-
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58. Jean-Louis Chrétien, L’inoubliable et l’inespéré, (Paris: Desclóe de Brouwer, 1991),
pp. 15-64.
59. “. . . quia et ipsis sensibus nostris, quibus anima per corpus utitur, nihil est oculis
praeferendum; et ideo in Scripturis sanctis visibilium nomine sensibilia cuncta denotantur”
(Mor. Eccl. Cath. XX.37 [p. 85]).
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jects. By contrast with Descartes’s transcendentalist rationalism or
Locke’s immanentist empiricism, Augustine’s ‘musical metaphysics’ and
his theory of divine illumination combines the priority of being over
knowledge (e.g., “the knowables beget knowledge,” De Trin. XIV.iii.13)
with the Neo-Platonist idea that knowing a thing perfects both the
knowing subject and the known object, as I will suggest below.
B. The Modulations of Measure, Number, and Weight (Wis. 11:20-21)
Returning for now to the numerical and proportional ordering of reality,
Augustine’s innovation is the idea that the presence of numbers and ra-
tios in objects, sensation, the senses, the memory, and judgment inti-
mates a hierarchy of forms (numbers) that is governed by ordering rela-
tions (ratios) of equality.
These beautiful things, then, please by number, where we have shown
equality is sought. For this is found not only in that beauty belonging
to the ears or in the motion of bodies, but also in the very visible forms
where beauty is more usually said to be. . . . For there’s not one of these
sensibles [which] does not please us from equality or likeness. But
where equality and likeness, there numberliness. In fact, nothing is so
equal or like as one and one.60
For Augustine, ‘numberliness’ is the ordering principle of all that is. The
mind is enticed by beautiful and harmonious things because they em-
body varying degrees of likeness with the One. Individual things are
beautiful and harmonious insofar as they reflect the unity of oneness.
The hierarchy of numbers and ratios is coextensive with the equality of
all things compared with the perfection of the One. This conjunction of
hierarchy and equality suggests an irreducible link between metaphysics
and politics in Augustine’s cosmology, as Rowan Williams has shown.61
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60. “Haec igitur pulchra numero placent, in quo iam ostendimus aequalitatem appeti.
Non enim hoc tantum in ea pulchritudine quae ad aures pertinet, atque in motu corporum
est, invenitur, sed in ipsis etiam visibilibus formis, in quibus iam usitatius dicitur pulchritudo
. . . nihil enim est horum sensibilium, quod nobis non aequalitate aut similitudine placeat. Ubi
autem aequalitas aut similitudo, ibi numerositas; nihil est quippe tam aequale aut simile
quam unum et unum” (De Mus. VI.xiii.38 [pp. 363-64]).
61. On this link between hierarchy and equality in Augustine’s politics, see Rowan
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The theme of ‘numberliness’ and the preeminence of oneness in Au-
gustine’s description of the cosmos can be traced to the Pythagorean
variant of Neo-Platonism, bequeathed by Plotinus and transmitted to
Christian theology by Porphyry and Philolaus.62 Against Aristotle’s
causal cosmology and immanentist ontology, Augustine fuses the self-
exteriorization of the Good in Plato and the One in Plotinus with the bib-
lical doctrine of creation ex nihilo and the hierarchical and triadic group-
ings in the theurgic metaphysics of Iamblichus (transmitted via Por-
phyry).63 On that basis, he offers a redescription of the world. Each and
every thing is what it is in virtue of a unique number and a unique set of
ratios between lower and higher numbers. Such numerical structures
are manifest in the beauty of individual material forms and the harmoni-
ous relations that pertain between them, as I have already indicated. The
number and ratios, which individuate a thing formally and materially,
express not only that thing’s unique location in space but also its unique
occurrence in time (De Mus. VI.xvii.57). Hence, the individuality and
unicity of material form is both temporal and spatial. Since time and
space are coextensive and correlated, material form is individuated by
the particular interaction of universal temporality and spatiality, here
mirroring the ‘horizontal’ participation amongst the forms themselves
in Plato.
How can this be so? In the De Musica, numbers and ratios are de-
fined as measurements or modulations (modulationes) over time and
across space. Modulations describe motion, rest, and the transition be-
tween them (De Mus. VI.ii.3; VI.vii.18). As such, they are neither part of a
perpetual succession of anterior and posterior moments without any te-
leology nor determined by fixed proportions that confine them to a
static existence. Instead, modulations are particular discrete ‘moments’
within the universal passage of time in space. Each ‘moment’ comes into
89
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Williams, “Politics and the Soul: A Reading of the City of God,” Milltown Studies 19/20
(1987): 55-72.
62. For fragments from Porphyry and Philolaus, see Andrew Barker, Greek Musical
Writings, Volume II: Harmonic and Acoustic Theory (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1989), I.1 and I.11, pp. 30, 36.
63. On triads in Iamblichus, see Shaw, Theurgy and the Soul, pp. 129-42, 199-215. On
the proximity of Iamblichus and Augustine in relation to triads, see Milbank, “Sacred
Triads: Augustine and the Indo-European Soul,” pp. 451-74, and John Dillon, “Iamblichus’
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existence and passes into nothingness. Material form is therefore indi-
viduated by the relations that pertain between higher and lower num-
bers over time and across space. Here Augustine makes the point that
each particular modulation, within a wider movement of time reflecting
eternity, intimates a higher number which has a greater equality and
likeness with the One. The One is the source of all existence and a higher
act of being but — pace Plato and Plotinus — it cannot be impersonal,
for why would an anonymous cause bring anything into actuality and
sustain things in being? For this reason, Augustine operates a profound
transformation of Platonist metaphysics and its Neo-Platonist develop-
ments, arguing that the creative formation of order out of chaos in Plato
or the generative power of the One in Plotinus cannot account for the re-
lational ordering of the world. Only a triune Creator can explain why and
how everything is brought out of the vacuity of nothingness into the
plenitude of being.
Augustine’s redescription of reality resonates with the Iamblichean
emphasis on hierarchical and triadic structures. All things, corporeal
and incorporeal, share three common features. In De Vera Religione, he
writes that “every being, substance, essence or nature, or whatever
better word there may be, possesses at once these three qualities: it is a
particular thing; it is distinguished from other things by its own proper
form; and it does not transgress the order of nature.”64 These three fea-
tures — ‘measure’ (or limit), ‘form,’ and ‘order’ (echoing the Book of Wis-
dom 11:20-21) — depict the metaphysical structure of the world.65 They
are universal principles that govern all particular beings. What emerges
from his redescription is a world brought into being, sustained, and per-
fected by God’s creative activity which directs all things to their divinely
given telos. Form embodied in matter denotes a thing’s individuality, sin-
gularity, or unicity. It is that “by which a thing is what it is” (Civ. Dei
VIII.6). Order is a thing’s station in the hierarchy of all beings. As such, it
marks a thing’s relationality and its finality — forming harmonious rela-
tions with other things, which perfects individual form and that of the
order as a whole. Telos so configured is dynamic, not static, because it is
90
SUBSTANCE AND RELATION
64. “Omnis enim res, vel substantia, vel essentia, vel natura, vel si quo alio verbo melius
enuntiatur, simul haec tria habet; ut et unum aliquid sit, et specie propria discernatur a cet-
eris, et rerum ordinem non excedat” (Ver. Relig. VII.13 [pp. 43-44]).
65. See W. J. Roche, “Measure, Number and Weight in Saint Augustine,” The New Scho-
lasticism 15 (1941): 350-76, and C. Harrison, “Measure, Number and Weight in Saint Augus-
tine’s Aesthetics,” Augustinianum 28 (1988): 591-602.
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coextensive and coeval with time itself. Unlike Aristotle’s indifferent
God, there is in Augustine a metaphysical link between the unity of the
world and the oneness of its Creator, neither of which the human mind
can ever fully grasp or comprehend. Von Balthasar puts this well:
It would be a mistake to take the harmony of the world, which is built
on fixed numerical relationships in space and time, as an ultimate,
static entity, from the passive contemplation of which the contem-
plating mind receives aesthetic sensations. On the contrary, for Au-
gustine, this beauty itself is only a dynamic striving towards a unity
that can never be attained.66
Conjointly, form and order express the beauty that is specific to each and
every thing and the beauty of harmonious relations between things.
Composite things are beautiful because individually and collectively
they form compounds and tend towards a kind of equality and propor-
tionality that blends unity with diversity — a dim reflection of Trinitar-
ian relationality. As such, composites are both individual and relational,
and they perfect their singularity and relationality by forming relations
with other composites. In so doing, they also help perfect the beauty of
the cosmos as a whole: “Such is the force and power of completeness and
unity that many things, all good in themselves, are only found satisfying
when they come together and fit into one universal whole.”67
But why do composite things strive towards unity and why does cos-
mic beauty reveal a creative transcending ordering of all things? Augus-
tine’s response is that both form and order require measure or limit —
the third metaphysical principle that governs all things. Without limits
in space and time, nothing can be formed or ordered in itself and as
such. Form and order require a natural temporal and spatial limit. In the
case of corporeal things, this is matter, which is repeatedly described in
the three commentaries on the Book of Genesis as “basic material, un-
sorted and unformed” (Gen. C. Man. I.v.9). This is not to say that Augus-
tine endorses Plato’s kora or Aristotle’s hylomorphism. To the contrary,
he defines matter as that which per se lacks form but has the disposition
91
Trinitarian God and Triadic Cosmos
66. Hans Urs von Balthasar, The Glory of the Lord: A Theological Aesthetics, trans. and
ed. Joseph Fessio and John Kenneth Riches (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1989), p. 129.
67. “Tanta est vis et potentia integritatis et unitatis, ut etiam quae multa sunt bona tunc
placeant, cum in universum aliquid conveniunt atque concurrunt. Universum autem ab
unitate nomen accepit” (Gen. C. Man., I.xxi.32 [I-13: 60]).
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to be given a form because it is neither totally chaotic (as for Plato) nor
purely passive (as for Aristotle), as I have already indicated:
By “hyle” I mean matter completely without form and quality, out of
which are formed the qualities we perceive. . . . It [“hyle”] has no form
by which we can perceive it. Indeed, it can hardly be conceived be-
cause it is so utterly without form. But it has the capacity to receive
form.68
Since matter stands in potency to the actuality of form, matter is for Au-
gustine an integral part of actual formation. Like Plato and Aristotle, he
knows that “nothing could by itself come into being” (Immort. An.
VIII.14) and that “nothing can form itself because nothing can give itself
that which it does not have” (Lib. Arb. II.xvii.46). So both matter and form
are caused by something other and higher than themselves. But unlike
Plato and Aristotle, Augustine maintains that material potency is nei-
ther totally chaotic nor purely passive but is instead directed to formal
actuality. I explore Augustine’s transformation of the (Neo-)Platonist ac-
count of matter and actualization in the following section.
7. Matter, Causality, and the Gift of Creation
For Augustine, the capacity of matter to receive form calls forth actual-
ization. Even utterly formless unsorted matter in some sense does not
‘wish’ to remain what it is but seeks a higher level in the hierarchical gra-
dation of being that is characteristic of Plotinian and Iamblichean Neo-
Platonist metaphysics. Matter requires not only form and order so as to
be what it is and to perfect its potential. It also requires a power of being
(virtus essendi) in order to be brought into being and to abide, for that is
according to Augustine the finality of all things (Gen. ad Lit. I.viii.14). To
be brought into being and to abide in being is to reveal the utter pleni-
tude of the creative source of being which inhabits all things and which
all things inhabit insofar as they are: “[B]y his immutable and surpassing
92
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68. “Sed hylen dico quamdam penitus informem et sine qualitate materiem, unde istae
quas sentimus qualitates formantur . . . Nec ista ergo hyle malum dicenda est, quae non per
aliquam speciem sentiri, sed per omnimodam speciei privationem cogitari vix potest. Habet
enim et ipsa capacitatem formarum” (Nat. Boni XVIII [p. 46]; cf. Ver. Relig. XVIII.36).
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power, not in any local sense or spatial sense, he is both interior to every
single thing, because in him are all things [Rom. 11:36], and exterior to ev-
ery single thing because he is above all things.”69
Contra Aristotle, final causation — however configured — cannot
explain why the eternal prime cause would sustain finite beings and
draw them into a plenitudinous relational order that is more than the
sum of its parts (Conf. XIII.ii.2; XIII.iv.5). And yet this ecstatic plenitude is
inscribed in finite existence and the numerical structure of the world. In
his unfinished literal commentary on the Book of Genesis, Augustine
writes that “every nature, whether it is perceived by merely sentient or
fully rational observers, preserves, in its parts being like one another, the
effigy of the whole universe.”70 So in perceiving material composite be-
ings, we grasp their singularity, relationality, and the overarching order
in which they share as beings. The phenomenally visible triadic struc-
ture of finite things (limit, form, and order) intimates an infinite creative
source, which can only be God. All that exists intimates “traces of certain
numbers without any matter, for it is there where the highest kind of
unity is” (Ver. Relig. XLII.79).
Augustine’s focus on the unity of the highest being and the highest
good does not compromise his emphasis on the material mediation of
God. Quite the reverse, Augustine’s innovative blending of Plotinian and
Iamblichean Neo-Platonist metaphysics with his ‘incarnational’ philoso-
phy and Trinitarian theology leads him to make a very good, if contro-
versial, case for saying that absolute immanence is absolute transcen-
dence: “I call the whole that contains and sustains us, whatever it is, the
‘world’ — the whole, I say, that appears before my eyes, which I perceive
to include the heavens and the earth.”71 If in the De Trinitate Augustine
exhorts “faith in temporal things,”72 it is precisely because the very limit
of material things mediates God’s ecstatic and creative activity. In the
Confessions, he describes his intellectual conversion in terms of a theo-
93
Trinitarian God and Triadic Cosmos
69. “cum sit ipse, nullo locorum vel intervallo vel spatio, incommutabili excellentique
potentia et interior omni re, quia in ipso sunt omnia, et exterior omni re, quia ipse est super
omnia” (Gen. ad. Lit. VIII.xxvi.48 [I-13: 374]).
70. “omnem naturam, sive quae sentientibus, sive quae ratiocinantibus occurrit,
similibus inter se partibus servare universitatis effigiem” (Gen. ad Lit. Imp. XVI.59 [I-13: 148]).
71. “Ego itaque hoc totum, qualecumque est quod nos continet, atque alit; hoc, inquam,
quod oculis meis apparet, a meque sentitur habere terram et coelum, aut quasi terram, et
quasi coelum, mundum voco” (Cont. Acad. III.xi.24 [p. 152]).
72. De Trin. XIV.i.3 [p. 371]. Cf. De Trin. IV.iv.24; XIII.ii.5; XIV.i.1.
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logical vision that transcends the false division between contemplative
and mystical experience: “[M]y mind attained to That Which Is [id quod
est], in the flash of one tremulous glance. Then indeed did I perceive your
invisible reality through created things.”73 Hence Augustine insists that all
material things, which “the eternal artist has formed . . . in limit, form
and order,”74 exhibit a desire for ever more intense actualization and
union with their Creator.
For this reason, Augustine develops both Platonism and Neo-
Platonism in a Christological and a Trinitarian direction. But there is am-
ple confusion about the precise nature of Augustine’s account of matter
and causation. In his book Augustine’s View of Reality, Vernon Bourke as-
serts that “it is vain . . . to attempt to relate the Augustinian treatment of
causality to the Aristotelian theory of the four causes (agent [or efficient],
final, formal and material). St. Augustine does not think as Aristotle
does.”75 The assumption is that Augustine has replaced Aristotle’s sophis-
ticated account of causality with a more simplistic mono-causal explana-
tion centered on Plato’s Good, Plotinus’s One, and the Trinitarian God of
Christianity. Likewise, it has been argued that Augustine’s Neo-Platonism
is the ultimate source of ‘occasionalism,’ which holds that all things (and
all actions between things) are the product of God’s direct, unmediated
intervention in this world. The idea is that each and every event is but an
‘occasion’ for God to intervene in the world so that his will be done.
Nicolas Malebranche, the French seventeenth-century Oratorian priest
and philosopher, drew on Augustine, William of Ockham, and Descartes
to systematize this conception of divine cause and effect into the doctrine
of ‘occasionalism.’76 As such, Augustine is widely held to be the patristic
precursor of modern philosophy of science.
However, in this section I argue that Augustine profoundly trans-
formed ancient accounts of causation and that his own conception of
causality is diametrically opposed to ‘occasionalism.’ My contention is
that, first of all, Augustine remodeled the Platonist idea of formal and
material causation and the Aristotelian teaching of the immanent
94
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73. “pervenit ad id, quod est in ictu trepidantis aspectus. Tunc vero invisibilia tua per ea
quae facta sunt intellecta conspexi” (Conf. VII.xvii.23; my italics [p. 138]).
74. Enchir., quoted in von Balthasar, The Glory of the Lord, p. 138, n. 3.
75. Bourke, Augustine’s View of Reality, p. 131.
76. Michael Buckley, At the Origins of Modern Atheism (New Haven and London: Yale
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causes and effects. Second, he developed a theory that overcomes the
aporiai of Platonist and Aristotelian causality, in particular Plato’s pre-
supposition that matter is eternal and Aristotle’s failure to explain why
the primary cause would wish to bring about secondary effects. Finally,
Augustine’s understanding of causality allows for secondary causality on
the part of creatures. Thus it secures freedom and values human agency,
while also grounding divine causality in God’s love and goodness.77
Augustine shares with Greek and Stoic philosophy the argument
that no sensible material thing can ever be self-generated, self-sufficient,
or self-contained. All things require a cause for their being. Consider the
following three quotes: “nothing can be generated without a cause” (De
Ord. I.iv.11); “nothing makes or begets itself ” (Immort. An. VIII.14); “there’s
absolutely no thing whatsoever that brings itself into being” (De Trin.
I.i.1). To come into existence is always already to have a cause that is irre-
ducible to its effect. Things also require a cause for their form and their
operation: “nothing can give itself that which it does not have” (Lib. Arb.
II.xvii.45). Finally, things have not one but a set of causes: “nothing can be
generated without . . . a determined order of causes” (De Ord. I.iv.11). Pace
Bourke, the similarity between Aristotle’s and Augustine’s account of
causality is apparent from the following passage:
For everything that exists, that whereby it is established, that whereby
it is distinguished, and that whereby it is in agreement are different.
Therefore, the created universe, if it exists in some way and is far from
being utterly nothing and yet is in agreement with itself and its parts,
there must be a threefold cause, by which it is, by which it is this, by
which it is in agreement with itself.78
Transposed into Aristotelian idiom, the last sentence can be restated as
follows: there must be a threefold cause — efficient, formal, and final.
These concepts are analogous to the triadic structure of all individual
things, ‘limit,’ ‘form,’ and ‘order,’ which I outlined in the previous section.
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77. On this point, I have benefited from Montague Brown, “Augustine and Aristotle
on Causality,” in Lienhard, Muller, and Teske, eds., Augustine: Presbyter Factus Sum, pp.
465-76.
78. “Omne quod est, aliud est quo constat, aliud quo discernitur, aliud quo congruit.
Universa igitur creatura si et est quoquo modo, et ab eo quod omnino nihil est plurimum
distat, et suis partibus sibimet congruit, causam quoque eius trinam esse oportet: qua sit, qua
hoc sit, qua sibi amica sit” (Div. Quest. XVIII [p. 86]).
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However, the missing element is material causation. Bourke offers the
following explanation for this lacuna: “There is no theory of potency and
act in Augustine’s thought, so matter simply means the original stuff that
God created out of nothing.”79 It is correct that Augustine speaks of matter
as formless. For instance, commenting on Genesis 1:2 (“the earth was with-
out form and void”), he writes “so then the first thing to be made was basic
material, unsorted and unformed, out of which all the things would be
made which have been sorted out and formed” (De Gen. C. Man. I.v.9). But
it is equally clear — as I have already indicated — that for Augustine mat-
ter is not purely passive (as it was for Aristotle). If there is mutability, which
means that there is temporality, there must be something that is capable
of being acted upon. If there is any matter at all, then it must be mutable
and therefore exist in time, in which case it cannot be utterly formless, for
how else to account for change in time? It follows that no individual mate-
rial thing is ever utterly formless, but has the potency to be formed: “For
the mutability of mutable things is itself capable of all those forms into
which mutable things are changed” (Conf. V.vi.6). For this reason, Augus-
tine’s conception of matter emphasizes the capacity to receive form.80
How are we to understand this idea of capacity to receive form? De-
veloping the insight of St. Justin Martyr, Augustine explains the material
capacity to be formed in terms of ‘seminal reasons’ (rationes seminales),
which he defines as primordial seeds that can be activated. He writes
that things unfold and come forth
in manifest forms and natures from the secret formulae that are caus-
ally latent in creation. . . . [They] carry within them a repetition, so to
say, of their very selves, invisible in some hidden power of reproduc-
tion, derived from those primordial causes of theirs, in which they
were inserted into the world that was created “when the day was




79. Bourke, Augustine’s View of Reality, p. 98.
80. See, supra, note 68.
81. “. . . ex occultis atque invisibilibus rationibus, quae in creatura causaliter latent, in
manifestas formas naturasque prodierunt . . . quodammodo inchoata sunt ea ipsa quae
consequentibus evolvenda temporibus primitus Deus omnia simul creavit, cum faceret
mundum: consummata quidem quia nihil habent illa in naturis propriis, quibus suorum
temporum cursus agunt, quod non in istis causaliter factum sit; inchoata vero, quoniam
quaedam erant quasi semina futurorum” (De Gen. ad Lit. VI.x.17–VI.xi.18 [I-13: 310-11]).
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In other words, Augustine conceives of matter as always already infused
with a certain shape that is inscribed in its potency and can be actual-
ized. But against the Stagirite, the Bishop of Hippo insists that the indi-
viduality of material things is not the product of an immanent substan-
tial form but linked to the transcendent actualization by God’s creative
power. In order to develop this alternative account, Augustine deploys
the Aristotelian language of act and potency to explain how an individual
material thing comes into being: “It was in the seed that all the rest was
originally to be found, not in the mass of full material growth, but in the
potentiality of its causative virtue.”82 By contrast with Aristotle’s indiffer-
ent God, divine actualization explains why things are brought from the
nothingness of nonexistence into the plenitude of actuality. Nor does the
primary causality of God diminish the secondary causality of the natural
order. To the contrary, Augustine makes a further distinction between
God’s original act of creation and his concurrent creative act:
It is one thing, after all, to establish and administer creation from the
inmost and supreme pivot of all causes, and the one who does that is
God the sole creator; it is another matter to apply activity from out-
side, in virtue of power and capacities distributed by him, so that the
thing being created turns out to be like this or like that. All these
things around us have been seminally and primordially created in the
very fabric, as it were, or texture of the elements; but they require the
right occasion actually to emerge into being.83
This distinction allows Augustine to explain why matter has the potency
and the desire to be actualized and individuated and how God’s creative
activity encompasses first- and second-order causation, that is to say,
bringing into existence the universal cosmos and actualizing particulars
therein. In other words, divine activity sustains even the individuating
actualization of things in this world. There can therefore be no separa-
tion of the supernatural grace of God from the natural operation of the
universe. As such, Augustine’s theological account of causation eschews
97
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82. “in semine ergo illa omnia fuerunt primitus, non mole corporeae magnitudinis, sed
vi potentiaque causali” (De Gen. ad Lit. V.xxiii.44, my italics [I-13: 299]).
83. “Aliud est enim ex intimo ac summo causarum cardine condere atque administrare
creaturam, quod qui facit solus Creator est Deus, aliud autem pro distributis ab illo viribus et
facultatibus aliquam operationem forinsecus admovere ut tunc vel tunc sic vel sic exeat quod
creatur” (De Trin. III.ii.16 [I-5: 136]).
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the modern dualism between nature and the supernatural and also vari-
ous modern attempts like ‘providential occasionalism’ to bridge a gap
that according to orthodox theology simply does not exist.
Based on this conceptuality of act and potency, Augustine also at-
tributes ‘meta-causality’ to God, that is to say, the action which pre-
serves and perfects actuality in matter which has received it. The crucial
difference with both Plato and Aristotle is that Augustine reconfigures
materiality as the active capacity to receive form, which together with
God’s continuous creative action constitutes human agency. In De
Civitate Dei, Augustine speaks of the ‘power of the seeds’ (Civ. Dei VII.30)
and of the efficient cause in things as ‘productive energy’ (Civ. Dei XII.25).
Each and every individual material thing displays at once formal, mate-
rial, efficient, and final causation: formal and material, since no matter
can ever be formless (otherwise it would be infinite in space and could
therefore not exist in time); efficient and final, since no material thing is
immutable but changes over time and moves to a telos which transcends
it (otherwise it would be capable of giving itself that which it does not
have).
However, Augustine’s theory of ‘seminal reasons’ is not confined to a
reformulation of Greek theories of causality. Aristotle’s Prime Mover can-
not explain why individual things are engendered and Plato’s Demiurge
cannot account for why particulars are material, as I showed in the pre-
vious chapter. Thus, Augustine seeks to reach beyond two forms of cau-
sation. First, the cause that brings about single-act subsistent existence
and, second, the cause that generates the effective operation of more in-
tense existing. Neither cause, according to Augustine, can account for
why a ‘first-order’ cause would wish to bring into being and sustain
‘second-order’ effects; causality cannot explain why a unique, simple, in-
divisible, immaterial ‘first-order’ cause would generate a multiplicity of
individual, composite, divisible, material things.
As a result of these limitations, Augustine not only recasts Aristote-
lian causation but also emphasizes the ecstatic plenitude of God and his
love as the ultimate cause of creation. The cause qua cause encompasses
its effects and effects are more than themselves because in their unfold-
ing they manifest their continuous cause. Effects only are in virtue of be-
ing in the cause (and are therefore always already more than them-
selves). Likewise, the cause only is cause of something in virtue of being
utterly ecstatic (Lib. Arb. I.vii; De Trin. XIV.xiii; Civ. Dei XI.26). For Augus-





Monday, January 16, 2012 2:51:49 PM
Color profile: Disabled
Composite  140 lpi at 45 degrees
what they are (effects of a cause that exceeds them), but also, most im-
portantly, why they are — in order to be and to testify to the utter pleni-
tude of the creative source which inhabits all things and which all things
inhabit insofar as they are:
This force and incorporeal nature which effected the whole body,
however, preserves the whole by its ever-present power. For, after
the making, it did not vanish and did not desert the thing made. . . .
For, what does not exist through itself will certainly not exist if deserted
by that through which it exists. We cannot say, however, that when the
body was made it received also the gift of being self-sufficient and
self-supporting, in case it should be deserted by its creator. . . . A form
is present in the whole body, because a more excellent nature supplies
and conserves the thing it has made. This change, naturally, does not
deprive the body of being a body, but lets it pass from one form to
another by a well-ordered movement. For no single part of the whole
can be reduced to nothing, because that effecting force comprises
the whole and, through its power, that neither works nor is inactive,
gives existence to everything that exists through it insofar as it does
exist.84
In short, Augustine argues that in each individual thing there is at work
some creating power that exhibits three features: first of all, it is a ‘power’
of a ‘more excellent nature’; second, it ‘supplies and conserves the thing
it has made,’ ‘gives existence,’ and ‘preserves the whole’; and finally, this
power ensures change ‘from one form to another by a well-ordered
movement.’ In the following section, I show how Augustine’s account of
creation ex nihilo frames his theory of individuation.
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84. “Haec autem vis et natura incorporea effectrix corporis universi praesente potentia
tenet universum. Non enim fecit, atque discessit effectumque deseruit. . . . Quod enim per se
non est, si destituatur ab eo per quod est, profecto non erit: et non possumus dicere id
accepisse corpus cum factum est, ut seipso iam contentum esse posset, etiamsi a conditore
desereretur. . . . Adest igitur species universo corpori, meliore natura sufficiente atque
obtinente quae fecit: quare illa mutabilitas non adimit corpori Corpus esse, sed de specie in
speciem transire facit motu ordinatissimo. Non enim quaepiam eius pars ad nihilum redigi
sinitur, cum totum capessat vis illa effectoria nec laborante nec deside potentia, dans ut sit
omne quod per illam est, in quantum est” (Immort. An. VIII.14-15; my italics [p. 78]).
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8. Self, Cosmos, and God
A. Knowledge, Wisdom, and Love
According to Augustine, there is an analogy between knowledge of the
world and knowledge of the self. Just as knowledge of the world reveals a
relational ordering of all things that intimates God, so too knowledge of
the self discloses a self in relation. Indeed, the self is of course no mono-
lithic substance but rather a complex compound that consists of being,
willing, and knowing, as well as memory, love, and understanding. For
Augustine, these mental triads reflect the image of the Holy Trinity in us.
Here Augustine’s fusion of (Neo-)Platonism with Trinitarianism is criti-
cal. The triadic structures of all material and immaterial things reveal
that everything is actualized and individuated by God’s loving wisdom.
For this reason, Augustine exhorts us not to focus exclusively on the in-
ternal ‘self ’ or the external ‘other’ but instead to discern that which
brings them both into actuality and sustains them in being. That is why
true love is indispensable to knowledge of the truth. For true love always
already involves the lover, the loved, and love itself — none of which can
be reduced to each other, as Rowan Williams notes.85 Since love for the
self and love for the other (or the neighbor) is love for love, Augustine in-
sists that love itself is relational and ecstatic, disclosing a transcendent
source that overflows into immanence. Thus he concludes that “[t]his
trinity of the mind is not really the image of God because the mind re-
members and understands and loves itself, but because it is also able to
remember and understand and love him by whom it was made.”86
The love that is involved in knowing the real ordering of the world
and the real constitution of the self is God’s loving wisdom, for that is
how God communicates himself to creatures. To discover divine
sapientia at the heart of the cosmos and the self is to discover the integral
and ecstatic openness and direction of all that is to God. For Augustine,
this is to discover our creatureliness and the createdness of the whole
universe, which is hierarchically and triadically ordered to reflect the di-
verse degrees of being and goodness. Rowan Williams puts this well:
100
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85. Williams, “The Paradoxes of Self-Knowledge in the De Trinitate,” pp. 121-34.
86. “Haec igitur trinitas mentis non propterea Dei est imago, quia sui meminit mens, et
intellegit ac diligit se: sed quia potest etiam meminisse, et intellegere, et amare a quo facta est”
(De Trin. XIV.iv.15 [I-5: 383]).
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Its [the mind’s] knowing and loving of God in this context is also a
knowing of its proper place in creation’s hierarchy, its freedom from
temporal and material conditioning in its deepest orientation. It is
possible for human minds to be set free for God, because there is noth-
ing in the order of creation that intrudes between the mind and God’s
self-communication.87
To know that we are created is to know that we are good in virtue of pro-
ceeding from the supreme Good itself. Our emanation from the One God
constitutes an ontological relation that was broken by the Fall and re-
stored by the Resurrection of Jesus Christ and the full revelation of the
Trinitarian God — Word and Wisdom, Logos and Sapientia, Christ and
Sophia. The divine free gift of creation grants us both freedom from and
freedom for the Creator. What we discover at the heart of being is that
“God is more interior to me than I to myself.”88 That is why for Augustine
we need to keep God firmly as the object of our being, willing, and know-
ing (here surely echoing Plotinus and Iamblichus). To do so is to share in
his loving wisdom and to transform ourselves and the world according
to the highest Good, so that we may preserve the goodness that we have
by participation and perfect the justice that we attain (here resonating
with Plato). We can do so by acting in accordance with God’s intention-
ality, which is mediated to us in and through the triple bond of the Book
of Scripture, the Book of Nature, and the Book of History.
As such, Augustine’s (Neo-)Platonist Trinitarian theology rules out
any interpretation that imputes to him some form of idealist anti-
materialism. Since in this world matter and form do not stand apart
from one another but instead constitute material form ( forma corporea),
the material reality we encounter mediates the form of the highest being
and good in God. Likewise, our soul cannot flee the body it inhabits but
through its embodiment can come to know why and how matter itself
was created by the Creator. However, Augustine also agrees with the Ar-
istotelian imperative to abstract from sense impressions and to separate
form from matter in order to attain the truth of immaterial ultimate
form that is the cause of all that is (De Trin. VIII.i.2-3). Here it is impor-
tant to note that abstraction in Augustine’s theological epistemology
101
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87. Williams, “Sapientia and the Trinity: Reflections on the De Trinitate,” pp. 317-32
(320).
88. “Deus interior intimo meo” (Conf. III.vi.11).
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must be understood in the context of his theory of divine illumination,
as I indicated in the previous section. It is precisely openness to the re-
ception of the free gift of divine wisdom that enables the human mind to
cognize the image of the triune Godhead in the self and in the other. This
also allows us to understand that God is not just the initial origin of cog-
nitive capacity but also the continued source of the process and the con-
tent of cognition.
Nor does this reduce ordinary knowledge to a product of proto-
Cartesian innate ideas that devalue the cognitive input of sense impres-
sions or the outcome of proto-Kantian noumenal structures that reverse
the priority of being over knowledge. To the contrary, Augustine outwits
in advance such and similar epistemological alternatives by equating
higher reason with the capacity to identify the supreme good of God in
created things by abstraction. By contrast with Aristotelian abstraction
that promotes contemplative retreat from the sublunary world, Augus-
tinian abstraction encourages a deeper immersion in the self and a
closer engagement with one’s inner embodied soul precisely in order to
find that we are created and individuated by relations with other ‘selves’
and with the relational God.
B. Self-Knowledge and Relationality
In this section, I will develop the point made at the end of the previous
section about self-knowledge and relationality. In Contra Academicos
(written after his conversion and before his baptism on Easter Day 387),
Augustine describes the self as a relational and dynamic entity that is
constituted by an outward and an inward movement, towards the multi-
plicity of the external world and back to its own original unity and
wholeness (Cont. Acad. II.i.2). His Neo-Platonist language of exitus and
reditus does not involve a “flight from the physical world”89 but instead
links intellectual contemplation to sensory experience. Knowledge of
the self starts with the things that the senses mediate to the mind. The
self, far from being private and solipsistic, is oriented towards the cos-
mos. In the process leading to self-knowledge, the soul discovers that it is
both substantial and relational — the self is some kind of substance that
entertains relations with the body, the world, and God.
102
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89. See, supra, note 57.
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In De Trinitate, the key to Augustine’s account of self-knowledge in
Book X is in fact to be found in Book VIII, as Rowan Williams has conclu-
sively shown.90 Having concluded that we have no direct grasp of the
truth by way of abstraction because our minds cannot sustain the exces-
sive light of God, Augustine insists that true knowledge of the self has ul-
timately and essentially God’s loving wisdom for its object. For that is
what creates, sustains, and upholds the movement of our mind. True
self-knowledge is knowledge of the self as created because to posit a self-
sufficient mind or self-generating reflexivity cannot explain why we de-
sire that which we do not as yet know — truth, being, the good, beauty,
unity, etc. If we can make judgments about things in the world (and, con-
tra the Skeptics, doubt for Augustine is a kind of judgment to withhold
assent), then we must already have some sense of the form of that which
we desire without knowing it in itself and as such (De Trin. VIII.ii.5).
The natural desire to know oneself leads to the discovery that the
human mind is neither endowed with innate ideas and/or purely
noumenal structures nor a fixed object of static contemplation. More-
over, abstraction from the ‘internal mind’ always terminates in self-
reflection, which is a movement caused and directed by desire (De Trin.
VIII.iii.7-8). However, if this is an accurate depiction of Augustine’s ac-
count, then it seems to end in an impasse. Innate desire for self-
knowledge causes mental activity, which we come to recognize as self-
reflection. In turn, self-reflection is the product of innate desire. It would
seem as if Augustine’s epistemology is circular at best or a priori at
worst.
However, Augustine’s emphasis on desire makes the point that it is
not exclusively by abstraction that one knows the truth but predomi-
nantly by judgment. This is why in Book VIII he leaves the question of
truth open and turns instead to knowledge of beauty and the good,
which involves judgment. The senses are alerted to the presence of spe-
cies forms in things and mediate them to the mind, which abstracts from
materiality. In De Civitate Dei, Augustine states that “mind and reason . . .
[are] quite rightly called a kind of sense because it involves judgement
[sententiae], a word which is derived from sensus” (Civ. Dei XI.3). Judg-
ment, however, involves and exceeds both sense perception and mental
abstraction by relating individual form to pure form and also back to its
material instantiation. Judgment is a synthetic faculty in that it concerns
103
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90. Williams, “The Paradoxes of Self-Knowledge in the De Trinitate,” esp. pp. 121-22.
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the ‘horizontal’ participation amongst forms as reflected in things
which make themselves known to the mind via the senses in virtue of the
beauty and harmony of their material form, whose ‘numberliness’ ap-
peals to the numbers and ratios in our cognitive faculties — as I sug-
gested in the previous section. For Augustine, we can make true judg-
ments because we are directed towards the good which is coextensive
with being, beauty, unity, and truth. Since the world of material forms is
characterized by degrees of being and goodness reflecting the extent to
which the actuality of form realizes the potency of matter (as both
Plotinus and Iamblichus held), there is among the vertical participation
of things in forms a hierarchical ordering. At the top of the pyramid of
being stands the supreme being and supreme good in God, and it is the
self-communicating nature of God’s good that infuses all things with
goodness and endows intelligent beings with the capacity to judge:
This is good and that is good. Take away this and that and see the good
itself if you can. In this way you will see God, not good with some other
good but the good of every good. For surely among all these good
things I have listed and whatever others can be observed or thought
of, we would not say that one is better than another when we make a
true judgement unless we had impressed on us some notion of good
itself by which we both approve of a thing, and also prefer one thing to
another. That is how we should love God, not this or that good but
good itself, and we should seek the good of the soul, not the good it
can hover over in judgement but the good it can cleave to in love, and
what is this but God?91
Thus, the self is relational in two ways that are coextensive with one
another. The self stands in ‘horizontal’ relation to God and in ‘vertical’
relation to all other beings. True self-knowledge is knowledge of our
creatureliness and the createdness of all that is, seen and unseen. Since
there is no neutral interspace between the mind and self-reflection, we
104
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91. “Bonum hoc et bonum illud. Tolle hoc et illud, et vide ipsum bonum, si potes; ita
Deum videbis, non alio bono bonum, sed Bonum omnis boni. Neque enim in his omnibus
bonis, vel quae commemoravi, vel quae alia cernuntur sive cogitantur, diceremus aliud alio
melius cum vere iudicamus, nisi esset nobis impressa notio ipsius boni, secundum quod et
probaremus aliquid, et aliud alii praeponeremus. Sic amandus est Deus, non hoc et illud
bonum, sed ipsum bonum. Quaerendum enim bonum animae, non cui supervolitet
iudicando, sed cui haereat amando; et quid hoc, nisi Deus?” (De Trin. VIII.ii.4 [I-5: 244]).
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are always already in contact with our created nature. Augustine’s criti-
cal point here is to show that it is cognition of the relational ordering of
the world that alerts to our own creatureliness. That is why he concludes
this passage of Book VIII of De Trinitate by relating the Platonist concep-
tion of the self-communicating Good and the Neo-Platonist account of
hierarchical triads to Acts 17:27-28, where it is said that the good “is not
situated far from any one of us, for in it we live, and move and are.”
Self-knowledge is knowledge of that which brings the self into being
and makes it what it is — the Creator God who imparts being and situ-
ates everything in the good. For it is the nature of the ecstatic and self-
exteriorizing Good to communicate itself to us. It makes itself known to
us, and that is how we come to know ourselves. A precondition for the
purification of the mind from confusing sense impressions and mislead-
ing concepts is our realization that we have judgment, which indicates
that we have knowledge of the good. Unlike Descartes’s innate ideas or
Kant’s absolute volition, our natural knowledge of the supernatural good
is in us but not of us, as Michael Hanby has definitively demonstrated.92
In this way, we grasp that we are constituted by the self-communicating
good. Self-knowledge is ultimately the recognition of our creatureliness,
as I have already suggested. To know that we are created is to know that
we are good in virtue of proceeding from the good itself. However, our
natural goodness does not make us just. That is why we need to keep
God firmly as the ‘object’ of thinking, which is to share in his creative wis-
dom and to actualize his creative activity — in ourselves, in others, and
in the world. To do so is to govern the self, the household, and the city in
accordance with God’s wisdom. To be ordered in this way is for Augus-
tine to overcome the narrow confines of inwardness and to ‘spend’ our-
selves ecstatically in the world. It is to embrace the world, to discern at
the heart of its materiality the infinite divine creative activity, and
through human agency to perfect our God-given form in an ever-closer
union with the Creator.
At this juncture, my reading of Augustine appears to meet easy refu-
tation. Surely Augustine himself argues for the purification of the soul
from all external sensations and internal images. Does he not reject the
outer world and seek to flee to the sanctum of the pure inner self (De
105
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92. Hanby, “Desire: Augustine beyond Western Subjectivity,” p. 113; Hanby, “Augustine
and Descartes: An Overlooked Chapter in the Story of Modern Origins,” 455-82; Hanby, Au-
gustine and Modernity, esp. pp. 72-105.
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Trin. XIV.iii.13)? Does not Augustine’s invocation of the Delphic motto
constitute a clear injunction against self-exteriorization: “Do not wish to
go out; go back into yourself. Truth dwells in the inner man”?93 So it
would appear as if self-knowledge for Augustine amounts to little more
than self-reflexivity. Indeed, he recognizes that as long as memory, un-
derstanding, and love are directed at the mind itself, the mind is treated
as a self-contained object and a self-sufficient agent, more akin to Aris-
totle’s thought thinking nothing but itself (Met. L 9, 1074b34-35). If so,
self-knowledge would seem to be not knowledge of our createdness and
of God’s creative activity, but instead knowledge of the self, by the self,
and in the self. Aren’t the modern and contemporary commentators
right after all to link Augustine’s focus on self-knowledge to Descartes’s
cogito and therefore to see the Bishop of Hippo (as well as Plato) as the
founding fathers of western modern subjectivism?
Well no, not at all. Augustine’s key argument in the De Trinitate is
that true self-knowledge is the recognition that nothing can cause itself
or sustain itself in being: “There is absolutely no thing whatsoever that
brings itself into existence” (De Trin. I.i.1). Much rather, life itself is a gift,
and true knowledge of the self and the world involves a recognition that
we can participate in the utter plenitude of being and the good because
the highest being and good in God is ‘giving itself ’ ecstatically to creation
in an original relation whose reverse face is the participation of reality in
the Creator, who alone brings about their particular existence. So just as
the beauty and harmony of material form and the relational ordering of
the world manifest the givenness of being and alert us to God’s creative
activity at the heart of materiality, so too the being and operation of the
mind intimate a higher power of being at work. The self is relational be-
cause it is brought into being by something other than itself and because
it desires to know what it is that upholds it. True self-knowledge is indi-
viduating because only true self-knowledge reveals our createdness and
our particular station in the relational order of creation. That is why Ro-
wan Williams is right to state that for Augustine, “Its [the mind’s] know-
ing and loving of God in this context is also a knowing of its proper place
in creation’s hierarchy, its freedom from temporal and material condi-
tioning in its deepest orientation.”94
106
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93. “Noli foras ire, in teipsum redi; in interiore homine habitat veritas” (Ver. Relig.
XXXIX.72 [p. 130]).
94. Williams, “Sapientia and the Trinity: Reflections on the De Trinitate,” p. 320.
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9. The Triune God and the Triadic Cosmos
At this juncture it is important to stress that Augustine’s theology avoids
two problems that are associated with much of ancient philosophy: first,
the sort of ontological dualism between the Good and the world often
wrongly ascribed to Platonist metaphysics and, second, the kind of pan-
theistic conflation of the divine and the human frequently attributed to
pagan Neo-Platonism. Indeed, Augustine rules out the possibility that
true self-knowledge equals discovering the image of the Trinity in the in-
ner recess of the soul. To the contrary, the ‘mental’ triad formed by mem-
ory, love, and understanding is wholly unlike the triune God. To quote
again the key passage from Book XIV of De Trinitate, Augustine writes
that “[t]his trinity of the mind is not really the image of God because the
mind remembers and understands and loves itself, but because it is also
able to remember and understand and love him by whom it was made.”95
Rather than seeing God’s image directly and identically in ourselves, we
come to know our createdness, for the numerical structure of reality
bears an analogical resemblance with the highest number of the one and
triune God, as the triadic structure of love intimates a triune God.96
Whereas our mind and the world lack the perfect unity of simple essence
and the perfect triunity of Trinitarian relations, only God combines pure
substantiality and pure relationality. This is how Augustine overcomes
the Aristotelian priority of substance over relation in the direction of a
fully Trinitarian theology that blends the biblical revelation of a rela-
tional God (John 1:1) with the self-communicating Good of Plato and the
hierarchical triads of Plotinus (and Iamblichus).
This account however seems to be in conflict with Augustine’s own
argument in the De Trinitate where in Book V he considers the category
of relation in order to conceptualize the unity of God’s threeness, only to
abandon relation in favor of substance in Book VII in order to secure the
simplicity of God’s essence.97 But long before Descartes,98 Augustine al-
107
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95. “Haec igitur trinitas mentis non propterea Dei est imago, quia sui meminit mens, et
intellegit ac diligit se: sed quia potest etiam meminisse, et intellegere, et amare a quo facta est”
(De Trin. XIV.iv.15 [I-5: 383]).
96. Williams, “Sapientia and the Trinity: Reflections on the De Trinitate,” esp. pp. 319-26.
97. Emmanuel Falque, “Saint Augustin ou comment Dieu entre en théologie. Lecture
critique des Livres V-VII du ‘De Trinitate,’ ” Nouvelle Revue Théologique 117 (1995): 84-111,
esp. pp. 99-107.
98. Jean-Luc Marion has wrongly claimed that Descartes was the first in the history
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ready reconfigured Aristotle’s primacy of substance in the direction of
relationality. The key to Augustine’s account is that in God substantiality
and relationality are in fact coextensive. There can be little doubt that
Augustine was familiar with Aristotle’s logic and some elements of his
metaphysics (De Trin. V, prol., 2). Nor does Augustine deny that some of
Aristotle’s categories can be applied to theology, namely that God is sub-
stance. Or, as the Bishop of Hippo immediately adds, “perhaps a better
word would be being [essentia],” which derives from being (esse).99 In a
double rebuff of the Aristotelian supremacy of substance and the Arian
charge that the Father’s substance differs from the Son’s as a result of the
latter’s ‘begotten-ness,’ Augustine argues that even if God’s immutable
substance does not allow for change, this does not imply that everything
said of God is said ‘substance-wise’ (secundum substantiam). Indeed,
“some things are said in relation to something else, like Father with refer-
ence to Son and Son with reference to Father, which is not an accident
because the one is always Father and the other always Son.”100 Hence
some ‘things’ are predicated of God relationally, because they are neither
essential nor accidental properties of the substance, for in either case
they would be subordinate to substance. As such, relation belongs to a
distinct order (De Trin. V.ii.9).
Yet at the same time, Augustine objects in Book VII to the applica-
tion of relation to God: “[I]f being is predicated by way of relationship,
then being is not being.”101 He goes on to argue that relation depends
on substance and that the Father is the Father in virtue of his sub-
stance, not in virtue of any relation. Therefore, Father and Son are both
substances. Each is one substance and they are one being, not a rela-
tion (De Trin. VII.i.2-3). The reason for Augustine’s insistence on sub-
stantial unity seems to be that any relation between Father and Son
would posit some interspace between two poles tied together by a bi-
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of philosophy to invert the primacy of substance over all other categories. See Jean-Luc
Marion, Dieu sans l’être, 2nd ed. (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1991), pp. 80-155.
99. “substantia vel si melius hoc appellatur essentia, quam graeci ousian vocant. Sicut
enim ab eo quod est sapere dicta est sapientia et ab eo quod est scire dicta est scientia, ita ab
eo quod est esse dicta est essentia” (De Trin. V.i.3).
100. “Dicitur enim ad aliquid sicut pater ad filium et filius ad patrem, quod non est
accidens quia et ille semper pater et ille semper filius” (De Trin. V.i.6 [I-5: 192, translation
modified]).
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nary link. (Neo-)Platonism notwithstanding, substance appears to
wield supreme sway, bringing Augustine’s theology closer to Aristotle’s
metaphysics after all.
But for Augustine God is always Father, Son, and Holy Spirit. The
Logos is already with God (John 1:1), and the image of God in us is the im-
age of a Creator who is both one and triune. Augustine’s God is always al-
ready relational and creative, not by necessity but in virtue of the self-
imparting communication of his loving wisdom. Hence the Bishop of
Hippo operates a radical transformation of Aristotelian categories that
is in accordance with orthodox theology and with the shared legacy of
Plato, Plotinus, and Iamblichus. God is both substance and relation, sub-
stantial insofar as the three persons share a single divine essence yet pre-
cisely for this reason always already relational. Here one cannot empha-
size enough the difference between Aristotle and Augustine. It is not the
case for the latter that God is a relational substance, for this would
merely qualify the primacy of substance. Since God transcends all cate-
gories of being and knowledge, neither infinite substance nor the pure
actuality of essence can capture the mysterious paradox of perfect unity
and unreserved triunity. Trinitarian relationality is perhaps the closest
we can come to describe in a single concept God’s absolute oneness and
the unique distinctness of each of the three divine persons. Since for the
whole of creation existence, essence, and continued being are received
and the desire of intelligent beings can be diverted from caritas and
dilectio to voluptas, nothing other than God is either purely substantial
or fully relational.
Here it is notable that Augustine proposes an analogy between a
thing’s triadic structure ( form, measure, and order) and its transcendent
cause — a higher power which brings everything into being, makes
things what they are, and orders them according to their divine warrant.
Since there is no regression ad infinitum for Augustine, there must be
some primary cause. This cause is neither Plato’s Good, nor Aristotle’s
Prime Mover, nor Plotinus’s One. It is instead the highest being (esse),
which is at once Beauty, Goodness, and Truth and which makes all other
beings:
In this order, then, it is understood that a form is given by the highest
Being through the soul to the body — the form whereby the latter ex-
ists, in so far as it exists. Hence the body subsists through the soul and
exists by the very fact that it is animated, whether universally, as is the
109
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world, or individually, as is each and every thing that has life within
the world.102
Augustine does not use ‘essence’ (essentia) in contradistinction to ‘exis-
tence’ (existentia). Despite some inconsistencies, it is clear from his texts
that Augustine posits the absolute primacy of being or, perhaps more ac-
curately, ‘to be’ (esse). Unlike Boethius and later Aquinas, Augustine does
not draw systematic distinctions between esse and essentia, but this does
not render him an ‘essentialist.’103 In De Trinitate and elsewhere, Augus-
tine insists that both essentia and existentia derive from esse: “[J]ust as
we get the word ‘wisdom’ [sapientia] from ‘wise’ [sapere], and ‘knowl-
edge’ [scientia] from ‘know’ [scire], so we have the word ‘being’ [essentia]
from ‘be’ [esse]” (De Trin. V.i.3; cf. Lib. Arb. II.xvii.46; Gen. ad Lit. V.xvi.34;
Civ. Dei VIII.6; XI.2).
The primacy of ‘to be’ has three important implications. First, to say
that ‘to be’ is the highest, truest, and most real station in the order of be-
ings is to posit an ontological difference between the ‘to be’ that makes
and sustains beings and all other things that are made and sustained
(Conf. VII.xx.26; cf. IX.x.25; X.vi.9; XI.iv.6). Second, within the hierarchy of
all that is, there are degrees of being among the things that are made and
sustained: “All other things which he made received existence from him,
each in its own degree” (Nat. Bon. XIX; cf. Ver. Relig. XVI.30). Finally, ‘to be’
preserves and enhances being by situating individuals according to their
particular station within the universal order. To refuse hierarchical or-
dering is to negate the very being that is given and to lapse into nothing-
ness: “For to defect from that which supremely is, to that which has a less
perfect degree of being: that is what it is to begin to have an evil will”
(Civ. Dei XII.7).
But why are individual things created and why are they created as in-
dividuals? If nothing is by or for itself but instead is made and sustained
in being, it follows that all which has being was made from nothing and
in the beginning (ex nihilo and in principio). To have being and to retain
110
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102. “Hoc autem ordine intellegitur a summa essentia speciem corpori per animam
tribui, qua est in quantumcumque est. Per animam ergo corpus subsistit, et eo ipso est quo
animatur, sive universaliter, ut mundus; sive particulariter, ut unumquodque animal intra
mundum” (Immort. An. XV.24 [p. 96]). Cf. Immort. An. XII.19; Gen. ad Lit. I.xvii.34-35;
III.xii.18; Ver. Relig. XI.22.
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existence is itself the purpose of creation. The whole of creation, insofar
as it is, is brought into being “in order that it should be, and in order that
it should abide” (Gen. ad Lit. I.8.14). In a move that binds together
apophasis and cataphasis, Augustine argues that all which has being tes-
tifies to its transcendent creative source which is individual in the unity
of its essence and the triunity of its three persons. The Creator is in him-
self incomprehensible but discernible through the traces (vestigia) im-
printed upon creation. All things that have being bear the mark of their
creator or being itself or idipsum (Conf. IX.x.24; XII.vii.7; XII.xv.20;
XIII.xi.12; De Trin. III.iii.8).
The creative cause is in the effect and all effects are in the cause. The
cause is always already more than itself. It is ecstatic creativity which is
manifest in all that is created: to discern being itself which is ‘to be,’ the
mind comes to have a glimpse of the utter transcendence and plenitude
of the creating cause:
Solely by your plenteous goodness has your creation come to be and
stood firm, for you did not want so good a thing to be missing. It could
be of no profit to you, nor equal to yourself as though proceeding from
your own substance, yet there was the possibility of its existing as your
creation. . . . It was no indigence on your part that drove you to make
them. Out of the plenitude of your goodness, you upheld them and con-
verted them to their form; it was not as though your own blessedness
stood in need of accomplishment and completion by them.104
There is thus no sense in which Augustine defends a foundationalist
metaphysics that combines the alleged ontological dualism of Plato’s
distinction between the world of ideas and the world of things with the
purported essentialism of Aristotle’s account of individual substance. In-
stead, Augustine stresses the ecstatic overflow of God’s being and good-
ness — an emphasis that underscores the proximity with Boethius and
Dionysius, whose theology is the subject of the next chapter.
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104. “Ex plenitudine quippe bonitatis tuae creatura tua substitit, ut bonum, quod tibi
nihil prodesset nec de te aequale tibi esset, tamen quia ex te fieri potuit, non deesset . . . quae
non ex indigentia fecisti, sed ex plenitudine bonitatis tuae cohibens atque convertens ad
formam, non ut tamquam tuum gaudium compleatur ex eis” (Conf. XIII.ii.2; XIII.iv.5; my ital-
ics [pp. 309, 311]).
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10. Conclusion: Christian Universalism
I began this chapter by mentioning that Pope Benedict’s defense of
Christianity’s hellenization at Regensburg has earned him the scorn of
many neo-scholastic critics who defend the neo-scholastic separation of
sacred doctrine from philosophy in Scotus, Ockham, and Suárez against
the papal championing of nouvelle théologie. What underpins in large
part Benedict’s compelling narrative is the ‘integral’ metaphysical theol-
ogy of Christian Neo-Platonism. As I hope to have shown, both Gregory
and Augustine made decisive contributions to the patristic synthesis of
ancient philosophy and biblical revelation by fusing Plato’s metaphysics
of ‘relational’ participation, Plotinus’s self-ecstatic creative One, and
Iamblichus’ sacred triads with the scriptural (and natural) disclosure of a
God who is always already triune and who creates everything out of
nothing.
In calling for the rehellenization of Christianity, Pope Benedict re-
news not just the synthesis of the Fathers and the Doctors of the Church
but also the Hellenic Jewish tradition in which both Jesus and the Apos-
tles were rooted. The encounter between biblical revelation and ancient
philosophy marks the advent of universalism beyond divine election and
the law, as Alain Badiou has convincingly argued in relation to the writ-
ings of St. Paul.105 Benedict’s retrieval and extension of nouvelle théologie
is perhaps the most significant attempt since nineteenth-century Rus-
sian sophiology to blend Pauline theology with Neo-Platonist metaphys-
ics and thus to conceptualize the universality of the Christian narrative,
a theme I will continue to explore in the following chapters focusing on
Boethius and Dionysius the Areopagite.
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105. Alain Badiou, Saint Paul: La Fondation de l’Universalisme (Paris: Presses
Universitaires de France, 1998).
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CHAPTER 3
Relational Substance and Cosmic Hierarchy
1. Introduction: Between Antiquity and the Middle Ages
In the previous chapter, I argued that Gregory of Nyssa and Augustine —
albeit in different ways — combined Platonist relationality and participa-
tion and Neo-Platonist conceptions of the One and sacred triads with the
biblical revelation of a relational God who creates everything out of noth-
ing. The world and all that it encompasses is created and receives both its
existence and its essence from God. In him, existence and essence coin-
cide and he alone is substance and relation, one and triune. In this chap-
ter, I argue that Boethius (c. 480-525) and Dionysius the Areopagite
(c. 470-525) systematize and extend Gregory’s and Augustine’s Trinitarian
theology by incorporating elements of Aristotle (Boethius) and pagan
Neo-Platonism (Dionysius). In so doing, they deepen and broaden a
Christian metaphysics that theorizes individuation in terms of an ever-
greater participation in the relational order of divine creation.
Compared with Augustine, Boethius’ synthesis of ancient philoso-
phy and Christian theology provides a more systematic treatment of the
‘ontological difference’ between God and creation and a more radically
philosophical conception of God’s utter ecstatic plenitude. In particular,
Boethius emphasizes the relationality of the Godhead by developing an
account of God as being beyond substance (deus ultra substantiam),
which had been foreshadowed by Augustine (Boethius, De Trinitate IV.2,
15-16, 18, 23 [17/19]).1 By retrieving and transforming the legacy of both
113
1. Throughout this chapter, references in either square brackets or parentheses refer
to the page numbers of Boethius’ works in the Loeb edition.
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Plato and Aristotle, Boethius does not just in some sense fulfill patristic
theology but also inaugurates medieval philosophy. As such, he was in-
deed “the last Roman and the first scholastic,” a Christian thinker in his
own right whose original thought made a decisive contribution to the
emergence of the scholastic method and had a lasting influence on some
of the most eminent medieval figures, from Alcuin (c. 735-804) and John
Scotus Eriugena (c. 800-877), via Abelard (1079-1142), Gilbert of Poitiers
(c. 1085-1154), and some members of the School of Chartres, to Albert the
Great (c. 1206-1280), St. Thomas Aquinas (c. 1225-1274), and John Duns
Scotus (c. 1265/66-1308).2
There is an ongoing debate on the importance of metaphysics and
the status of esse in Boethius’ commentaries on logic and also in his
theological writings, the Opuscula sacra. Some commentators maintain
that Boethius’ ontology is grounded in the primacy of essence over exis-
tence.3 In an influential book, Brosch argues that Boethius confines his
treatise to the essence of God and beings, but that he fails to grasp the
distinction between esse essentiae and esse existentiae.4 Others, like Pi-
114
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2. Marie-Dominique Chenu speaks of the twelfth century as the aetas boetiana
(‘Boethian age’). See Marie-Dominique Chenu, La théologie au douzième siècle, 3rd ed.
(Paris: Vrin, 1976), pp. 142-58. On the influence of Boethius, see also Martin Grabmann, Die
Geschichte der scholastischen Methode (Freiburg im Breisgau: Herdersche Verlagshand-
lung, 1911), vol. 2, p. 148 passim; Henry Chadwick, Boethius: The Consolations of Music,
Logic, Theology, and Philosophy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1981), pp. 108-253; Marga-
ret Gibson, “The Opuscula Sacra in the Middle Ages,” in Boethius: His Life, Thought and In-
fluence, ed. M. Gibson (Oxford: Blackwell, 1981), pp. 214-34; Osmund Lewry, “Boethian
Logic in the Medieval West,” in Gibson, ed., Boethius: His Life, Thought and Influence, pp.
90-135; John Marenbon, From the Circle of Alcuin to the School of Auxerre: Logic, Theology
and Philosophy in the Early Middle Ages (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), pp.
18-19; J. Marenbon, “Boethius: From Antiquity to the Middle Ages,” in Medieval History:
Routledge History of Philosophy (London: Routledge: 1998), vol. 3, ch. 1, pp. 11-28; J. Maren-
bon, Boethius (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), pp. 164-82.
3. This has been argued by Lambertus M. de Rijk, who emphasizes the centrality of
quiddity in Boethius’ translation and commentaries on Aristotelian logic. See
Lambertus M. De Rijk, “Boèce logicien et philosophe. Ses positions sémantiques et sa
métaphysique de l’être,” in Atti di Congresso Internazionale di Studi Boeziani, ed. Luca
Obertello (Rome: Herder, 1981), pp. 141-56; L. M. de Rijk, “On Boethius’ Notion of Being — A
Chapter on Boethian Semantics,” in Meaning and Inference in Medieval Philosophy, ed. Nor-
man Kretzmann (Amsterdam: Kluwer, 1988), pp. 1-29.
4. Herman J. Brosch, Der Seinsbegriff bei Boethius. Mit besonderer Berücksichtigung der
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erre Hadot, have contended that Boethius draws on Porphyry’s and
Marius Victorinus’s Neo-Platonism in order to give an account of esse as
supreme Being, synonymous with the One and pure act of Existing (l’acte
pur d’Exister) that is beyond essence and existence and prior to both be-
ing (l’être) and ens (l’étant).5 This debate is significant for the question of
individuation, as the metaphysical status of essence or existence deter-
mines the mode of actualization of particular individual things. My argu-
ment is that Boethius focuses on finite existence more than finite es-
sence because this configuration allows him to combine the primacy of
act over potency with the potentiality of finite essences vis-à-vis God’s
infinite act of being. Coupled with his demonstration that divine sub-
stance is relational, he argues that God creates everything ex nihilo and
actualizes universal being in all particulars. The relationality of beings
enables the participation and perfection of the Good. As “the last Ro-
man,” Boethius provides a unique synthesis and transformation of Plato’s
and Aristotle’s legacy. As “the first scholastic,” he extends Augustine’s
works and prefigures Aquinas’s vision. Above all, he systematizes the ‘on-
tological difference’ and develops a Trinitarian theology that is amena-
ble to natural reason.
2. Boethius’ Philosophical Ordering of the Sciences
For Augustine knowledge (scientia) is ultimately ordered by God’s wis-
dom (sapientia), as I showed in the previous chapter. For this reason,
knowledge of the self is sustained by divine self-communication. By re-
trieving and transforming Plato’s and Aristotle’s legacy, Boethius system-
atizes and extends Augustine’s conception of Christian metaphysics and
Trinitarian theology. Drawing on Porphyry’s Isagoge (the standard com-
mentary on Aristotle at his time), he follows Aristotle’s distinction be-
tween speculative and practical knowledge.6 Philosophy or speculative
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5. Pierre Hadot, “Fragments d’un commentaire de Porphyre sur le Parménide,” Revue
des Études Grecques 74 (1961): 410-38; P. Hadot, “La distinction de l’être et de l’étant dans le
‘De hebdomadibus’ de Boèce,” in Die Metaphysik im Mittelalter. Ihr Ursprung und ihre
Bedeutung, ed. Peter Wilpert (Berlin: De Gruyter, 1963), pp. 147-53; P. Hadot, “Forma
essendi: Interprétation philologique et interprétation philosophique d’une formule de
Boèce,” Les Études Classiques 38 (1970): 143-56; P. Hadot, “L’être et l’étant dans le
néoplatonisme,” Études néoplatoniciennes (1973): 27-41.
6. Met. E 1, 1026a6-33, in The Complete Works of Aristotle, vol. 2, p. 1620. Cf. P. Merlan,
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science (scientia speculativa) is concerned with speculative knowledge,
which can be divided into three branches: physics, mathematics, and
theology (De Trinitate II.5-16). Theology is a proper science because like
physics and mathematics, it deploys rational concepts and combines
reason with faith. It is the highest science since it operates intellectually
(intellectualiter) in order to “apprehend that form which is pure form and
no image, which is very being and the source of being.”7 Since Boethius
rejects the possibility that being itself is univocal and Creator and cre-
ation fall under one and the same category of being, his definition of
metaphysics differs radically from that of later medieval scholastic theo-
logians such as John Duns Scotus. Indeed, Boethius’ identification of the-
ology with ‘first philosophy’ lays the metaphysical foundations of what
long after him would come to be known as the ‘ontological difference’
and the concept of ‘analogy of being.’
First I discuss Boethius’ philosophical ordering of the sciences in
some detail. Since all things that exist in this world and can be known via
the senses and the mind are matter-form compounds, the first specula-
tive science is physics, which investigates “the form of bodies together
with their constituent matter” (De Trinitate II.8). Matter-form com-
pounds, though forming an individual entity, manifest to the mind their
dual aspect. The distinction or separation between the formal and the
material is performed by the intellect and gives rise to the second specu-
lative science, mathematics. The human mind is not limited to the cog-
nition of form in relation to matter but can attain vision of pure form, for
“all being is dependent on form”8 and this dependence is intelligible in
actual beings. The natural light of reason mediates the simplicity and
unity of form, in which all material things participate. In the Consolatio,
the particular is described as “the specific form itself, which is present in
single individuals.”9 Moreover, all particulars point to universal form it-
116
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From Platonism to Neoplatonism, 3rd ed. (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1968), pp. 59-87; Marenbon,
Boethius, p. 82 n. 25; Sten Ebbesen, “Boethius as an Aristotelian Commentator,” in Aristotle
Transformed: The Ancient Commentators and Their Influence, ed. Richard Sorabji (London:
Duckworth, 1990), pp. 373-91.
7. “. . . inspicere formam quae vere forma neque imago est et quae esse ipsum est et ex
qua esse est” (De Trinitate II.19-21 [9/8-10]). On the three sciences and their respective
methods, see James A. Weisheipl, “Classification of the Sciences in Medieval Thought,”
Mediaeval Studies 27 (1965): 54-90, esp. pp. 58-62.
8. “Omne namque esse ex forma est” (De Trinitate II.21 [10/11]).
9. “. . . speciem[que] ipsam quae singularibus inest . . .” (De Consol. V.iv.87-88 [410/411]).
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self. Nothing that is in act is immutable, everything is subject to change,
and so there is an ontological discrepancy between what a thing actually
is and what it potentially could be. Actual being is in act, but not wholly
so because otherwise how would it change, and why? There is then in ac-
tual being the act of form and the potency of matter. Here Boethius goes
beyond Aristotle’s account of individuation in terms of the union be-
tween proximate matter and individual substantial form by relating all
particular matter-form compounds to form itself (or Plato’s Good). For
matter and form do not exist by themselves. Instead, there is something
that brings them into actuality and makes them what they are. Crucially,
Boethius links the individuation of particular things to the actualization
of beings.
In what sense does this account of Christian metaphysics differ from
Greek philosophy? Vision of pure form is for Boethius nothing less than
vision of God, who creates all forms ex nihilo. Since the senses are at-
tuned to individual particular things and mediate sensible species to the
mind, the first object of the intellect is that which is (id quod est). In per-
ceiving that which is, sense perception discerns more than an isolated
self-contained entity. The very actuality of that which is discloses its
transcendent source. For the potency of particular sensible things re-
quires a higher act in order to be brought into actuality. Concrete things
are particular, yet at the same time instantiate a universal essence and
also have a universal source of being. Like Plato’s Good and Plotinus’s
One, this source or power of being (virtus essendi) must be ecstatic and
self-communicating, otherwise how would it impart actuality to beings?
There is such a first cause, which is being itself (ipsum esse). Only God is
being itself, for only God’s goodness and love can explain why he wishes
to create beings that bear his trace and depend on him for their exis-
tence, their essence, and their continuous being. To be created is to be
made in his image and likeness, to stand in analogous relation to the one
and only power of being. All this foreshadows Aquinas’s concept of the
pure act of self-subsistent being, as I will show in chapter 5.
How do actual things themselves intimate a creative transcendent
source of being and how can the mind cognize it as such? Boethius takes
from Augustine not only the principle of divine illumination but also and
above all the argument that illumination operates through reason in De
Trinitate Book X, as I suggested in the previous chapter. Boethius’ inno-
vation is to deploy Plato’s account of relationality and Aristotle’s con-
cepts of act and potency in order to show that knowledge of actual
117
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things is knowledge of the transcendent source which brings them into
being and makes them what they are. Knowledge of a thing-in-act leads
the knower to cognize being itself or God, for “all being is dependent on
form.” Since there is no absolute unbridgeable gulf that separates reason
from faith and philosophy from theology, forms in things disclose form
itself or God. Just as there is no pure faith that is transcendentally im-
posed, there can be no pure self-sufficient reason that operates alone
within the immanent realm. Instead, Boethius radicalizes Augustine’s
principle that intellection points to, and calls forth, belief in God, while
faith seeks and upholds understanding.
This is not to say for Boethius that the natural order is inherently de-
fective and requires the supernatural correction of divine grace. Nor
does he imply that faith and illumination are transcendental data that
devalue sense perception and empirical evidence. Instead, reason al-
ways already involves a prerational trust (pistis or faith), and belief can —
indeed must — be rationally mediated and elaborated. This is why
Boethius writes in the prologue of his treatise on the Trinity that “[w]e
should of course press our inquiry only so far as the insight of man’s rea-
son is allowed to climb the height of heavenly knowledge.”10 In this quest,
he hopes to be faithful to Augustine’s vision. Indeed, Boethius exhorts
Symmachus, to whom the De Trinitate is dedicated, to “examine whether
the seeds of argument sown in my mind by St. Augustine’s writings have
borne fruit.”11 In the following sections, I argue that Boethius prolongs
and radicalizes Augustine’s Trinitarian metaphysics, in particular the
idea that creation is a hierarchical relational order and that each and ev-
ery being is made in the image of a fully relational God who is beyond
substance (ultra substantiam).
3. Perception of Particulars and Cognition of Universals
In this section, I examine the relation between Boethius’ ontology and
his epistemology in his commentaries on Aristotle. Boethius focuses on
the ontological foundation of Aristotelian, Stoic, and Neo-Platonist logic
118
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10. “Sane tantum a nobis quaeri oportet quantum humanae rationis intuitus ad
divinitatis valet celsa conscendere” (De Trinitate, prol., 22-24 [5/4]).
11. “an ex beati Augustini scriptis semina rationum aliquos in nos venientia fructus
extulerint” (De Trinitate, prol., 31-33 [4/5]). Cf. Robert Crouse, “Semina Rationum: St. Au-
gustine and Boethius,” Dionysius 4 (December 1980): 75-86.
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and epistemology. This is most apparent in his ‘solution’ to the problem
of the universals. Like Plato and Aristotle, Boethius insists that univer-
sals are not separate entities that the mind produces by abstracting from
concrete particulars. Rather, universals are in the mind but not of the
mind, for they are present in actual particulars that exist by participat-
ing in them. For this reason, individuality marks the constitutive pres-
ence of universals in particulars, and individuation describes the actual-
ization of universality in particularity — as I now show.
A. Metaphysical Realism
In his commentary on Aristotle’s Categories, Boethius draws on Por-
phyry’s Isagoge, the standard Neo-Platonic introduction to the Categories
in those late patristic times.12 The core insight that Boethius retains from
Aristotle (and Porphyry) is that universal categories are real in the sense
that they are present in particular sensible things. The relation of univer-
sals and particulars is neither posited a priori nor induced a posteriori
but is real and intelligible. As such, it can be perceived by the senses and
cognized by the mind. The priority of particulars (In Cat. 183 c–184 b) is
indispensable to a proper understanding of Boethius’ theological episte-
mology: both words and concepts refer primarily to particular sensible
things, not to mental structures or products of intellectual activity. In
other words, knowledge of particulars is knowledge of how and why par-
ticulars exist and of what constitutes them qua particulars.
Paradoxically, to know what constitutes something as this particu-
lar rather than that particular involves knowing universals. For particu-
lars are differentiated from one another not just quantitatively but also
qualitatively. Here Boethius combines Aristotle’s theory of abstraction
with Augustine’s account of divine illumination. Knowledge of qualita-
tive differentiation requires knowledge of genus and species. Such
knowledge is obtained through speculative abstraction.13 Since the
mind encounters all material things through the senses, abstraction is
based on sensorial perception and on concepts of the mind (mentis
119
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12. Jorge J. E. Gracia, “Boethius and the Problem of Individuation in the Commen-
taries on the ‘Isagoge,’ ” in Obertello, ed., Atti di Congresso Internazionale di Studi Boeziani,
pp. 169-82.
13. “prima est quaestio, utrum genera ipsa et species vere sint an in solis intellectibus
nuda inaniaque fingantur” (1 In Isag. I. c. 10 [24]).
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ratione concepta, In Cat. 183 c). Like Aristotle’s epistemology, the pro-
cess of cognition in Boethius can be described as a virtuous, upward cy-
cle or spiral whereby the senses activate the mind by mediating sensible
species, just as intellection informs judgment and the imagination.
Knowledge of the relation between particulars and universals consti-
tutes a movement from the sensible via the intelligible to an ever more
intense grasp of the sensible. Here there is a striking similarity with
Plato’s ‘second voyage’ in the middle and later dialogues and the idea of
fashioning the real in the light of the ideal, as I discussed in chapter 1. In
developing this account, Boethius makes three related arguments. First,
universals in some sense exist. Second, they are neither purely corpo-
real nor exclusively incorporeal. Third, they entertain an irreducible
link with particular sensible things.
Before I can examine each argument, I need to make a wider point
about Boethius’ metaphysical realism. The opposition between Platon-
ism and Aristotelianism still haunts contemporary interpretations of
Boethius’ ‘solution’ of the problem of universals. According to Henry
Chadwick, Boethius’ position oscillates ambiguously between Aristotle
and Plato. The Aristotelian argument (taken from Alexander of Aphro-
disias) is, as Chadwick understands it, that universals exist as mental
concepts in the mind but have some basis in the reality of particulars.
The Platonist argument is that universals can only be formed by specula-
tive abstraction from all corporeality until the mind attains pure form.14
Similarly, it has been asserted that Boethius rejects naïve realism and
skeptical idealism in favor of a mediating position, which Alain de Libera
terms ‘abstractionist, conceptual realism.’ On his account, Boethius sides
with Aristotle against Plato. Universals are the result of abstracting from
particulars, and knowledge of universals entails a fuller grasp of particu-
lars.15 Albeit in different ways, both Chadwick and de Libera claim that
Plato’s and Aristotle’s accounts of the metaphysical status of universals
are incompatible and that Boethius failed to grasp and resolve this in-
compatibility.
However, the Platonist and the Peripatetic positions on universals
share the conviction that universals are real, not nominal or conceptual.16
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14. Chadwick, Boethius, pp. 124-33.
15. Alain de Libera, L’art des généralités. Théories de l’abstraction (Paris: Aubier, 1999),
pp. 205-24.
16. Gail Fine, On Ideas: Aristotle’s Criticism of Plato’s Theory of Forms (Oxford: Claren-
don, 1993), pp. 24-29. See, supra, chapter 1.
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Against Chadwick and de Libera, I contend that it was Boethius’ ambition
to illustrate this fundamental agreement. His works go some way towards
demonstrating Plato’s and Aristotle’s shared realism (2 In Isag. I. c. 11 [167:7-
20]). Boethius’ account of universals consists of four closely connected
ideas: first, particulars stand in a ‘vertical’ relational participation to uni-
versals; second, the mind can grasp this relationality; third, knowledge of
this relationality is knowledge of a thing’s actuality (id quod est), its poten-
tiality (esse), and the power of being (virtus essendi) which actualizes it and
makes it what it is; fourth, such knowledge is ontological in the sense that
in making itself known to the mind through the senses, a thing actualizes
not only its cognoscibility but also the knower’s potency to know (potestas
rationis). Let me now discuss these four ideas in turn.
Boethius describes Plato’s and Aristotle’s shared realism in terms of
the idea that the universal and the particular do not pertain to separate
independent realms but that particular material form is a reflection of
universal immaterial form. Knowledge of the relational participation of
particulars to universals is based upon actual material things, not innate
ideas. Here Boethius fuses Augustine’s theory of divine illumination with
Aristotle’s emphasis on abstraction from sense perception, as I have al-
ready indicated: “For individuals stand out to the highest degree if either,
leaving the name unmentioned, they are pointed out to the eye or shown
by touch.”17 The mind does not abstract universal immaterial form from
particular sensible matter. Rather, cognition of the essence of particular
sensible things is cognition of a complex matter-form compound, not
cognition of pure form (2 In Isag. I. c. 11 [165:3-7]). That is why mathemat-
ics, the second in the order of sciences, investigates forms of bodies.
According to de Libera, the mark of Boethius’ metaphysics and epis-
temology is the metaphysical coincidence of the universal and the par-
ticular in actual beings, which is paralleled by the noetic coincidence of
the senses and the intellect. As a result, the particularity which the
senses perceive in a thing is the universality which the mind cognizes in
all things that pertain to a certain species or genus.18 De Libera also ar-
gues that this ‘solution’ is indebted to Alexander of Aphrodisias’ Neo-
Platonist argument, according to which existence is not confined to ei-
ther purely mental constructs or exclusively material realities but also
121
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17. “Individua enim maxime ostendi queunt, si vel tacito nomine sensui ipsi oculorum
digito tactuue monstrentur” (2 In Isag. III, c. 10 [233-34]).
18. De Libera, L’art des généralités, pp. 187-93.
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includes “notions of things,” that is to say, mental constructs that have a
real correlate (as opposed to signifying notions of nonexistent things
such as chimerae or centaurs).19 In support of his interpretation, he re-
fers to the concept of resemblance and quotes from Boethius’ second
commentary on the Isagoge:
[A] species should be considered as nothing other than a thought col-
lected from the substantial likeness of many individuals which differ
by number, whilst a genus is a thought collected from the likeness of
species. . . . [T]his likeness becomes sensible when it is in singulars
and in universals it becomes intelligible, and in the same way when it
is sensible it remains in singulars, when it is grasped by the intellect, it
becomes universal.20
So conceived, similitudo is not purely nominal or conceptual but real. As
such, universality is not a function of ratiocination, but instead marks
the presence of forms in things. Universals entertain an irreducible link
with the reality of particulars. The substantial likeness of individual
things gives rise to universal categories. This likeness and the objects
that share in it are somehow simultaneously particular and universal.
John Marenbon writes that “an object is both singular and universal [and
quoting Boethius], ‘universal when it is considered in thought, single
when it is perceived sensibly in those things in which it has its being.’ ”21
On this account, Boethius’ epistemology can be described as
constructivist-realist abstraction, in the sense that genera and species
are mental constructs that enable a better grasp of things than sense
perception because particulars reflect universals in diverse ways.22
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19. De Libera, L’art des généralités, pp. 209-10. John Marenbon’s reading relativizes the
influence of Alexander of Aphrodisias on Boethius. See Marenbon, Boethius, pp. 26-32.
20. Marenbon, Boethius, pp. 29-30. This quote from Boethius is in 2 In Isag. I. c. 11 (166:
16-21): “nihil aliud species esse putanda est nisi cogitatio collecta ex individuorum dissimilum
numero substantiali similitudine, genus vero cogitatio collecta ex specierum similitudine . . .
haec similitudo cum in singularibus est, fit sensibilis, cum in universalibus, fit intellegibilis,
eodemque modo cum sensibilis est, in singularibus permanet, cum intellegitur, fit universalis.”
21. Marenbon, Boethius, pp. 30-31. The quote from Boethius is in 2 In Isag. I. c. 11 (167:
4-7): “universale est, cum cogitatur, alio singulare, cum sentitur in rebus his in quibus esse
suum habet.”




Monday, January 16, 2012 2:51:52 PM
Color profile: Disabled
Composite  140 lpi at 45 degrees
B. Theological Epistemology
What does the mind know about a thing when it cognizes universality?
According to de Libera, knowledge of things is for Boethius knowledge of
their essence. Knowledge is the abstraction of species and genera from
matter and the contemplation of essence by the intellection of species
and genera. To cognize species and genera requires some kind of resem-
blance (similitudo) between individual sensible things. Boethius’ episte-
mology is therefore not limited to deduction, but also includes induc-
tion. For de Libera, Boethius’ innovation is the idea of abstraction as
cognition by collection (cogitatio collecta), as opposed to cognition by
the senses or the imagination. Abstraction so configured produces a rep-
resentation in the mind of essential likeness (similitudo substantialis),
which oscillates between the unity of essence of an individual thing and
the concept of this unity.
However, this interpretation posits an undemonstrated priority of
essence over existence, grounded in the equally undemonstrated pri-
macy of the mind over that which is and makes itself known. Abstrac-
tion is taken to be the “condition of possibility”23 of cogitatio collecta,
which, as the mental representation of similitudo substantialis, is the
“apperception of the common traits”24 of individual sensible things. On
this point, de Libera’s language can barely disguise his proto-Kantian
reading of Boethius, notably the assertion that universals are exclu-
sively in the mind and that essence is prior to existence. Moreover, he
wrongly attributes to Boethius the claim that intellection wields su-
preme sway over actual things,25 a position that is in complete contra-
diction with Boethius’ insistence on the metaphysical primacy of being
over knowing, which he takes from both Plato and Aristotle. This pri-
macy implies that particulars are the first object of intellect (In Cat.
182c) and that the mind first encounters composites, rather than simple
substances (In Cat. 184 a-b). The priority of existent particulars is the
cornerstone of Boethius’ metaphysical realism. He also shares with Ar-
istotle the argument that the essence of composites is not form ab-
stracted from matter, but form in relation to matter. This is also true for
Plato, insofar as universal forms require matter in order to be reflected
123
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23. De Libera, L’art des généralités, p. 279.
24. De Libera, L’art des généralités, p. 228.
25. De Libera, L’art des généralités, pp. 274-79.
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in diverse ways, as I argued in chapter 1. There is thus a distinction, but
no separation, of form from matter and essence from existence. As
Boethius clearly holds, just as there is no naïve idealism in Plato, there
is no brute materialism in Aristotle. According to Plato’s and Aristotle’s
shared realism of universals, all material reality is a reflection of ideal
form. In the ‘sublunary world of things,’ universals are not and cannot
be outside or apart from particulars. The relational participation of par-
ticulars in universals can be glimpsed by sense perception and grasped
by intellectual cognition.
The claim that Plato’s and Aristotle’s accounts of universals are dia-
metrically opposed and that Boethius posits the primacy of essence over
existence also dictates interpretations of his theory of semantics and
mental language. According to Lambertus de Rijk, Boethius argues that
language is the product of the mind that conceives things (res) as no-
tions (intellectus) signified by words (voces). Since notions are always
true notions of the true nature (or ‘quiddity’) of things, words refer prin-
cipally (principaliter) to the essence of things and only indirectly to the
actual things (2 In Periherm. 24.12-13). For de Rijk, the quiddity of things
signified by words is Aristotle’s passiones animae, not Plato’s transcen-
dent Forms.26 Curiously, de Rijk quotes the Cratylus in support of his
reading, but it is precisely in this dialogue that Plato equates the notion
of power (dÖnamiv) not simply with the action of ‘words’ upon the mind
but also with a wider psychological sense and crucially a cosmic princi-
ple that orders reality and holds all nature (Crat. 399 e–400 b). As such,
de Rijk wrongly privileges the semantic-epistemic function of power
over the cosmic-metaphysical dimension that is more prominent in
Plato’s philosophy.27 This misreading explains why Boethius’ mention of
quiddity is likened to the priority of formal essence over material
instantiation in Aristotle rather than the real actuality of transcendent
forms in immanent things in Plato.
Against such and similar essentialist interpretations, John Magee
rightly contends that the mark of Boethius’ epistemology and semantics
is a double mediation and a double movement. The double mediation is
124
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26. L. M. de Rijk, “Boèce logicien et philosophe: Ses positions sémantiques et sa
métaphysique de l’être,” pp. 141-56; de Rijk, “On Boethius’ Notion of Being: A Chapter on
Boethian Semantics,” pp. 1-29.
27. Michel René Barnes, “The Role of DÖnamiv in Plato’s Philosophy,” in The Power of
God: Dunamis in Gregory of Nyssa’s Trinitarian Theology (Washington, DC: Catholic Uni-
versity of America Press, 2001), pp. 54-93, esp. pp. 70-76.
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performed by sense perception and the mind. The double movement
goes from actual things (res) via the senses (sensus) and thoughts
(intellectus or passiones animae) to written letters (litterae) and/or words
(voces), and from the letters or words via intellectus and sensus back to
the senses.28 The point is that Boethius combines Aristotle’s emphasis
on sensible things as the first object of the intellect with Plato’s argu-
ment that the intelligible is not a realm in itself but reflected in the sensi-
ble (1 In Periherm. 37.4; 2 In Periherm. 20.17) — the material only is by vir-
tue of partaking in the ideal, so that in perceiving materiality we always
already discern its participation in ideality (2 In Periherm. 21.8). Just as
the universal requires the particular to be reflected in diverse ways, so
the particular requires the universal in order to be. This parallelism is
echoed at the level of knowledge. Cognition of particulars does not stop
either at particulars themselves or at universals but involves an exit
from, and a return to, materiality in order to grasp how the universal
constitutes the particular that reflects it.29 Here the theological episte-
mology of Boethius is already apparent.
4. Individuation and the Metaphysics of Act and Potency
In this section I will suggest that Boethius’ metaphysical realism and his
theological epistemology are linked to his transformation of Aristotle’s
language of act and potency. The common assumption in de Libera and
de Rijk is that Boethius follows Aristotle and develops a theory of knowl-
edge of essences based on abstraction. But the double movement from
the sensible via the intelligible back to the sensible and the double medi-
ation by sense perception and intellectual cognition highlight Boethius’
attempt to relate the existence of material particular things to the es-
sence of immaterial universal forms. His fusion of epistemology with on-
tology has important implications for his theory of individuation. At
first, it would seem as though he simply attempts to synthesize Plato and
125
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28. John Magee, Boethius on Signification and Mind (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1989), pp. 49-92.
29. Both de Libera and de Rijk would object that there are notions which are at once
nonexistent and signifying like chimerae or centaurs and therefore that knowledge is
noumenal rather than phenomenal. However, as Magee suggests, such notions are for
Boethius matters of opinion (opinabile). As such, they are not strictly speaking knowable
(scibile), and the sole truth about them is that they do not exist (1 In Periherm. 166.6; 2 In
Periherm. 375.23–376.23). Cf. Magee, Boethius on Signification and Mind, pp. 83-84.
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Aristotle, arguing that matter is brought from potency into actuality by
form, which does not exist outside embodiment. Thus, individuation de-
scribes the ordering of particular concrete matter by universal immate-
rial form.
A. Ipsum Esse or Act of Being
However, already in his commentaries on Aristotelian logic, Boethius’
account surpasses Greek metaphysics and develops Augustine’s theol-
ogy. Beyond Aristotle (and in some sense Plato), Boethius argues that
particulars as form-matter compounds intimate being itself (ipsum esse).
For the actuality of particulars stands in potency to that which brings
them into actual existence and makes them what they are. A thing’s ac-
tuality mediates both that thing’s potentiality and the act that actualizes
it. Therefore actualization individuates things by aligning forms in par-
ticulars more closely with the first principle and final end of all beings —
that which is being (id quod est esse) or God (De Hebdom. reg. VI), a clear
contrast with Aristotle’s indifferent God.
To know a thing is to cognize the ontological coincidence of univer-
sal form in particular matter. Thus to know a thing is to cognize that
thing’s ‘vertical’ relationality to esse ipsum, which brings beings from po-
tency into actuality and makes them what they are. So configured,
knowledge actualizes both a thing’s cognoscibility (scibilitas) and the
mind’s capacity to know (potestas rationis). For this reason, knowledge is
ontological. Boethius’ account prolongs and radicalizes Plato’s and Au-
gustine’s idea that being and knowing are coextensive. His innovation is
to demonstrate that knowledge of form is not only ontological but also
teleological, for the telos of knowable objects is to be known and that of
capable minds is to know. As a result, knowledge of form individuates
both the knowing mind and the known object.
In the process of developing this account, Boethius transforms both
Aristotelian and Neo-Platonist metaphysics, in particular Aristotle’s ten-
dency to privilege substance over relation. Before showing why for
Boethius relation is not subordinate to substance and how relationality
precedes participation, I explore his understanding of act and potency.
The logical and metaphysical priority of actuality of being over potency
to know, which Boethius takes from Aristotle, implies that actual things
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cannot ultimately exist without actual things. All effective knowledge is
ultimately grounded in actualized reality. Yet at the same time, things
that have been brought from potency into actuality may not actually be
known — things are cognoscible (scibilia) without being effectively
cognized (scita). Here two questions can be raised. First, why would
things be ‘knowables’? Second, how might ‘knowables’ (scibilia) become
‘knowns’ (scita)?
Concerning the first question, Boethius argues that all things have a
potency to be and to be known. The telos of all things is to actualize their
ontic and epistemic potency. This twofold potentiality is inscribed into
the nature of all created things and the whole of creation. God’s creative
activity brings things into being and makes them what they are.30 In the
unfolding of reality, it actualizes their potency and in turn is manifest in
their actualization. So in coming into being things disclose God’s active
creativity. In coming to know their being we come to know their
createdness (or creatureliness) and God’s continuous creative action
which upholds all beings. Through corporeal things that appear to the
senses and the mind, God manifests himself because his love and good-
ness communicate themselves. This conception foreshadows the idea of
bonum diffusivum sui in Aquinas, as I will show in chapter 5. For
Boethius, the communicability of universals is an indication that a
higher actuality is at work in particulars.31
With respect to the second question, Boethius suggests that things
pass from cognoscibility to cognition because they make themselves
known to the mind through the senses. There only is sense perception
because the senses perceive something actual. In virtue of the senses the
mind is always already in contact with reality. Magee puts this suc-
cinctly: “sensus is activated by the presence of a res.”32 As such, sense per-
ception is the origin of knowledge — sensus is the origo intellectus.33
127
Relational Substance and Cosmic Hierarchy
30. Here Boethius is influenced by the Neo-Platonist emphasis on theosis and
theurgy. See Pierre Courcelle, La Consolation de Philosophie dans la tradition littéraire.
Antécédents et postérité de Boèce (Paris: Études Augustiniennes, 1967), pp. 163-64;
P. Courcelle, Late Latin Writers and Their Greek Sources (Cambridge, MA: Harvard Univer-
sity Press, 1969), pp. 301-2; Robert Crouse, “The Doctrine of Creation in Boethius: The ‘De
hebdomadibus’ and the Consolatio,” in Studia Patristica: Eighth International Conference on
Patristic Studies, ed. E. A. Livingstone (Oxford: Pergamon Press, 1979), Part 1, pp. 417-21.
31. 2 In Periherm. 2.7 (136: 20–137: 13).
32. Magee, Boethius on Signification and Mind, p. 104.
33. Magee, Boethius on Signification and Mind, p. 99.
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Sense perception is at once passive and active, an intellective faculty and
a content of intellection. It is itself cognitive because it induces both a
physical change in sense organs and a mental (or spiritual) change in the
mind (a point that was later developed by Aquinas, as we will see in
chapter 5).
What is it that we perceive when we see a particular sensible thing?
According to Boethius, we perceive a compact composed of matter and
form. But unlike the intellect, sense perception does not divide and com-
pose form and matter or abstract form from matter. Instead, it appre-
hends the unity of things, form instantiated in matter or, more accu-
rately, ‘material form’: “For sense examines the shape set in the
underlying matter.”34 As such, sense perception gives access to a thing’s
existence as well as its essence. That which the senses perceive and me-
diate to the mind is a thing’s singularity, its unique composition of uni-
versal form particularized in matter. Knowledge and understanding of
universals belong to intellectual cognition, but a certain apprehension of
particulars belongs to sensory cognition.35
In perceiving particulars and cognizing the universals which are
present in them, the mind passes from the potency of understanding
(potestas rationis) to the act of knowing (actus intelligentiae). In knowing
the being of things, the knower ascends in the hierarchy of being. For
nonrational beings, to be is to have the disposition to be known. Like-
wise for rational beings, to be is to have the disposition to know. For hu-
man beings, to know is to enhance their actuality and therefore to per-
fect their form. Both knowledge and being require a higher act to come
into actuality (2 In Periherm. 238.20-27). So knowledge of things implies
some knowledge of being itself because to know is to know that a thing
passes from potential ‘knowability’ to actual ‘known-ness’ in virtue of a
higher actuality — God’s creative act of being.
B. ‘Modal’ Metaphysics
This conclusion is not based on a blind belief in the existence of God but
emerges from Boethius’ modification of Greek and Roman philosophy.
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34. “sensus enim figuram in subiecta materia constitutam . . . perpendit” (De Consol.
V.iv.84-85 [411/410]).
35. 2 In Periherm. 29.6; 55.17; 1 In Isag. 24.14; 84.7; 136.7.
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Notably, he reconfigures the relation between logic and metaphysics and
argues that modality is ultimately grounded in reality rather than being a
product of the mind in the mind. Quoting from Boethius’ commentary
on Aristotle’s Peri Hermeneias, Simo Knuuttila writes that
the absence of unqualified possibility suggests that all modalities are
real rather than logical, i.e. the truth of modal axioms is evaluated
from the point of view of the actual world and its history. I think this is
taken for granted in Boethius’ description: “The Stoics have postu-
lated as possible that which is susceptible of true affirmation, when
things that are external to it but happen together with it do not in any
way prevent it. The impossible is that which never admits of truth,
other external things preventing it [2 In Periherm. 234.27–235.1].”36
In order to tie possibility to potency and exclude both accident and fate
as ultimate causes of the actuality of things, Boethius situates modality
in being, not in the mind. For instance, he challenged Alexander of
Aphrodisias’ idea of possibilities that will never be actualized.37 To be-
lieve in nonactualizable possibilities is to believe in a nondemonstrable a
priori, since such possibilities are by definition without any relation to
actual beings and thus wholly unintelligible (2 In Periherm. 197.11–198.3).
At the same time, Boethius goes beyond Aristotle’s account of act
and potency and formulates an account of nature that balances the sub-
stance of being with the relation between actuality and potentiality. Na-
ture is actuality that stands in potency to the act that brings it into being
and makes it what it is. As such, nature and all things therein exhibit a
disposition to be: “[W]e know that nature regularly develops no property
in vain” (2 In Periherm. 236.16-17). Everything that has potency can be
brought into actuality. As a result, potencies that will never be actualized
cannot be because they would be contrary to nature and therefore con-
trary to God’s creation. To say this is to say that nonactualizable poten-
cies are false — the only truth about such potencies is that they are not.
What determines the truth or falsehood of any given proposition is
whether it describes the world, both actual and potential.
129
Relational Substance and Cosmic Hierarchy
36. Simo Knuuttila, Modalities in Medieval Philosophy (London and New York:
Routledge, 1993), pp. 17-18.
37. Alexander of Aphrodisias, De fato (176.15-16), quoted in Knuuttila, Modalities in
Medieval Philosophy, p. 18.
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If all potencies are actualizable, then it also follows that all actuali-
ties have the potency to be. Act and potency are not circular but hierar-
chical because in order to be actual, a potency requires a higher act that
actualizes it (1 In Periherm. 120.24–121.16; 2 In Periherm. 237.1-5). In actual
things, we can discern the power that brings them from their potency to
be into the actuality of being because the coming-into-being (and
passing-away) of individual substances involves a change in the sub-
stance which is irreducible to the substance itself, since nothing can be
its own cause of generation (as Plato, Aristotle, Plotinus, and other an-
cient philosophers insisted). As a result, substance alone cannot account
for the substantial change in the process of actualization.
Here Boethius’ metaphysics of act and potency differs significantly
from Aristotle’s. First of all, the latter denies that substantial change as
such is actual because he excludes any state between nonbeing and be-
ing (Phys. VI 5, 235b6-32). By contrast, Boethius draws on Augustine (Civ.
Dei XII.2) to argue that actualization, though instantaneous, takes place
in time and not in eternity. Since prior to existence there is nothing
(though nothing is not because it lacks any ontological station), the ‘onto-
logic’ underpinning the process of actualization is best described by the
idea of creation ex nihilo.
The second difference between Aristotle and Boethius concerns the
alternation of motion and rest in individual substances, which raises
questions about whether the passage from motion to rest and from rest
to motion constitutes substantial or kinetic change. As Simo Knuuttila
indicates, Aristotle envisages the possibility that individual motion is a
change in the substance itself but tends to associate all changes with ki-
netic energy — modifications in the state of a substance, not substantial
change itself.38 This ambivalence in Aristotle prompts Boethius to ex-
plore the temporal inscription of all that is finite. Actuality is modal as
well as temporal — it is a matter of when, not only of whether. The tempo-
ral and ontological nature of actualized potencies leads Boethius to
chart a middle way between the relative possibility of accidentalism and
the absolute necessity of fatalism. He argues that when things are actual
they are so necessarily, in the sense that their actualization owes nothing
to accident or fortune (1 In Periherm. 110.28–111.1). Yet at the same time,
actual things are contingent because neither their actualization nor
their actuality is in itself necessary. For nothing can actualize itself or
130
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38. Knuuttila, Modalities in Medieval Philosophy, pp. 21-22.
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preserve itself in being by itself alone. The contingency of things that are
actual hovers between necessity and possibility, as it were independently
of any kind of fate or probability.39 There is thus a stark contrast between
Aristotle’s actualism and Boethius’ idea of a kind of actual necessity: ev-
erything that is in act poses its own necessity, which is nevertheless al-
ways contingent on the act that brings it into existence and sustains it in
being.40
Boethius also holds that the temporality of motion and rest and the
finitude of beings-in-act intimate a power of being that not only brings
things into being and makes them what they are, but also sustains them
in being and perfects their singularity. The mark of Boethius’ metaphysics
is his emphasis on the temporality of actualization and the temporal un-
folding of potentiality into actuality. The rejection of accident and fate as
causes of actuality leads him to develop an alternative account of causa-
tion that preserves the radical contingency of all that is and the priority of
act over potency. Both existence and essence are in potentiality to being
itself (ipsum esse). Particular things stand in potency to the supreme actu-
ality of being and thus manifest the ‘ontological difference,’ as I will dis-
cuss in the following section. This difference, though absolute, is quali-
fied by the ‘vertical’ relationality of particular form to universal form. To
be individuated is to reflect the universal diversely in particular ways.
5. Individual Substance and the ‘Ontological Difference’
In the following three sections of this chapter, I investigate Boethius’
metaphysics and his account of substance, relation, and participation in
his theological tractates — the Opuscula sacra. Boethius configures the
difference and relation between the Creator and creation in terms of the
difference and relation between being itself (esse ipsum) and that which
is (id quod est). Following (and perhaps surpassing) Augustine, he de-
scribes God as fully relational and the divine persons as being beyond
substance (ultra substantiam). The relationality of the ‘ecstatically self-
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39. It is in terms of temporal, qualified necessity of actual things that Boethius reads
Aristotle’s balancing act of combining the principle of bivalence with the idea of radical
contingency in Book 9 of the Peri Hermeneias. Cf. Gail Fine, “Truth and Necessity in De
interpretatione 9,” History of Philosophy Quarterly 1 (1984): 23-47.
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giving’ Godhead is the reason why creation exists and can participate in
the Trinity. To say that beings are relational is to say that they are always
already good, not in and of themselves but by virtue of the universal
Good which communicates itself and is present in particulars. Likewise,
to say that beings are participatory is to say that they preserve and per-
fect their goodness by exercising virtue and ordering their life according
to God’s intentionality.
Already in De Fide Catholica, Boethius highlights the difference be-
tween existence and esse. In the opening lines, the divine substance is said
to have existed (exsistere) since eternity (De Fide 13 [52]). Similarly, the
verb ‘to exist’ is used to describe how the world was created ex nihilo, not
made from divine substance or fashioned according to “the existence of
some independent nature.”41 ‘Exsistere’ contrasts with ‘esse,’ which is de-
ployed in connection with the divine persons (De Fide 17 [52], 21-48 [54])
and with the coming into being of the world (De Fide 58 [56]). The use of
exsistere and esse is not in any way systematic. However, Boethius does
emphasize their difference, insisting that exsistere in some sense depends
on esse. For instance, creation exists by virtue of having been brought into
being (De Fide 55-63 [56]). Esse exceeds exsistere because all that exists
has been brought into being (esse) in order to be (ut esset). And if that
which exists only is because it has received esse and if what it is is to be,
then esse binds together both existence and essence.
In the Contra Eutychen et Nestorium, essence, existence, and esse are
analyzed in greater detail and with more rigor. Before refuting the two
heresies in question, Boethius defines a metaphysical framework that
underpins his theological writings. This framework conceptualizes the
difference between God’s esse and the esse of all nondivine substances on
the basis of the predicative difference in respect of ‘nature’ and ‘person.’
Nature is predicable of all things that are (esse) and as such can be
cognized in some manner (quoquo modo) by the human mind (Contra
Eut. I.8-12 [78]). Nature so defined extends to God, for “God and matter
. . . are apprehended in some way through the removal of things.”42 But
nature cannot be predicated univocally of material things and God. Di-
vine substance is simple; as such, it only acts and cannot be acted upon.
By contrast, nondivine substances are complex; as such, they can be
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41. “. . . existentia propriae naturae . . .” (De Fide: 61 [56]).
42. “deus et materia . . . aliquo tamen modo ceterarum rerum privatione capiuntur”
(Contra Eut. I.14-15 [79/78]).
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acted upon as well as act. Similarly, if “nature is the specific differentia
that informs a thing,”43 then it can be predicated of both God and men.
But predication is not univocal, for Christ has two natures, divine and
human. Here Boethius’ fusion of metaphysics with theology is crucial:
the simplicity of divine substance and Christ’s twofold nature highlights
the predicative difference between God and man.
Boethius then goes on to show how this predicative difference also
holds in the case of ‘person’ and how predicative differences are not
nominal but real. Since ‘nature’ is either a substance or an accident and
since “nature is a substrate of person and . . . person cannot be predi-
cated apart from nature,”44 it follows that ‘person’ can only be predicated
of substances, corporeal or incorporeal, because ‘person’ cannot consist
exclusively of accidents. So ‘person’ is predicable of God in the sense that
he is a rational substance, though of course not in the same way as man.
For God alone is an incorporeal substance, which is immutable and im-
passible. Likewise, both God and man are persons because substance
only is in individuals:
[I]f person belongs to substances alone, and these [are] rational, and if
every substance is a nature, and is not in universals but in individuals,
we have found the definition of person: ‘the individual substance of a
rational nature.’45
In contemporary theology, there is an ongoing debate on whether this
definition privileges a more substantialist account of the human person
or whether we already find in Boethius a fully relational metaphysics and
anthropology. In a number of important interventions and program-
matic contributions, Joseph Ratzinger has questioned the insufficiently
anthropological basis of Boethius’ account.46 However, it can be con-
tended that the ‘last Roman and first scholastic’ provides a radical fusion
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43. “natura est unam quamque rem informans specifica differentia” (Contra Eut. I.57-58
[80]).
44. “. . . personae subiectam esse naturam nec praeter naturam personam posse
praedicari” (Contra Eut. II.10-11 [83/82]).
45. “si persona in solis substantiis est atque in his rationabilibus substantiaque omnis
natura est nec in universalibus sed in individuis constat, reperta personae est definitio:
‘naturae rationabilis individua substantia’ ” (Contra Eut. III.1-5 [85/84]).
46. Joseph Ratzinger, Introduction to Christianity (New York: Herder & Herder, 1970),
pp. 102-3; J. Ratzinger, “Concerning the Person in Theology,” Communio 17 (1990): 438-54.
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of Greek concepts with biblical elements, a contribution to the
‘hellenization’ of Christian theology of which Pope Benedict XVI spoke
so eloquently in his controversial Regensburg address. Indeed, individ-
ual substance is not predicated univocally of God and man because this
definition of person derives from the Greek ÕpËstasiv, which denotes in-
dividual subsistence (individua subsistentia), and the divine persons are
the only self-subsistent substances:
Man has . . . oÔs¾a or essence because he is, oÔs¾wsiv or subsistence be-
cause he is not any subject, ÕpËstasiv or substance because he is sub-
ject to other things which are not subsistences or oÔs¾wseiv, while he
is prËswpon or person because he is a rational individual. Next, God is
oÔs¾a or essence, for He is and is especially that from which proceeds
the being of all things. He is oÔs¾wsiv, i.e. subsistence, for He subsists
in absolute independence; and Õc¾stasjai, for He is substance.
Whence we go on to say that there is . . . one essence and subsistence
but three Õpost}seiv, that is, three substances. And indeed, following
this use, men have spoken of One essence of the Trinity, three sub-
stances and three persons. For did not the language of the Church for-
bid us to say that there are three substances in God, substance might
seem for this reason to be predicated of God, not because he is set un-
der other things like a substrate, but because, just as he is before all
things, so He is as it were the principle beneath all things, supplying
them with oÔsiãsjai or subsistence.47
In this passage, Boethius clearly argues that the difference between God
and man is both predicative and real. God’s essence is not identical with
man’s essence, since God is the source of all being, whereas man is the re-
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47. “Est . . . hominis quidem essentia, id est oÔs¾a quidem atque essentia quoniam est,
oÔs¾wsiv vero atque subsistentia quoniam in nullo subiecto est, ÕpËstasiv vero atque sub-
stantia, quoniam subset ceteris quae subsistentiae non sunt, id est oÔs¾ãseiv; est prËswpon
atque persona, quoniam est rationabile individuum. Deus quoque est et oÔt¾a est et essentia,
est enim et maxime ipse est a quo omnium esse proficiscitur. Est oÔs¾wsiv, id est subsistentia
(subsistit enim nullo indigens); et Õc¾stasjai: substat enim. Unde et etiam dicimus unam esse
. . . essentiam vel subsistentiam deitatis, sed tres Õpost}seiv, id est tres substantias. Et quidem
secundum hunc modum dixere unam trinitatis essentiam, tres substantias tresque personas.
Nisi enim tres in deo substantias ecclesiasticus loquendi usus excluderet, videretur idcirco de
deo dici substantia, non quod ipse ceteris rebus quasi subiectum supponeretur, sed quod idem
omnibus uti praesset ita etiam quasi principium subesset rebus, dum eis omnibus oÔsiãsjai
vel subsistere subministrat” (Contra Eut. III.79-101 [91-93/90-92]).
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cipient of being. God’s subsistence is not identical with man’s subsis-
tence, since God is absolutely independent, whereas man is dependent
on God in order to be brought into being. God’s substance is not identi-
cal with man’s substance, since God is never subject to anything,
whereas man is a substrate for the existence of accidents. And God is
three substances in one, whereas man is of one substance only. Finally,
God is not a person in the same way as man, since God is not only an in-
dividual substance of a nature endowed with reason, but a relational
substance, three persons in one. I now turn to the three remaining
Opuscula sacra, which set out Boethius’ metaphysical account of individ-
uation in terms of man’s ‘vertical’ participation in God’s infinite
relationality.
6. Deus Ultra Substantiam
In the Utrum Pater, Boethius examines the claim first formulated in the
Contra Eutychen et Nestorium that the three persons of the Trinity can be
predicated substantially of the divinity. All three persons are individual
substances. Yet at the same time, they are also — taken together — one
single substance, noncomposite and indivisible, simply one. What is
predicated substantially of the deity must be common to all three sub-
stances (Utrum Pater 5-17 [32/34]). The name of God is an exemplary
case, but so are other divine names such as truth, goodness, immutabil-
ity, justice, and omnipotence. If so, can the individual persons also be
predicated of the common substances, precisely because each is a sub-
stance? In other words, are Father, Son, and Holy Spirit also substantially
predicated of the divinity? Boethius denies this, as the Father does not
transmit His name to the Son or the Holy Spirit. The three are “not predi-
cated substantially [of the divinity] but in some other way”48 — not acci-
dentally, because no divine attribute is accidental, but relatively (ad
aliquid). Since predication refers to real things, ‘relative’ predication
points to the relational nature of the Godhead.
According to Boethius, ‘relative’ predication means that the predi-
cable applies not to one substance only, but to the relations that the
substances entertain with one another. This applies to the three per-
sons of the Trinity and the Trinity itself, as the Father only is a Father
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48. “non substantialiter praedicari sed alio modo” (Utrum Pater 34 [35/34]).
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with respect to a Son and the Trinity cannot be equated with any of the
three persons. Boethius takes this solution from Augustine, who in
Book V of the De Trinitate argues that the Arian dualism of substantial
and accidental predication fails to take into account the Aristotelian
category of relation, as I argued in the previous chapter.49 Since it con-
cerns the predicative difference with respect to the category of sub-
stance, this point has a direct bearing on the ‘ontological difference’
between God and creation. In Boethius’ De Trinitate, substance is recon-
figured in terms of relationality. God is three persons in one subsistent
substance precisely because divine substantiality is constituted by Trin-
itarian relations (De Trinitate IV.11, 15-16, 18, 23). By contrast, man is not
a subsistent substance because he depends on God’s substance. Like-
wise, man is not fully relational because man only exists by participat-
ing in God’s relationality (De Trinitate II.51-56). I now detail this argu-
ment.
Boethius demonstrates the relationality of substance on the basis of
nondivine substances, which stand in potency to the actuality of God; as
such, the finite essence of such substances does not coincide with the in-
finite act of being (De Trinitate II.31-37 [11/10]). Since divine substance is
pure form without matter and everything else has being by virtue of sub-
stantial form, there is only one true form, God. All other forms are not
genuine forms but images of the one true form: “For from these forms
which are outside matter have come those forms which are in matter and
produce a body. We misname the entities that reside in bodies when we
call them forms, since they are images; for they only resemble those forms
which are not incorporate in matter.”50 The difference of pure form and
‘material form’ leads Boethius to argue that substantial form cannot be
predicated univocally of God and man. Strictly speaking, neither God nor
man is a genuine substance, though for very different reasons:
When we name a substance, as man or God, it seems as though that of
which the predication is made were itself substance, as [if] man or
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49. Cf. Stephen Gersh, Middle Platonism and Neoplatonism: The Latin Tradition (No-
tre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1986), vol. 2, pp. 705-7; Marenbon, Boethius, pp.
77-78.
50. “Ex his formis quae praeter materiam sunt, istae formae venerunt quae sunt in
materia et corpus efficiunt. Nam ceteras quae in corporibus sunt abutimur formas vocantes,
dum imagines sint. Adsimulantur enim formis his quae non sunt in materia constitutae” (De
Trinitate II.51-56 [13/12]). Cf. Marenbon, Boethius, pp. 80-82.
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God were substance. But there is a difference: since man is not simply
and entirely man, and therefore is not substance after all. For what
man is he owes to other things which are not man.51
The claim that man is not a true substance follows from the metaphysi-
cal argument that man is a matter-form compound and therefore stands
in potency to a higher actuality. Man is not substance; man has sub-
stance by virtue of participating in God’s esse.
If man has substance by participating in God, God must be sub-
stance. However, Boethius repeatedly states that God is ultra
substantiam — beyond substance.52 For God exceeds substantial predi-
cation. Following the Utrum Pater, Boethius extends Augustine’s teach-
ing on ‘relative’ predication in the direction of relationality. Only sub-
stantial predication in conjunction with relative predication respects the
predicative and ‘ontological difference’ that pertains between God and
man. Substantial predication alone establishes the sameness of the di-
vine substance in the three Trinitarian Persons, but it does not express
the ‘otherness of the divine persons’ (De Trinitate IV).
Since no relation can be related to itself, inasmuch as one which
makes a predicate by itself is a predication which lacks relation, the
manifoldness of the Trinity is produced in the fact that it is predica-
tion of a relation, and the unity is preserved through the fact that there
is no difference of substance or operation. . . . So then, the substance
preserves the unity, the relation makes up the Trinity . . . the relation in
the Trinity of Father to Son, and of both to Holy Spirit is like a relation
of identicals. But if a relation of this kind cannot be found in all other
things, this is because of the otherness natural to all perishable, tran-
sitory objects.53
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51. “cum dicimus ‘substantia’ (ut homo vel deus), ita dicitur quasi illud de quo
praedicatur ipsum sit substantia, ut substantia homo vel deus. Sed distat, quoniam homo non
integre ipsum homo est ac per hoc nec substantia; quod enim est, aliis debet quae non sunt
homo” (De Trinitate IV.29-34 [19/18]).
52. De Trinitate IV.11, 15-16, 18, 23 (16/18).
53. “Sed quoniam nulla relatio ad se ipsum referri potest, idcirco quod ea secundum se
ipsum est praedicatio quae relatione caret, facta quidem est trinitatis numerositas in eo quod
est predicatio relationis, servata vero unitas in eo quod est indifferentia vel substantiae vel
operationis. . . . Ita igitur substantia continet unitatem, relatio multiplicat trinitatem quod est
idem ad id quod est idem . . . et similis est relatio in trinitate patris ad filium et utriusque ad
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Crucially, ‘relative’ predication neither refers to a binary relation be-
tween two terms nor denotes a single identity that is reducible to sub-
stance. Instead, “the relation in the Trinity” describes the ‘horizontal,’ in-
finite, and unreserved participation of the Trinitarian persons in each
other without any tertium quid or univocal foundation in substance. It is
the original ‘ecstatic self-giving’ of this relationality beyond substance
that brings everything out of nothing into actuality and enables the
whole of creation to perfect its unique form by participating ever more
intensely in God’s relational being. In the De Hebdomadibus, to which I
now turn, this emphasis on relationality is supplemented by the argu-
ment that participation enables man to attain an ever-greater likeness
with God by preserving and enhancing the goodness that is bestowed
upon particulars by the divine act of being. Man is individuated by shar-
ing in the economy of the Trinitarian God and by the exercise of virtue,
chief of all the virtue of justice.
7. Relationality and Participation
The De Hebdomadibus concerns the sense in which substances can be
said to be good. The main question is the nature of the relationship be-
tween being (esse) and goodness (bonum), on the one hand, and that
which is (id quod est), on the other hand. The paradox that Boethius ex-
plores is how composite finite substances can be said to be good with-
out, however, being identical with the good. The treatise is divided into
two parts: first, an exposition of nine rules and, second, their application
to the question of whether substances can be (said to be) good. The key
to Boethius’ solution of this aporia is the ‘ontological difference’ between
being and that which is. Rule two reads as follows: “[B]eing and that
which is [id quod est] are different: being itself is not yet, but that which
is, having taken the form of being, is and consists.”54 How are we to inter-
pret esse? In the De Hebdomadibus, Boethius distinguishes between the
being (esse) of that which is and being itself (esse ipsum). The former is
the immanent form, “which [in the De Trinitate] Boethius had said
138
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spiritum sanctum ut eius quod est idem ad id quod est idem. Quod si id in cunctis aliis rebus
non potest inveniri, facit hoc cognata caducis rebus alteritas” (De Trinitate VI.1-24 [29-31/28-
30]).
54. “diversum est esse et id quod est; ipsum enim esse nondum est, at vero quod est
accepta essendi formam est atque consistit” (De Hebdom. 28-30 [41/40]).
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should really be considered an image ( for instance the form humanity
that makes Socrates a man).”55 As immanent form, esse is not self-
generated but derives from being itself (ipsum esse): “[T]hey [all non-
divine things] take that which they are from that which is being.”56
Boethius defines ipsum esse as that which ‘is not yet,’ ‘does not partici-
pate in any way in anything,’ is not anything but itself, can be partici-
pated in by that which is and thus gives it being (De Hebdom. 29, 31-32,
36-37, 41-42). In chapter 5, I show how Aquinas extends this framework
by introducing the distinctions between ens, esse commune, and ipsum
esse subsistens.
For now reverting to Boethius, the following question can be raised:
If there is a difference between esse and id quod est, how can that which
is be good? First, Boethius distinguishes goodness by substance from
goodness by participation. Both modes are inadequate to explain good-
ness in composite substances. Goodness by substance means that sub-
stances are intrinsically good, which implies that “they are like the first
good, and thereby they will be that good itself; for nothing is like it save
itself. Hence all things that are, are God — an impious assertion.”57
Goodness by participation means that substances are in no way good in
themselves. But “the common opinion of the learned . . . that everything
that is tends to the good and everything tends to its like.”58 So if sub-
stances cannot be good either by substance or by participation, in what
sense can they be good at all? Boethius’ proposed solution to this aporia
is to say that all nondivine substances are actually good insofar as they
flow from being itself, which is the first good. Yet at the same time, they
are potentially good insofar as they stand in potency to the actuality of
being itself, which is the highest good.
For the first good, since it is, is good in virtue of its being; but the sec-
ondary good, since it has flown from that whose very being is good, is
itself also good. But the very being of all things has flown from that
which is the first good and which is such a good that it is rightly said
139
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55. Marenbon, Boethius, p. 89.
56. “id quod sunt autem habent ex eo quod est esse” (De Hebdom. 70 [45/44]).
57. “primo sint bono similia ac per hoc ipsum bonum erunt; nihil enim illi praeter se
ipsum simile est. Ex quo fit ut omnia quae sunt deus sint, quod dictu nefas est” (De Hebdom.
77-80 [45/44]).
58. “tenet enim communis sententia doctorum omne quod est ad bonum tendere, omne
autem tendit ad simile” (De Hebdom. 58-59 [43/42]).
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to be good in virtue of its being. Therefore the being of these things is
good; for then it is in the first good.59
In this passage, Boethius argues that the ‘ontological difference’ entails a
distinction between the good itself and that which is good by virtue of em-
anating from it. In order to substantiate this argument, Boethius
configures the good itself to be coextensive with being itself: “[T]hat very
first good is being itself and is the good itself and good being itself.”60 So
that which is always already is good because it is relational to being itself
which is the good itself. The ecstatic plenitude of being itself and the good
itself communicates being and goodness to all beings that are brought
into existence. All that is has a share in the actuality of being itself and thus
in the good itself. The Good is not beyond being in the sense of being sepa-
rate from it.61 Instead, being and goodness are coterminous. Boethius’
idea of the coextension of the good and being prefigures the medieval con-
ception of the convertibility of the transcendentals.
This is significant for individuation because the difference be-
tween the actual and the potential goodness of nondivine substances
paves the way for the exercise of justice as the highest individuating ac-
tivity. Boethius argues that all that exists is always already good but not
just, for only God’s absolute goodness is justice. To do justice is to pre-
serve and extend the goodness that is given by God and received by
nondivine substances: “[B]eing good refers to essence, being just to ac-
tion.”62 To do justice is to be individuated and to individuate those
things to which action imparts justice because it is to pursue the God-
given telos of tending to the good (De Hebdom. 58-59). To pursue this
telos is to perfect our individual form and to perfect the form of things
140
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59. “Primum enim bonum, quoniam est, in eo quod est bonum est; secundum vero
bonum, quoniam ex eo fluxit cuius ipsum esse bonum est, ipsum quoque bonum est. Sed
ipsum esse omnium rerum ex eo fluxit quod est primum bonum et quod bonum tale est ut
recte dicatur in eo quod est esse bonum. Ipsum igitur eorum esse bonum est; tunc enim in eo”
(De Hebdom. 121-27 [47-49/46-48]).
60. “illud ipsum bonum primum est et ipsum esse sit et ipsum bonum et ipsum esse
bonum” (De Hebdom. 149-50 [49/48]).
61. This has been argued extensively by Jean-Luc Marion, who wrongly attributes this
position to Dionysius the Areopagite and Thomas Aquinas, as I will argue in this chapter
and also in chapter 5. See Jean-Luc Marion, L’idole et la distance. Cinq études, 3rd ed. (Paris:
Biblio-Essais, 1991 [1977]), esp. pp. 190-201; Marion, Dieu sans l’être, (Paris: Presses
Universitaires de France, 1991), pp. 81-155.
62. “bonum esse essentiam, iustum vero esse actum respicit” (De Hebdom. 165-66 [51/50]).
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which are drawn into the just order. So Boethius’ solution to the ‘aporia
of the good’ is that composite finite substances are good by participa-
tion, not by substance, because the Good is coextensive with being
(not above being) and thus communicates itself to all substances that
have being by virtue of God’s creation ex nihilo. The relationality of the
Godhead imparts relational being to all that is, and participation in the
Trinity marks the preservation and perfection of goodness thus given
and received.
8. The Coextension of Being and the Good according to Dionysius
Like Boethius, Dionysius the Areopagite views Christian theology as the
continuation and accomplishment of a long tradition reaching back to
Plato — a shared understanding that correlates with that of Augustine
and Gregory of Nyssa. Broadly speaking, there is thus no opposition be-
tween some of the main Church Fathers in the Greek East and the Latin
West on the centrality of Neo-Platonism and the fusion of the biblical
idea of creation ex nihilo with Plato’s self-diffusive Good. As I will sug-
gest in the final two sections of the present chapter, Dionysius’ specific
contribution to this ‘hellenization’ of Christian theology is at least
threefold: first of all, binding together the Platonist emphasis on good-
ness and the Aristotelian accentuation of being qua being; second, re-
lating divine illumination to deification (theosis) and union with God
(with and beyond Augustine); third, developing a kind of ‘mystagogical
metaphysics’ that brings together the mystical theology of elevation
(anagogy) with the twin (ecclesiastical and celestial) hierarchy as well as
the double theoria of Scripture and the sacraments (as in Origen). It is
this theological metaphysics of the Christian Neo-Platonist tradition
that Aquinas defends and develops in the face of both radical
Aristotelianism and Avicennian Augustinianism at the universities of
Paris and Oxford in the mid-thirteenth century, as I will suggest in dif-
ferent ways in chapters 4-6.
For now let me return to Dionysius, who argues that individuation
marks the participation of the angelic and human intelligences in the hi-
erarchical ordering of the cosmos which is created by, and describes to
us, the infinite beauty and goodness of the divine thearchy. Hierarchy, a
term coined by the Areopagite, is central to his theological metaphysics
of individuation:
141
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. . . hierarchy is a sacred order, a state of understanding and an activity
approximating as closely as possible to the divine. And it is uplifted to
the imitation of God in proportion to the illuminations divinely given to
it. The beauty of God . . . reaches out to grant every being, according to
merit, a share of light and then through a divine sacrament, in harmony
and in peace, it bestows on each of those being perfected its own form.63
As such, individuation for Dionysius is closely connected with the triadic
links between the sacred order created by God, the divine activity that
sustains all things in being, and the science or theoria through which we
are deified — an account that combines elements of both Christian and
pagan Neo-Platonism (above all Proclus), as I will suggest in greater de-
tail below.64
For all these reasons, it is somewhat baffling that scholars like Vladi-
mir Lossky and Jean-Luc Marion have repeatedly dismissed and denied
the import of Neo-Platonist metaphysics in the theology of Dionysius.65
In making this dubious claim, they do not just ignore Nicholas of Cusa’s
recognition of the prominence of Proclean elements in Dionysius’ meta-
physics and all the nineteenth-century scholarship attesting to this, as
Wayne Hankey has documented.66 Perhaps more importantly, both
Lossky and Marion provide a distorted reading of Dionysius’ thought
and his influential legacy in East and West. Since Hankey has conclu-
sively refuted Lossky’s interpretation and devotes less attention to
Marion, in what follows I shall focus on the latter.
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63. Dionysius the Areopagite, Celestial Hierarchy, 164d, in Pseudo-Dionysius: The Com-
plete Works, trans. Colm Luibhéid (Mahwah, NJ: Paulist Press, 1987), pp. 153-54 (translation
modified). Henceforth CH.
64. See, inter alia, Istvân Perczel, “Pseudo-Dionysius and the Platonic Theology: A
Preliminary Study,” in Proclus et la Théologie Platonicienne, ed. A. Ph. Segonds and C. Steel
(Leuven: Leuven University Press, 2000), pp. 492-530; Eric D. Perl, Theophany: The Neopla-
tonic Philosophy of Dionysius the Areopagite (Albany: State University of New York Press,
2007).
65. Vladimir Lossky, Essai sur la Théologie Mystique de L’Église d’Orient (Paris:
Éditions Cerf, 2005; orig. pub. 1944); English translation: The Mystical Theology of the East-
ern Church (Crestwood, NY: St. Vladimir’s Seminary Press, 1997; orig. trans. and pub. 1957).
For biographical references to Marion’s work on Dionysius, see, Marion, L}idole et la dis-
tance (cited in note 61, above).
66. Wayne J. Hankey, “Misrepresenting Neoplatonism in Contemporary Christian Di-
onysian Polemic: Eriugena and Nicholas of Cusa versus Vladimir Lossky and Jean-Luc
Marion,” American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 82 (2008): 683-703.
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For Marion, the metaphysical oscillation between presence and ab-
sence must be abandoned in favor of the phenomenological concept of
distance, which alone liberates God from being confined to some foun-
dational substance and from the language of ‘object.’ Both represent an
ontic approach to the ontological difference and are therefore ‘idola-
trous.’ Marion’s concept of distance is based on his reading of A¼t¾a in
the Dionysian corpus. A¼t¾a suspends the predicative language of
metaphysics and ‘ab-solves’ God from any idolatrous naming. Only
when we conceive of God as A¼t¾a can we attain “the point of view of
the absolute . . . : freed from all relation, therefore also from all think-
able relation which would tie [God as the absolute] to an absurd ‘other
than Himself.’ ”67 Here Marion is right to argue that Dionysius con-
figures A¼t¾a as gift rather than cause and that he substitutes liturgy for
predication.
Paradoxically, Marion’s spectacular blindness to Dionysius’ Neo-
Platonist metaphysics masks the true meaning: just as Marion restricts
the excess of donation over reception to saturated phenomena (instead
of phenomenality as a whole), so to he suggests that Dionysius confines
liturgical praise to eminence (instead of extending it to cataphasis and
apophasis). However, it is clear from the text of the Mystical Theology
that divine excess, which “surpasses all being” (1000b), transforms all
language in a liturgical direction, so that affirmation and negations
dimly reflect God’s eminent nature. For Dionysius, we discern God’s ex-
cess in all that is (Divine Names [henceforth DN] 593d). Indeed, in the Ce-
lestial Hierarchy, even the human body is described as a locus that mani-
fests the transcendent in the immanent. Each bodily sense not only
registers sense impressions passively, but relates these back to their
source (CH 332a–333c). This source must be transcendent, for all finite
bodies share in it yet never exhaust it.
If all things immanent intimate their transcendent cause, then it is
also analogically the case that all divine names point to something
more than themselves — God’s excess over all names: “Realizing all this,
the theologians praise it [the Cause of all] by every name — and as the
143
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67. Marion, L’idole et la distance, pp. 179-201, 226-27 (179). According to Marion, what
elevates ordinary discourse to theology — discourse on God — is the intervention of A¼t¾a
(Cause), which is the advent of absolute transcendence within immanence (or Heidegger’s
Ereignis). As such, immanence is in excess of donation over reception and in excess of re-
ception over being. Put differently, the immanent is for Marion given before it is received
and is received before it is.
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Nameless One” (DN 596a). Naming the ‘Nameless’ God ceases to be
mere predication and, by liturgical subversion, becomes itself a form of
praise of absolute divine transcendence, in the very act of expressing its
constitutive indigence. Cataphasis always already implies apophasis,
and conjointly cataphasis and apophasis imply ‘eminence.’ Contrary to
Marion’s assertion, Dionysius does not conceive the passage from
cataphasis and apophasis to ‘eminence’ as a rupture. Here the term ÕpŸr
(beyond) is key. It does not mean ‘above’ (in the sense of wholly
superposed), ‘apart from’ (in the sense of without), or let alone ‘outside’
(in the sense of absolutely separate). Rather, ÕpŸr expresses some ana-
logical resemblance between all that is and A¼t¾a.68 Precisely because
God does not resemble the world but rather the world describes God as
revealed in Christ’s works (Ecclesiastical Hierarchy [henceforth EH]
432B), we can say that the triadic structures of the created order inti-
mate the Trinitarian nature of the Creator. And contra Gilson, who
wrongly ascribes a form of Porphyrian essentialism to Dionysius,69 one
can argue that the Areopagite fuses the Proclean emphasis on theurgy
and triadic schemes in the world with the Platonist idea of a self-
diffusive Good whose ecstatic outflow endows all things with goodness
and draws them into the twin hierarchy which proceeds from and re-
turns to God (EH 424b–445c).
For Dionysius, this has been disclosed by the divine works of Jesus
Christ, which are described as the “consummation of the divine words”
(EH 432b) and which are transmitted to us by Scripture and by the un-
spoken traditions of liturgical symbols and gestures. All acts and lan-
guage are ultimately liturgically ordered.70 Theology and theurgy con-
join in calling forth divine songs of praise, as the whole Dionysian corpus
attests (e.g., DN 637c; EH 441c-d, 444a, 485a-b). So while Marion cor-
rectly shows that Dionysius’ account of causation is couched in terms of
donation and excess, he wrongly suggests that it implies God’s absolute
distance vis-à-vis creation, beyond the metaphysical presence-absence
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68. René Roques, L’univers dionysien. Structure hiérarchique du monde selon le
Pseudo-Denys (Paris: Éditions Cerf, 1983), pp. 53-59.
69. Étienne Gilson, Being and Some Philosophers (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of
Mediaeval Studies, 1949), ch. 1, esp. pp. 30-34.
70. Andrew Louth, Denys the Areopagite (Wilton, CT: Morehouse-Barlow, 1989), pp.
17-32; Denys Turner, Eros and Allegory (Kalamazoo, MI: Cistercian Publications, 1995), pp.
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divide. In turn, this argument is based on the primacy of Goodness
(Bonté) over Being which Marion wrongly ascribed to the Areopagite, as I
will now argue.
Marion’s reading that divine goodness can only be given and re-
ceived in virtue of the ontological distance discussed earlier appears at
first unassailable. Indeed, in the Divine Names Dionysius appears to
trace the first principle to God’s goodness beyond being: “And we may be
so bold as to claim also that the Cause of all things loves all things in the
superabundance of his goodness, that because of his goodness he makes
all things, brings all things to perfection, holds all things together, re-
turns all things” (DN 708A-B). However, Marion’s prioritizing of chapter
four of the Divine Names over chapter five and other texts is misguided.
His interpretation leads him to gloss over some key Neo-Platonic con-
cepts in Dionysius’ metaphysics, starting with the coextension of the
Good, the Beautiful, and the One. This is borne out by the following two
passages, the first taken from chapter four of the Divine Names itself and
the second from chapter one:
The Beautiful is therefore the same as the Good, for everything looks
to the Beautiful and the Good as the cause of being, and there is noth-
ing in the world without a share of the Beautiful and the Good. (DN
704b)
Indeed, the inscrutable One is out of the reach of every rational pro-
cess. Nor can any words come up to the inexpressible Good, this One,
this source of all unity, this supra-existent Being. (DN 588b)
If the Good, the Beautiful, and the One are coextensive, it is hard to see
why Goodness would assume absolute primacy over Being. What
would it mean to say that Goodness is somehow prior to Being, which
after all is coterminous with the Good, as we shall presently see?
Marion’s insistence on the primacy of the Good over Being arises from
the fact that he throws out the Neo-Platonist baby with the Porphyrian
bathwater, so to speak. Of course he is right to distance Dionysius from
Porphyry’s essentialism of the One: in the Mystical Theology, it is said
that A¼t¾a “is neither one nor oneness” (1048a). But it does not follow
that the Areopagite views the first principle and final end as being en-
tirely outside the orbit of Being. On the contrary, all beings proceed
from and return to their source of being in God. Indeed, Dionysius de-
145
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scribes God in book five of the Divine Names as the source and the
giver of being:
The first gift therefore of the absolutely transcendent Goodness is the
gift of being, and that Goodness is praised from those that first and
principally have a share of being. From it and in it are Being itself, the
source of all beings, all beings and whatever else has a portion of exis-
tence. This characteristic is in it as an irrepressible, comprehensive
and singular feature. (DN 820c-d)
Moreover, all reverts ultimately to the One and the Perfect — in an
epistrophe that mirrors Proclus, as Wayne Hankey has rightly remarked.
For this reason, the henosis of the Mystical Theology is not a Porphyrian
fusion with the One beyond difference but rather a union with God that
preserves the ontological difference through analogical relation. Indeed,
God is equally participant in all beings, and beings participate differ-
ently in God as a function of their capacity to receive the gift of the ex-
cess of Being (CH 121c; DN 644b; Epistles 1092b).71 Here Dionysius is
much closer to the Proclean strand of Neo-Platonism, which emphasizes
the ecstatic overflow of God, as I have already indicated.
For the Areopagite, God is both supra-existential and supra-
essential (DN 956b; MT 1000a) prior even to the cause of Being — pure
plenitude whose ecstatic overflow is both without and within the exis-
tence and essence of all that is. In the words of Fran O’Rourke, Dio-
nysius conceives of divine being as “the plenary presence of the perfec-
tion of all reality.”72 The sheer excess of divine transcendence is such
that God manifests himself in all that he brings into being out of noth-
ingness. As a result, our apophatic ascent to the supreme Cause de-
pends on its prior cataphatic descent in a dialectic of eminence that
surpasses both modes. This is what the analogical relation between cre-
ative and created Goodness (Êmo}gajon) and Being (tÌ eÅnai) means for
Dionysius.73 God’s love for his creation is manifested in the cataphatic
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71. Roques, L’univers dionysien, pp. 59-67; Vladimir Lossky, “Le sens des “analogies”
chez Denys le Pseudo-Aréopagite,” Archives d’histoire doctrinale et littéraire du Moyen Âge
5 (1930): 279-309.
72. Fran O’Rourke, Pseudo-Dionysius and the Metaphysics of Aquinas (Leiden: E. J.
Brill, 1992), p. 69.
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kenosis of the Incarnation: “[T]hough himself beyond being, he [Jesus]
took upon himself the being of humans. Yet he is not less overflowing
with transcendence. He is the ever-transcendent, and so superabun-
dantly so” (Epistles 1072b). In the Letters, the Areopagite relates once
more both cataphasis and apophasis to eminence in such a way that his
theological metaphysics outflanks the ancient and modern dualism be-
tween presence and absence:
Someone beholding God and understanding what he saw has not ac-
tually seen God himself but rather something of his which has being
and which is knowable. For he himself solidly transcends mind and
being. He is completely unknown and non-existent. He exists beyond
being and he is known beyond the mind. And this quite positively
complete unknowing is knowledge of him who is above everything
that is known. (Ep. 1065a-b)
In different ways, both Lossky and Marion view Christian Neo-
Platonism through the prism of modern philosophy. For this reason,
they ignore the theological metaphysics that underpins the Dionysian
corpus and transforms the account of being. As the gift of God, being is
always already analogical and hierarchical. It is precisely the Platonist
emphasis on the self-diffusive Good and the relational positioning of all
things that separates the Areopagite’s theology from the Porphyrian fo-
cus on unity with the One.
9. Individuation and Hierarchy
Like Augustine, Gregory, and Boethius, Dionysius eschews the Aristote-
lian language of individual substance and efficient causality in favor of a
more Platonist vision of relational beings that participate in the creative
activity of the first principle and final end in God. As such, both being
and knowing are given rather than self-generated. According to the
Areopagite, to receive and return the gift of being is to enter the (asym-
metrical) movement of perfective elevation — the movement from and
to God (not unlike exitus and reditus in Augustine). This also applies to
how we come to know the supreme Cause. We are elevated to knowledge
of God through the confluence of self-purification and divine illumina-
tion. To be purified is to abandon the contemplation of the self and the
147
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fixation on all things immanent. Likewise, illumination is the reception
of the light that directs human sight to the threshold of the transcen-
dent. Conjointly, purification and illumination uplift the mind beyond all
there is to transcendence itself: “By an undivided and absolute abandon-
ment of yourself and everything, shedding all and freed from all, you will
be uplifted to the ray of the divine shadow which is above everything that
is” (MT 997b–1000a).
This metaphysics of anagogy or elevation has a theological corre-
late, which is the doctrine of creatio ex nihilo — the gratuitous, free, and
continuous divine gift of being that brings everything out of nothing into
actuality. The Incarnation manifests God’s kenotic descent and calls on
the whole of creation to receive and return it liturgically in an asymmet-
rical gift-exchange that perfects the degrees of being of each creature
standing in an analogical relation to its creator. Divine creativity issues
forth in a sacred order wherein individuation is neither purely internal
nor purely external to beings but instead marks God’s gift of goodness
that actualizes all things relationally. This sacred order is both hierarchi-
cal and participatory in the sense that the cosmos is characterized by
degrees of being and perfection and things are positioned relationally at
different stations in the hierarchy of creation.
Not unlike the other Church Fathers discussed in this essay, the im-
manent discloses for Dionysius the transcendent at the heart of the ma-
terial world. As shown above, the doxological nature and dynamic of his
theology exhorts beings to “turn to all of creation” (DN 593d) and discern
the resemblance and analogical relation of all that is to the supreme
Cause in God (MT 1000d–1001a) through purification and illumination.
In this manner, we come to know the harmonious sacred order that un-
derpins and upholds the whole of reality. This hierarchy of creation is in-
timated in the ‘perceptible symbols’ of natural and social life:
. . . because of this inspired, hierarchical harmony each one is able to
have as great as possible a share in him who is truly beautiful, wise
and good. . . . We see our human hierarchy . . . as our nature allows, plu-
ralized in a great variety of perceptible symbols lifting us upward hier-
archically until we are brought as far as we can be into the unity of dei-
fication. . . . For us . . . it is by way of the perceptible images that we are
uplifted as far as we can be to the contemplation of what is divine.
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Here as elsewhere in the Dionysian corpus, individuation is described in
terms of the gift of goodness and being which enables us to participate
in the creation of hierarchy.74
Like the whole of his theology, the notion of hierarchy has a pro-
foundly doxological meaning; it denotes the sacred order of the celestial
and the ecclesiastical hierarchy, which are triadically arranged (the three
orders of the three angels) and express heavenly and earthly praise of
God. Dionysius transforms the Proclean idea of polytheistic divine ener-
gies and different rituals for the simple and the wise in the direction of a
doxological metaphysics where the whole world speaks of God and in
praise of Creator and his creation. Conjointly all the forces constitute a
cosmic liturgy and form a hierarchical symphony that reflects the beauty
of God and extends from the seraphim, the archangels, and angels to
man and the whole of the natural world. As such, the doxological is nei-
ther invented by humans to contain religious experience nor is it limited
to the ecclesia. On the contrary, liturgy is at the heart of divine creativity
and of God’s gift of being and goodness. The Creator reveals himself as
one and triune through the praise of his work as expressed through the
Son and the Holy Spirit, who bind together the all of creation in hymns of
praise — an elevating of hymnein to God with songs of praise that are re-
flected and embodied in sacramental rites and divine works. As such, lit-
urgy is also always theurgic and theurgy is also always liturgical. Like-
wise, deification is elevating and elevation is deifying.
The mystery of divine Creation and Incarnation is not confined to
the sacramental rites within the ecclesiastical hierarchy but extends to
the entire cosmos. The Areopagite, following Proclus’s harmony of the
celestial choirs, complements in some important way Augustine’s ‘musi-
cal metaphysics’ with a stronger emphasis on liturgical theurgy and ana-
gogical theosis. Since this cosmic praise encompasses each individual,
unique path back to the Creator, it is also the case that God is not just
intelligible to the few wise who cognize him through abstract concepts.
Rather, divine disclosure is dispersed throughout the cosmos and per-
ceptible for all in simple images as much as in apophatic contemplation
— if not more so. For the light of truth and love shines forth in the world
and illuminates our mind to see divine beauty in all created things as
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mediated through our senses. The supernaturally infused gifts of faith
and grace direct our natural desire to know the first cause and final end,
towards an encounter with God in Christ.
10. Conclusion: Analogical Hierarchy
In this chapter, I have argued that Boethius deploys both Platonist and
Aristotelian concepts in order to give a more systematic exposition of
Augustine’s Trinitarian theology. Beyond Greek metaphysics, he argues
that only God’s love and goodness can explain why particular sensible
things are brought out of nothing into existence. Beyond Augustine’s
theory of illumination, he provides an epistemology centered upon
Plato’s account of universals and Aristotle’s metaphysics of act and po-
tency. What constitutes individuals qua individuals is the relation of uni-
versal form to particular matter. And what perfects individual form is
the ever more intense actualization of universal form in particular
things, above all the exercise of justice, which preserves and enhances
the goodness of all nondivine substances.
More specifically, to know a thing is for Boethius to cognize the on-
tological coincidence of universal form instantiated in particular matter.
Thus to know a thing is to cognize that thing’s relation with esse, which
brings beings from potency into actuality and makes them what they
are. For Boethius, universals only exist in particulars, and the logic that
governs the link between particulars and universals is relation, which is
in some sense prior to participation because participation alone cannot
explain why universals are present in particulars. By contrast, the (onto-)
logic of creation and the relation between ipsum esse and id quod est can
account for the ontological and noetic coincidence of particulars and
universals. Participation describes how a particular thing further actual-
izes its potency and thereby perfects its universal form in particular di-
verse ways. So while relation explains why created things can be said to
be good, participation shows how something that is good can also be
just. This is how Boethius connects the metaphysical dimension of indi-
viduation to his conception of politics.
Whereas Boethius emphasizes participation and analogy, Dionysius
the Areopagite accentuates hierarchy and anagogy. Transforming the
pagan Neo-Platonism of Proclus, he links sacred triad and the cosmic
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tarian traces in the world and union with God the Creator. In so doing,
the Areopagite combines Plato’s focus on the Good with Aristotle’s em-
phasis on the unity of existence and essence in substances. Moreover,
Dionysius ties Augustinian divine illumination to deification and
develops a cosmic and doxological theology that blends liturgy and
theurgy.
In this manner, individuation is neither intrinsic nor extrinsic to
things but instead marks God’s gift of being and goodness, which are re-
ceived and returned in an asymmetrical gift-exchange within the twin
ecclesiastical and celestial hierarchy of the divinely sustained order of
creation. As such, Dionysius’ focus on cosmic praise and mystical ascent
outwits in advance the false early modern divide between the purely ra-
tional and the purely affective, as chapter 9 will also suggest. Before that,
Part II of this book will examine how the shared patristic legacy of Au-
gustine, Gregory, Boethius, and Dionysius was received and transformed
by medieval theology and in what ways the theological metaphysics of
creation and individuation evolved.
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PART I I
Matter and Form
In his Regensburg lecture of 2006, Pope Benedict XVI firmly ties metaphys-
ics to politics by linking violence in religion to the absoluteness of divine vo-
lition in Islam. Controversially, his argument is that in the dominant Is-
lamic traditions of Sunnism and Shi}ism, God’s will is inscrutable and
therefore unintelligible to the human mind. As a result, divine injunctions
cannot be fully understood and must instead be blindly obeyed. In other
words, the Pope’s charge is that the gulf between God and human catego-
ries in much of Islam diminishes the ‘grandeur of reason’ by sundering
rationality from faith. Taken to its extreme, this paved the way for the se-
cretly collusive complicity of fideism and rationalism in such a way that ab-
solute divine power is disjoined from divine intellect and becomes the
overriding category. What underpins all this is a series of metaphysical po-
sitions that Benedict calls into question: first of all, an incipient dualism be-
tween essence and existence; second, a separation of human agency from
divine creativity; third, the rise to power of both militant secularism and re-
ligious fundamentalism, which are mirror images of each other insofar as
both combine a blind transcendentalism of the will with an empty positiv-
ism of power.
As I will argue in the second part of this essay, the origins of the
modern separation of reason from faith can in fact be traced to the con-
fluence of certain developments in both Islamic and Christian theology
as early as the late eleventh and the twelfth century. Indeed, there are key
elements in the works of Avicenna (Ibn SIn#) and Gilbert Porreta that
gave rise to a whole series of modern dualisms. By contrast, influential
thirteenth-century figures such as Aquinas and Al-ArabI opposed this
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synthesis of theology, philosophy, and mysticism that puts a greater em-
phasis on participation and mediation. This theological resistance to the
proto-secular tendencies has important implications for present and fu-
ture efforts to restore the ‘grandeur of reason’ and envision a proper en-
gagement among the faiths and also between religious and other ideo-
logical bodies around a debate on universals such as the nature of the
divine, the relation between peace and justice, and the irreducible link
between ethics, politics, and economics.
The next three chapters turn to medieval accounts of creation and
individuation, in particular the work of Gilbert Porreta (c. 1085-1154), St.
Thomas Aquinas (c. 1225-1274), John Duns Scotus (1265/66-1308), Wil-
liam of Ockham (1288/89-1349), and Jean Buridan (c. 1300-1361). In chap-
ters 4 and 5, I examine two rival interpretations of Boethius, that of
Porreta and that of Aquinas. My argument is that Gilbert inherited a tra-
dition that was no longer primarily metaphysical but instead tended to
privilege logic and grammar. Within this strand of Platonism and Neo-
Platonism, the primacy of mathematics over physics or natural philoso-
phy led to an increasing formalization of theology and prioritized unity
and individuality over against diversity and relationality. In chapter 5, I
explore how Aquinas drew not only on Aristotelian ‘first philosophy’ but
also on Platonist metaphysics in order to reconfigure divina scientia. My
contention is that he developed a metaphysics of creation and individua-
tion that blends the universality of the act of being with the particularity
of beings in act. By extending and transforming Augustine’s and
Boethius’ metaphysics, Aquinas showed that relations individuate sub-
stances and that the act of being is the ultimate cause of individuation.
Finally, I investigate in chapter 6 how Scotus, Ockham, and Buridan
radicalized the twelfth-century separation of theology and philosophy
and the importance of logic and semantics as the foundation of meta-
physics. In spite of some significant differences, Scotus, Ockham, and
Buridan share the idea that individuality is more real than universality
and that material substances are self-individuating. The elimination of
God from actuality entails the exclusion of divine creative action from
the actualization and individuation of particular sensible things. This
marks a fundamental rupture from the metaphysics of relationality and
participation, for the individuating relation of creation becomes un-
hinged and is progressively replaced by the idea of individuality as a de-
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CHAPTER 4
The Priority of Essence over Existence
1. Introduction: Islam, Christianity,
and the Medieval Roots of Modernity
In his groundbreaking Regensburg address, Pope Benedict XVI links a
postsecular politics to a presecular metaphysics.1 The metaphysics un-
derpinning the Pope’s narrative offers a rich and as yet unrealized poten-
tial for an alternative modernity where both the rationalism of militant
secularists and the fideism of religious fundamentalists are abandoned
in favor of the ‘grandeur of reason’ and a new kind of engagement be-
tween all faiths and cultures — above all the world’s largest religions,
Christianity and Islam. For Benedict, it is now equally clear that the
modern divorce of religion from politics reinforces the absolutism of sec-
ular reason and the “dictatorship of relativism which does not recognize
anything as definitive and whose ultimate goal consists solely of one’s
own ego and desires.”2
155
1. Pope Benedict XVI, “Glaube, Vernunft und Universität. Erinnerungen und
Reflexionen,” lecture at the University of Regensburg on 12 September 2006, available on-
line at http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/benedict_xvi/speeches/2006/september/
documents/hf_ben-xvi_spe_20060912_university-regensburg_ge.html. Published as
Glaube und Vernunft. Die Regensburger Vorlesung (Freiburg: Herder, 2006); The Regensburg
Lecture, trans. James V. Schall, SJ (Chicago: St. Augustine’s Press, 2007).
2. Joseph Cardinal Ratzinger, “Homily during the Mass pro eligendo romano pontifice,”
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Benedict’s political critique of value-free democracy (in his dialogue
with Jürgen Habermas) and his social and cultural critique of the ‘dicta-
torship of relativism’ are of a piece with his theological defense of the
Hellenic metaphysics of relationality and the biblical doctrine of cre-
ation ex nihilo. By making these and other complex links in the Regens-
burg address (which were clearly lost on most commentators), the Pope
was asking nothing less than whether the modern poles of the individual
and the collective (and cognate ideas such as freedom and justice, rights
and responsibility, etc.) are caught within shared secular, liberal axioms.
These axioms are also those of theocratic fundamentalisms since they
equally deal in a politics of the indifferent will, inherited — as is also the
case in the end for liberalism — from the nominalism and voluntarism of
the late Middle Ages, as André de Muralt has documented.3 Benedict’s
paradoxical argument is that a postsecular politics requires a presecular
metaphysics. The theological origins of secular modernity will be one of
the main arguments in this part of the essay.
In calling for the ‘rehellenization’ of Christianity, Benedict renews not
just the synthesis of the Fathers and the Doctors of the Church but also the
Hellenic Jewish tradition in which both Jesus and the Apostles were
rooted. The encounter between biblical revelation and ancient philosophy
marked the advent of universalism beyond divine election and the law, as
Alain Badiou and others have convincingly argued. This encounter also
gave rise to the pan-European civilization that is now under threat from
both modern militant secularism and modern religious extremism. In this
light, a fundamental question raised by the Regensburg address is how
Christianity, which as a result of shifts within Christian theology was so
deeply implicated in the genesis of secular modernity, can offer a post-
secular alternative. This is linked to the contemporary resurgence of reli-
gion in international relations and the growing importance of Islam in
global politics.4 It was of course in the same Regensburg lecture that Pope
Benedict linked violence in religion to the absoluteness of divine volition
in Islam, as I suggested in the introduction to Part II of this book. All this
raises questions about the origins and nature of modernity.
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3. Alain de Muralt, L’unité de la philosophie politique. De Scot, Occam et Suárez au
libéralisme contemporain (Paris: Vrin, 2002).
4. See, inter alia, Pavlos Hatzopoulos and Fabio Petito, eds., Religion in International
Relations: The Return from Exile (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003); Scott M. Thomas,
The Global Resurgence of Religion and the Transformation of International Relations: The
Struggle for the Soul of the Twenty-First Century (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005).
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In this chapter, I will argue that the original modern separation of
reason from faith can in fact be traced to the confluence of certain devel-
opments in both Islamic and Christian theology as early as the late elev-
enth and the twelfth century, in particular key elements in the works of
Avicenna (Ibn SIn#) and Gilbert Porreta such as the priority of essence
over existence, the separation of philosophy from theology, and the pri-
macy of individual substance over relational particulars.5 By contrast,
influential thirteenth-century figures such as Aquinas and Al-ArabI op-
posed these dualisms. Instead, they retrieved and extended a more me-
diated tradition that shifts the emphasis back on the participation of the
whole of creation in divine creativity. Before I can outline this tradition, I
will explore how the twin questions of creation and individuation were
articulated in the eleventh and the twelfth centuries in both Islamic and
Christian theology.
2. The Division of Ontology and Theology
in Early Islamic Philosophy
A. Al-KindI and Al-F#r#bI
The relationship between philosophy and theology has arguably been
the main determinant in the history of ideas since the encounter of bibli-
cal revelation and ancient reason. There can be little doubt that it has
decisively shaped the evolution of both Christianity and Islam. From the
dawn of the church to the end of the Middle Ages, ancient philosophy
was integral to Christian theology, commencing with St. Paul, the Apos-
tolic Fathers, and the Apologists, as I argued in chapter 2. Though early
patristic figures such as Tatian and Tertullian accused pagan thought of
engendering heresy, the Fathers and Doctors of the Church spoke of
philosophia christiana (Augustine) and divina scientia (Aquinas). By con-
trast, Plato and Aristotle were absent from the formative period of Islam
and marginal during the first two centuries until a concerted translation
movement centered in Baghdad made the philosophic inheritance of the
Greeks available in Arabic — with the help of many Syriac Christians
such as Hunayn ibn Ish#q and his son Ish#q ibn Hunayn in the ninth cen-
157
The Priority of Essence over Existence
5. Cf. Edward Booth, Aristotelian Aporetic Ontology in Islamic and Christian Thinkers
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983).
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tury.6 Based on translated manuscripts of Aristotle and Neo-Platonist
thinkers from Plotinus to Proclus, it was Al-KindI (d. 870) — the founder
of Islamic philosophy — who stated that metaphysics is theological. For
‘first philosophy’ studies the truth that is one, and only God is pure one-
ness (wahda faqat mahd):
Indeed, the human art which is highest in degree and most noble in
rank is the art of philosophy, the definition of which is knowledge of
the true nature of things, insofar as is possible for man. The aim of the
philosopher is, as regards his knowledge, to attain the truth, and as re-
gards his action, to act truthfully. . . . We do not find the truth we are
seeking without finding a cause; the cause of the existence and contin-
uance of everything is the True One, in that each thing which has be-
ing has truth. The True One exists necessarily, and therefore beings
exist. . . . The noblest part of philosophy and the highest in degree is
first philosophy, by which I mean the science of the First Truth, Who is
the cause of all truth.7
Following Al-KindI, Al-F#r#bI (c. 870-950) argues that both reason and
revelation share the same first principles and final ends. Since they en-
able proper perception and intellectual vision, the theoretical virtues of
‘true philosophy’ are indispensable to knowledge of the truth and su-
preme happiness (sa}adah),8 a concept that provides the link between his
reflections on ontology and his foundational contribution to Islamic po-
litical philosophy.9 Influenced by Ammonius (c. 435/445-517/526), who
harmonized Aristotle with Plato by (wrongly) claiming that the Prime
158
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6. On Hunayn’s role, see A. Z. Iskandar, “Hunayn Ibn Ish#q,” in The Dictionary of Scien-
tific Biography, ed. Charles Coulston Gillispie (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1978),
vol. 15 (suppl. 1), pp. 230-49. On the dissemination of Greek philosophy and theology in the
Arabic world via Syriac translations beginning in the fifth century, see Cristina D’Ancona,
“Greek into Arabic: Neoplatonism in Translation,” in The Cambridge Companion to Arabic
Philosophy, ed. Peter Adamson and Richard C. Taylor (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 2005), pp. 10-31.
7. Al-KindI, “On First Philosophy,” in Alfred L. Ivry, Al-KindI’s Metaphysics (Albany:
State University of New York Press, 1974), pp. 55, 98.
8. Al-F#r#bI, “Part I: The Attainment of Happiness,” in Al-F#r#bI, Philosophy of Plato
and Aristotle, trans. Mushin Mahdi, rev. ed. (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2001),
iv.55-56, pp. 44-45.
9. Muhsin S. Mahdi, Alfarabi and the Foundation of Islamic Political Philosophy: Essays
in Interpretation (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2001).
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Mover is not just the final but also the efficient cause which brings the
sublunary world into being,10 Al-F#r#bI contends that the work of Plato
and that of Aristotle are identical: “Let it be clear to you that, in what
they presented, their purpose is the same, and that they intended to offer
one and the same philosophy.” Since “the true philosophy” (according to
which “the idea of Imam, Philosopher and Legislator is a single idea”)
“was handed down to us by the Greeks from Plato and Aristotle only,” Al-
F#r#bI rejects the idea of a diametric opposition between ancient reason
and religious revelation. Instead, he insists that the true philosopher
“should have sound conviction about the opinions of the religion in
which he is reared, hold fast to the virtuous acts in his religion and not
forsake all or most of them.”11
In line with the strongly Aristotelianized strand of Neo-Platonism
stretching from Porphyry to Ammonius that grounds the study of being
in logic, Al-F#r#bI was the first Islamic philosopher to posit a real dis-
tinction between existence and essence in created beings. The concept
of a form-matter compound does not imply that a thing exists, and
knowledge of a thing’s essence does not require that thing’s existence.
Just as existence is ordered as a predicate to essence in the order of logic,
so existence is ordered merely as an accident to essence in the order of
being. In God existence and essence coincide because according to Neo-
Platonist cosmology there is a hierarchical gradation of being, and the
highest being is the One whose simplicity and indivisibility rule out any
real distinction between existence and essence.
However, there is in Al-F#r#bI’s work an incipient split between on-
tology and theology that betrays his logicized and Aristotelianized Neo-
Platonism. Ontologically, there must be a first cause and a final end of all
that is because causation and generation cannot have an infinite regress.
Even though in the Neo-Platonist scheme the cause is superior to its ef-
fects, both are inscribed within the same horizon of being as a result of
the ‘onto-theo-logic’ of emanation. As such, God as the Active Intellect
that causes the existence of nature and natural things through self-
reflection falls under the same concept of being as beings that emanate
159
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10. On the opposition between Plato and Aristotle in relation to efficient causality
and the creative activity of God, see, supra, chapter 1. On the different strands of Neo-
Platonism (Porphyrian-Ammonian vs. Iamblichean-Proclean) that shaped Christian and
Islamic philosophy and theology, see below main text and also chapters 3 and 5.
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from it.12 This leads Al-F#r#bI to claim that first philosophy is primarily
the study of being qua being and only incidentally of God. In part, the di-
vision between ontology and theology is the result of Al-F#r#bI’s failure
to recognize Plato’s conception of ideas or forms as the metaphysical re-
lation between the immaterial Good and all material things. For this and
other reasons, he concludes his commentary on Aristotle by stating that
“we do not possess metaphysical science.”13
Theologically, Al-F#r#bI appeals to the Plotinian scheme of emana-
tion whereby the First Cause (in thinking itself) emanates the immate-
rial being of the first intellect, which in turn thinks of the First Cause and
of itself. Thus a multiplicity of being and thought ensues. But in the ab-
sence of a transcendent Good that brings all things into being and makes
them what they are, Al-F#r#bI’s reliance on the Aristotelian logic of cau-
sality leads him to restrict rational knowledge of the highest being to an
anonymous first cause that is the source of all being — about which he
says that “one should believe that it is God.”14 This division of ontology
from theology foreshadows a proto-modern separation of reason from
faith and the contours of Islamic rationalism and fideism that can in part
be traced to Avicenna or Ibn SIn# (c. 980-1037), who together with Aver-
roes or Ibn Rushd (c. 1126-1198)15 was the most influential Islamic philos-
opher and theologian in the Middle Ages.
B. Avicenna
Avicenna is notorious for having read Aristotle’s Metaphysics forty times
and knowing it off by heart without, however, grasping the meaning of
first philosophy. It was only after consulting Al-F#r#bI’s commentary on
the Stagirite that Avicenna understood why metaphysics is first and
foremost the study of being qua being and not principally of God. Even
though he describes metaphysics as ‘divine science’ and ‘absolute wis-
160
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12. Al-F#r#bI, “Part III: The Philosophy of Aristotle,” in Philosophy of Plato and Aris-
totle, xix.129-30, pp. 128-29.
13. Al-F#r#bI, “Part III: The Philosophy of Aristotle,” xix.133, p. 130.
14. Quoted in David C. Reisman, “Al-F#r#bI and the Philosophical Curriculum,” in The
Cambridge Companion to Arabic Philosophy, pp. 52-71 (57).
15. Jan A. Aertsen and Gerhard Endress, eds., Averroes and the Aristotelian Tradition:
Sources, Constitution and Reception of the Philosophy of Ibn Rushd (1126-1198). Proceedings of
the Fourth Symposium Averroicum (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1999).
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dom,’ he also clearly states that the subject-matter of metaphysics is the
existent (al-mawjqd) insofar as it exists “rather than the more specific
existence of God, which is ‘sought’ rather than ‘postulated’ in that sci-
ence [i.e., metaphysics].”16 Unlike Al-KindI, who associates first philoso-
phy with the highest truth in God, Islamic thought after Al-F#r#bI and
Avicenna tends to redefine metaphysics as the study of being qua being
or ontology.17
Moreover, Avicenna reconfigures not just the subject-matter of meta-
physics but also the object of the new science of ontology, replacing the
Neo-Platonist emphasis upon God’s power of being (virtus essendi), which
brings everything into actuality and makes it what it is, with a more
logicized Aristotelian stress on divine essence, which causes nondivine
essences. Reading the work of Aristotle and the Neo-Platonists through
the prism of Al-F#r#bI’s real distinction between existence and essence,
he agrees with his forebear that a thing’s existence is extrinsic to its es-
sence and that ‘thing’ is the supreme genus, divisible into the species
‘existent’ and the species ‘nonexistent.’18 Coupled with the abstraction of
‘existence’ (wujqd) from ‘existent’ (mawjqd) and of ‘thingness’ (shay}iyya)
from ‘thing’ (shay), Avicenna subsequently replaced ‘thingness’ with the
Aristotelian-F#r#bian notion of essence or quiddity (m#hiyya) — an early
indication of his onto-logical essentialism.
Indeed, Avicenna’s variant of the distinction between existence and
nonexistence further devalues a thing’s actual existentiality in favor of
its abstract essentiality because the cause and principle of individuation
does not encompass the coming into being of particular things but is in-
stead confined to a being’s ‘thingness,’ which is independent of that
thing’s actualization.19 As Robert Wisnovsky has convincingly argued,
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16. Avicenna, Metaphysics, trans. P. Morewedge (Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
1973), I.6.
17. For references to the scholarship of Dimitri Gutas and Amos Bertolacci docu-
menting the shift in the Islamic tradition from a theological to an ontological conception
of metaphysics, see Thérèse-Anne Druart, “Metaphysics,” in The Cambridge Companion to
Arabic Philosophy, pp. 327-48, esp. p. 328.
18. The priority of thing over existent and nonexistent in Al-F#r#bI derives from the
Mu}tazilI mutakallimqm, who formed the first school of Islamic doctrinal theology and ar-
gued that ‘thing’ (shay}) is the most universal category applicable to reality, which can be
subdivided into ‘existent’ (mawjqd) and ‘nonexistent’ (ma}dqm).
19. Avicenna, Metaphysics VII.1; cf. David Burrell, “Essence and Existence: Avicenna
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what underpins Avicenna’s ontology is the logical primacy of a thing’s
‘what-ness’ (or essence) over above that thing’s ‘that-ness’ (or existence):
“Even if we permit Avicenna to deny having advocated an ontological
scheme — analogous to the Mu}tazilI’s and Al-F#r#bI’s views — in which
‘thing’ is extensionally broader than existent, ‘thing’ will at least be seen
now to enjoy a logical priority over existent, that is, be viewed as more
basic than existent.”20 Therefore, Avicenna’s ontology can perhaps be de-
scribed as a ‘meta-logic’ of essences.
It is hard to overstate the preeminence of logic vis-à-vis ontology
and theology in Avicenna. Beyond Aristotle, he develops the logical dis-
tinction between the first object of the intellect and the second object
which is human knowledge of the real in an ontological and epistemo-
logical direction by claiming that the categories of logic precede both
universality and particularity and that universal created essences are
prior to their particular embodiment.21 For Avicenna, ‘horseness’ is the
essence of horse, and, like all other created essences, this essence exists
and can be known independently of whether it refers to the horse in gen-
eral or to a living horse in particular.22 That is why Avicenna coins a dic-
tum that was frequently quoted in the Middle Ages: equinitas est equini-
tas tantum.23 Since created essences are indifferent to the singularity of
particulars and the universality of being, it is logic that grounds and gov-
erns physics, mathematics, and first philosophy (or theology) — Aris-
totle’s tripartite division of the sciences. For Avicenna, the object of logic
is the totality of universal categories. By contrast, the object of physics is
individual existent things, that of ontology is the general realm of being
qua being, and that of theology is the more specific coincidence of exis-
tence and essence in God. Avicenna’s meta-logical ontology of abstract
disembodied essences severs the metaphysical relation between partic-
ular created beings and the universal being of the Creator God, which is
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20. Robert Wisnovsky, “Avicenna and the Avicennian Tradition,” in The Cambridge
Companion to Arabic Philosophy, pp. 105-13 (109).
21. Conor Cunningham, Genealogy of Nihilism: Philosophies of Nothing and the Differ-
ence of Theology (London: Routledge, 2002), esp. pp. 9-13.
22. Avicenna Latinus, Liber de philosophia prima sive scientia divina, ed. S. Van Riet, 2
vols. (Louvain: E. Peeters, 1980), p. 233, line 36–p. 234, line 44. Cf. Avicenna, Opera, trans.
Dominic Gundissalinus (Venice: Bonetus Locatellus for Octavianus Scotus, 1508), folio
87ra.
23. Étienne Gilson, La philosophie au Moyen Âge. Des origines patristiques à la fin du
XIVe siècle, 2nd rev. ed. (Paris: Éditions Payot & Rivages, 1999 [1922]), p. 352.
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central to the vision of the ecstatic, plenitudinous, self-diffusive Good in
the Boethian-Dionysian and Iamblichean-Proclean strands of Neo-
Platonism.
Moreover, Avicenna also posits an absolute essence beyond material
embodiment and mental existence, which is “possible of existence in it-
self ” (mumkin al-wujqd bi-dh#tihi).24 As such, essence is not just logically
prior to existence but it is also extensionally broader than existence —
with the implication that there are essences in the divine mind that are
never actualized. But since for Avicenna all actual essences necessarily
emanate from the first cause whose essence is existence, there is a ten-
sion between the monism of the uncreated cause and the dualism of a
created being whose existence is extrinsic to the essence that must
somehow preexist in God.25 Although he seems to distance himself from
this sort of ‘meta-logic’ of essences in other passages of the Metaphysics
in the Shif#, the ambiguity in relation to the philosophical status of es-
sence and existence has shaped the entire Islamic philosophical tradi-
tion (perhaps with the exception of certain mystics like Al-ArabI). This
influence is evinced, for example, by the false opposition between the
essentialism of SuhrawardI (d. 1191), who equates existence with prod-
ucts of the mind (i}tib#rI), and the existentialism of Mull# Sadr# (d. 1640),
who reduces essences to mere mental constructs. In either case, created
beings entertain a merely causal link with uncreated being, and the real
ontological difference between existence and essence is replaced by sim-
ply conceptual distinctions.
Even those theologians (mutakallimqm) such as Al-R#zI (d. 1210) and
Al-TqsI (d. 1274) who attempt to chart a middle ground tend to start on
the basis of Avicenna’s logicized ontology and the introduction of ab-
stract essentiality into theology.26 In this setting, both ShI}I and SunnI
mutakallimqm disseminate the Avicennian tradition even when they re-
ject certain aspects of it such as the idea of necessity in creation, which
many opposed on the grounds of absolute divine power and volition.
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Avicenna’s fusion of Arabic Aristotelianized Neo-Platonist philosophy
( falsafa) with Islamic doctrinal theology (kal#m) predetermined the
conceptual space within which Islamic thought evolved. Crucially, this
underscores a profound consensus in Islamic philosophy and theology
centered on the Avicennian onto-theological priority of essence vis-à-vis
existence (and God’s act of being) and the concomitant primacy of possi-
bility over actuality.
Taken together, Avicenna’s essentialism and his possibilism intro-
duce necessity in creation and drive a wedge between reason and faith.
Indeed, Avicenna’s idea of essence ‘possible of existence in itself ’
(mumkin al-wujqd bi-dh#tihi) is linked to his conception of God as that
which is “[the] necessary of existence in itself ” (w#jib al-wujqd bi-
dh#tihi).27 Beyond the Ammonian fusion of Aristotle with Plato, Avi-
cenna’s variant of Islamic Neo-Platonism makes two claims: first, that
this sort of necessity implies divine qualities such as simplicity, immuta-
bility, and eternality, to which all other types of necessity ultimately re-
fer; second, that this necessity is the productive source of all other ne-
cessities. Avicenna’s God is both a final and efficient cause whose effects
are ‘necessary of existence through another’ (w#jib al-wujqd bi-ghayrihi).
In Metaphysics I.6, Avicenna insists that essence determines existence: a
thing whose essence is insufficient to bring it into existence is caused,
whereas a thing whose essence is sufficient to bring it into existence is
uncaused.
Avicenna’s emphasis on the unity of being in virtue of essence is the
philosophical parallel of the Mu}tazilI mutakallimqm, who viewed really
distinct divine attributes as a violation of Islam’s cardinal tenet of God’s
indivisible oneness (tawhId). As the only being in which existence is the
same as essence, God is the sufficient condition of possibility for the
necessary existence of possible essences. That is why in Avicenna’s the-
ology (according to the Latin translation) God is necesse esse (w#jib al-
wujqd bi-dh#tihi), whereas everything else is possible and actualized
through God’s absolute necessity. But the implication is that the actual-
ity of particular beings discloses nothing other than the dependence of
their essence on a higher cause. Since their existence is extrinsic to
their essence, knowledge of what actually existent things are does not
require or involve knowledge of why that thing exists or what it is that
164
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brought that thing into actuality. So just as at the metaphysical level es-
sence precedes existence by a sort of disjunctive echo that paradoxi-
cally cuts off actual existents from the divine exactly to the extent that
they depend on it for their existence, so at the theological level the pri-
macy of necessity and possibility over actuality diminishes divine
intellection of beings in favor of divine volition that wills essences into
an existence that remains purely extrinsic, accidental, and thus arbi-
trary from a human perspective.
That is how Avicenna introduces a radical rupture in Neo-Platonist
theology between Creator and creation. In consequence, human reason
can only infer the necessary existence of a first cause that is the source of
all possible essences. But faith alone confirms that the God of Aristotle is
in fact the God of the Qur}an. By contrast with other Neo-Platonists be-
fore Avicenna such as Boethius and Al-KindI, who argued that reason
can have a certain approximate knowledge of God as the highest being
beyond being, Avicenna tends to separate reason from faith and to re-
strict knowledge of the divine as the first principle and final end of all
that is to the ‘holy intellect’ (intellectus sanctus) of the Prophet Moham-
med. Avicenna’s ontology of essences serves to reinforce the emphasis in
Islamic theology on the priority of divine volition over divine intellection
— a voluntarism that is prominent in the orthodox SunnI tradition but
absent from many strands of ShI}I and SufI mysticism.
As I have already indicated, Avicenna’s synthesis of Aristotelianized
Neo-Platonist philosophy ( falsafa) and Islamic doctrinal theology
(kal#m) shaped Islamic thought throughout the Middle Ages and the
early modern era in the Arab world and beyond. However, it would be
historically inaccurate and theologically simplistic to attribute knowl-
edge of Aristotle in Christian Europe to the rapid expansion of Islam or
to blame Islamic philosophy for the rise of radical Aristotelianism at
Christian universities in the twelfth century. Rather, there is growing evi-
dence to suggest that already at the time of St. Anselm, medieval Chris-
tian theologians had access to key elements of Aristotelian and Neo-
Platonist metaphysics via the Latin translations of Greek patristic works
in the monastic and cathedral libraries of England and Normandy.28
Moreover, Sylvain Gouguenheim has shown that Aristotle in the original
Greek was known at Gall and Mont Saint-Michel prior to the arrival of
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heritance (Aldershot, UK: Ashgate, 2004), esp. pp. 107-73 and 201-6.
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Arabic translations.29 Coupled with the transmission of Christian Neo-
Platonism by the Latin Church Fathers, medieval Christian theology was
in fact permeated by Greek philosophy based on original sources in a va-
riety of places. For precisely this reason, the acceptance of radical
Aristotelianism by Christian theologians cannot be blamed on the ad-
vent of Islam in Europe. Instead, it was a shift internal to Christian theol-
ogy in the late eleventh and the twelfth century that paved the way for
the reception and integration of Aristotelian-Avicennian essentialism
into the Christian tradition. The key figure in this process was Gilbert
Porreta (c. 1085-1154) and the Porretan School he inspired, as I will argue
in the following sections.
3. The Turn from Being to Essence
in Medieval Christian Theology
Not unlike later Islamic Neo-Platonists like Al-KindI, early Christian
Neo-Platonists such as Boethius followed Aristotle’s distinction of theo-
retical and practical science and his tripartite division of theoretical sci-
ence into physics, mathematics, and first philosophy (or theology) — as I
showed in the previous chapter. Accordingly, theology is a properly
philosophical discipline because like physics and mathematics, it de-
ploys rational concepts and does not operate on the basis of supernatu-
ral faith alone. As the science that investigates the “very being and the
source of being,”30 theology orders all sciences because all sensible par-
ticular things intimate being itself (esse ipsum), which brings them into
existence and makes them what they are. Only knowledge of being itself
enables a proper grasp of universals in particulars. Both mathematics
and physics are indispensable to the process of abstraction and to
knowledge of the actual world, but they are framed by the primacy of be-
ing over knowing and of theology over ontology.
By contrast, Gilbert Porreta who commented extensively on
Boethius inherited a tradition that was no longer primarily concerned
with the metaphysical reality of the self-diffusive Good of God but in-
stead focused on dialectical and grammatical questions like the philo-
166
MATTER AND FORM
29. Sylvain Gouguenheim, Aristote au Mont Saint-Michel. Les racines grecques de
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30. Boethius, De Trinitate, II.19-21 (8-10).
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sophical status of mental language. He was influenced by twelfth-
century theology, in particular the metaphysically impoverished Platon-
ism of Roscelin de Compiègne (c. 1050-1120), who claimed that words sig-
nify things literally and that there is a proper substance that corresponds
to each noun.31 Coupled with the geometrical method based on Euclid-
ean a priori assumptions, this ‘grammatical Platonism’ (Jean Jolivet)32
tends to privilege discursive mediation over above sensory mediation
and the imagination. It maintains that linguistic conventions and rules
of language determine knowledge and the human understanding of
God’s unity and triunity. Knowledge of the individuality of universal sub-
stances is thus grounded in the singularity of names and not in the actu-
ality of actual particular things known through perception, the imagina-
tion, and abstraction, as for Christian Neo-Platonists in East and West
such as Gregory of Nyssa, Augustine, Dionysius the Areopagite, and
Boethius — as I have shown in chapters 2 and 3.
First I will put Gilbert Porreta’s work in context before discussing its
impact on Christian theology from the mid-twelfth century to the early
fourteenth century. Unlike Boethius before him and Aquinas after him,
Porreta did not bequeath to philosophy and theology the same range of
seminal works as the Opuscula sacra or the Summa Theologiae. There are
only three writings that can be attributed unequivocally to him, all of which
are commentaries: on Boethius’ Opuscula sacra, on the Psalms, and on the
Pauline epistles. However, Gilbert’s influence was significant because his
works made a decisive contribution to the very terms of philosophical and
theological debates that were to prevail from the second half of the twelfth
to the early fourteenth century. Chief of all was his reconceptualization of
two methods of demonstration: dialectical quaestiones and ‘mathematical’
reasoning (more geometrico), to which I will return.
What is more contentious is the nature of Porreta’s influence on me-
dieval philosophy and theology. His distinction between quod est and
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quo est, which he developed in his commentary on Boethius’ De
hebdomadibus, is widely accepted as the most important contribution of
his work. There are however two competing interpretations of Gilbert’s
works, particularly regarding this distinction. The first interpretation is
similar to the reading of Boethius, according to which this distinction is
best understood in terms of existence and essence. Since Berthaud de-
voted the first monograph to Porreta’s philosophy in 1892,33 in which he
argued that this distinction is real, a large number of works have ad-
dressed the nature of this distinction (real, formal, causal, or objective)
and its philosophical and theological ramifications, in particular the sta-
tus of essence with respect to esse.34 By contrast, the second interpreta-
tion contends that Gilbert’s distinction can only be understood in the
light of his division of the sciences and the classification of natural and
theological rules or modes of reasoning (rationes). This interpretation,
which was pioneered by Grabmann and systematized by Schmidt,35
raises two sets of questions. First, is Porreta’s method predominantly
shaped by semantics, grammar, or rhetoric? Second, do his philosophi-
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What is common to both interpretations is the claim that Porreta
defends a variant of metaphysical realism. He is credited with a realist
account of universals that centers upon the substantial conformity of
native forms ( formae nativae) that are common to diverse, subsistent
substances.37 As a result, he seems to offer an alternative to Roscelin of
Compiègne, who was famously indicted by Anselm for equating univer-
sal substances with “the puff of an utterance” ( flatum vocis).38 Likewise,
Gilbert does not appear to embrace Aristotle’s substantialist metaphys-
ics, which would threaten the personal and relational nature of the Trini-
tarian persons. Rather, his metaphysical realism seems consonant with
his Trinitarian theology. Moreover, it has been argued that he develops a
non-univocal account of person. Thus, he preserves the ‘ontological dif-
ference’ between Creator and creation and the limits of human language
and knowledge.39
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In the following sections, I argue that Gilbert privileges mathematics
over natural philosophy (or physics) and thus formalizes metaphysics by
importing ‘mathematical’ reasoning into the transcendent domain. The
primacy of mathematics also leads to the priority of abstraction vis-à-vis
sense perception. As a result, reflections on the Trinity and God the Cre-
ator become disjoined from any inquiry into the created world, which
henceforth is thought to manifest nothing but its own existence. Thus,
the link between creation and its transcendent author is no longer a
matter of rational discernment but tends to be fideistic. My account of
Porreta qualifies his realism and highlights the formalist character of his
metaphysics, which (as I will show in chapter 6) was later amplified by
Scotus, Ockham, and Buridan. This is significant for the question of indi-
viduation, as the onus of individuation shifts from transcendent causes
to immanent principles. I begin with a brief analysis of more geometrico
and the division of the sciences. I then outline his distinction of singular-
ity, dividuality, and individuality and his conception of subsistent sub-
stances. Finally, I examine his account of creation and concretion.
4. More geometrico: A Mathematical Ordering of the Sciences
By contrast with Boethius’ metaphysical realism and his theological or-
dering of the sciences, Porreta combines ‘grammatical Platonism’ with a
hierarchy of disciplines that is grounded in the nominalist method of
‘mathematical’ reasoning. To say this is not to say that Anselm’s indict-
ment of twelfth-century theology was correct. His charge that Roscelin’s
universal substances are nothing but a flatum vocis is misguided because
the universality of substances is based upon the general structures of
mental language, a position shared by Gilbert. In this sense, Porreta (like
Roscelin) is no ontological nominalist. But since Gilbert denies that the
mind acquires true knowledge of forms via sense perception, his is a po-
sition of metaphysical formalism. Indeed, ‘grammatical Platonism’ com-
mits him to the idea that knowledge of composite substances is gov-
erned by grammatical categories and framed by logic and mathematics,
in particular a priori definitions, axioms, postulates, and theorems. At
first, it would seem as if mathematics, on the basis of abstraction from
actual things, merely aims to identify the forms that inhere in material
things and act as their causes. However, as Porreta understood it, mathe-
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disciplina40 and which represents an a priori mapping of forms accord-
ing to the similarity with other forms. Mathematical abstraction yields
forms at their most general and most abstract, neither particular forms
(like Aristotle’s substantial individual form) nor universal forms (like
Plato’s form of beauty or justice).
This configuration of mathematics has far-reaching implications for
Porreta’s division of the sciences. First, whereas natural philosophy (or
physics) concerns the mode of being of forms in things, mathematics ab-
stracts not only from matter but also from any determinants such as ge-
nus, species, and differentia. Second, insofar as it aims at forms outside
any determination, mathematics does not have its own proper objects
because it can be applied to all things and all forms. As such, matter is
“coextensive with natural philosophy . . . [and] ‘constitutes an epistemo-
logical precondition for natural philosophy.’ ”41 The mapping of form ac-
cording to some meta-formal content or similarity entails a ‘mathema-
ticization’ of knowledge because form is identified with notio or concept,
not with the real presence of universals in particulars. This is why Gillian
Evans is right to argue that “Gilbert considers mathematics a ‘higher
study’ precisely because it is not restricted by the limited nature of real
things: ‘it [mathematics] is a higher discipline — which the Greek called
math3sis — that abstracts from concrete things.’ ”42
Given the monopoly of mathematics over form, the third implica-
tion is that natural philosophy is restricted to the study of secondary
forms (‘quo ests’), which inhere in concretized things (‘quod ests’).43 By
itself, natural philosophy cannot obtain knowledge of the link be-
tween the form of a thing and its transcendent cause. Any such link is
either purely abstract and a matter of mathematicized knowledge, or
else it is exclusively supernatural and a matter of knowledge based on
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faith alone. However, this does not imply that theology is an autono-
mous science. Since mathematics enables knowledge of forms which
are inaccessible in natural philosophy, mathematics is not so much a
propaedeutic tool but instead acts as a corrective of natural philoso-
phy and makes knowledge of forms possible for theology.44 Based on
mathematics, theology discloses true form or what is simple (simplex),
independently of all matter and according to rationes which are both
shared with mathematics and specific to theology (In de Trin. I.2.41
[86: 38–87: 45]).
So configured, mathematics induces theology to abandon the actu-
ality of particular sensible things in the quest for pure form. The turn
away from actual things is reinforced by the intervention of supernatural
faith, which operates outside natural reason — a conception that is dia-
metrically opposed to the Christian Neo-Platonist injunction of ‘faith
seeking understanding.’ For Gilbert, faith enables human cognition to
engage in total abstraction (remotio, rationis abstractio) from all material
instantiation.45 As such, reason knows some natural principles, but only
faith can provide knowledge of God and pure form which is inaccessible
to reason.46 According to Porreta, knowledge of God is more certain
than knowledge of mutable things because it rests on the “most certain
and firmest foundation” (certissimum atque firmissimum fundamentum)
of faith. The operation of faith pushes mathematical abstraction to its
logical conclusion, to the point where matter is absolutely discarded as a
medium of form. This differs markedly from the patristic and early medi-
eval insistence that the presence of the Creator is mediated in and
through material things (Rom. 1:20) and that theology orders all other
sciences on account of the primacy of God’s act of being over all things,
as I have argued with respect to the work of Gregory, Augustine,
Boethius, and Dionysius in chapters 2 and 3. By contrast with this preem-
inence of theology, Porreta posits the priority of ‘mathematical’ reason-
ing over sense perception and judgment, and views ‘more geometrico’ as
the most universal method of enquiry. As such, the only difference be-
tween theology and the other sciences is that in theology supernatural
faith not only produces a perception of pure form but also commands as-
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sent to this perception.47 While this is not wrong in itself, the separation
of faith from reason foregrounds the division of ontology from theology
— precisely the legacy of Avicenna, as I have already indicated. In the
concluding section of this chapter, I will suggest that this, coupled with
the priority of essence over existence, explains the compatibility and
confluence of Avicenna’s and Porreta’s metaphysically impoverished the-
ology. For now I will proceed with a critical reading of Gilbert’s applica-
tion of ‘more geometrico’ to the question of creation and individuation.
5. Singularity, Dividuality, and Individuality
In this section I analyze Porreta’s ontology and his account of particulars
and universals. Commenting on Boethius’ distinctions between univer-
sality, particularity, and personality in the theological tractates, Gilbert
also contrasts the singular, the individual, and the personal.48 But these
terms have markedly different meanings in his work compared with
those in Boethius’ Opuscula sacra. First, he defines the notion of singular-
ity as that which specifies both the commonality and the difference be-
tween that by which (id quo) something is and that which it is (id quod):
The property [of a person] is called ‘singular’ for one reason, ‘individ-
ual’ for another, and ‘personal’ for another. For, although whatever is
individual is [also] a singular — and whatever is a person is [also] a
singular and individual — nevertheless, not every singular is an indi-
vidual. Nor is every singular or individual a person. For, in natural
[things], whatever is, is something by what is other than itself. And
since that by which it is something is singular, that also which is
something by it is singular. . . . And so by the singularity of that by
which it is, that which is something by it is singular.49
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47. “in religione prima est fides que quidem generaliter est veritatis cuiuslibet rei cum
assensione perceptio” (In de Trin. I.1.3 [71: 11-12]).
48. Klaus Jacobi, “Einzelnes — Individuum — Person. Gilbert von Poitiers’
Philosophie des Individuellen,” in Individuum und Individualität im Mittelalter, ed. Jan A.
Aertsen and Andreas Speer (Berlin and New York: De Gruyter, 1996), pp. 3-22.
49. “alicuius proprietas alia ratione ‘singularis,’ alia ‘indiuidua,’ alia ‘personalis’ uocatur.
Quamuis enim quicquid est indiuiduum, est singulare — et quicquid est persona, est
singulare et indiuiduum — non tamen omne singulare est indiuiduum. Nec omne singulare
uel indiuiduum est persona. In naturalibus enim quicquid est, alio, quam ipsum sit, aliquid
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In this passage, he argues that actual particular sensible things
(naturalibus) are best described as singular and that their singularity is a
function of the singularity of their quo est (that by which they are some-
thing). The reason why particular sensible things are not individuals is
that they differ only numerically from other particulars (not qualita-
tively). If they share the same ‘quo ests,’ then they conform with one an-
other and also with the ‘quo ests’ that make them similar: “[T]herefore,
not only those [things] which they are, but also those by which they con-
form, are one dividual [sic].”50
Porreta deploys the notion of ‘dividual’ in order to mark the differ-
ence between singularity and individuality. Not all singulars are individ-
uals, and not all individuals are persons. By contrast, all individuals are
singular and all persons are both singular and individual. Put differently,
the extension of individuality is more limited than that of singularity,
and the extension of personality is more limited yet. That which explains
the similarity of certain singulars ( for example, the similarity between
men — their humanity and rationality) cannot be individual, otherwise
it would make singulars not merely numerically distinct but also qualita-
tively different. Thus, that by which singulars conform to one another is
a ‘dividual’ (diuiduum). ‘Dividuals’ are universal because they are com-
mon to more than one singular.
Unlike Augustine’s and Boethius’ universals, which are really present
in particular things, Porreta’s ‘dividuals’ are exclusively mental entities:
“Some substances are universal by the substantial similarity of the form
[i.e., dividuality], others are particulars, that is to say individuals by the
dissimilarity of their complete properties.”51 Since the similarity between
singular instances of humanity or rationality is the result of a mental
operation52 and has no correlate in beings (or no correlate that can be
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est. Et quoniam id, quo est aliquid, singulare est, id quoque, quod eo est aliquid, singulare
est. . . . Itaque singularitate eius, quo est, singulare est etiam id quod eo aliquid est” (In de
Trin. I.v.22-23 [143: 53–144: 60]).
50. “ideoque non modo illa, quae sunt, uerum etiam, illa, quibus conformia sunt, unum
diuiduum sunt” (In de Trin. I.v.24 [144: 64-65]).
51. “RURSUS SUBSTANTIARUM ALIAE SUNT UNIUERSALES substantialis forme simili-
tudine: ALIAE SUNT PARTICULARES, i.e. indiuiduae plenarum proprietatum dissimilitudine”
(In Contra Eut. II.22; Boethius’ text in capital letters [269: 36-38]).
52. Richard J. Westley, “A Philosophy of the Concreted and the Concrete: The Con-
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discerned as such), it follows that the metaphysical status of ‘dividuals’ is
purely formal. It is true that Gilbert speaks of the intellect as that which
“on the basis of whatever particulars grasps universal things.”53 But it is
far from clear what in particular sensible things can account for the exis-
tence of universals. The term similarity (conformitas) is too vague to
serve as an adequate concept in order to explain the reality of universals.
Even if universals were not only mental constructs but also real entities,
there would be no instance of verification other than the mind itself. As I
argued in the previous sections, Gilbert denies sense perception any gen-
uine cognitive import.
In addition to ‘dividuals,’ Porreta’s other conceptual innovation is
the already mentioned distinction between that which is something (id
quod est) and that by which it is something (quo est). The latter is not a
transcendent cause which makes the thing what it is. Instead, quo est
refers both to substantial properties like humanity and to accidental
characteristics such as tallness. Since each id quod est is constituted by
a collection of substantial properties and accidental characteristics,
Porreta speaks of ‘quo ests.’ The question that arises is whether the sin-
gularity of the id quod est is due to the singularity of one quo est or sev-
eral ‘quo ests’ or all of them. It seems that the totality of substantial
properties and accidental characteristics constitutes particulars as in-
dividuals. Conjointly, substantial properties and accidental characteris-
tics form what he calls “the total property” (tota proprietas, e.g., In Con-
tra Eut. II.29). The essence of things is therefore composed of a
multiplicity of properties or forms. As such, it differs fundamentally
from unitary essence in Gregory, Augustine, Boethius, and Dionysius, as
I have shown in chapters 2 and 3. Moreover, Gilbert’s thesis on multiple
forms in many respects foreshadows the late medieval separation of in-
dividuation in the immanent realm from transcendent divine creative
activity, as I will suggest in chapter 6, and also modern conceptions of
ontology such as Leibniz’s monads and Hume’s atomism, as I will argue
in chapter 9.
For now let me return to Porreta’s account of individuation in terms
of ‘the total property’ which makes a singular an individual rather than a
‘dividual’ by differentiating that singular from otherwise similar
singulars which together form a ‘dividual’:
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53. The full quote is as follows: “Res universales intellectus ex quibuslibet particularibus
sumit” (In Contra Euty. III.31 [278: 1-2]).
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For things are said [to be] ‘individual’ because each of them is consti-
tuted from such properties, the whole collection of which, having
been produced in thought, will never be the same in any other of the
numerically particular [things] by a natural conformity. For this rea-
son the total form of Plato — which conforms to no one in act and na-
ture [i.e., potency] — is truly individual. But every part of it is indeed
singular, although not individual since it conforms to many at least by
nature. And so his soul, the total form of which is part of the form of
Plato, is not truly called ‘individual’ by name.54
The key point in this passage is that things are not individuated by the
act of being that brings form-matter compounds into actuality and
makes them what they are. Instead, that which constitutes particular
things qua individuals is the totality of ‘quo ests.’ As I show in the follow-
ing section, ‘quo ests’ are not transcendent causes. Nor do they depend
on transcendent causes in order to individuate things. Instead, they rep-
resent immanent principles that explain how actualized substances are
individuated. The implication of all this is that Porreta does not address
the question as to why things are unique individuals in the first place
and why they tend towards ever-greater individuation.
6. The Generation and Subsistence of Singular Substances
Porreta’s theory of individuation can only be fully understood by examin-
ing the metaphysical status of id quod est and quo est. Since things are
one yet at the same time exhibit a plurality of attributes, he draws a dis-
tinction between that which is (id quod est) and that by which (quo est) it
is what it is.55 This distinction is not merely logical but in fact extends to
the metaphysical structure of the world. It describes the causal relation-
ship between the plurality of attributes or forms and the dual aspect of
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54. “Nam ‘indiuidua’ dicuntur huiusmodi quoniam unumquodque eorum ex talibus
consistit proprietatibus quarum omnium cogitatione facta collectio nunquam in alio quolibet
alterutrius numero particularium naturali conformitate eadem erit. Hac igitur ratione
Platonis tota forma — nulli neque actu neque natura conformis — uere est indiuidua. Omnis
uero pars eius singularis quidem est: non autem uere indiuidua quoniam multis est saltem
natura conformis. Itaque anima eius, cuius tota forma pars est forme Platonis, non uero
nomine dicitur ‘indiuidua’ ” (In Contra Eut. III.14-15 [274: 85-93]).
55. In de Hebdom. I.67 [202: 86].
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each thing, material and formal. Crucially, Gilbert views both matter and
form as purely immanent. As Nielsen remarks, “Every object is itself mat-
ter, and as such formed by the thing’s own form: ‘. . . quod unumquodque
subsistentium aliquid est, est ex propria forma, que inest materia.’”56
Porreta’s construal of the subsistence of matter-form compounds lo-
cates actualization and individuation exclusively in particular sensible
things themselves. The Good, which emanates (defluxit) from God’s ab-
solute power (In de Hebdom. II.150 [220: 59-64]), provides the condition
of possibility for the generation and corruption of things but does not
make any difference to the actuality of particulars or the perfection of
their own substantial form. Instead of individuation being seen as a lim-
ited ‘share’ of divine unity, it is now seen either as a transcendentally nec-
essary meta-logical category or as a state of affairs simply willed by God
and telling us nothing of the inner divine reality in which the whole of
creation participates.
Let me substantiate this claim. For Gilbert, a material thing is abso-
lutely dependent upon its formal principle, just as form cannot be with-
out being in the actual thing (In Contra Eut. III.33 [278: 8]). This meta-
physical dependence follows from the relationship of causality: the id
quo which serves as the cause determines the id quod which is its effect.
Since the cause precedes and surpasses its effect, the id quo or esse (or
form or essence) is prior to the id quod (actuality): “Everything which is
being is naturally prior to that which is.”57 What distinguishes Porreta’s
‘grammatical Platonism’ from the metaphysical realism of patristic
Christian Neo-Platonists is the status of essence. By equating esse with
form, Porreta abandons the metaphysical link between God’s transcen-
dent power of being and the actuality of material things in favor of the
immanent subsistence of individual substances and the priority of for-
mal essence over real existence.
This is significant for individuation because the cause of actualiza-
tion is now exclusively immanent. First, the id quo is that which is in
matter ( forma, que inest materia).58 The concepts of participation
(participatio) and inherence (inesse) are used to describe the mode of
presence of form in matter and the connection between id quod est and
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56. Nielsen, Philosophy and Theology in the Twelfth Century, p. 47. The reference for
the quote from Porreta is In de Trin. I.ii.52 (89: 10-11).
57. “omne vero esse eo, quod est, naturaliter prius est” (In Contra Eut. I.1 [242: 5-6]).
58. See, supra, note 56.
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id quo est or esse: “Everything which is participates in that which is be-
ing.”59 As Nielsen explains, Gilbert’s description of this causal relation-
ship in terms of habitus shows that the human mind can cognize this
link as it is found in things. He posits a purely causal connection between
essence and existence which the mind can know because this connec-
tion is not only in each thing but also lacks any transcendent cause. The
transcendence of esse (the power of being or virtus essendi) in Augustine
and Boethius contrasts with the immanence of esse (essence or essentia)
in Porreta.
Second, a particular thing is what it is by virtue of having both sub-
stantial properties and accidental features. This distinction requires a
substrate in which both can be present. Substantial properties require a
substance (substantia) in order to inhere in a thing. However, for Porreta
substance is neither Aristotle’s category nor Boethius’ matter-form com-
pound. Instead, substance is substantial form, which gives beings ‘some-
thing’ (this-ness or essence). The reason for emphasizing this-ness or es-
sence is that ultimately all substantial forms depend on divine essence
(In de Hebdom. I.27-28 [93: 54-65]). The difference with Augustine and
Boethius is that Gilbert’s account focuses on the essential link of the Cre-
ator and creation and excludes any existential link. As I will suggest in
the following chapter, Aquinas sought to shift the focus away from the
essentialism of both Avicennian and Porretan theology to the metaphys-
ical realism of God’s pure act of being.
Third, substance denotes not only substantial form but also that
which subsists (In de Trin. I.iv.99 [135: 95-101]). So configured, subsistence
(subsistentia) is the substantial form of a particular thing that subsists
(subsistens). This conceptuality departs from the primacy of person over
substance in Gregory, Augustine, Boethius, and Dionysius, as I will now
show. Porreta stipulates a hierarchy of subsistences, beginning with the
most general subsistence (subsistentia generalissima) which is created,
yet not subject to generation and corruption and therefore eternal (In de
Hebdom. I.98 [208-9: 64-70]). This subsistence gives rise to two different
forms, both eternal (perpetue): corporeal form, which is the eternal sub-
sistence of all bodies, and spiritual form, which is the eternal subsistence
of all immaterial beings. As Nielsen concludes, “One consequence of this
is that Gilbert, no more than he advocates a substantial-existential form,
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59. “omne quo est participat eo quod est esse” (In de Hebdom. I.96 [208: 60]). Cf. In de
Hebdom. I.100 [209: 84].
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propounds an essential form which is common to all that is created.”60
Thus Porreta puts the emphasis on essence rather than existence and di-
vides created essence into two elements, corporeal and incorporeal. As a
result, God’s creative action does not encompass the actualization of all
beings. Likewise, matter oscillates ambiguously between primary matter
(i.e., unformed matter which is created first and acts as the prima
subsistentia for substantial form)61 and corporeality (i.e., matter which is
always already formed and only exists in virtue of a form).
Coupled with the overarching priority of essence over existence, the
unresolved relation between matter and form at the level of the most
general subsistence impacts upon the relation of matter and form at the
subsequent levels in the hierarchy of subsistences. The eternal sub-
sistences are followed by a series of ‘differences’ (differentiae) that give
rise to genera and species, e.g., the composite genus animal with the sim-
ple differentia rationality yields the species man.62 The actual form, hu-
manity, is found in every human being and can therefore be said to be
universal. Yet at the same time, this and other universals are not real be-
cause they are the result of a mental operation that is based on a similar-
ity that is not substantial (unlike Boethius’ similitudo substantialis).
At the bottom of the hierarchy of subsistences are particular sensi-
ble things, also called subsistent (subsistens). Gilbert views particulars as
subsisting substances because they provide the ‘material’ for substantial
forms (In Contra Eut. III.36 [279: 24-28]). The key problem in his line of ar-
gument is that there is no account of what brings this material into exis-
tence. For substantial forms act as the causes that make the concrete
thing (as effect) capable of receiving further forms (both substantial and
accidental). What remains unexplained is the generation and individua-
tion of particulars, which are so configured that they can be further
formed. To say that particular things continue to receive new substantial
forms could imply that the essence of particulars changes. Conjointly
with the idea of a plurality of substantial forms, both the identity and the
unity of particular sensible things are threatened. This raises fundamen-
tal questions about the nature of individuality and the cause of individu-
ation in Porreta’s metaphysics.
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60. Nielsen, Philosophy and Theology in the Twelfth Century, p. 51.
61. On Porreta’s account of primary matter and the relation with Platonism, see
Étienne Gilson, “Note sur les noms de la matière chez Gilbert de la Porrée,” Revue du
moyen âge latin 2 (1946): 173-76.
62. In de Trin. I.ii.65 [92: 96-100]; In de Hebdom. I.99-100 [209: 71-85].
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The primacy of essence over existence entails a focus on form at the
expense of matter. That is in part why Aquinas reintegrates matter into
his account of individuation, as I will argue in the following chapter. By
contrast with the Neo-Platonist emphasis on triadic relationality,
Gilbert’s ‘grammatical Platonism’ posits that everything is by itself some-
thing (per se aliquid est) and is one (per se una est) by virtue of having a
substantial form.63 As such, that which subsists does so in virtue of the
formality of ‘quo ests’: “[E]ach subsistent subsists by the agglomeration of
a multiplicity of quo ests: genus, differentia and accident.”64 The actual
materiality of composites does not make a difference to a thing’s actual-
ity. Since a thing’s essence is composed of a plurality of substantial
forms, they cannot be the source of unity and individuation. Likewise,
since a thing can be formed by further substantial forms over time, they
cannot be the source of identity either. This leaves matter, but matter is
subject to corruption and therefore cannot be the principle of
diachronic individuation. The plurality of immanent substantial forms
requires a higher cause that can secure its unity and identity. As a result,
Porreta is compelled to locate the unity of particular sensible things ex-
clusively in the only subsistence that is perfectly immaterial and abso-
lutely one — the divine essence. In the absence of any existential link, the
divine essence acts as a transcendental guarantee of unity and identity.
This contrasts markedly with the Neo-Platonist idea of the transcendent
Good, which is the source of both existence and essence and infuses all
things with goodness. In the following section, I show how Gilbert’s con-
ception of divine essence provides the necessary transcendental secur-
ing of the unity of composites that subsist by themselves.
7. Creation, Concretion, and the
Transcendental Securing of Unity
In his discussion of Porreta’s account of universals and individuals, Jean
Jolivet argues that universality is synonymous with the conformity among
singulars in terms of certain common ‘quo ests’ that co-constitute them.65
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63. In de Trin. I.v.29 [145: 95-100]; cf. In de Trin. I.ii.57, 61; I.iii.48; I.iv.6; I.iv.99; In de
Hebdom. I.35; In Contra Eut. I.89; II.12; III.43.
64. “omne subsistens multorum quibus est, i.e. generis et differentiae et accidentis,
concretione subsistit” (In de Trin. I.v.26 [144: 79-81]; cf. In de Trin. I.ii.6 prol.).
65. Jean Jolivet, “Trois variations médiévales sur l’universel et l’individu: Roscelin,
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Accordingly, the totality of ‘quo ests’ differentiates this singular from that
singular and makes it an individual rather than a ‘dividual.’ Porreta also
posits the participation of every ‘subsistent’ (subsistens) in a hierarchy of
forms, commencing with secondary forms (later called formae nativae by
his disciples, who formed the Porretan school)66 and extending to the
most general subsistence.67 As Jolivet points out, the noetic upward
movement from the singular via the conformity with other singulars to
the universal is mirrored by the ontological downward movement from
the most general to the specific subsistence.68
However, this reading begs the question as to how the intellect is
able to know universals on the basis of singulars. There is nothing in the
actuality of particular things that intimates the presence of common
forms that inhere in them. Gilbert’s response is that the actualization of
particular sensible things involves not just secondary but also primary
forms: “[A]ll natural things are not only created but also concretized.”69
How are we to understand the distinction between creation and concre-
tion? According to Porreta, creation marks the reception of the substan-
tial form and the coming into existence of a subsistent. As such, creation
is identical with generation, and both are immanent in the sense that
they are unrelated to transcendent forms. By contrast, concretion repre-
sents the specification of general forms. Indeed, it is only when he speaks
of concretion that a link between the secondary forms in particular
things and the primary forms emerges. As Nielsen puts it, “ ‘[C]oncretion’
. . . describes not only the ordering of the accidental forms, but also the
linking together of secondary natures to the primary form, i.e., differ-
entiae to genus generalissimum or, as Gilbert calls the two general forms,
corporeality and spirituality, the perpetuae subsistentiae.”70 Nielsen goes
on to argue that particular things come to exist by virtue of one subsis-
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Abélard, Gilbert de la Porrée,” Revue de métaphysique et de morale 97 (1992): 111-55, esp. pp.
141-55.
66. Gilson, La philosophie au Moyen Âge, esp. pp. 262-68; Vicaire, “Les Porrétains et
l’avicennisme avant 1215,” pp. 449-82.
67. “generalissima subsistentia” (In de Hebdom. I.98 [208-9: 64-70]). See Forest, “Le
réalisme de Gilbert de la Porrée dans le commentaire du ‘De Hebdomadibus,’ ” esp. p. 107.
68. Jolivet, “Trois variations médiévales sur l’universel et l’individu: Roscelin,
Abélard, Gilbert de la Porrée,” pp. 144-45.
69. “omnia naturalia non modo creata, sed etiam concreta sunt” (In de Hebdom. I.57
[199: 19-20]).
70. Nielsen, Philosophy and Theology in the Twelfth Century, p. 70.
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tence or substantial form through creation before they can be formed by
virtue of several subsistences through concretion.
But this conception of generation (creation) and formation (concre-
tion) is based upon the priority of form and essence to the detriment of
matter and existence. Since he simply presupposes that the recipient
material exists and that it has the capacity to receive form, Porreta does
not elucidate how substantial form can be received. In this sense, singu-
larity is part of the determination of actual particular things, but re-
mains unexplained. Not only are we left wondering how matter can re-
ceive substantial form; we also ignore why substantial form would want
to inhere in matter. Like Aristotle, Porreta’s focus on essence does not ac-
count for the existence of the realm of singular matter-form compounds.
Divine immaterial essence somehow issues forth into nondivine mate-
rial substances that are created as subsistents and concretized as indi-
viduals. This requires a brief discussion of divine essence with respect to
form and matter.
All particular composite substances are generated and formed ac-
cording to certain eternal ideas. These ideas act as archetypes, models,
or exemplars. Copies of ideas include both immanent substantial forms
and actual things themselves which have essences from such forms.71
Even though created forms are derived from their exemplars by deduc-
tion (deductio), the resemblance between them is extrinsic.72 Thus, im-
manent forms represent but a very remote imitation (imitatio). This dif-
fers significantly from Plato’s idea of forms in the world that are diverse
reflections of the one source (rather than copies), as I showed in chap-
ter 1. If something is a reflection, then it is relational to that of which it is
a reflection. By contrast, to speak of copies is either to posit a relation
that threatens the ‘ontological difference’ or to impose a distance that
undermines the possibility of participation. Moreover, as Nielsen ex-
plains, the only reason why the mind can effectively ascertain the pres-
ence of immaterial created (i.e., derived or deduced) ideas in material
things and the participation of such things in such ideas is the transfer-
ence or transmutation of names from the theological realm of pure form
without matter to the natural realm of form in connection with matter.73
Only faith, not reason, can provide knowledge of the link between things
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71. In de Trin. I.ii.17 (82: 98); I.ii.97 (99-100: 11-20).
72. “secundum extrinseca” (In de Hebdom. I.76 [204: 37-47]).
73. Nielsen, Philosophy and Theology in the Twelfth Century, p. 73.
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and their ultimate origins. As I have already indicated in section 2 of the
present chapter, this incipient fideism can also be found in some strands
of Islamic theology.
Likewise, matter is also created according to ideas in the divine
mind. In his commentary on the Pauline epistles, Porreta describes these
ideas in Augustinian terms as ars divina or Verbum.74 Coupled with the
two eternal subsistences (corporeality and spirituality) and the theory of
archetypes or models, matter as a divine idea is an exemplar of corporeal-
ity, from which singular bodies can be derived. However, Gilbert departs
from the Augustinian vision in two crucial respects. First, there is nothing
in singular material beings that would intimate their relation with the
eternal subsistence of corporeality, let alone with the divine idea of mat-
ter. This is because, according to Porreta, the mathematical structure of
nature does not manifest God’s creative activity in the world. By contrast,
Augustine’s reconfiguration of the Stoic and Neo-Platonist scheme of
numbers and ratios is a model that describes the world in terms of rela-
tional individuals. Second, matter remains unexplained, above all the ca-
pacity of matter to receive form and of material form to be perfected.
Neither creation nor concretion can account for the reception and per-
fection of form. This is because matter is created formless.75 Likewise,
secondary forms embodied in concrete matter are concretized by being
related back to the primary forms, but it is not clear why primary forms
would want to inhere in matter or how the mind can cognize such tran-
scendent forms based on its immanent self.
Gilbert addresses these two objections by referring to the divine es-
sence and supernatural faith. The mind seeks universal forms only if su-
pernatural faith produces a perception of pure form and commands as-
sent to this perception.76 This is why, as Jolivet observes, the mind
transcends the plurality of ‘quo ests’ and cognizes that which secures the
unity of all ‘quod ests’: “[T]here could not be in a single being such a plu-
rality [of ‘quo ests’] if a unique principle had not bound them together.”77
The principle that binds together the plurality of ‘quo ests’ is “the will of
the Good whence derives the being of each of the subsistents, i.e., not
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74. For a textual reference to Porreta’s commentary on the Pauline Epistles, see Niel-
sen, Philosophy and Theology in the Twelfth Century, p. 73, n. 192.
75. Nielsen, Philosophy and Theology in the Twelfth Century, p. 76, n. 213.
76. See, supra, note 47.
77. “Neque uero in uno tanta multitudo . . . esse posset nisi unum principium haec in illo
iunxisset” (In De Hebdom. II.148 [219: 49-51]).
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only that which is and that which is something and that by which it is
and by which it is something, but also being and being something.”78
Even though this might seem to be close to Augustine’s and Boethius’
Neo-Platonist account, the crucial difference is that Porreta restricts the
link to abstract essence, not actual existence. There is nothing in a
thing’s actuality that would intimate its createdness. Moreover, Porreta
differs from Augustine and Boethius in that both his division of the sci-
ences and his theory of knowledge privilege the immanence of second-
ary forms. The only participation that the mind can know rationally is
the participation of a thing in its own form, which inheres in it. The link
with higher forms is purely essential and as such not perceptible to the
senses. Only faith can propel the mind to seek remote traces of the divine
essence in subsistent substances.
Therefore, the actuality of things does not in any way intimate the
presence of God. Instead, knowledge of the principle that guarantees the
unity of subsistent substances is grounded in an a priori assumption that
God is that “essence out of which is whatever is.”79 The divine essence is
such that from the will of the Good emanates a unitary principle that se-
cures transcendentally the unity of all immanent forms that inhere in
material things. On this point, Gilbert wrongly equates Neo-Platonism
with an unmediated primacy of the One, ignoring the generative activity
as a result of the One’s ecstatic overflow. For Porreta, that which upholds
both the unity and the identity of particular sensible things is the one-
ness and immutability of God’s essentia, not his existence.
8. Towards Potentia Dei Absoluta and Formal Modality
In the previous section, I showed that Gilbert develops a Platonism of es-
sential derivation, which contrasts with the Christian Neo-Platonist
metaphysics of existential creation. Porreta stresses the link between
forms and the divine essence but fails to explain how God might be re-
lated to the creation and concretion of matter and the generation of ma-
terial particulars. The downward movement of form from the most ab-
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78. “. . . esse eorum, i.e. non modo id quod est et aliquid est itemque id quo est uel quo
aliquid est uerum etiam illud et esse et aliquid esse A BONI UOLUNTATE DEFLUXIT” (In de
Hebdom. II.150 [220: 58-61]).
79. “esse, ex quo est quicquid est” (In de Trin. I.i.7 [71: 35-36]).
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stract and general eternal subsistence to the concrete ‘subsistents’ is
explained in terms of the ‘outflow’ (deflux) of the will of the Good. But
this conception cannot account for the desire of the mind to know the
highest form and conform to it as best as possible. In this section, I argue
that Gilbert’s metaphysics of essential derivation devalues actuality. The
metaphysical status of actuality has implications for both theology and
metaphysics. Theology is governed by the absolute power of God and
metaphysics is structured by formal modality. So configured, theology
and metaphysics combine to produce a formalist synthesis that stands
in stark contrast to the metaphysical realism of Christian Neo-
Platonism.
According to Porreta, the world’s metaphysical structure is com-
posed of three elements — subsistence, singularity, and plurality of
forms. Subsistence is that which is by itself.80 Knowledge of the depen-
dence of concrete composite substances on a transcendental instance
arises from the following logical and semantic consideration: strictly
speaking, things are not because only God is and therefore “the existen-
tial sense of ‘is’ can be used properly only in theology.”81 Therefore, esse
(transferred or ‘transumed’ from theology into natural philosophy) de-
scribes a thing’s essences, rather than its actuality. As I argued in previ-
ous sections, Gilbert’s redefinition of esse has the effect of shifting the fo-
cus from the actuality of particular sensible things to their essence:
“[B]eing is indeed naturally prior to all which is.”82 The primacy of es-
sence over existence is a mark of Porreta’s metaphysics (In de Hebdom.
I.27-35 [193: 55–194: 92]) and reduces the relation between the world and
God to essential likeness, independently of their actuality. The link be-
tween God and creation is purely formal and does not extend to efficient
causality.
However, does not Porreta’s concept of conformity (conformitas)
among particular sensible things indicate a substantial likeness that
provides a basis for the reality of universals?83 If so, do not particulars
partake of the real being of God by participating in forms that are ideas
in the divine mind? The problem with this sort of reading is that it ig-
nores the logic underpinning Porreta’s account. The latter begins with
185
The Priority of Essence over Existence
80. Schmidt, Gottheit und Trinität nach dem Kommentar des Gilbert Porreta zu
Boethius De Trinitate, pp. 31-35, 59.
81. Marenbon, “Gilbert of Poitiers,” p. 337.
82. See, supra, note 57.
83. In de Trin. I.v.24-25 (144: 63-78); In Contra Eut. II.22-24, 28 (269: 34-50; 270: 73-77).
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God and traces the inherence of uncreated ideas in particular sensible
things by deduction. Universals are in particulars because the will of the
Good gives rise to a derivation that makes everything good by
metonymy, i.e., by contiguity, not by actual similarity. Likewise, forms
that descend along the hierarchy of being until they reach embodiment
confer subsistences that can only be mathematically identified and ana-
lyzed. Gilbert’s approach is therefore exclusively formal and centered
around logic and language.
Moreover, the mathematical method of abstraction and induction
from particular things is based upon the a priori assumption that forms
can only be apprehended by the mind, not the senses. Therefore, demon-
stration by more geometrico, which consists in mapping forms according
to the highest generality and abstraction, commits Porreta to discarding
the actuality of particular sensible things in favor of logical possibility.
This contrasts with Boethius, for whom all things are at once singular
and universal. The relationality of particulars to God is phenomenally
discernible because a thing’s actuality intimates both its own potency
and the power of being (virtus essendi) which actualizes it and thereby
perfects its form. The principal difference is that Boethius focuses on
metaphysical potentiality, not logical possibility.
The divergence between Boethius’ and Porreta’s development of the
shared metaphysical tradition could hardly be more marked. Boethius
follows Augustine in arguing that God’s choice among an infinite set of
possibilities reveals his goodness and love and that actualization and in-
dividuation mark the perfection of divinely given form, so that every-
thing may be and may abide and in so doing testifies to God’s pleni-
tudinous reality. Under the influence of eleventh-century theology, in
particular the concept of divine omnipotence in Petrus Damianus
(c. 1007-1072), Gilbert argues that God’s choice among an infinite set of
possibilities reveals nothing other than his absolute power.84 This theo-
logical — or perhaps fideistic — approach implies that in Porreta’s ‘gram-
matical Platonism’ there is no rational demonstration of a thing’s pro-
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84. For a detailed account of the shift from Augustine and Boethius to Porreta, see
Simo Knuuttila, “Possibility and Necessity in Gilbert of Poitiers,” in Jolivet and de Libera,
eds., Gilbert de Poitiers et ses contemporains, pp. 199-217; Knuuttila, Modalities in Medieval
Philosophy, (London: Routledge, 1993), pp. 81-82; Knuuttila, “On the History of Theory of
Modality as Alternativeness,” in Potentialität und Possibilität. Modalaussagen in der
Geschichte der Metaphysik, ed. Thomas Buchheim, Corneille H. Kneepkens, and Kuno
Lorenz (Stuttgart: Frommann-Holzboog, 2001), pp. 219-36, esp. pp. 230-36.
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cession from God and its reversion to him because that which the
human mind perceives has been emptied of all cognitive content in such
a way that faith alone leads human cognition from things to God.
This approach is evinced by Porreta’s commentary on the Pauline
epistles, in particular the following extract:
It says that philosophy is knowledge about natural things and that it is
deduced from rational principles, but the necessity which belongs to
them is the customary one. One divine power is the source of the mo-
tion and substance of all things and of the connection of the causes of
those things which are said to belong to them. Some people, who don’t
understand what is said, when hearing that some things are called
necessary, not considering the reasons for saying so, deprive them of
God’s power, thinking that what is called necessary on the basis of
custom of nature cannot be not the case absolutely. This is why they
deny that a virgin could have given birth to a child and other similar
things called impossible in the sense just mentioned.85
In other words, natural regularities depend for their operation on God’s
will. Revealed truths about God’s essence, namely his absolute power,
have a corrective function in that they can highlight which natural phe-
nomena are erroneously taken to be absolute necessities by natural phi-
losophy and natural reason. However, Porreta goes further than this and
argues that the very actuality of particular things is misleading because
their changeability induces a wrong sense of necessity: “Because no tem-
poral things are free from mutability, the whole customary necessity be-
longing to them is shaky.”86
That which is (id quod est) entertains no rationally intelligible rela-
187
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85. “Philosophiam vocat scientiam naturaliam deductam ex principiis rationum, quo-
rum tamen est consuetudini accommodata necessitas. Sed divina ex una potestate omnium
motus est atque substantia et earum, quae ad se dicuntur, causarum conexio. Quidam autem
imperiti ea, quae dicuntur, ex dicendi rationibus minime iudicantes cum audiunt quaedam
esse necessaria, divinae derogant potestati putantes id, quod iuxta naturae consuetudinem
dicitur, necessarium absolute non posse non esse. Ideoque negant virginem peperisse et
huiusmodi alia, quae predicto modo dicuntur impossibilia” (quoted in Nielsen, Philosophy
and Theology in the Twelfth Century, p. 136, n. 82; translation in Knuuttila, Modalities in Me-
dieval Philosophy, pp. 75-76).
86. “Et quoniam in temporalibus nihil est quod mutabilitati non sit obnoxium, tota
illorum consuetudini accommodata necessitas nutat” (In de Trin. II.i.7 [164: 36-8]).
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tion with transcendent forms, nor is it relational to God. For divine cre-
ative and ‘concretive’ activity produces copies that bear but a weak re-
semblance to their exemplar (secundum extrinsica);87 a resemblance that
can only be ascertained by mathematical abstraction in the mind and is
absent from the phenomenal manifestation of material forms (as for
Plato and Augustine). That which exists merely represents one possibil-
ity in an infinite set of equally probable possibilities. As Simo Knuuttila
has documented, Gilbert, “inspired by Peter Damian’s more pious than
philosophical ideas,”88 asserted that the actual world and its history are
no more compelling than any other possible set of alternative providen-
tial projects:
All things are similarly subject to His power, so that as those, which
have not been existent can have been existent, and those which do not
exist or will not exist, can exist, in the same way those which have
been existent can have been non-existent, and those which are or will
be, can be non-existent.89
In this passage, Porreta claims that divine power is absolute and can al-
ter the past, the present, and the future. The actuality of particular be-
ings is not only radically contingent. More importantly, it does not dis-
close anything about God’s creative and concretive activity other than
his absolute will. Since both the actuality of particular things and the
perfection of form can retrospectively be undone, neither actualization
nor individuation nor perfection matters metaphysically.
188
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87. Nielsen, Philosophy and Theology in the Twelfth Century, p. 73.
88. Knuuttila, “Possibility and Necessity in Gilbert of Poitiers,” p. 199. For Petrus
Damiani’s Letter on Divine Omnipotence, see Pierre Damien. Disputatio super quaestione
qua quaeritur, si deus omnipotens est, quomodo potest agere ut quae facta sunt facta non
fuerint (c. 1067), trans. and ed. A. Cantin (Paris: Éditions Cerf, collec. “Sources chré-
tiennes” no. 191, 1972). On Damiani’s conception of potentia Dei absoluta, see William
Courtenay, Capacity and Volition: A History of the Distinction of Absolute and Ordained
Power (Bergamo: Pierluigi Lubrina Editore, 1990), esp. pp. 25-28. See also Teresa Antonelli,
“Elementi della metafisica di Pier Damiani — Il problema del possibile nel medio evo,” in
Die Metaphysik im Mittelalter, ed. Peter Wilpert (Berlin: De Gruyter, 1963), pp. 161-64.
89. “Aeque etenim uniuersa eius subiecta sunt potestati ut silicet sicut, quaecumque non
fuerunt, possunt fuisse et, quaecumque non sunt uel non erunt, possunt esse ita etiam,
quaecumque fuerunt, possunt non fuisse et, quaecumque sunt uel erunt, possunt non esse” (In
De Trin. I.iv.72 [129: 25-28]; translation in Knuuttila, Modalities in Medieval Philosophy,
p. 78). Cf. In Contra Eut. II.16 (267: 94–268: 98).
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The reason for this devaluation of actuality is not Porreta’s argument
that relation is extrinsic to God, which is true because God lacks nothing
at all and nothing can be added to him. Instead, actuality is abandoned
in favor of possibility in order to emphasize God’s absolute power. All we
can know about God is the absoluteness of his will. The goodness that
derives from divine volition has no objective basis other than the mind
and its faculty to abstract forms from particulars and to relate them to
their transcendental source based on the belief in a Creator God, not by
intellectual cognition based on induction (In Contra Eut. I.32-33 [248: 73–
249: 83]). As Nielsen puts it, “in faith and theology, where one does not re-
strict oneself merely to considering the created world, knowledge of true
necessity is achieved by experiencing the divine will, which is truly im-
mutable.”90 This account of actuality and possibility marks a radical
break with that of patristic Christian Neo-Platonism, according to which
things, when they are actual, are so necessarily, in the sense that their ac-
tualization owes nothing to accident or fortune.91 So configured, actual-
ity testifies to God’s power of being and the love and goodness by which
he imparts being to everything that is, seen and unseen.
Coupled with the nonactual likeness or similarity (conformitas)
among particular sensible things, the primacy of essence reinforces the
focus on logical possibility rather than metaphysical actuality. Contrary
to Boethius’ metaphysical understanding of potency as dispositions of
real powers to be, Gilbert’s understanding is theological or, more accu-
rately, fideistic because this world is but one in an infinite number of
equally probable possibilities that God can bring into actuality for no rea-
sons other than his absolute will. Likewise the natural operation of this
world and the underlying natural laws can be suspended or abrogated:
When it is said that man cannot be dissolved or that man cannot be
not dissolved, it is not because God could not do it, but because God
ordained that the condition of man is such before the fall or after the
fall or after the resurrection. In the same way it is said that the sun
cannot be not moving, although divine power could stop it from mov-
ing. There is an infinity of similar cases.92
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90. Nielsen, Philosophy and Theology in the Twelfth Century, p. 137.
91. For example, Boethius, 1 In Periherm. 110.28–111.1. See, supra, chapter 3.
92. “Non enim iccirco dicitur non posse uel dissolui uel non dissolui quod Deus haec
facere non possit sed quod, ut ita se haberet uel ante peccatum uel post peccatum uel post
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For Porreta, God’s power and God’s will are not coextensive. While divine
executive power is immutable and absolute, divine choice determines
which of the alternative providential programs will be realized and
which of the hitherto unrealized potentialities will be actualized in the
real world. In other words, there is a difference between God’s absolute
power and God’s power in actu. This difference was later called the dis-
tinction between potentia Dei absoluta and potentia Dei ordinata.93 Even
though his conceptuality is clearer than Damian’s, Porreta also privileges
potentia Dei absoluta and stresses God’s arbitrary will.94 As such, God’s
rationally unintelligible will replaces the transcendence and radiance of
divine goodness in the patristic Christian Neo-Platonism of Gregory, Au-
gustine, Boethius, and Dionysius.
This is significant for the question of individuation because it raises
the problem of the uniqueness of the world and all individuals therein.
As I argued in section 5 of this chapter, Gilbert distinguishes between
singularity, individuality, and personality. Singular things are individu-
ated by possible properties, and it is the modal element that determines
individuality:
The property of something, which is naturally dissimilar to everything
else that actually or potentially was or is or will be, is truly called and
truly is, not only singular or particular, but individual. . . . For this rea-
son Plato’s whole form, which is neither in act nor by nature similar to
anything else, is truly individual.95
In his commentary on De Trinitate, Porreta highlights the modal charac-
ter of his theory of individuality: “Platonity collected from all things
190
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resurrectionem homo, diuina uoluntas statuit. Secundum hoc dicitur sol non posse non
moueri cum tamen diuina potestas eum, ut non moueatur, sistere possit. Et huiusmodi sunt
infinita” (In Contra Eut. V.42 [322: 43-49]). Translation in Knuuttila, Modalities in Medieval
Philosophy, p. 77 (translation modified).
93. Courtenay, Capacity and Volition, esp. pp. 25-36, 65-79; Knuuttila, Modalities in
Medieval Philosophy, esp. pp. 100-102.
94. Grzegorz Stolarski, La possibilité et l’être. Un essai sur la détermination du
fondement ontologique de la possibilité dans la pensée de Thomas d’Aquin (Fribourg:
Éditions Universitaires, 2001), pp. 204-5.
95. “Illa uero cuiuslibet proprietas, quae naturali dissimilitudine ab omnibus — quae actu
uel potestate fuerunt uel sunt uel futura sunt — differt, non modo ‘singularis’ aut ‘particularis’
sed etiam ‘indiuidua uere et vocatur et est.’ . . . Hac igitur ratione Platonis tota forma — nulli
neque actu neque natura conformis — uere est indiuidua” (In Contra Eut. III.13, 15 [274: 81-90]).
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which, in act and by nature [potency], have been, are or will be Plato’s.”
The term ‘by nature’ indicates that which could be without ever being
actually, i.e., an abstract possibility that may or may not be concretized
and depends for its concretion on divine will alone. Knuuttila summa-
rizes Gilbert’s modal metaphysics as follows: “Necessities and possibili-
ties are not considered primarily as types of events or individuals,
instantiated in various degrees in actual history. Modal terms basically
refer to things and structures in various conceivable states of affairs
which, as the intentional correlates of divine choice and power, are in
principle realizable.”96
God’s absolute power tends to undermine human agency and over-
rides nature rather than accomplishing it. Unlike the Church Fathers
and Doctors who (albeit in different ways) connect actualization with
the Neo-Platonist concept of perfectibility, Gilbert severs individuation
from action. This move is mirrored by his claim that the first good can
only be participated in extrinsically and externally (In De Trinitate
I.2.10).97 Thus, the link between the Good and the existence and actuality
of particulars becomes unhinged; relationality is abandoned in favor of
an absolute dependency of created being on God, which undermines the
capacity of particulars to perfect their form by participating in the Trini-
tarian relationality.
9. Islam, Christianity, and the Passage to Modernity
In this final section, I will connect my earlier discussion of Islamic theol-
ogy and Avicenna to my reading of Gilbert Porreta. By driving a wedge
between creation and Creator, Ibn SIn# and Porreta paved the way for
the long and nonlinear transition from the Middle Ages to modernity.
Both reduced divine creative activity to a causal link between the
uncreated essence of the first being or God and the created essences of
particular beings. As such, they elevated essence over above existence
and also redefined metaphysics as the science of being qua being rather
than the divine source of being, thereby subordinating God to the gen-
eral category of being and privileging ontology vis-à-vis theology. There
is thus a clear lineage from Avicenna and Porreta via Duns Scotus and
191
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96. Knuuttila, Modalities in Medieval Philosophy, p. 82.
97. Nielsen, Philosophy and Theology in the Twelfth Century, esp. pp. 77-81.
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William of Ockham to Descartes, Spinoza, and Kant, as I will indicate at
the end of this section and develop in greater detail in chapters 6-9.
In section 2 of the present chapter, I already mentioned the lasting
impact of Avicenna on Islamic philosophy and theology. Though un-
doubtedly less renowned, Porreta was a key figure in medieval thought.
Through the influence of the Porretan school, Gilbert’s ontology shaped
Christian theology from the late eleventh to the early fourteenth century.
Porreta’s De sex principiis was commented on by Albert the Great, Robert
Kilwardby, and Walter Burleigh. More importantly, the main disciples of
Gilbert who endorsed and developed his thinking included influential
figures like Thierry of Chartres, Alain of Lille, Simon of Tournai, and
Nicholas of Amiens. Each of them made a decisive contribution to the
terms of philosophical and theological debate that prevailed from the
second half of the twelfth to the early fourteenth century and beyond,
notably the two methods of demonstration — dialectical quaestiones
and ‘mathematical’ reasoning (more geometrico).98
Avicenna’s and Porreta’s shared emphasis on the abstraction of gen-
eral essences at the expense of the embodiment of universal being in
particular beings influenced the reception of Aristotle’s ontology and
theology into medieval Christian and Islamic thought. That is why
Gilson is right to say that Gilbert’s teaching “favored the diffusion of that
form of Platonism which one might term the realism of essences and
which Avicenna’s philosophy was soon to reinforce so powerfully.”99 The
variant of Platonism referred to by Gilson is precisely the strand that we
can trace to Porphyry and Ammonius, a strongly logicized and Aristote-
lianized synthesis of Aristotle and Plato that Avicenna and Porreta sup-
plemented with Aristotelian logic, grammar, and ontology — notably Ar-
istotle’s substitution of the concept of individual substantial essence for
Plato’s account of transcendent forms in things (as shown in chapter 1).
Indeed, the priority of essence and possibility over existence and ac-
tuality entered Christian theology through Gilbert’s legacy. This legacy
was reinforced by the translation of Avicenna’s Shif# (including the
192
MATTER AND FORM
98. On the influence of Gilbert, see Chenu, “Un essai de méthode théologique au XIIe
siècle,” pp. 258-67; Chenu, La théologie au douzième siècle, pp. 98-106, 124-28, 142-48, 308-14,
379-85; Henri de Lubac, Exégèse Médiévale, 4 vols. (Paris: Aubier-Montaigne, 1959-61), II.1,
p. 232; Marc Ozilou, “Introduction générale,” in Saint Bonaventure. Les Sentences, Questions
sur Dieu, Commentaire du premier livre des sentences de Pierre Lombard, ed. M. Ozilou (Paris:
Presses Universitaires de France, 2002), pp. 11-13.
99. Gilson, La philosophie au Moyen Âge, p. 268 (my translation).
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Metaphysics) and also by a Porphyrian-Ammonian (rather than an
Iamblichean-Proclean) reading of major books such as the Liber de
causis, whose historical importance has been established beyond rea-
sonable doubt: “[T]he main interest of this opus, from a historical point
of view, is to provide a testimony of the insertion of Avicenna’s Meta-
physics into Western philosophy.”100 Building on Gilson’s pioneering re-
search in relation to the impact of Avicenna on Christian theology,101
Marie-Thérèse d’Alverny has traced Latin translations of Avicenna’s
works to the second half of the twelfth century in Toledo, where Ibn
Daqd (Avendauth) and Dominicus Gundissalinus completed the Latin
version of Avicenna’s Shif#, including the Metaphysics, and made it avail-
able to the emerging network of European universities.102 Whether or
not Gundissalinus was himself in contact with Gilbert’s disciples of the
Chartrean School, there is sufficient historical evidence to suggest that
the milieu of Gilbert of Poitiers’ disciples . . . was particularly well pre-
pared to receive Avicenna’s Metaphysics insofar as the latter drew on
Plotinus much more than its Aristotelian parts. It is among them
[Gilbert’s disciples] that one can sense the syntheses of Saint Augus-
tine, of the great mystic Dionysius the Areopagite and of Avicenna.
These syntheses characterize what Étienne Gilson has termed ‘Latin
Avicennism’ [avicennisme latin].103
This analysis is confirmed by M. H. Vicaire, who has documented the
crucial impact of Avicenna’s position on Gilbert’s disciples, and this al-
ready before 1215.104
Coupled with Avicenna’s essentialism and possibilism, Gilbert’s for-
malism endorsed and developed the Porphyrian scheme of emanation
193
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100. Marie-Thérèse d’Alverny, Avicenne en Occident (Paris: Vrin, 1993), ch. 11, p. 173 (my
translation).
101. Étienne Gilson, “Les sources gréco-arabes de l’augustianisme avicennisant,” Ar-
chives d’histoire doctrinale et littéraire du Moyen Âge 4 (1929): 5-107; É. Gilson, “Avicenne en
Occident au Moyen Âge,” Archives d’histoire doctrinale et littéraire du Moyen Âge 39 (1969):
89-121.
102. Alverny, Avicenne en Occident, ch. 3, pp. 64, 69; ch. 5, pp. 71-75.
103. Alverny, Avicenne en Occident, ch. 2, p. 15 (my translation). Though Alverny’s
reading of the Aristotelian and Neo-Platonist traditions needs to be qualified (see, supra,
section 2), I agree with her point about the integration of Avicenna into Christian theol-
ogy by Porreta’s disciples.
104. Vicaire, “Les Porrétains et l’avicennisme avant 1215,” pp. 449-82.
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rather than the Boethian and Dionysian conception of divine plenitude
and self-diffusion. He thereby reinforced the stress on causation and mul-
tiplicity of forms rather than the rival concept of relation and form-
matter union, all of which is apparent in the interpretation of the afore-
mentioned Liber de causis that was dominant in the twelfth and early
thirteenth century,105 until Aquinas rightly attributed the book to
Proclus. As M.-T. d’Alverny remarks, the Liber is not an isolated instance
of Avicenna’s influence on Christian theology. Others include an Epistola
de causa et causato and two anonymous texts that go back to the begin-
ning of the thirteenth century.106 A prime example of this confluence and
mutual reinforcement are the later works by some members of the School
of Chartres. In these writings, individual substantial form contains and
determines a thing’s essence, supplanting the divine act of being which
brings that thing into existence.107 The implication is that the actuality of
created beings is severed from God’s pure act and that the perfection of
created beings is separate from the synergic fusion of human and divine
work (or theurgy) that is central to the Neo-Platonism of Iamblichus and
Proclus (as well as Aquinas, as I will suggest in the following chapter).108
Porreta’s ‘Latin Avicennism’ was not confined to individual members
of the School of Chartres but extended to leading Franciscans — here I
anticipate some of the arguments that I develop in greater detail in
chapter 6 — notably John Duns Scotus (c. 1265/66-1308) and William of
Ockham (c. 1289/90-1349). In a groundbreaking article of 1927, Étienne
Gilson showed how Avicenna’s ontology and theology constituted the
basis for Scotus’s early modern alternative to Aquinas’s synthesis of bibli-
cal revelation and ancient philosophy.109 As Gilson notes, the link be-
tween Avicenna and Porreta and Scotus and Ockham is Henry of Ghent
(d. 1293), a contemporary of St. Thomas Aquinas (c. 1225-1274). Under the
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105. Alverny, Avicenne en Occident, ch. 5, p. 81; ch. 11, pp. 170-81.
106. Alverny, Avicenne en Occident, ch. 11, p. 178.
107. For instance, an anonymous Commentary of Boethius’ De Trinitate, attributed to
the Chartrean School, says that “actus enim possibilitatis perfectio, perfectio vero omnis ex
forma est. Actus igitur forma” (quoted in Chenu, La théologie au douzième siècle, p. 312).
108. On Iamblichus and Proclus, see Gregory Shaw, Theurgy and the Soul: The Neopla-
tonism of Iamblichus (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1995), pp. 21-27,
59-106, 199-228, and John Milbank, “Sophiology and Theurgy: The New Theological Hori-
zon,” in Adrian Pabst and Christoph Schneider, eds., Encounter between Eastern Orthodoxy
and Radical Orthodoxy, (Aldershot, UK: Ashgate, 2009), pp. 45-85.
109. Étienne Gilson, “Avicenne et le point de départ de Duns Scot,” Archives d’histoire
doctrinale et littéraire du Moyen Âge 2 (1927): 89-149.
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influence of Avicenna, Henry of Ghent introduced into Christian theol-
ogy the separation of divine essence from divine ideas (ideae) and that
which they produce (ideatae). In line with Gilbert, Ghent conceptualizes
the link between ideae and ideatae in merely causal terms, as a relation
of producer to product.110
Even though he (rightly) rejects Avicenna’s claim that creation is nec-
essary, Ghent nonetheless agrees with him — and here I paraphrase
Heidegger — that “logical possibility stands higher than real actuality” (at
least for created beings).111 Since God does not create out of necessity but
rather in an act of supreme freedom, it follows for Ghent that essences are
possible unless and until they are actualized. In his idiom, possible es-
sences have esse essentiae before they are given esse existentiae. So config-
ured, possibility is an intermediary instance between pure divine imagi-
nation and full actuality.112 As possibles, these essences or ideatae have
their own independent being. The being of essence (esse essentiae) must
be different from the radical simplicity and unity of divine essence. Yet
precisely because only God’s essence is existence, the being of created es-
sence cannot be the same as the actuality of existence. Since Ghent does
not follow Aquinas’s account of actualization in terms of God’s pure act of
being (actus purus), he tends to devalue esse existentiae to the point where
it expresses nothing but God’s free will that a thing may be and may abide.
As such, Ghent’s account of God’s free creation is little more than the mir-
ror image of Avicenna’s conception of God’s necessary creation whereby
God’s volition which causes things to exist cannot be rationally known as
divine but must be fideistically believed.
Moreover, Ghent separates the actuality of created things from the
Creator’s pure being by claiming that the difference between esse
existentiae and esse essentiae is not real but instead purely formal. The
implication is that the general category of esse is now the first object of
195
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110. Henry of Ghent, Summa, q. 2 a. 5, 7-14, cited in Cunningham, Genealogy of Nihil-
ism, p. 15.
111. In chapter 9, I briefly argue that Heidegger’s attempted deconstruction of meta-
physics in terms of onto-theology is historically and conceptually flawed because it is
grounded in the modern (and residually transcendentalist) primacy of possibility over ac-
tuality. However, the confusion of the highest being and the most general being that is ex-
pressed by the concept of onto-theology is an important hermeneutical key to unlock the
key difference between the medieval account of analogous being and the modern theory
of univocal being.
112. Cunningham, Genealogy of Nihilism, pp. 13-16.
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human intellection and that as such it is thinkable apart from and out-
side God.113 Since esse now provides both the highest and most general
ground for being qua being, Ghent can be said to be the co-founder (to-
gether with Avicenna) of onto-theology.114
Building on Ghent, Duns Scotus establishes the absolute priority of
possibility over actuality by positing as the object of metaphysics univocal
being (ens univocum), an account consonant with Avicenna’s conception of
common nature in his Metaphysics V.1-2. So construed, being can only be
cognized if we can somehow have prior knowledge of what can be, in order
to avoid reducing ontology either to physics or to logic. As Catherine
Pickstock has shown, the univocity of being and the formal distinction be-
tween essence and existence imply that the link between actuality and po-
tentiality is now no longer ontological and as such making itself known to
the human intellect. Rather, it is epistemological and thus constructed by
the mind and projected onto the world.115 After Scotus, being as an actual-
ity is not just thinkable apart from or outside of God before it is actualized
by God’s free will (as in Ghent). But, more fundamentally, being as a logi-
cally possible existence has its own reality: in the words of Scotus, “a logical
possibility could remain separately in power by its own nature, even when
there were, per impossibile, no omnipotence to which it could be an ob-
ject.”116 Here the threefold influence of Avicenna is palpable. First, ens is the
object of metaphysics and the first object of the intellect. Second, human
experience of reality involves general categories rather than singular beings
or universal being. Third, the cause of knowledge is separate from the ob-
ject known. Taken together, these three claims amount to axiological pri-
macy of abstraction over the senses and the imagination and an
epistemological dualism between subject and object. As for Porreta, knowl-
edge of the cause is different from knowledge of its effect, which means that
196
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113. Henry of Ghent, S. Qu. Ordin., a. 24, q. 7, ad 1 and ad 2; q. 8, q. 9, in Henry of Ghent’s
Summa: The Questions on God’s Existence and Essence (Articles 21-24), trans. J. Decorte and
R. J. Teske, SJ (Leuven: Peeters, 2005), pp. 243-73.
114. For a reading of Ghent in this sense, see Édouard-Henri Wéber, “Eckhart et
l’ontothéologisme: Histoire et conditions d’une rupture,” in Maître Eckhart à Paris. Une cri-
tique médiévale de l’ontothéologie, ed. Emile Zum Brunn et al. (Paris: Presses Universitaires
de France, 1984), pp. 13-83.
115. Catherine Pickstock, After Writing: On the Liturgical Consummation of Philosophy
(Oxford: Blackwell, 1998), pp. 121-31.
116. Duns Scotus, Ordinatio I, d. 36, q. 60-61, in Opera Omnia (Civitas Vaticana: Vati-
can, 1982), vol. 6, n. 296.
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any form of ‘adequation’ (convenientia) between the knowing subject and
the known object no longer pertains (as for the Christian Neo-Platonism of
Aquinas, as I will suggest in the following chapter).
Finally, Ockham radicalizes Scotus’s position by arguing that possi-
ble being is somehow present before being is intelligible and that “possi-
ble being is something a creature has of itself . . . [and that] a creature is
possible, not because anything pertains to it, but because it can exist in
reality.”117 For Ockham, any form of community of being is void of any re-
ality. As Cunningham has pointed out, the ontological real difference of
essence and existence is reduced to factuality.118 In consequence, being
as a logical possibility is of itself, and a thing’s actual existence does not
alter its potency in any way. In other words, for Ockham, actuality loses
all ontological importance and is nothing but an expression of God’s un-
knowable (and, in this sense, arbitrary) potentia absoluta. After Ockham,
actual being ceases to entertain any phenomenally perceptible or onto-
logically intelligible relation with potential being, a move that reduces
ontological potency to a priori possibility.
Thus, possibility is granted not only its independent ontological sta-
tion, but becomes the absolute precondition of knowing actuality. It is
the absolute primacy of possibility over actuality that constitutes the
mark of modern metaphysics. In this sense, modern metaphysics is secu-
lar because the primacy of possibility, far from respecting God’s free will
and absolute initiative, is ultimately complicit with a form of
necessitarianism that is at odds with orthodox Jewish, Christian, and
Muslim teachings on divine creation. By inverting the patristic and me-
dieval primacy of real actuality over modal possibility, Ghent, Scotus,
and Ockham build on Avicenna and Porreta’s shared legacy and inaugu-
rate a new era in theology: “[U]ntil the early fourteenth century possibili-
ties were treated as having a foundation in God; in the modern theory
they were dissociated from this ontological backing.”119 Moreover, possi-
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117. William of Ockham, I Sent. d. 43, q. 2, in Guillelmi de Ockham, Opera Philosophica
et Theologica, ed. G. I. Etzekorn and F. E. Kelley (St. Bonaventure, NY: St. Bonaventure Uni-
versity, 1979), vol. 4, pp. 640-50.
118. Cunningham, Genealogy of Nihilism, p. 19. I am indebted to Cunningham’s work
for arguments in this paragraph.
119. S. Knuuttila and L. Alanen, “The Foundations of Modality and Conceivability in
Descartes and His Predecessors,” in Modern Modalities: Studies of the History of Modal The-
ories from Medieval Nominalism to Logical Positivism, ed. S. Knuuttila (Dordrecht: Kluwer,
1988), pp. 1-69 (41).
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bilities are not only removed from actuality, but actuality itself is drained
of all relation to its divine source: “[D]ivine actuality disappears behind
the infinite variety of what is possible.”120
Following Avicenna and Porreta, it was Ghent, Scotus, and Ockham
who developed the primacy of essence over existence. As such, they were
instrumental in the birth and rise of modern ontology and theology.
Coupled with the univocity of being and the formal distinction between
existence and essence, the primacy of possibility over actuality provides
the basis for a universal math3sis whereby reality is reduced to abstract
and spatialized relations among things and between the knowing sub-
ject and the known object. This formalization of being underpins mod-
ern philosophy from Descartes via Suárez, Wolff, and Leibniz to Kant
and Peirce.121 Indeed, the binary account of being in terms of the possi-
ble and the necessary, which Christian theology inherited from both
Gilbert and Avicenna, stretches in different ways via Leibniz’s equation
of God with possibilitas and Kant’s claim that being “is not a real predi-
cate,” since “the real contains no more than the merely possible,”122 to
Hegel’s logic of necessity. In the West at least, late scholastic theology es-
tablished the hegemony of the possible over the actual, a hegemony per-
petuated by modern philosophy.
10. Conclusion: Faith and Reason
Modernity unfolded in different ways in the Latin West and in the
Byzantine East or in the Islamic world. It is therefore dangerous to apply
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120. Harry R. Klocker, William of Ockham and the Divine Freedom (Milwaukee: Mar-
quette University Press, 1992), p. 114.
121. See, inter alia, Étienne Gilson, Jean Duns Scot. Introduction à Ses Positions Fonda-
mentales (Paris: Vrin, 1922), pp. 595-640; Gilson, La philosophie au Moyen Âge, pp. 591-620,
638-86; Ludwig Honnefelder, Ens inquantum ens. Der Begriff des Seiendes als solchen als
Gegenstand der Metaphysik nach der Lehre des Johannes Duns Scotus (Münster: Aschendorff,
1979); L. Honnefelder, Scientia transcendens. Die formale Bestimmung der Seiendheit und
Realität in der Metaphysik des Mittelalters und der Neuzeit (Duns Scot, Suarez, Kant, Peirce)
(Hamburg: F. Meiner, 1990); L. Honnefelder, “Der zweite Anfang der Metaphysik. Voraus-
setzungen, Ansätze und Folgen der Wiederbegründung der Metaphysik im 13/14. Jahr-
hundert,” in Philosophie im Mittelalter. Entwicklungslinien und Paradigmen, ed. J.-P. Beck-
mann et al. (Hamburg: F. Meiner, 1987), pp. 165-86; Jean-François Courtine, Suarez et le
système de la métaphysique (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1990).
122. Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, A599/B627.
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the same methods, assumptions, and historical templates. But to reca-
pitulate the argument of this chapter, it is clear that in the passage to the
modern era theology was separated from philosophy and reason sun-
dered from faith. The origins of modern rationalism and fideism can be
traced to influential figures such as Avicenna and Gilbert Porreta who
redefined metaphysics as the study of being qua being and restricted ra-
tional cognition to the causal dependence of particular beings on the
universal being of God. By focusing on essence at the expense of exis-
tence, both abandoned the Neo-Platonic vision of God’s creative act of
being and human union with the divine through both contemplation
and theurgic practices framed by the doxologic of praising and giving
thanks to the divine through prayer, worship, and works.
Moreover, the emphasis on essence in both high medieval Islamic
and Christian thought introduced a split between Creator and creation,
as the link pertaining between them was now increasingly viewed in
purely causal terms. Taken together, Avicenna’s and Scotus’s shared for-
mal distinction between existence and essence and Ockham’s denial of
the reality of divine universals in created particulars favored the emer-
gence of ontological nominalism and theological voluntarism, which
characterize modernity in both the Christian and the Islamic world. Re-
inforced by the growing separation of reason from faith and the rise of
rationalism and fideism, the modern settlement has promoted the kind
of secular extremism and religious fundamentalism which have
sidelined traditional religion and which the Pope’s Regensburg address
condemned.
In this chapter, I have also examined Porreta’s twelfth-century the-
ory of individuation. Gilbert’s account of universals is not nominalist but
his position tends to be formalist, in the sense that there is no objective
basis for the presence of universals in particulars other than what the
mind establishes independently of perceiving actually existing things
(by contrast, for Augustine and Boethius, actuality discloses God’s cre-
ative and concurrent activity). Particular composites are individuated by
the confluence of a thing’s ‘total property’ (i.e., the collection of all ‘quo
ests’ that constitute an individual) and the derivation of the Good from
divine volition. Based on the separation of theology from natural philos-
ophy and the primacy of the mathematical method (demonstration by
more geometrico), Porreta focuses on the descent of forms into material-
ity as a result of the will of God whence everything derives. However, this
derivation is not amenable to human reason. Only faith can give us ac-
199
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cess to the ultimate cause that actualizes and individuates particular
material things.
One of the main differences with Plato, Aristotle, and Boethius is
that Porreta reasons from abstract possibility to concrete actuality. As a
result, particular sensible things neither mediate nor intimate the cre-
ative and concretive action of God that individuates them. Creation,
concretion, and individuation are not manifest in the actuality of things
and thus cannot be cognized rationally by the mind. According to
Gilbert, only faith gives access to the presence of transcendent forms in
immanent things. The centrality of divine absolute power and modal
possibility marks a radical departure from the Platonist framework of
relationality and participation and the Aristotelian metaphysics of act
and potency. Porreta’s emphasis on abstraction and demonstration by
more geometrico leads him to separate theology from natural philosophy
and to make Trinitarian relationality an object of pure faith that is not in-
telligible to natural reason. As a result, participation in the Trinity is ex-
trinsic and does not affect the existence and actuality of created beings.
Gilbert thus severs the real existential link between the Good and partic-
ular beings and thus undermined the vision that Augustine and Boethius
had inherited from the Platonist tradition and extended towards a meta-
physics of relationality. It was Aquinas who provided a compelling cri-
tique of ‘grammatical Platonism,’ radical Aristotelianism, and the
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CHAPTER 5
Participation in the Act of Being
1. Introduction: Aquinas’s Retrieval of Neo-Platonist Realism
In the previous chapter, I examined Gilbert Porreta’s theory of individu-
ation and drew some comparisons with Boethius’ work upon which he
commented. Gilbert’s realism can be questioned because his metaphys-
ics and epistemology begin with forms or essences, not the actual exis-
tence of particulars. Contrary to Boethius’ metaphysics, which empha-
sizes the difference between existence and essence and the relational
orientation of individual composite substances, Porreta privileges
modal metaphysics and more geometrico, which moves from abstract
possibility to concrete actuality. This devaluation of actuality means
that particular things disclose little more than their own immanent
forms, a collection of ‘quo ests’ that constitute a thing’s ‘total property’
and make it an individual. Particulars neither mediate nor intimate
God’s universal creative and concretive action, which is the first cause
of actualization and individuation.
In this chapter, I argue that St. Thomas Aquinas (c. 1225-1274) re-
trieves and extends the metaphysical tradition of Christian Neo-
Platonism that he inherited from figures such as Gregory, Augustine,
Boethius, and Dionysius. Unlike Porreta’s ‘grammatical Platonism’ cen-
tered upon abstraction and demonstration by more geometrico, Aquinas
reconfigures the relation between ‘natural philosophy’ and ‘revealed the-
ology’ along Neo-Platonist lines. In this manner, he reverses the
formalist priority of essence over existence and develops an account of
individuation that can (perhaps anachronistically but nonetheless val-
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versal act of being (which is also an infinite intelligence always in act) ac-
tualizes all particular beings in virtue of divine self-diffusive goodness
and love. Thomas’s emphasis on God’s love and goodness as well as on
ideas in the divine mind is evidence that his theology is neither proto-
rationalist nor purely natural; instead it blends God’s cataphatic kenosis
as well as the unity of the divine and the human in Christ ( following the
Cappadocians) with our apophatic ascent to union with the Creator ( fol-
lowing Dionysius). Far from emphasizing reason alone, Aquinas fuses ra-
tionality with the supernaturally infused habit of faith and argues that
our bodily sensing is at once physical and spiritual (as I will show in sec-
tions 4 and 5). As such, our mind and body are elevated to union with
God through spiritual sensing, the intellect, and the imagination. In this
way, particulars are constituted and individuated by God’s continuous
gift of being.
I also argue that Thomas draws a distinction between the cause of
individuation and the principle of individuation. The cause is the act of
being which brings everything into actuality and makes it what it is. The
principle is designated matter (materia signata), which receives this act
and thus explains diversity amongst specifically or formally identical be-
ings. The act of being acts as a primary cause, which sustains the princi-
ple that functions as secondary causality. Knowledge of God’s act of be-
ing enables composites to be further actualized and individuated by
perfecting their own divinely given form. Such action also enhances the
relational orientation of other beings and helps perfect the hierarchical
cosmos as a whole.
2. Subalternatio: A Theological Ordering of the Sciences
The question of individuation is absolutely central to the work of the An-
gelic Doctor, and his account has generated scholarly controversies since
the reception of his oeuvre.1 According to Aquinas, the individuation of
202
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1. For example, see Ingbert Klinger, Das Prinzip der Individuation bei Thomas von
Aquin: Versuch einer Interpretation und Vergleich mit zwei umstrittenen Opuscula (Münster-
schwarzach: Vier-Türme-Verlag, 1964). The most significant recent debate is between Jo-
seph Owens and John F. Wippel. See Joseph Owens, “Thomas Aquinas: Dimensive Quan-
tity as Individuating Principle,” Mediaeval Studies 50 (1988): 279-310, and John F. Wippel,
The Metaphysical Thought of Thomas Aquinas: From Finite Being to Uncreated Being (Wash-
ington, DC: Catholic University of America Press, 2000).
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composites is both a philosophical and a theological problem. Philo-
sophically, individuality concerns the Porphyrian logical tree in which the
predicates descend from the most universal down to the most specific in
connection with the individual subject of which they are affirmed or de-
nied. Likewise, individuality pertains to natural philosophy, which de-
scribes how substantial form is received into matter and diversified by
embodiment. Finally, individuality is metaphysical in the sense that it en-
compasses both the unity of particulars and their differentiation from
other particulars, as unity is a transcendental that is convertible with be-
ing. Theologically, the individuation of composites raises questions about
why the immaterial God would create not only immaterial substances
composed of being and form (e.g., angels) but also material composite
substances composed of being, form, and matter. How might such mate-
rial composites partake of God’s self-subsistent being and his absolute
goodness and plenitude? This description of the problem of individuation
emphasizes the inextricable link with the idea of creation and ties re-
vealed theology (sacra doctrina) to metaphysics or natural theology
(divina scientia). The conjunction of both and their joint subordination to
Scientia Dei is the mark of Aquinas’s account of the sciences and consti-
tutes the cornerstone of his theory of subalternation (subalternatio).2
Thomas elaborates this theory in his commentaries on Boethius, which
differ significantly from those of Porreta, in particular concerning the re-
lation between metaphysics and theology.3 The main difference is that for
Aquinas all human beings share the quest for the knowledge of truth
(veritas rerum) and to know the truth is to know that everything is created
ex nihilo (In de Caelo I 10, lec. 22, no. 8; In II Met. lec. 1, no. 275).
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2. This is the basis for Aquinas’s hierarchy of the sciences, which is ultimately gov-
erned by God’s ordering wisdom. See Mark D. Jordan, Ordering Wisdom: The Hierarchy of
Philosophical Discourses in Aquinas (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1986).
3. Martin Grabmann, Die theologische Erkenntnis- und Einleitungslehre des heiligen
Thomas von Aquin auf Grund seiner Schrift “In Boethium de Trinitate” im Zusammenhang
der Scholastik des 13. und beginnenden 14. Jahrhunderts dargestellt (Freiburg in der Schweiz:
Paulusverlag, 1948); Siegfried Neumann, Gegenstand und Methode der theoretischen
Wissenschaften nach Thomas von Aquin aufgrund der Expositio super librum Boethii De
Trinitate (Münster and Westfalen: Aschendorfsche Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1965); Matthias
Lutz-Bachmann, “Die Einteilung der Wissenschaften bei Thomas von Aquin. Ein Beitrag
zur Rekonstruktion der Epistemologie in Quaestio 5, Artikel 1 des ‘Kommentars’ von
Thomas zum Trinitätstraktat des Boethius,” in “Scientia” and “Disciplina.” Wissenstheorie
und Wissenschaftspraxis im 12. und 13. Jahrhundert, ed. R. Berndt, M. Lutz-Bachmann, and
R. M. W. Stammberger (Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 2002), pp. 235-47.
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First I will spell out Thomas’s theological ordering of the sciences in
terms of his theory of subalternation. Compared with Gilbert’s twelfth-
century method, the nature of theological enquiry at the time of Aquinas
displays both fundamental continuities and discontinuities. The
quaestio-technique has become the dominant form of theological debate
and writing, perhaps first and foremost in Peter Lombard’s Liber
sententiarum. Under the influence of a number of key figures such as
Alain of Lille (d. 1203), William of Auxerre (d. 1231), Alexander of Hales
(c. 1170-1245), William of Auvergne (c. 1180-1249), and Albert the Great
(c. 1206-1280), the quaestio-approach is by now vastly extended in three
different directions. First, the scope of application extends to all theolog-
ical matters, except for exegesis. Second, the mode of operation includes
the techniques of grammar, rhetoric, and dialectic. Third, the format
consists of a meticulous subdivision in articles, each divided in ques-
tions, answers, objections, and responses to objections, as well as an in-
creasing part devoted to free commentary — the expositio textus.4 The
main change relative to Gilbert’s time is the increasing use of new philo-
sophical concepts within theology. For this reason, the subject matter of
theology has expanded to include speculative questions.5 In part, this is
the result of a growing influence of Aristotelian metaphysics mediated
by Islamic theologians such as Averroes and Avicenna but also by
Anselm and other medieval Christian theologians, as Sylvain
Gouguenheim and others have shown.6 In the specific case of Aquinas,
the Neo-Platonist metaphysics of relational participation is the main
conceptual framework that he uses in his critique of both ‘grammatical
Platonism’ and radical Aristotelianism,7 as I will suggest in this chapter.
Indeed, Aquinas’s critical adaptation of Aristotelian metaphysics
into Christian Neo-Platonist theology (which of course is itself already
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4. Marie-Dominique Chenu, “Un essai de méthode théologique au XIIe siècle,” Revue
des Sciences Philosophiques et Théologiques 24 (1935): 258-67; André Hayen, “La théologie
aux XIIe, XIIIe et XXe siècles,” Nouvelle Revue Théologique 79 (1957): 1009-28, and 80 (1958):
113-32; M.-D. Chenu, La théologie comme science au XIIIe siècle, 3rd ed. (Paris: Vrin, 1969),
pp. 15-57; M.-D. Chenu, Introduction à l’étude de Saint Thomas d’Aquin (Paris: Vrin, 1993),
pp. 230-32; Jan A. Aertsen, Nature and Creature: Thomas Aquinas’s Way of Thought, trans.
Herbert D. Morton (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1988).
5. Chenu, La théologie comme science au XIIIe siècle, pp. 22-26.
6. See, supra, chapter 4, notes 28 and 29.
7. Cf. Fernand van Steenberghen, Thomas Aquinas and Radical Aristotelianism
(Washington, DC: Catholic University of America Press, 1980).
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Aristotelian) is evident in his early works, the first commentary on the
Sentences (In Sent.) and the treatise De ente et essentia (De ente). By the
time Aquinas composes the former in 1252-56, one of the central dis-
putes concerns the nature of theology and, more widely, the relation be-
tween philosophy and theology and between reason and faith. Thomas
rethinks the status and operation of theology (sacra doctrina) by sketch-
ing a synthesis of the established theory of literary modes of interpreting
Scripture with new metaphysical and epistemological considerations
derived from the Neo-Platonism of Aristotle mediated by both patristic
Christian Neo-Platonism and the early Islamic theology of Averroes and
Avicenna. Indeed, Aquinas combines the shared Platonist and Aristote-
lian metaphysical priority of being over knowledge8 with the Christian
theological emphasis on divine self-revelation in order to develop a new
account of divine illumination, as I will suggest in this and the following
section.9
This synthesis charts a middle ground beyond the ( false) opposition
between the philosophical fideism of Petrus Damiani and Gilbert
Porreta, on the one hand, and the theological rationalism of Alain de
Lille (c. 1128-1202/03) and William of Auvergne (d. 1249), on the other
hand.10 Contrary to Gilbert’s separation of faith and reason, Aquinas in-
sists on the difference and analogy that apply to the light of faith (lumen
fidei) and the rational intellection of principles (intellectus principiorum).
By extension, this analogical difference also pertains to the first theolog-
ical principles and the first principle of the noØv or agent intellect (In I
Sent. prol. art. 3, sol. 2, ad. 2; In I Sent. prol. art. 3, sol. 3, ad. 3). According
to Aquinas, this analogical difference or ‘differential analogy’ signifies
that knowledge in faith and in reason deals with the same objects from
different yet somehow continuous perspectives, for the habitus of sci-
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8. Chenu, La théologie comme science au XIIIe siècle, p. 42.
9. Étienne Gilson, “Pourquoi saint Thomas a critiqué saint Augustin,” Archives
d’histoire doctrinale et littéraire au Moyen-Âge 2 (1926): 5-127.
10. Alain de Lille fused Aristotle with Pythagorean elements and claimed that all reli-
gious truths (including the mysteries of faith) derive from first principles that are self-
evident to human reason without the aid of revelation. William of Auvergne defended a
similar variant of rationalism. Among other texts, he wrote De immortalitate animae, a re-
script of a book by Dominicus Gundissalinus who translated some of Avicenna’s work into
Latin and helped the diffusion of Avicennian essentialism, as I argued in the previous
chapter. There is thus a certain genealogical link stretching from Gilbert Porreta and
Avicenna via Gundissalinus to Lille and Auvergne.
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ence and the habitus of faith both draw on the habitus of principles.11
The analogy between the light of reason and the light of faith means that
God is the object of both philosophy and theology. Concomitantly, cogni-
tion of God is given to the mind not only through faith but also through
reason via sense perception and intellection (In II Sent. d. 14, q. 1, a. 2).
This stands in contrast with Porreta’s claim that pure form pertains ex-
clusively to theology and that natural philosophy can only know imma-
nent form. It is also markedly different from Gilbert’s separation of faith
from reason and the division of the sciences based on more geometrico.
Here I need to say more about the science of theology. The scientific
status of sacra doctrina, as Thomas sees it, is grounded in the distinction
between theology and faith. The former operates in virtue of the natu-
rally acquired habitus of reason. By contrast, the latter is a supernatu-
rally infused habitus.12 Whereas theology draws on natural principles,
faith is by supernatural grace alone and — pace Alain de Lille — cannot
be inferred from first principles. This conception underpins Aquinas’s
later theory of subalternatio, with both divina scientia and sacra doctrina
subordinated and directed to Scientia Dei.13 The emphasis on natural
principles and reason, which are nevertheless supernaturally oriented,
entails a focus on immanent actual things and knowledge of the tran-
scendent causes that bring them into actuality. Contrary to the ‘natural’
priority of essence over that which is, Aquinas accentuates actual being
(ens) and God’s act of being (actus essendi). By relating the particular in-
dividuality of created things to the divine universal unitary pure act of
being, Thomas reverses the severing of actualization from individuation
in the shared legacy of Avicenna and Gilbert and overcomes the proto-
modern separation of nature from the supernatural good in God.
This difference with Avicennian and Porretan essentialism is central
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11. For example, “. . . habitus scientiae inclinat ad scibilia per modum rationis . . . sed
habitus fidei, cum non rationi innitatur, inclinat per modum naturae, sicut habitus
principiorum” (In III Sent. d. 23, q. 3, art. 3, sol. 2, ad. 2) and “praeterea lumen fidei se habet
ad articulos sicut lumen naturale ad principia naturaliter cognita. Sed lumen naturale facit
videre principia per se nota. Ergo et lumen fidei facit videre articulos” (In III Sent. d. 24, q. 1,
art. 1, sol. 1).
12. “sicut habitus principiorum non acquiritur per alias scientias, sed habetur a natura,
sed acquiritur habitus conclusionum a primis principiis deductarum — ita etiam in hac
doctrina non acquiritur habitus fidei, qui est quasi habitus principiorum, sed acquiritur
habitus eorum quae ex eis deducuntur et quae ad eorum defensionem valent” (In I Sent. prol.,
q.1, art. 3, sol. 2, ad. 3).
13. Chenu, La théologie comme science au XIIIe siècle, pp. 67-92.
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to the question of individuation. Paradoxically, knowledge of God’s exis-
tence is knowledge of how and why composites are individuated. For
Aquinas, only the ecstatic goodness of God’s self-subsistent being can ul-
timately explain why the universal act of being is present in every partic-
ular being and secures both its unity and differentiation from other be-
ings. Likewise, only the divine idea of materiality can account for the
reception of substantial form in designated matter (materia signata) and
the essential relation (habitudo essentialis) between them that individu-
ates matter-form compounds. As Rudi te Velde has argued contra Nor-
man Kretzmann,14 God’s existence is neither a working hypothesis in
Aquinas’s ‘natural’ theology nor the search for an epistemic justification
of the theistic belief that God exists. Rather, in the opening chapters of
the Summa contra Gentiles, Thomas already seeks to demonstrate God’s
existence as a “necessary foundation of the whole undertaking [quasi
totius operis necessarium fundamentum]” (SCG I.9.8), which is to develop
a rationally intelligible account of God’s being and attributes. For Aqui-
nas, to know that God exists is to know that the truth of his existence is
metaphysically founded in God’s actual being. True knowledge of God
follows from his being which is and makes itself known as such. Knowl-
edge of God is amenable to the light of reason and therefore the subject-
matter of metaphysics. God’s actuality frames not only sacra doctrina
but also and equally divina scientia.
The theory of subalternation entails a different division of sciences
compared with that of Boethius and Gilbert. Contra Boethius, Thomas
does not classify the sciences according to ascending degrees of abstrac-
tion.15 Metaphysics or ‘first philosophy’ is not restricted to pure form but
instead encompasses all things, including individual material beings in
motion, “according to the common ratio of being,”16 i.e., according to
that which is common to material and immaterial substances alike. Con-
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14. Rudi te Velde, “ ‘The First Thing to Know about God’: Kretzmann and Aquinas on
the Meaning and Necessity of Arguments for the Existence of God,” Religious Studies 39
(2003): 251-67, esp. pp. 253-59.
15. Louis-Bertrand Geiger, “Abstraction et séparation d’après s. Thomas In De
Trinitate, q. 5, a. 3,” Revue des Sciences Philosophiques et Théologiques 31 (1947): 3-40. Cf. C. J.
Kelly, “Abstraction and Existence: A Study on St. Thomas, In Boethii De Trinitate q.5, a. 3,”
Laval théologique et philosophique 21 (1965): 17-42; P. Merlan, “Abstraction and Metaphysics
in St. Thomas’ Summa,” Journal of the History of Ideas 14 (1953): 284-91.
16. “secundum communem rationem entis” (In Boeth. de Trin. q. 5, a. 4, ad 6). Cf. In VII
Met. lec. 11, no. 1526, and In XII Met. lec. 2, no. 2427.
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tra Gilbert, Aquinas argues that mathematics does not provide a better
understanding of natural phenomena than natural philosophy (or phys-
ics). Rather than viewing mathematics as a meta-logical corrective to
natural philosophy and a necessary basis for knowledge of forms in the-
ology, Thomas agrees with Augustine and Boethius that mathematical
principles are grounded in the metaphysical structures of creation.
Most importantly, none of the mathematical sciences can demon-
strate propter quid or why natural phenomena occur because they all ab-
stract from natural matter, motion, and efficient and final causes (In I
Post. An. lect. 25, no. 6).17 Even though each science is autonomous and
has a proper subject-matter and method, all the mathematical sciences
are subordinate to natural philosophy or physics, which provides the
starting point for first philosophy or metaphysics. Following Plato and
Augustine, Aquinas maintains that cognition of pure form and its ulti-
mate source — God — occurs in relation to the material world, not by
fleeing from it. In developing his theory of subalternation and his classi-
fication of the sciences, he argues against the natural priority of essence
over that which is (as for Porreta). The first object of the senses and the
intellect is a being (ens), and all particular sensible things (entia) disclose
both an essence and an act of being which brings them into existence. As
I show in the following sections, Thomas’s theory of individuation is in-
extricably linked to the metaphysical question of the link between the
one and the many and to the Christian Neo-Platonist theological episte-
mology which centers on illumined abstraction and supernaturally in-
fused ‘natural’ reason.
3. Metaphysics beyond the One and the Many
Aquinas traces the problematic of unity and diversity back to Par-
menides, whose works he knows primarily via Aristotle (In I Phys. lec. 2;
In I Met. lec. 9, 137-39). Against Parmenides’ double claim that the abso-
lute unity of being excludes nonbeing and that the concept of being must
be univocal, Thomas opposes an account of being that stresses a hierar-
chical and relational ordering of analogical being flowing from God’s cre-
ative pure act of being (actus purus). As such, individuation is not added
208
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17. James A. Weisheipl, “Classification of the Sciences in Medieval Thought,”
Mediaeval Studies 27 (1965): 54-90, esp. pp. 81-90.
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extrinsically to actualized, immanent beings. Nor can individuation be
reduced to the generation of secondary effects by a primary cause.
Rather, individuation is inscribed into the very structure of being and
concerns the actualization of all things: “Each being possesses its act of
existing and its individuation in accordance with the same factor.”18 The
reality of being encompasses the unity and the diversity of all that is and
could be. Likewise, the concept of being is analogical, not univocal or
equivocal. The act of being which actualizes and individuates all things
is anagogical (perfective and elevating), not causal or indifferent.
What accounts for the concurrent unity and unicity of each thing
and the transcendent hierarchical order of all beings is the power of be-
ing (potestas or virtus essendi), which is the nature and operation of
God’s pure act of being (SCG I.28; De potentia q. 7, a. 2, ad 9; In de causis,
prop. 4). The power of being is the first cause of all beings, and common
being (esse commune) is the first effect of the power of being — a con-
ception that combines Plato’s idea of relationality with Plotinus’s argu-
ment about the creative nature of the One. The following two passages
make this point: “The first of all effects is being itself, which is presup-
posed to all other effects, and does not presuppose any other effect”;
“Being is the most common first effect and more intimate than all other
effects: wherefore it is an effect which belongs to God alone to produce
by His own power.”19 For this reason, common being marks the actuality
that stands in potency to God’s self-subsistent being (ipsum esse
subsistens). As such, it does not have existence or essence in itself but
exists by participating in God’s relational being, an account that echoes
Plato’s metaphysics.20
Common being is not some secular station that is interposed be-
tween God and beings. Nor does it describe a flat and simple ontological
plane that assembles all things identically. Instead, common being is
that which binds together all beings qua beings and relates the whole of
creation to its Creator in a real relation that reveals God to be both
209
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18. “. . . unumquodque secundum idem habet esse et individuationem” (Sent. de Anima q.
1, ad 2m).
19. “primus autem effectus est ipsum esse, quod omnibus aliis effectibus praesupponitur,
et ipsum non praesupponit aliquem alium effectum” and “ipsum esse enim est
communissimus effectus primus et intimior omnibus aliis effectibus; et ideo soli Deo competit
secundum virtutem propriam talis effectus” (De potentia q. 3, a. 4, resp., and a. 7, resp.).
20. Cf. Joseph Owens, “Thomistic Common Nature and Platonic Idea,” Mediaeval
Studies 21 (1959): 211-23.
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wholly transcendent and immanent.21 This complex structuring com-
bines both horizontal and vertical participation:
All created causes communicate in one common effect which is being,
although each one has its peculiar effect whereby they are all differen-
tiated. . . . Accordingly, they have this in common that they cause be-
ing, but they differ in that fire causes fire, and a builder causes a house.
There must therefore be some cause higher than all others by virtue of
which they all cause being and whose proper cause is being: and this
cause is God.22
Paradoxically, Aquinas’s distinction between the power of being and
common being secures the unity of the transcendent primary cause and
the diversity of its immanent secondary effects by fusing a hierarchical,
analogical relation with an asymmetrical, relational participation. Since
he posits a real difference between Creator and creation which neverthe-
less is in God ( for nothing can be outside the orbit of divine being),
Thomas traces all individual things to one and the same unique divine
source. As such, the individuality of creation mirrors the singularity of its
Creator.
In this way, Aquinas refutes Porreta’s thesis of a plurality of substan-
tial forms and outwits in advance Duns Scotus’s univocity of being as
well as Suárez’s formalist difference within a real unity. All things have a
unique form that is created by God’s pure act and participates in com-
mon being. Esse commune does not encompass the Creator but is in-
stead enfolded by divine creative power. Fran O’Rourke puts this well:
“esse commune rather is itself contained under the power of God, sicut
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21. Cf. Michael J. Dodds, “Ultimacy and Intimacy: Aquinas on the Relation between
God and the World,” in Ordo Sapientiae et Amoris: Image et message de saint Thomas
d’Aquin à travers les récentes études historiques, herméneutiques et doctrinales. Hommage
au Professeur Jean-Pierre Torrell, OP, ed. Carlos-Josaphat Pinto de Oliveira (Fribourg:
Éditions Universitaires, 1993), pp. 211-27; Thomas Weinandy, Does God Change? (Still River,
MA: St. Bede’s Publications, 1985) and Does God Suffer? (Notre Dame: University of Notre
Dame Press, 2000).
22. “Omnes autem causae creatae communicant in uno effectu qui est esse, licet sin-
gulae proprios effectus habeant, in quibus distinguuntur. . . . Conveniunt ergo in hoc quod
causant esse, sed differunt in hoc quod ignis causat ignem, et aedificator causat domum.
Oportet ergo esse aliquam causam superiorem omnibus cuius virtute omnia causent esse, et
eius esse sit proprius effectus. Et haec causa est Deus” (De potentia q. 7, a. 2, resp.; cf. De
potentia q. 3, a. 5, resp.; a. 6, resp.; a. 7, resp.; SCG I.65.4; II.15.4).
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contentum in continente, since his divine power extends beyond created
being.”23 Moreover, the ontological relation between the simplicity of
God’s self-subsistent being and the unicity of each substantial form is
such that the latter receives the divine act of being according to its own
mode and in order to be:
[E]very thing exists because it has being. A thing whose essence is not
its being, consequently, is not through its essence but by participation
in something, namely being itself. But that which is through participa-
tion in something cannot be the first being, because prior to it is the
being in which it participates in order to be.24
On this account, individuation marks the confluence of the particular
mode of being according to which each and every composite receives
and operates the universal act of being. The first principle and the final
end of individuality is (the act of) being.
In developing his metaphysical account of individuation that en-
compasses composites and separate substances (angelic individuation)
as well as the doctrine of divine simplicity, Aquinas begins with compos-
ite substances. Just as we know the prior on the basis of the posterior
(the cause on the basis of effects), so we know separate substances (and
ultimately divine simplicity) on the basis of composite substances (De
ente c. 1, 1). My focus is therefore first on the individuation of composite
substances and only then on angelic individuation and the doctrine of
divine simplicity. Each and every being that is in act (ens in actu) is so in
virtue of receiving common being: “[B]eing is common to everything
that is.”25 The nature of the mode of receiving common being varies ac-
cording to whether things are separate substances or composites, i.e.,
simple or matter-form compounds. Separate substances are void of any
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23. Fran O’Rourke, Pseudo-Dionysius and the Metaphysics of Aquinas (Leiden: E. J.
Brill, 1992), p. 142. See also Josef de Vries, “Das ‘esse commune’ bei Thomas von Aquin,”
Scholastik 39 (1964): 163-77, and Rudi A. te Velde, Participation and Substantiality in
Thomas Aquinas (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1995), pp. 184-206.
24. “Omnis res est per hoc quod habet esse. Nulla igitur res cuius essentia non est suum
esse, est per essentiam suam, sed participatione alicuius, scilicet ipsius esse. Quod autem est
per participationem alicuius, non potest esse primum ens: quia id quod aliquid participat ad
hoc quod sit, est eo prius. Deus autem est primum ens, quo nihil est prius. Dei igitur essentia
est suum esse” (SCG I.22.9).
25. “Omnibus autem commune est esse” (SCG II.15.4).
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unrealized material potentiality, but their form or essence stands in po-
tency to their own act of being (De spir. creat. q. 1, a. 1, ad. 5). In this sense,
they are composed of substance and of the act of being. Composite sub-
stances, i.e., matter-form compounds, are composed of prime matter
that stands in potency to its corresponding substantial form (which is
the act of matter), and of an essence that is composed of matter and form
and as such stands in potency to its act of being (De prin. I.3; De spir.
creat. q. 1, a. 1, resp.; SCG II.54.1-3; De sub. sep. c. 6, 8).
More specifically, composite substances are made of prime matter
and substantial form, and prime matter is brought into being by sub-
stantial form, which is its act. The nature or essence of composites is nei-
ther form alone nor matter alone but the composition of form and mat-
ter (De ente c. 2, 1). The form of the whole ( forma totius) is that which
makes the composite what it is. As such, form is that which makes a par-
ticular being (ens) this rather than that. By contrast, the act of being
brings a composite into actuality (ens in actu). For this reason, the indi-
viduation of composite beings-in-act marks a twofold actualization:
first, the actualization of prime matter (materia prima) that stands in po-
tency to substantial form; second, the actualization of matter-form com-
pounds that stand in potency to the act of being (esse or actus essendi).
This is why Aquinas shifts the emphasis away from formal essence to-
wards the partial actuality of particular beings (entia) and the pure act of
being.
Moreover, the primacy of actual being translates into the priority of
metaphysics over epistemology: “[K]nowledge has only being for its ob-
ject.”26 To know a thing’s individuality is not only to know the unity of
that particular thing and to be able to differentiate it from other things
but also to know the first principle and final end of individuation — the
creative act of self-giving by which the act of being brings everything
from nothingness into actuality and makes things what they are. In
knowing a thing, the mind knows that thing’s particularity, which is also
that thing’s unique station within the common order of universal being.
So knowledge of particularity is in some fundamental sense knowledge
of commonality: “[B]eing is found to be common to all things, which are
by themselves distinct from one another.”27 Here Aquinas draws on
212
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26. “cognitio non sit nisi entis” (De veritate q. 2, a. 3, ad 12).
27. “esse inveniatur omnibus rebus commune, quae secundum illud quod sunt, ad
invicem distinctae sunt” (De potentia q. 3, a. 5, resp.).
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Boethius to suggest that the metaphysical (nonidentical) coincidence of
individual and common being is reflected in the noetic coincidence of
the perception of particulars and the intellection of universals.28 Beyond
Boethius, Aquinas argues that to know the presence of universal being in
particular beings is to know first principles:
[S]ince nature is always directed to one thing, of one power there must
naturally be one object. . . . Hence, the intellect, being one power, has
one natural object, of which it has knowledge, essentially and natu-
rally. And this object must be one under which are included all things
known by the intellect. . . . Now this is none other than being. Our in-
tellect, therefore, knows being naturally and whatever essentially be-
longs to being as such; and upon this knowledge is founded the
knowledge of first principles.29
Epistemologically, since God is the source of first principles, it follows
for Thomas that the divine science of metaphysics (divina scientia) is
subordinate to the Science of God (Scientia Dei), as I indicated in the pre-
vious section. Ontologically, since “all beings, inasmuch as they share in
being, have certain principles that are principles of all beings,” as Aqui-
nas remarks in his commentary on Boethius’ De Trinitate,30 common be-
ing binds together all actual particular things. And since “a principle ex-
presses relationship to that which proceeds from it,”31 the principles of
being intimate that which brings all things into being and makes them
what they are — the self-subsistent pure act of being or God. Ultimately,
knowledge of a thing’s individuality is knowledge of the relation between
the unity of God’s power of being and the multiplicity of beings. By ac-
centuating the asymmetrical relationality of Creator to creation and the
‘vertical’ participation of beings in being, Thomas outflanks both the re-
213
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28. See, supra, chapter 3, section 3.
29. “Cum natura semper ordinetur ad unum, unius virtutis oportet esse naturaliter
unum obiectum. . . . Intellectus igitur cum sit una vis, est eius unum naturale obiectum, cuius
per se et naturaliter cognitionem habet. Hoc autem oportet esse id sub quo comprehenduntur
omnia ab intellectu cognita . . . Quod non est aliud quam ens. Naturaliter igitur intellectus
noster cognoscit ens, et ea quae sunt per se entis inquantum huiusmodi; in qua cognitione
fundatur primorum principiorum notitia” (SCG II.83.29).
30. “omnia entia, secundum quod in ente communicant, habent quaedam principia
quae sunt principia omnium entium” (In Boeth. de Trin. q. 5, a. 4, co. 2).
31. “principium autem relative ad principiatum dicitur” (SCG II.11.1).
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sidual dualism of the one and the many in ancient philosophy and the
priority of essence over existence in earlier medieval theology.
In the remainder of this chapter, I explore Aquinas’s theological ac-
count of individuation centering on God’s act of being. Far from threat-
ening divine unity or simplicity, Thomas shows how individuation in
the created order mirrors divine singularity within the Trinitarian God-
head. Aquinas’s innovation is to fuse the Neo-Platonic emphasis on the
self-diffusive Good with Aristotle’s conceptuality of act and potency and
to blend divine substantiality with a hierarchy of different kinds of rela-
tionality. To be individuated is to preserve and perfect God’s image and
likeness. And to know how and why a thing is this rather than that indi-
vidual is to be able to help fashion it according to its God-given unique
telos, so that all may be elevated to their proper station within the rela-
tional order of creation: “[M]an’s perfection consists in our union with
God.”32
4. Can Created Minds Know Singulars?
The question of individuation is pivotal in Aquinas’s metaphysical theol-
ogy of creation. For Thomas, each actual individual thing reflects in a
unique and particular way the universal, transcendent, and hierarchical
order of being which makes itself known to the mind via the senses and
which the mind comes to know by forming universal concepts. In seeing
individual things in act, the mind comes to know the divine act of being
which brings them into being and makes them what they are. And to
cognize the act of being is to glimpse God’s creative activity, for only the
onto-logic of creation can explain how and why being (esse) encom-
passes both the particularity of individual beings and the universality of
being, at the level of reality and concept alike. Yet at the same time, Aqui-
nas is adamant that “our intellect does not know singulars.”33 Thomas
seems to suggest that, by contrast with God’s uncreated mind, the cre-
ated human mind lacks knowledge of things qua singulars. If this were
so, the Angelic Doctor would struggle to explain how and why the link
214
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32. “perfectio hominis consistat in coniunctione ad deum” (In Boeth. de Trin. q. 2, a. 1,
resp.).
33. “. . . intellectus noster singularia non cognoscens” (De veritate q. 2, a. 4, ad 1; cf. SCG
I.65.9). Cf. George Klubertanz, “St. Thomas and the Knowledge of the Singular,” New Scho-
lasticism 26 (1952): 135-66.
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between Creator and creation is rationally intelligible. Suddenly, theo-
logical realism and intellectualism appear less compelling than the rival
positions of nominalism and voluntarism later defended by Scotus and
Ockham. Likewise, the idea of illumined reason seems less persuasive
than the fideistic alternative of Damiani and Porreta.
In the present and the following section of this chapter, I will argue
that Aquinas builds on the Christian Neo-Platonism of Gregory, Augus-
tine, Boethius, and Dionysius in order to defend a realist and intellec-
tualist theology that outwits in advance both the nominalist-voluntarist
synthesis and the false binary opposition between rationalism and
fideism. By correcting both Augustinian illumination and Aristotelian
abstraction, Thomas develops a theological epistemology that accentu-
ates the mediating role of the common sense (sensus communis), judg-
ment, and the imagination. The common sense binds together the cog-
nitive import of diverse sensory impressions and alerts us to the
presence of common being in particular things, though we can only ob-
tain cognition of universality through intellectual abstraction and sepa-
ration. Judgment enables us to apprehend the fittingness (convenientia)
of individuals in relation to other immanent individuals and transcen-
dent forms, though we can only obtain cognition of singulars with the
help of the imagination.
A. Being and Knowledge
In the tradition of Neo-Platonism, Aquinas defends an epistemological re-
alism and intellectualism according to which both material and immate-
rial reality is within the remit of analogical being and as such can be
known by the mind. In the words of Thomas, “every reality is essentially a
being”34 and “knowledge has only being for its object,” as I have already
mentioned.35 As a result, knowledge is not concerned with a priori mental
structures that we can simply name and project onto the world in order to
make sense of confused and contradictory sensory experience. Instead,
the noetic structure of intellection reflects the metaphysical structure of
reality: knowledge is knowledge of both material and immaterial things
that share in the act of being that endows everything with form, as
215
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34. “quaelibet natura est essentialiter ens” (De veritate q. 1, a. 1, corp.).
35. See, supra, note 26.
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Thomas insists as early as in his 1255 treatise De principiis naturae (I.2;
IV.3). There is an ‘appropriate’ correspondence or fittingness (convenientia)
between material things and immaterial ideas.36 Even though reality pre-
cedes our knowledge of it, being and knowing are nevertheless cotermi-
nous (e.g., De veritate q. 1, a. 1, resp.) because in the created order intelligent
beings perfect their God-given form through knowledge of their own
creatureliness and the createdness of all that is. Like Augustine, Aquinas
combines the theme of cosmic harmony (common to scriptural and philo-
sophical reflections on measure, number, and weight) with the question of
virtue and perfectibility. His Iamblichean-Proclean emphasis on theurgic
elevation rather than the Aristotelian focus on abstractive contemplation
is key, as I will show in the course of the present chapter.
Instead of a specific number of categories or purely causal accounts,
Thomas privileges the more (Neo-)Platonist language of the creative, self-
giving Good and universal forms in which things participate relationally.
This retrieval of Plato — and not just Aristotle — also explains the accen-
tuation of teleology and questions about ‘why’ things are the way they are
— not just ‘how’ they might be so. Aquinas puts this as follows:
[T]he problem of why something is so is related to the problem of
whether it is so, in the same way that an inquiry as to what something
is stands in regard to an inquiry as to whether it exists. For the question
why looks for a means to demonstrate that something is so . . . like-
wise, the question what is it seeks a means to demonstrate that some-
thing exists, according to the traditional teaching in Posterior Analytics
II, 1; 89b 22. Now, we observe that those who see that something is so
naturally desire to know why. So too, those acquainted with the fact
that something exists naturally desire to know what this thing is, and
this is to understand its substance.37
216
MATTER AND FORM
36. This is what underpins Aquinas’s adequation theory of truth, as outlined already
in De veritate q. 1, a. 1, corp. Cf. John Milbank and Catherine Pickstock, Truth in Aquinas
(London and New York: Routledge, 2001), ch. 1.
37. “Sicut se habet quaestio propter quid ad quaestionem quia, ita se habet quaestio
quid est ad quaestionem an est: nam quaestio propter quid quaerit medium ad demon-
strandum quia est aliquid, puta quod luna eclipsatur; et similiter quaestio quid est quaerit
medium ad demonstrandum an est, secundum doctrinam traditam in II posteriorum.
Videmus autem quod videntes quia est aliquid, naturaliter scire desiderant propter quid.
Ergo et cognoscentes an est aliquid, naturaliter scire desiderant quid est ipsum, quod est
intelligere eius substantiam” (SCG III.50.4; my italics).
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Since we are endowed with a natural desire for knowing first principles
and ultimate finalities (In I Met. lec. 1, nos. 1-4), we seek to discover not
just whether things are and in what sense they are individual but also
how and why this might be so (In Boeth. de Trin. q. 6, a. 3, resp.). By anal-
ogy with the link between an Deus sit and quid sit Deus, the created order
can be understood only in terms of the relation between existence and
essence, which both flow from the goodness of its Creator in whom all
transcendentals are fully convertible (De veritate q. 21, a. 1, resp. and ad 5.;
ST I, q. 5, a. 1, resp.). As I will demonstrate in greater detail below, ‘indi-
viduality’ is linked to transcendental unity in such a way that God him-
self is supremely singular. Therefore, it is not the case that general being
somehow creates particular being. Rather, God’s infinite mode of united
‘definiteness’ (yliatim in Aquinas’s commentary on the Liber de Causis)
imparts a share of its singular unity to created beings according to a fi-
nite mode. For this reason, individual things mirror and intimate divine
singularity, and everything within creation is individuated in union with
its Creator through contemplative knowledge of singularity, theurgic
practices, and praise for the divine. Just as ‘ontological’ individuation
marks the actualization and perfection of particular beings by the divine
act of being, so ‘epistemological’ individuation describes the actualiza-
tion and perfection of universal form in particular things through di-
vinely illumined knowledge. As such, God’s creative power of being pro-
vides both the original meta-physical act of self-giving and the meta-
epistemic principle of intelligibility of all that is.
Before I can further explore Thomas’s account of individuation, I will
briefly return to the question of being, knowledge, and the human desire
for divinely illumined truth. Aquinas explores the ‘Meno paradox’ of why
we desire that which we do not as yet know by extending the Platonist
insistence on the ecstatic outflow of the Good with the Aristotelian lan-
guage of act and potency in the direction of creation ex nihilo and Trini-
tarian relationality. Divine goodness is that which endows us with the
natural desire for the supernatural Good in God. Here Thomas positions
divina scientia within the shared metaphysical tradition stretching from
Plato via Aristotle and Plotinus to Dionysius: “ ‘the good is that which all
things desire.’ ”38 Paradoxically, this natural desire for the supernatural
good discloses the divinely infused self-transcendence of all things:
217
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38. Quoted by Aquinas in In de Div. Nom. IV.7.10; In Eth. I.1.9; ST I, q. 5, a. 1, resp.; the
reference in Aristotle is Ethics I 1, 1094a3.
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“[E]verything primarily and of itself seeks its own completion, which is
‘the good’ of each one and is always proportioned to what can be com-
pleted, and in this regard has a similitude with respect to it [the thing
completed].”39 Beyond Aristotle and Porphyry, Aquinas situates the
Good within the orbit of being and associates the natural orientation to
the supernatural truth in God with the desire to be in act: “[A]ll things,
each according to its mode, desire to be in act; this is clear from the fact
that each thing according to its nature resists corruption. To be in act,
therefore, constitutes the nature of the good.”40 Pure actuality is not sim-
ply the final cause that provides the ultimate lure for things in this world.
Instead, it is God’s ecstatic self-giving which offers everything a share in
the act of being and in so doing endows it with actual goodness. This is
why being and the good are coterminous and the actuality of being en-
joys absolute primacy over the potency of nonbeing. The latter also ac-
counts for Aquinas’s insistence that true knowledge is knowledge of the
‘adequation’ between the knowing mind and the known object. To say
that “all things desire to be” is to say that “everything loves its own being
and desires its preservation, an indication of which is the fact that every
thing resists its own dissolution.”41
Moreover, knowledge and being are not just coextensive but also
mutually reinforcing. If things have being in virtue of form (De prin. I.2;
IV.3), then knowledge of being is itself ontologically constitutive of real-
ity: to know a thing is to make that thing’s spiritual and material form
more intensely present in the mind and in the world because a thing’s
potency and telos include its cognoscibility (or potency to be known, as
Boethius remarks), which is actualized in the act of knowing. If things
make themselves known to the mind via the senses and if things have
first principles and final ends (In I Met. lec. 2, nos. 45-46), then coming to
know a thing makes a difference to the known thing and the knowing
mind — there is a harmonious correspondence (convenientia) between a
thing’s telos to be known and the mind’s desire to know. The act of know-
218
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39. “. . . unumquodque primo et per se appetit suam perfectionem quae est bonum
uniuscuiusque et est semper proportionata perfectibili et secundum hoc habet similitudinem
ad ipsum” (In Boeth. de Hebd. 2, 279-81).
40. “Omnia autem appetunt esse actu secundum suum modum: quod patet ex hoc quod
unumquodque secundum naturam suam repugnat corruptioni. Esse igitur actu boni
rationem constituit” (SCG I.37.4; cf. SCG III.3.4; De veritate q. 21, a. 2, resp.).
41. “esse namque suum unumquodque amat et conservari appetit; signum autem est,
quia contra pugnat unumquodque suae corruptioni” (SCG II.41.5).
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ing actualizes the potency to be known and in so doing brings a thing’s
being and the mind’s being more intensely into actuality.
Epistemologically, the primacy of being over knowing translates into
the priority of sense perception over abstraction. Aquinas develops Aris-
totle’s imperative that “ ‘all our knowledge begins with the senses’ ”42 in a
more theological direction by linking divine revelation to the disclosure
of God’s creative activity in created things. First of all, he argues that “a
thing makes itself known in the soul by its exterior appearance, since our
cognition takes its beginning from sense, whose direct object is sensible
qualities.”43 Since they are brought into actuality by God’s act of being,
things are not merely passive entities that are ‘just there.’ Instead, every-
thing in actu appeals to our senses and activates sense perception: “[A]
sense cannot perceive unless it is stimulated by a sensible object,”44 for
there is a priority of being over knowing. Here Thomas’s epistemology
builds on Boethius’ demonstration that universals are manifest in partic-
ulars and that the actuality of beings actualizes the potency to be and to
know. Pace Gilbert, individuality describes not a thing’s pure formal es-
sence but rather the unique union of form and matter that differentiates
this from that.
Second, Aquinas’s epistemological realism has attracted derision
from modern and contemporary critics who accuse him either of
essentialism or of existentialism. Since he is guilty of neither, Thomas
outwits all his deriders. Contrary to Descartes’s circular and inward self-
evidence of cogito ergo sum, Thomas inverts the primacy of the thinking
mind and reestablishes the ontological primacy of object over subject.
Like judgment and the imagination, the senses have a mediating func-
tion between the mind and the world. Sensory perception, far from in-
ducing confusion and deception, constitutes a self-exteriorizing move-
ment: to perceive anything at all is primarily to understand that both the
219
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42. “ ‘omnis nostra cognitio a sensu ortum habet,’ ” in Aquinas, In Boeth. de Trin. q. 1, a. 3,
s.c. 3. Crucially, in Post. Anal. II, 19, 100a14–b5, Aristotle argues that “for though one per-
ceives the particular, perception is of the universal . . . for perception too instils in this
way.” Cf. SCG I.30.3. Cf. Cornelio Fabro, “Il Problema della Percezione Sensoriale,”
Bollettino Filosofico 4 (1938): 5-62.
43. “res enim notitiam sui facit in anima per ea quae de ipsa exterius apparent, quia
cognitio nostra a sensu initium sumit, cui per se obiectum sunt sensibiles qualitates” (De
veritate q. 1, a. 10, resp.).
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subject and the object exist rather than to become aware of the thinking
self: “For one perceives that he has a soul, that he lives, and that he exists,
because he perceives that he senses.”45 The centrality of sense perception
requires a separate discussion, which I now turn to.
B. Knowledge and Sense Perception
In a rejoinder to a debate between Sheldon Cohen and John Haldane
about Aquinas’s theory of perception, Paul Hoffman dismisses Haldane’s
interpretation and seeks to reconcile Cohen’s rereading with a more tra-
ditional understanding of sense cognition in Thomist philosophy.46 In
what follows, I shall argue that Hoffman is right about Cohen and Hal-
dane, but wrong about Aquinas. Without sense power, Hoffman reduces
perception to the passive reception of sensible form and fails to recog-
nize the active apprehension of actual form-matter compounds. I revisit
the triangular debate between Cohen, Haldane, and Hoffman before I
outline my own account of sense power and perception in Thomas’s
metaphysics.
Cohen advances a physicalist reading of perception and ascribes
special importance to Aquinas’s distinction between the natural and
spiritual reception of sensible forms. He takes issue with the interpreta-
tion defended by Étienne Gilson and D. W. Hamyln, who argue that sen-
sation involves a nonphysical reception of a sensible form which ulti-
mately leads to a mental image or, in Aquinas’s terminology,
phantasma.47 Cohen’s contention is that both natural and spiritual re-
ception is always a ‘physical event’ that results in a physical likeness
rather than an intellectual representation.48 As such, he attributes to
220
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45. “In hoc enim aliquis percipit se animam habere, et vivere, et esse, quod percipit se
sentire et intelligere” (De veritate q. 10, a. 8, resp.; my italics).
46. Sheldon M. Cohen, “St. Thomas Aquinas on the Immaterial Reception of Sensible
Forms,” Philosophical Review 91 (1982): 193-209; John Haldane, “Aquinas on Sense Percep-
tion,” Philosophical Review 92 (1983): 233-39; Paul Hoffman, “St. Thomas Aquinas on the
Halfway State of Sensible Being,” Philosophical Review 99 (1990): 73-92.
47. Étienne Gilson, Le Thomisme. Introduction à la philosophie de St. Thomas d’Aquin,
5th ed. (Paris: Vrin, 1948), English translation: The Christian Philosophy of St. Thomas Aqui-
nas, trans. L. K. Shook (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1956), pp. 203-4; D. W.
Hamyln, Sensation and Perception (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1961), p. 46 passim.
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Aquinas a unitary theory of sensation whereby sensation is a power of
the body-soul compound (not of the soul alone), which involves the nat-
ural and the spiritual reception of sensible forms as a physical event (not
as a physical and a mental event). In other words, a sensible object ef-
fects a change at the level of the sense organ, but not at the level of the
soul. For this reason, the likeness in the sense organ is physical insofar as
it is a material reflection by receiving the material disposition of the sen-
sible object without acquiring that particular material disposition. For
instance, a mirror can receive the color ‘red’ without either turning red
itself or ceasing to reflect other colors.
However, Cohen’s monism disguises a more fundamental dualism in
his interpretation between unconscious perception and conscious sen-
sation — or perceptual and cognitive reception. He wrongly asserts that
Aquinas separates the perceptual reception of sensible forms, which is
passive and limited to the sense organ, from the cognitive reception of
sensible forms, which is active and encompasses appetites, desires, and
awareness.49 Thomas rejects this separation, arguing instead that
“intellectively, cognizing is like sensing: what they share is passion, being
affected.”50 A purely physicalist reading like Cohen’s, which focuses on
the passive registration of a sensible form by a sense organ, misses the
spiritual transformation involved in perception: “A change is spiritual
when the form causing the change is received in the thing being changed
according to a spiritual mode of being, as the form of color in the pupil,
which is not made colored by this.”51 So in perceiving actual sensible
things, the sense organ itself undergoes both a physical and a spiritual
change.
This is crucial because it challenges the purported dualism in Aquinas
between physical reception and spiritual change and, more fundamen-
tally, between matter and form. Since composite substances constitute a
single, unique matter-form compound (rather than the juxtaposition of
221
Participation in the Act of Being
49. Cohen, “St. Thomas Aquinas on the Immaterial Reception of Sensible Forms,” pp.
207-9.
50. “Ex hoc autem sequitur quod, cum sentire sit quoddam pati a sensibili, aut aliquid
simile passioni, quod intelligere sit vel pati aliquid ab intelligibili, vel aliquid alterum
huiusmodi, simile scilicet passioni” (In De anima lib. III, lec. 7, n. 5, commenting on De
anima III 4, 429a13-18).
51. “spiritualis autem secundum quod forma immutantis recipitur in immutato
secundum esse spirituale, ut forma coloris in pupilla, quae non fit per hoc colorata” (ST I, q.
78, a. 3, resp.)
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material potency and formal actuality),52 individuation is not confined to
essences and encompasses both the unity of each actual thing and its dif-
ferentiation from other actual things, as I have already suggested. Like-
wise, perception is not limited to the ‘physical event’ of receiving sensible
form, as Cohen maintains, but also entails the spiritual transformation of
the knowing mind, the known thing, and the senses that mediate between
them. Indeed, the realism of Thomas’s metaphysics emphasizes that all
cognition transforms both the knowing subject and the known object and
that perception is a form of prereflexive cognition of singularity:
A sense is a power in a corporeal organ; the intellect is an immaterial
power that is not the act of any corporeal organ. . . . [T]he sense must
corporeally receive a likeness of the thing being sensed. Intellect in-
corporeally and immaterially receives a likeness of what it
cognizes. . . . A thing’s likeness, received in the senses, represents that
thing as it is singular. A likeness received in intellect represents that
thing as the defining character of a universal nature. This is why the
senses have cognition of singular things, whereas intellect has cogni-
tion of universals.53
Here Aquinas goes further than simply restoring Boethius’ distinction
between sensory cognition of singularity and intellective cognition of
222
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52. Indeed, the essence of a composite substance is neither form itself nor the rela-
tion between form and matter but the matter-form compound itself: “[E]ssence embraces
both matter and form . . . essence does not signify the relation between matter and form or
something added to them (essentia comprehendit materiam et formam . . . non potest dici
quod essentia significet relationem quae est inter materiam et formam uel aliquid superaddi-
tum)” (De ente c. 2, 1-2).
53. The full quote in Latin is as follows: “sensus est virtus in organo corporali; intellectus
vero est virtus immaterialis, quae non est actus alicuius organi corporalis. Unumquodque
autem recipitur in aliquo per modum sui. Cognitio autem omnis fit per hoc, quod cognitum est
aliquo modo in cognoscente, scilicet secundum similitudinem. Nam cognoscens in actu, est
ipsum cognitum in actu. Oportet igitur quod sensus corporaliter et materialiter recipiat
similitudinem rei quae sentitur. Intellectus autem recipit similitudinem eius quod intelligitur,
incorporaliter et immaterialiter. Individuatio autem naturae communis in rebus corporalibus
et materialibus, est ex materia corporali, sub determinatis dimensionibus contenta: universale
autem est per abstractionem ab huiusmodi materia, et materialibus conditionibus individu-
antibus. Manifestum est igitur, quod similitudo rei recepta in sensu repraesentat rem secun-
dum quod est singularis; recepta autem in intellectu, repraesentat rem secundum rationem
universalis naturae: et inde est, quod sensus cognoscit singularia, intellectus vero universalia”
(In De anima lib. II, lec. 12, n. 5, commenting on De anima 417b19-29: 71-94).
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universality. Since “sense and intellect are similar,”54 perception is con-
ceptually informed, just as intellection is always also perceptual. Indeed,
in the Summa contra Gentiles, Thomas argues that sensation (sentire) is a
joint operation of the soul and the body.55 Cohen’s physicalism ignores
that sensation blends passivity and activity because sensation is both re-
ception and mediation — immaterial reception of sensible form and me-
diation of sensible reality to the mind (De veritate q. 10, a. 11, resp.).
Why does this matter for the question of individuation? Knowledge
of singularity perfects both the knowing subject and the known object,
as I have already argued. Aquinas’s metaphysics of analogy and partici-
pation builds on the patristic Neo-Platonist concepts of perfectibility
and degrees of being and goodness (in the work of figures such as Greg-
ory and Dionysius) in order to emphasize the idea of anagogy or eleva-
tion to union with God. The ‘similarity’ of the senses and the intellect
that Thomas identifies is an integral part of his theological epistemol-
ogy, such that one can speak of a hierarchical mediation of species from
the senses via the intellect back to the senses and the imagination. In-
deed, species are both sensible and intelligible, and in this way percep-
tion and intellective cognition are symmetrical: “We have actual sensa-
tion or actual knowledge because our intellect or our senses are
informed by the species or likeness of the sensible or intelligible ob-
ject.”56 Species are not neutral intermediate instances between sensible
reality and the intellective soul. On the contrary, they represent the ob-
ject to the senses and the mind in an appropriate or proportionate fash-
ion — hence the importance of convenientia or ‘adequation’ in Aquinas’s
account of truth, as Gilbert Narcisse has shown.57 Since true knowing is
the product of “the assimilation of the knower to the thing known” (De
veritate q. 1, a. 1, resp.), sensible species cannot be either mere pictorial
images or proper objects of intellectual knowledge. Instead, they acti-
223
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54. Aristotle, De anima III 2, 427a9, quoted by Aquinas in his De sen. c. 18, 449a17-18.
55. “sunt tamen aliquae operationes communes sibi et corpori, ut timere et irasci et
sentire et huiusmodi: haec enim accidunt secundum aliquam transmutationem alicuius
determinatae partis corporis, ex quo patet quod simul sunt animae et corporis operationes.
Oportet igitur ex anima et corpore unum fieri, et quod non sint secundum esse diversa” (SCG
II.57.6).
56. ST I, q. 14, a. 2, resp.
57. Gilbert Narcisse, Les raisons de Dieu: Arguments de convenance et esthétique
théologique selon St. Thomas d’Aquin et Hans Urs von Balthasar (Fribourg: Éditions
Universitaires Fribourg Suisse, 1997).
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vate the power of sense organs and in so doing mediate the form of a sen-
sible object to the senses and the mind alike. Leen Spruit summarizes
this well:
[The species] represents that characteristic feature of sensible things,
which grounds the act of sense perception: it is an effect of the thing
communicating itself according to its formal structure. This general
view entails that the species in sensation is an instrumental principle
rather than the perceptual object itself. Once received in our soul, it
enables us to construct a sensory image or representation, that is, the
phantasm.58
If the species is an “instrumental principle rather than the perceptual
object itself,” it follows for Aquinas that the senses perceive sensible real-
ity itself — not a world of mere phenomena from which the mind must
abstract in order to construct the world of noumena, as Kant would later
assert.
C. Two Modes of Being
At this juncture it is instructive to consider Haldane’s intervention in the
debate with Cohen and Hoffman. Haldane characterizes Aquinas’s defi-
nition of the nature of sensible being as a ‘halfway state’ between materi-
ality and immateriality. Based on Thomas’s distinction between two
modes of being (esse naturale and esse intentionale), he suggests that
form can exist according to two modes: in a particular composite sub-
stance, the form ‘humanity’ is instantiated ‘naturally,’ and in the senses,
the same form is present ‘intentionally.’ He supports this argument by
quoting from Aquinas’s commentary of Aristotle’s De anima: “And it is
thus that a sense receives form without matter, the form having, in the
sense, a different mode of being from that which it has in the object
sensed. In the latter it has a material mode of being (esse naturale) but in
the sense, a cognitional and spiritual mode (esse intentionale).”59 This dis-
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58. Leen Spruit, Species Intelligibilis: From Perception to Knowledge (Leiden: E. J. Brill,
1994), vol. 1, p. 163.
59. “Et per hunc modum, sensus recipit formam sine materia, quia alterius modi esse
habet forma in sensu, et in re sensibili. Nam in re sensibili habet esse naturale, in sensu autem
habet esse intentionale et spirituale” (In de Anima lib. II, lec. 24, n. 3).
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tinction is important in three ways. First, Thomas contends that both
the senses and the intellect cognize sensible objects according to the
form of their materiality, in relation to material embodiment or by ab-
stracting from it. In so doing, the senses and the mind receive being spiri-
tually or intentionally. Intentionality signifies things themselves ( first in-
tention) or concepts (second intention), in such a way that knowledge of
forms perfects the knowing mind as well as the known thing and enables
intellectual beings to preserve and enhance their own unique singular
form and that of other things in creation. The importance of inten-
tionality for Aquinas’s account of individuation is evinced by his fusion
of the particularity of individual things with the universality of common
concepts like ‘individual,’ as Thomas makes clear in the following pas-
sage:
[T]he individual can be signified in a twofold way, either by a noun of
the second intention, like the noun ‘individual’ or ‘singular,’ which
does not signify the singular thing but the intention of singularity; or
by a noun of the first intention, which signifies the thing to which the
intention of particularity belongs.60
The distinction between first and second intention is instrumental to
the notion of demonstratio in Aquinas’s epistemology, i.e., a rationally in-
telligible account of being, as Joseph Owens has rightly remarked. In the
case of a second-intention predicate, ‘individual’ refers to an instance of
a species and in this sense is not unique, as there are other individuals
with the same specific nature. Only according to the first intention does
the notion of individuality limit the signification to the one unique ac-
tual thing.61 In the following section, I provide a detailed account of the
metaphysical meaning of individuality.
Second, the distinction between natural and intentional being con-
firms that perception is always already cognitive. If this is so, then
225
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60. “. . . individuum dupliciter potest significari vel per nomen secundae intentionis,
sicut hoc nomen ‘individuum’ vel ‘singulare’, quod non significat rem singularem, sed
intentionem singularitatis; vel per nomen primae intentionis, quod significat rem, cui
convenit intentio particularitatis” (In I Sent. d. 23, q. 1, a. 3, resp.). Cf. In I Sent. d. 26, q. 1, a. 1,
ad 3m; In III Sent. d. 6, q. 1, a. 1, resp.
61. Joseph Owens, “Thomas Aquinas (b. ca. 1225; d. 1274),” in Individuation in Scholas-
ticism: The Later Middle Ages and the Counter-Reformation 1150-1650, ed. Jorge J. E. Gracia
(Albany: State University of New York Press, 1994), pp. 173-94 (179).
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Haldane is wrong to allege that Aquinas’s theory of universals in particu-
lars is incoherent. He is also mistaken in following D. W. Hamlyn’s point
that phantasmata are mental products of sense stimulation which “fill a
gap in a causal theory of perception . . . a link . . . between the stimulation
of the sense organ and the final judgement about those objects.”62 In a
synthesis of Plato and Aristotle, Aquinas argues instead that form is uni-
versal and singular, common, and particular, in the sense that humanity
is indeed instantiated individually in each human being. Yet at the same
time, the act of being, which brings things into existence and actualizes
their form, is common to all beings, as I showed in section 2 of the present
chapter. Equally, phantasmata do not have to fill any gap because there is
no such gap: the symmetry between sense perception and intellectual
cognition implies that species are present in the sense and in the mind ac-
cording to the same cognitional or spiritual mode of being. Phantasmata
do not bridge an otherwise unbridgeable gap because perception and
cognition are always already related to each other in analogous and hier-
archical ways, without any need to appeal to a tertiary instance.
Aquinas’s distinction between a natural and a cognitional (or spiri-
tual) mode of being is important in a third way. It shows that in the
senses, species are immaterial yet individuated and received physically
by the sense organ:
There is the perfect immateriality of intelligible being; for in the intel-
lect things exist not only without matter, but even without their indi-
viduating material conditions, and also apart from any material organ.
Then there is the half-way state of sensible being. For as things exist in
sensation they are free indeed from matter, but are not without their
individuating material conditions, nor apart from a bodily organ.63
On this point, Hoffman’s contribution to the debate with Cohen and
Haldane is crucial. Hoffman states what he takes to be Aquinas’s two guid-
ing metaphysical principles in connection with individual sensible being:
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62. Hamlyn, Sensation and Perception, p. 49, quoted by Haldane, “Aquinas on Sense
Perception,” p. 238.
63. “Nam quoddam est penitus immateriale, scilicet esse intelligibile. In intellectu enim
res habent esse, et sine materia, et sine conditionibus materialibus individuantibus, et etiam
absque organo corporali. Esse autem sensibile est medium inter utrumque. Nam in sensu res
habet esse sine materia, non tamen absque conditionibus materialibus individuantibus,
neque absque organo corporali” (In De anima lib. II, lec. 5, n. 6).
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first of all, what is received is received according to the mode of the recipi-
ent and, second, the principle that individuates things is matter. Senses re-
ceive species corporeally and materially, while the intellect receives them
incorporeally and immaterially. But since perception is always already
cognitive, senses also somehow receive species incorporeally and immate-
rially, though not in the same way as the intellect. This is what Aquinas de-
scribes as the ‘half-way’ state of sensible being, which he conceptualizes in
terms of degree of materiality and immateriality.64 What does this mean
and what are the implications? As Hoffman shows, the idea of degrees is
paramount because it enables Thomas to argue that forms are present in
the senses according to both modes. For this reason, Aquinas distin-
guishes between the reception by the senses, which is corporeal and mate-
rial (Cohen’s ‘physical event’), and the apprehension by the senses, which
is incorporeal and immaterial: “It must be said, as I have already said, that
passion properly is found where there is corporeal change. This indeed is
found in the acts of the sensitive appetite: there is not only spiritual
change, as there is in sensitive apprehension, but also natural change.”65
Hoffman is also right to argue that corporeal or material reception is not
the same as natural (as opposed to spiritual) change. For reception of sen-
sible form always involves a recipient — the senses — but does not neces-
sarily involve reception of matter: insofar as agents act by their form, every
patient receives form without matter.66 Aquinas addresses the question of
whether changes are natural or spiritual and whether spiritual change re-
quires a soul in terms of the material disposition of the patient and the
agent vis-à-vis the form. If that disposition is identical, then forms are not
received without matter (e.g., air acted on by fire). Applied to sensible be-
ing, the implication is that the immaterial reception of sensible species is
material because it takes place in sense organs and it is immaterial be-
cause sensitive apprehension (or perception) is cognitive.
Why and how is this relevant to the question of individuation? So far
we have seen that sensual perception is the double locus of material and
immaterial reception and natural and spiritual change. Given that the
intellect cognizes universal form abstracted from matter and without
any sense organ, it is the senses that enable us to cognize particular
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64. Hoffman, “St. Thomas Aquinas on the Halfway State of Sensible Being,” pp. 83-85.
65. “Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut iam dictum est, passio proprie invenitur ubi est
transmutatio corporalis. Quae quidem invenitur in actibus appetitus sensitivi; et non solum
spiritualis, sicut est in apprehensione sensitiva, sed etiam naturalis” (ST I-II, q. 22, a. 3, resp.).
66. Hoffman quotes in support In De anima lib. II, c. 12, lec. 24: 551.
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form. For this reason, sense perception is indispensable to the cognition
of individuals. This is exactly what Thomas concludes in the De veritate:
[O]ur mind is notably directed to know singulars, for we know
singulars directly through our sensitive powers which receive forms
from things into a bodily organ. In this way, our senses receive them
under determined dimensions and as a source of knowledge of the
material singular. For, just as a universal form leads to the knowledge
of matter in general, so an individual form leads to the knowledge of
designated matter, which is the principle of individuation.67
But Hoffman fails to address two questions that arise from this argu-
ment and are central to Aquinas’s theory of individuation. First, how do
we perceive sensible species? Second, what do we perceive when a spe-
cies is present to our senses according to both the cognitional and the
spiritual mode? In what follows, I will show that Thomas’s answer to the
first question is sense power and his answer to the second question is
common being instantiated in individual beings.
D. Sense Power
In this subsection I outline Thomas’s account of sense power by drawing
primarily on his commentary of Aristotle’s On sense and what is sensed
(1267-69) but also on some key questions in the Summa Theologiae. Aqui-
nas follows both biblical teaching and Greek metaphysics on the priority
of being vis-à-vis knowing in order to show that it is actual objects that
activate the senses: “ ‘sensation occurs as a result of one’s being moved by
external objects of sense’ [Aristotle, De anima II.5]. Hence, man cannot
sense without an external sensible object, any more than a thing can be
moved without a mover.”68 In other words, the actuality of sensible ob-
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67. “Unde patet quod mens nostra directe singulare cognoscere non potest; sed directe
cognoscitur a nobis singulare per virtutes sensitivas, quae recipiunt formas a rebus in organo
corporali: et sic recipiunt eas sub determinatis dimensionibus, et secundum quod ducunt in
cognitionem materiae singularis. Sicut enim forma universalis ducit in cognitionem materiae
universalis, ita forma individualis ducit in cognitionem materiae signatae, quae est
individuationis principium” (De veritate q. 10, a. 5, resp.).
68. “ ‘sentire accidit in ipso moveri a sensibilibus exterioribus’. Unde non potest homo
sentire absque exteriori sensibili: sicut non potest aliquid moveri absque movente” (SCG II.57.8).
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jects actualizes the potency of our sense organs, such that our potential
to see becomes actual seeing and what was visible is now seen (De sen. c.
5, 439a12-18). In this process, which is both physical and spiritual, there is
an adequation (convenientia) between seeing and what is seen. The bond
that binds them together is the actuality of God’s act of being, which
(and here I anticipate my argument) we can dimly apprehend when we
perceive actual sensible things. The faculty that enables us to do so is
sense power. First of all, sense power is not limited to the body but also
concerns the soul: “[S]ense-power is common to soul and body, for sens-
ing pertains to the soul through the body.”69 For this reason, Hoffman is
right to emphasize the physical and the spiritual dimension of sensation
in Aquinas’s epistemology. But here one can go further than this and re-
late sense power not only to the vegetative and appetitive part of the soul
but also to the cognitive or intellective part and ultimately to the essence
of an intelligent being. If sensing is necessary to knowing and if knowing
is the proper act of the intellective part of the soul, then sensing is indis-
pensable to the operation of the soul. If a substance’s essence is related
to that substance’s specific operation, which it is for Aquinas (already in
the De ente et essentia), then sensing is an integral part of what it is to be
an intelligent being.
Second, sense power is both material and immaterial because there
are degrees of materiality and immateriality and therefore sensible being
can be said to be in a halfway state, as Hoffman argues correctly against
both Cohen and Haldane. Beyond Hoffman, it is important to link the
idea of degrees of materiality to cognition of singulars. For Aquinas, only
the senses (and the imagination) can know singulars qua singulars pre-
cisely because singularity involves matter, which is the principle of
individuation70 — as I will argue in detail. Building on Aristotle’s argu-
ment in the De anima that the knowledge of individuals is the joint prod-
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69. “sensus autem communis est animae et corpori, sentire enim convenit animae per
corpus” (De sen. proem 436a18).
70. “[T]he sensitive power that is in animals is certainly open to what is outside, but
only in the singular. Hence it also has an immateriality inasmuch as it is receptive of forms
of sensible things without matter, but it has the lowest immateriality in the order of
knowers, inasmuch as it can receive these forms only in a bodily organ (Virtus autem
sensitiva, quae inest animalibus, est quidem capax extrinsecorum, sed in singulari tantum:
unde et quamdam immaterialitatem habet, inquantum est susceptiva specierum sensibilium
sine materia; infimam tamen in ordine cognoscentium, inquantum huiusmodi species
recipere non potest nisi in organo corporali)” (De sen. c. 1, 436b10).
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uct of the senses and the intellect but originates in the senses and re-
quires sense power, Aquinas makes the crucial point that sense power
gives us access to singularity:
If [the object] is apprehended as an individual — e.g. when I see some-
thing coloured I perceive this human being or this animal — then this
sort of apprehension in a human being is produced through the cogi-
tative power. This is also called particular reason, because it joins in-
dividual intentions in the way that universal reason joins universal
concept. But all the same, this power is in the soul’s sensory part. For
the sensory power, at its highest level, participates somewhat in the
intellective power in a human being, in whom sense is connected to
intellect. . . . The cogitative power apprehends an individual as exist-
ing under a common nature. It can do this insofar as it is united to the
intellective power in the same subject. Thus it cognises this human
being as it is this human being.71
Aquinas’s argument is that sense power is in the sense organs but not of
the sense organs, insofar as it is both physical and spiritual, both mate-
rial and immaterial. The physicality and materiality of sense power de-
rives from the activation by sensible objects, which are themselves mate-
rial. The spirituality and immateriality of sense power follows from the
idea that the sensible species are perceived immaterially yet in relation
to their material individuating conditions. The difference between sense
cognition and intellective cognition is precisely that the former relates
sensible species to their embodiment while the latter abstracts from it.
More precisely, sense power is at an intermediary station between
sensible objects and sense organs on the one hand and intelligible form
and abstraction on the other hand: “[S]eeing itself is not located in the
appearance of this form in the eye, but in what is doing the seeing, that
230
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71. “Si vero apprehendatur in singulari, utpute cum video coloratum, percipio hunc ho-
minem vel hoc animal, huiusmodi quidem apprehensio in homine fit per vim cogitativam,
quae dicitur etiam ratio particularis, eo quod est collativa intentionum individualium, sicut
ratio universalis est collativa rationum universalium. Nihilominus tamen haec vis est in parte
sensitiva; quia vis sensitiva in sui supremo participat aliquid de vi intellectiva in homine, in
quo sensus intellectui coniungitur. . . . Nam cogitativa apprehendit individuum, ut existens
sub natura communi; quod contingit ei, inquantum unitur intellectivae in eodem subiecto;
unde cognoscit hunc hominem prout est hic homo” (In De anima lib. II, lec. 13, nn. 14-16, com-
menting on De anima 417b19-29: 191-222).
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is, in what has the power of sight: for the eye is a seeing thing not because
it is smooth, but because it has the power of sight.”72 In the Summa con-
tra Gentiles, Aquinas refers to Aristotle in describing sense power as a
“certain form of an organ,”73 which indicates not just the blending of the
material and the immaterial and the physical and the spiritual but also
emphasizes the link with the intellect, insofar as sense power is capable
of apprehending the actuality of sensible forms. As will by now be clear,
Aquinas makes this astonishing claim by fusing Plato’s metaphysics of
relational participation with Aristotle’s conceptuality of act and potency.
Here it is important to clarify Thomas’s precise use of Aristotle. To de-
scribe sensing as a power (virtus) is to say, first of all, that it is a disposi-
tion that stands in potency to the actuality of sensible objects. Indeed, he
takes from Aristotle’s De anima the idea that sensibles are sensed
through sense organs because sensibles actualize sense power. For in-
stance, color (or sound or odor) is sensed by sight (or hearing or smell)
because color is actual (as opposed to purely potential) and as such actu-
alizes sense power by activating and altering a sense organ: “[A] sense-
power is a sensible object in potentiality and . . . sensible objects make a
sense-power be in actuality.”74 For this reason, Aquinas effectively argues
that to perceive an object is to sense its actuality. In other words, to per-
ceive something is to perceive that that thing is in act.
The second use of Aristotle relates to sense power that functions as
an agent in respect of the potential intellect. Aquinas explains this in
terms of the Platonist idea of participation of the sense power in some-
thing higher than itself: “[T]he sensory power [vis sensitiva], at its high-
est level, participates somewhat in the intellective power in a human be-
ing, in whom sense is connected to intellect.”75 Knowledge of singulars is
more than knowledge of individuals qua individuals — it is knowledge of
something that exceeds separate, apparently self-sufficient individual
entities. For each thing is relationally positioned and as such discloses
231
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72. “Et ita patet quod ipsum videre non consistit in hoc quod est apparere talem formam
in oculo; sed consistit in vidente, idest in habente virtutem visivam: non enim oculus est
videns propter hoc quod est laevis, sed propter hoc quod est virtutis visivae” (De Sen. c. 3,
438a5).
73. “de sensu dicit Aristoteles, in II de anima, quod est quaedam ratio organi” (SCG
II.69.9).
74. “quod sensus est potentia sensibile, et quod sensibilia faciunt sensum esse in actu”
(De Sen. c. 5, 439a6).
75. See, supra, note 71.
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other things as well as the shared transcendent source. As Haldane re-
marks, Thomas writes in De veritate that truth as ‘adequation’
(convenientia) “is the perfection of a knower qua knower, for something
is known by a knower only in so far as the known is somehow in the
knower . . . in which way it is possible for the totality of the whole uni-
verse to exist in one thing.”76 Here Aquinas extends the Christian Neo-
Platonist idea we have already encountered in Augustine, that particu-
larity intimates the universality it participates in, just as the microcosm
of the household reflects the macrocosm of the universe which never-
theless always exceeds it.77 Emphatically, Thomas’s metaphysics of rela-
tional participation outwits in advance Suárez’s dualist transcendental-
ism which separates ‘pure nature’ from the supernatural and Spinoza’s
monist immanentism which equates God with substantiality, as I will
show in chapters 7 and 8. For now, I will conclude the long excursus on
Aquinas’s theological epistemology by examining how sense perception
relates to the apprehension of actuality.
5. Apprehending Actuality
A. Transcendental Thomism
The question of apprehending individual beings and common being has
been at the heart of Thomist scholarship since the revival of Thomism in
the wake of Pope Leon XIII’s encyclical Æterni Patris (1880).78 While there
is agreement amongst different schools of interpretation on the impor-
tance of judgment in apprehension, there is disagreement on the status of
judgment in relation to the senses and the intellect.79 According to ‘tran-
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76. “haec est perfectio cognoscentis in quantum est cognoscens, quia secundum hoc a
cognoscente aliquid cognoscitur quod ipsum cognitum est aliquo modo apud cognoscentem
[. . .] Et secundum hunc modum possibile est ut in una re totius universi perfectio existat” (De
veritate q. 2, a. 2, resp.).
77. See, supra, chapter 2, section 7, where I mention Augustine’s image of the “effigy of
the whole universe.”
78. On the transcendentalist, the participationist, and the analogical reading of
Thomas, see Douglas C. Hall, The Trinity: An Analysis of St. Thomas Aquinas’ Expositio of
the De Trinitate of Boethius (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1992), pp. 3-9.
79. A concise summary of this debate can be found in Joseph Owens, “Aquinas on
Knowing Existence,” The Review of Metaphysics 29 (1976): 670-90.
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scendental Thomism’ (a designation first coined by J. Donceel),80 there is
in the mind an a priori structure that cognizes intelligible essence and ap-
prehends sensible existence. According to Karl Rahner, “[T]he formal
structure of this judgement [sense judgment of existence] — and with
more reason the structure and the content of universal judgements and
especially of metaphysical judgements — cannot be grounded in the evi-
dence of sense perception.”81 In other words, ‘transcendental Thomists’
assert that sense cognition requires supplementation by objective judg-
ment not only to produce a universal form but also to ascertain the exis-
tence of universal form outside the mind in things.82
At the same time, ‘transcendental Thomism’ recognizes that knowl-
edge of the actual existence of universal form outside the mind requires
knowledge of sensible singulars and their relation to universal forms. Be-
yond Kant, this interpretation acknowledges that knowing universals is
dynamic and tends towards infinite being (esse), which is the a priori
condition of possibility for judgment of both essence and existence.
‘Transcendental Thomism’ also takes into account Plato and Aristotle’s
shared insight that all cognition begins with the senses, but Karl Rahner
insists that “in the line of Aristotle, Kant and Hegel, he [Aquinas] sees it
[the a priori] in a formal a priori of the spontaneous spirit itself . . . its ba-
sis, speaking in the manner of St. Thomas, is the light of the intelligence
itself, which informs, objectifies, conceptualizes and judges the data
from sense cognition.”83 ‘Transcendental Thomists’ correctly view judg-
ment as the epistemic operation through which the mind obtains knowl-
edge of existence. Likewise, immanence is rightly construed as partici-
patory rather than self-sufficient. However, the origin of the notion
‘existence’ is thought to be purely noetic and it is the mind that projects
it onto sense perception.84 In so doing, the formality of a priori objective
judgment supplants the reality of sensation; the mind can only move to
233
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80. J. Donceel, “Transcendental Thomism,” The Monist 58 (1974): 67-85.
81. Karl Rahner, “Aquinas: The Nature of Truth,” Continuum 2 (1964): 65.
82. See, inter alia, Joseph Maréchal, Le point de départ de la métaphysique. Leçons sur
le développement historique et théorique du problème de la connaissance, 5 vols. (Paris:
Desclée, 1944-1949); Karl Rahner, Geist in Welt. Zur Metaphysik der endlichen Erkenntnis bei
Thomas von Aquin, 2nd rev. ed. (Munich: Kösel-Verlag, 1957); trans. Dych, Spirit in the
World (New York: Herder & Herder, 1968); Bernard Lonergan, Verbum: World and Idea in
Aquinas (New York: Philosophical Library, 1957).
83. Rahner, “Aquinas: The Nature of Truth,” p. 65.
84. Donceel, “Transcendental Thomism,” pp. 76-77.
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the infinity of esse if judgment verifies that sensible singulars embody
the universal forms which the mind fashions in its own image. For this
reason, the actus essendi of ‘transcendental Thomism’ is neither in the
eye of the beholder nor in the object of sensation but a product of the
mind alone.
Such and similar readings of Aquinas are wrong on at least two ac-
counts. First, they do not accord with Thomas’s conception of the poten-
tial intellect, which is activated by sense perception (e.g., De anima III.4,
429b30–430a2). As early as in his commentary on Boethius’ De Trinitate
(c. 1256-59), Aquinas argues that both the possible intellect and the agent
intellect are not separate substances (and thereby the same for all souls),
but instead proper to each and every soul and conjointly capable of ap-
prehending the truth: “[B]oth an active and a passive power are ascribed
to the soul in its intellectual activity. . . . So, just as the other natural ac-
tive powers, joined to their passive counterparts, suffice for natural ac-
tivities, so also the soul, endowed with an active and passive power, is ad-
equate for the perception of truth.”85 It is true to say that for Thomas, the
efficacy of the active intellect extends to knowledge of natural principles
and finalities. On the basis of sense perception, the intellect forms uni-
versals with which to cognize principles and teloi. But like Augustine and
other patristic Neo-Platonists, Aquinas argues that divine activity is nec-
essary to bring everything, including the intellect, into being, to make it
what it is and to direct it to its specific end.
If this is true, then ‘transcendental Thomism’ is mistaken on a sec-
ond account. To elevate the formality of ens as concept over above the re-
ality of ens as being ignores Aquinas’s emphasis on the ontological prior-
ity of being (esse) vis-à-vis both that which is (ens or id quod est) and
essence (essentia).86 The origin of the notion ‘existence’ or ‘act of being’
cannot be exclusively noetic: “God is constantly at work in the mind, en-
dowing it with its natural light and giving it direction. So the mind, as it
goes about its work, does not lack the activity of the first cause.”87 The ex-
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85. “. . . in anima ponitur respectu intelligibilis operationis, quae est cognitio veritatis, et
potentia passiva et potentia activa. Unde sicut aliae potentiae activae naturales suis passivis
coniunctae sufficiunt ad naturales operationes, ita etiam anima habens in se potentiam
activam et passivam sufficit ad perceptionem veritatis” (In Boeth. de Trin. q. 1, a. 1, resp.).
86. In I Sent. d. 8, q. 1, a. 3, resp.; De ente prol. and c. 1, 1-2.
87. “In hoc ergo continue Deus operatur in mente, quod in ipsa lumen naturale causat et
ipsum dirigit, et sic mens non sine operatione causae primae in operationem suam procedit”
(In Boeth. de Trin. q. 1, a. 1, ad. 6).
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tension of Augustine’s theory of divine illumination operated by Aquinas
reinforces the real presence of the divine act of being in beings. More-
over, the potential intellect is not activated by the agent intellect but by
sensation. What the senses mediate to the intellect is always already in
actuality and is sensed as an actuality or as an event, “something that oc-
curs to the intellect by the mode of actuality, absolutely so.”88 Thus, the
intellect neither passes judgment on mere existence nor has cognition of
essence alone, by abstraction, or by division and composition. Instead,
for Aquinas the mind conceptualizes that which the senses apprehend
and mediate — the act of being in beings-in-act.
B. Thomist Existentialism
Both Jacques Maritain and Étienne Gilson, albeit for different reasons,
reject transcendental Thomism and defend what they call a form of
‘Thomist existentialism.’ Against the Cartesian opposition of intelligence
and mystery, Maritain follows Aquinas’s theory of subalternation in or-
der to describe the object of intellection as an inexhaustible, ‘trans-
objective’ reality, which he likens to an intelligible mystery that marks
the terminus of the intellectual act.89 As such, reality has two aspects —
essence and existence — with two corresponding intellectual opera-
tions. The first operation consists in forming concepts of essences and
the second operation concerns the attainment of the perfective end of
things, i.e., their actuality.90 Maritain draws on the late scholastic theolo-
gian Thomas de Vio (1469-1534), also known as Cardinal Cajetan, to
equate the latter operation with judgment:
[I]t is in the second operation of the mind, in judgement, in the com-
position and division, that the speculative intelligence grasps being
not only from the point of view of essence but from the point of view of
235
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88. “. . . aliud quod cadit in intellectu per modum actualitatis absolute” (In I Peri Herm.
lec. 5, no. 73 [16b23]).
89. Jacques Maritain, Distinguer pour unir: Ou, les degrés du savoir (Paris: Desclée,
1932); J. Maritain, Sept Leçons sur l’Être et les premiers principes de la raison spéculative
(Paris: Pierre Téqui, 1934), pp. 8-9, quoting Aquinas, “non terminatur ad enuntiabile, sed ad
rem” (ST II-II, q. 1, a. 2, ad 2).
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existence itself, actual or possible, — existence thus grasped ut
exercita (as exercised by a subject, not only presented to the mind as
with the simple concept of existence, but as held possibly or actually
by the subject). . . . [I]t is in the judgement that knowledge is com-
pleted and fulfilled.91
In short, judgment pertains to actual or possible existence, not to the
concept of existence. For this reason, judgment must return to sensation
because to judge is to apprehend the existential condition of essences.92
If, as Maritain claims, judgment corresponds to the second opera-
tion of the intellection, then the question is: What corresponds to the
first operation? For Aquinas, the first operation of the intellect consists
in abstracting the essence from a concrete being (ens concretum
quidditati sensibili) or, as Maritain correctly defines it, a particular
quiddity and being in general bound together in concrete things.93 Being
thus defined is the first object of the intellect. To this first object corre-
sponds the common sense. According to Maritain, general being gives
rise to what Thomists such as Cajetan or John of St. Thomas (1589-1644)
termed abstractio totalis or extensive abstraction,94 i.e., a pre- or infra-
scientific abstraction of general being from the diversity of sensible, indi-
vidual beings. As such, general being grounds the logical relations of
generality and is an intermediary station between the diversity of sensi-
ble individual beings, on the one hand, and the unity of abstract being
qua being, on the other hand. The latter is the object of intuition, which
Maritain explicitly refers to as metaphysical intuition.95 So if judgment is
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91. “C’est dans la seconde opération de l’esprit, dans le jugement, dans la composi-
tion et la division, que l’intelligence spéculative tient l’être non seulement au point de vue
de l’essence mais au point de vue de l’existence elle-même, actuelle ou possible, — exis-
tence saisie alors ut exercita (en tant qu’exercée par un sujet, en tant même que détenue,
non pas seulement en tant que présentée à l’esprit comme il arrive dans le simple concept
d’existence, mais en tant même que détenue possiblement ou actuellement par un sujet)
. . . Or c’est dans le jugement que se complète et s’achève la connaissance,” in Maritain,
Sept Leçons sur l’Être et les premiers principes de la raison spéculative, p. 26.
92. Maritain, Sept Leçons sur l’Être et les premiers principes de la raison speculative, pp.
28-31.
93. Maritain, Sept Leçons sur l’Être et les premiers principes de la raison speculative,
p. 24. Cf. Aimé Forest, La structure métaphysique du concret selon Saint Thomas d’Aquin
(Paris: Vrin, 1956).
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concerned with the actuality of sensible quiddities, then judgment is
preceded by the common sense and by metaphysical intuition.
In later works, Maritain speaks of the intuition of being (l’intuition de
l’être) as a unique judicative act. This differs from all predicative and
other judgments, and it precedes and structures all ideas and concepts
of existence. By defining the intuition of being as that which is produced
“in and through an affirmative judgement of existing,”96 Maritain makes
it dependent on an a priori metaphysical framework and therefore re-
stricts it to an extraordinary judgment. Indeed, he goes as far as saying
that the intuition of being is absent from “the conversations of everyday
life.”97 In short, Maritain reduces the apprehension of actuality to the
metaphysical intuition of being, which is an extraordinary judgment and
as such escapes the common sense.
However, this does not accord with Aquinas’s argument, which I
have already cited, that the senses mediate to the mind “something that
occurs to the intellect by the mode of actuality, absolutely so.”98 Maritain
is right to state that all intellection starts with the perception of sensible
particular beings and returns to sensation in order to grasp the existen-
tial condition of the essence known. For this reason, physics or natural
philosophy is not separate from metaphysics or divina scientia in
Thomas’s pyramidal ordering of the sciences, as Maritain himself sug-
gests.99 But Maritain is wrong to maintain that Thomas equates sensa-
tion of things with discernment of the self. Likewise, he is mistaken in re-
stricting the intuition of being to the third act of intellection —
metaphysical intuition.100 Instead, Aquinas combines Augustine’s ac-
count of the cosmically embedded self with Aristotle’s insight that sensa-
tion of actual sensible things in the world precedes consciousness of the
self in the mind.
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95. Maritain, Sept Leçons sur l’Être et les premiers principes de la raison speculative, pp.
51-70.
96. “dans et par un jugement affirmatif de l’exister,” in Jacques Maritain, “Réflexions
sur la nature blessée et sur l’intuition de l’être,” Revue thomiste 68 (1968): 5-41 (17) (original
italics).
97. Maritain, “Réflexions sur la nature blessée et sur l’intuition de l’être,” p. 20.
98. See, supra, note 88.
99. Maritain, Sept Leçons sur l’Être et les premiers principes de la raison spéculative, pp.
29-40.
100. Maritain, “Réflexions sur la nature blessée et sur l’intuition de l’être,” pp. 20-23.
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The Philosopher says: “We sense that we sense, and we understand
that we understand, and because we sense this, we understand that
we exist.” [Ethics IX.] But one perceives that he understands only from
the fact that he understands something. For to understand something
is prior to understanding that one understands. Therefore, through
that which it understands or senses the soul arrives at actual percep-
tion of the fact that it exists.101
According to Thomas, sensation is sensation of being in actuality. This
kind of apprehension of being is not restricted to extraordinary meta-
physical intuition of being, as Maritain claims. Instead, it is part of com-
mon, ‘everyday’ experience, which he wrongly regards as devoid of any
apprehension of being in actuality.
Gilson, by contrast, argues that there is no strict equivalence be-
tween ideas or concepts of existence on the one hand and actual being
on the other hand, for the latter precedes and exceeds the former. Gilson
also contends that we intuit individual things in act, not a thing called
‘existence.’ Nor does intuition give us full cognition of God’s pure act of
being. No concept can ever grasp self-subsistent being in and of itself.
Rather, human intellection can apprehend the act of being (actus
essendi) in being (ens), which is the first object of natural knowledge and
to which corresponds the first in the order of sciences — metaphysics.
Gilson describes this as follows:
Since the existing (l’exister) proper to each being (être) is beyond any
concept, we have to content ourselves to apprehend it in being, which
is the first and most immediate determination of the act of being. This
is why ens [sic] is the supreme concept and the first principle of our
knowledge. . . . If we had a pure intellectual intuition of the sensible, we




101. “unde dicit philosophus in IX Ethicorum: sentimus autem quoniam sentimus; et
intelligimus quoniam intelligimus; et quia hoc sentimus, intelligimus quoniam sumus. Nullus
autem percipit se intelligere nisi ex hoc quod aliquid intelligit: quia prius est intelligere
aliquid quam intelligere se intelligere; et ideo anima pervenit ad actualiter percipiendum se
esse, per illud quod intelligit, vel sentit” (De veritate q. 10, a. 8, resp.).
102. Gilson, Le Thomisme, pp. 120-21. Gilson quotes In IV Met. lec. 6, n. 605 in support
of his understanding of ens.
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According to this interpretation, Aquinas denies sensation, intuition,
and abstraction any cognition of the act of being. Only judgment can at-
tain the act of existing and, as such, attain the truth of beings.103 Against
Maritain, Gilson maintains that Aquinas distinguishes the intuition of
first principles from the apprehension of being in beings (étants). So
while we can have a sense intuition of really existing things — the com-
mon sense perceives sensibles that are — we cannot have an intellectual
intuition of the act of existing.104
Not unlike Maritain, Gilson fails to think through the link Thomas
establishes between perception and actuality. If that which the senses
mediate to the intellect is always already in actuality and is intuited “by
mode of actuality, absolutely so,”105 then perception of a being (ens) is in
some sense perception of being (esse). How so? In perceiving that which
is (id quod est), we intuit being (esse) and not merely the ‘fact’ that some-
thing has existence. Whereas sense organs perceive the real existence of
individual sensibles in their singularity but do not grasp actuality in it-
self or as such, the common sense extends beyond individual sensitive
operations such as sight to the unity that underlies the multiplicity of
sensibles. As a result, we apprehend the act of being in beings-in-act
through the common sense, even though the common sense does not
know it as such, for only the intellective power of the mind can cognize
being as an act. Both Maritain and Gilson ignore Thomas’s insight that
sensation of sensibles is sensation of being.
C. Aquinas’s Metaphysics beyond Participationist Thomism
Cornelio Fabro and Louis-Bertrand Geiger reject both transcendental
Thomism and Thomist existentialism in favor of a ‘participationist’ read-
ing of Aquinas’s metaphysics. Fabro is correct to argue that the act of being
(actus essendi) describes not so much the state of existence but rather the
act of things — being in order to be in act (esse ut actus). This is why things
can be said to participate in the pure actuality of being or God.106 He is
239
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103. Gilson, Le Thomisme, pp. 122-23.
104. Gilson, The Christian Philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas, pp. 204-5; Étienne
Gilson, “Propos sur l’être et sa notion,” in San Tommaso e il pensiero moderno, ed.
Pontificia Accademia di S. Tommaso (Rome: Città Nuova Editrice, 1974), pp. 7-17.
105. See, supra, note 88.
106. Cornelio Fabro, La nozione metafisica di partecipazione secondo S. Tommaso
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equally right to emphasize the primacy of the ontological ens (id quo est or
quod habet esse) vis-à-vis the epistemological ens (quod primo intellectus
intelligit).107 Yet at the same time, Fabro maintains that ens grounds both
the concrete and the abstract and as such differs from ancient formalism
and modern existentialism.108 But to view the Thomist ens as a transcen-
dental is precisely to privilege formality over actuality, a late scholastic fal-
lacy that gave rise to modern transcendentalism.109 Indeed, Fabro con-
tends that the notion of being (notio entis) precedes the notion of existence
and essence as objects of the intellect because, through a combined act of
judgment and conceptualization, we know the formality of essence before
we conceptualize the factuality of existence.110 However, this does not ac-
cord with Aquinas’s distinction of judgment and conceptualization and
his insistence that in apprehending beings, we apprehend the actuality of
being — the act of being in beings-in-act.
For his part, Geiger denies that sense apprehension according to
Thomas enables cognition of transcendent being. Instead, the mind can
only cognize transcendent being by separating it from movement and
matter. As such, “separatio is a judgement that is passed on the immate-
riality of being in rerum natura.”111 Put differently, the mental act of sepa-
ration is not a form of abstraction but instead a cognitive judgment. But
in order to be able to pass an objective judgment, Geiger asserts that the
mind must somehow be able to have a priori knowledge of immaterial
being, the object of metaphysics. While he is right to say that physics is
240
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d’Aquino (Turin: Marietti, 1950), pp. 200 passim. C. Fabro, Partecipazione e causalità
secondo S. Tommaso d’Aquino (Turin: Marietti, 1960), pp. 20-50, 212-44; C. Fabro, Dall’
essere all’ esistente, 2nd ed. (Brescia: Morcelliana, 1965), pp. 40-60. On Fabro’s reading of
Aquinas, see Carlo Giacon, “S. Tommaso e l’esistenza come atto,” Mediœvo 1 (1975): 1-28,
esp. pp. 23-27.
107. Cornelio Fabro, “Die Wiederaufnahme des Thomistischen ‘Esse’ und der Grund
der Metaphysik,” Tijdschrift voor Filosofie 43 (1981): 90-116, esp. pp. 91-94.
108. Fabro, “Die Wiederaufnahme des Thomistischen ‘Esse’ und der Grund der
Metaphysik,” pp. 103-8.
109. See Adrian Pabst, “Wisdom and the Art of Politics,” in Encounter between Radical
Orthodoxy and Eastern Orthodoxy: Transfiguring the World through the Word, ed. Adrian
Pabst and Christoph Schneider (Aldershot, UK: Ashgate, 2009), pp. 109-37.
110. Cornelio Fabro, “The Intensive Hermeneutics of Thomistic Philosophy: The No-
tion of Participation,” Review of Metaphysics 27 (1974): 449-91, esp. p. 470.
111. “la separatio est un jugement qui se prononce sur l’immaterialité de l’être in re-
rum natura,” in Geiger, “Abstraction et séparation d’après s. Thomas In De Trinitate, q. 5,
a. 3,” p. 24.
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an incomplete science that requires metaphysical supplementation, he
is wrong to suggest that the mind cognizes transcendent being through
judgment that is founded in the a priori metaphysical knowledge of im-
material being. To maintain this is to ignore Aquinas’s argument that
perception of sensible, material composites (entia) is to perceive neither
mere existence or pure essence nor being qua being but instead esse in
ens — something like the advent or unfolding of being-in-act. In the re-
mainder of this section, I will set out Thomas’s account of how the com-
mon sense apprehends the divine act of being.
Aquinas himself makes the point about apprehending actuality.
Once more he fuses Plato’s emphasis on relational participation with Ar-
istotle’s accentuation of act, potency, and sense perception. Drawing on
De Anima, he writes in De Senso that the sense organs perceive and medi-
ate to the mind the actuality of sensibles: “[W]hat each of them [the
sensibles] is according to actuality — that is according as colour, flavour
or any other sensible object, is in actuality perceived by sense — as has
been said in On the Soul.”112 For this reason, the actuality of sensibles,
which inhere in particular things and participate in the divine act of be-
ing, actualizes the potency of sense powers which inhere in sense organs
and participate in cognitive power. There is thus a hierarchical
‘adequation’ or convenientia between being and knowing: “[T]he visible
in actuality is the same as seeing in actuality.”113 According to Aquinas,
to perceive a particular thing is to see the actuality that envelops it. This
is mediated by the common sense, which synthesizes the perceptual and
cognitive power of all the senses. Indeed, many different sensible objects
within one genus — say, the visible — are sensed in virtue of one sense-
power — in this case, seeing. Moreover, many different sensible objects
across different genera — the visible or the audible — are sensed by one
and the same indivisible ‘organ’ — the sensitive part of the soul (De Sen.
c. 18, 449a2-10). In turn, the proper senses — seeing or hearing — are
bound together by the common sense (sensus communis), which “per-
ceives by means of sight, and by means of hearing, and by means of other
proper senses, which are different potential parts of the soul, and not . . .
like different parts of a continuum.”114 Thomas also describes the com-
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112. “Quid autem sit unumquodque eorum secundum actum, idest secundum quod est
color actu perceptus a sensu, aut sapor vel quodcumque aliud sensibile, dictum est in libro de
anima” (De Sen. c. 5, 439a12-18).
113. “videlicet visibile in actu est idem visioni in actu” (De Sen. c. 5, 439a12-18).
114. “sensus communis sentit per visum et per auditum, et alios sensus proprios, qui sunt
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mon sense as the first and common principle that underlies the opera-
tions of the proper senses: “[S]ince the operations of the proper senses
are referred to the common sense as their first and common principle,
the common sense is related to the proper senses and their operations in
the way that one point is related to different lines that meet in it.”115 The
common sense is the sense power that informs all sense organs and uni-
fies the mediations it receives.
Indeed, the actuality we perceive is in fact the common being that
enfolds and upholds all sensibles. Thomas develops this crucial argu-
ment in four stages. First of all, he distinguishes between proper sensible
objects and common sensibles (De Sen. c. 5, 439a6). Sensible objects are
perceived in relation to each sensitive part or individual sense organ:
color, sound, odor in relation to sight, hearing, and smell. Second, com-
mon sensibles are aspects of sensibles that are common to different gen-
era of sensibles like movement, number, figure, magnitude, unity, time,
etc.116 Within different genera of different sensible things, there are com-
mon features, e.g., color with respect to all visible things. Color has two
principles: a material principle — the transparent — and a formal princi-
ple — light itself. The transparent is not a property of different bodies
but rather a ‘common nature,’ “that is, a natural property found in many
things — one that he [Aristotle] also calls a ‘power’ inasmuch as it is a
principle of vision.”117 Third, this ‘common nature’ is not separate, but
instantiated in sensible objects to varying degrees. Light, the formal
principle of color, shines forth in all bodies and is therefore the actuality
within the genus of the visible. Equally, the transparent, the material
principle of color, is that which is receptive of light and is therefore the
potentiality within the genus of the visible. Conjointly, the act of light
and the potency of the transparent produce the visibility of sensible ob-
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diversae partes potentiales animae; non autem diversae partes sunt alicuius continui” (De
Sen. c. 18, 449a9).
115. “operationes sensuum propriorum referantur ad sensum communem, sicut ad pri-
mum et commune principium, hoc modo se habet sensus communis ad sensus proprios et
operationes eorum, sicut unum punctum ad diversas lineas, quae in ipsum concurrunt” (De
Sen. c. 18, 449a10-12).
116. Bernard J. Muller-Thym, “The Common Sense, Perfection of the Order of Pure
Sensibility,” The Thomist 2 (1940): 315-43, esp. p. 321.
117. “[natura communis], quae in multis corporibus invenitur; scilicet quaedam
naturalis proprietas in multis inventa, quam etiam virtutem nominat, inquantum est
quoddam principium visionis” (De Sen. c. 5, 439a21).
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jects. Perception concerns the interplay of the act of form and the po-
tency of matter. Fourth, Aquinas argues that to perceive an individual
sensible object is in fact to perceive a commonality that binds together
apparently separate, discrete entities. Since the senses mediate species
form in its material embodiment and its transcendently received actual-
ity, the common sense dimly apprehends God’s act of being which under-
pins all things.
But two questions arise that cast doubt on my argument. First, since
contrary sensibles like whiteness and blackness do not coincide in natu-
ral bodies and therefore cannot be sensed simultaneously, how can the
common sense be a unitary principle? Second, how can Aquinas move
from common sensation to apprehension of common being without
leaping from sensitive to intellective cognition, which conflates the
nonreflexivity of the sense with the self-reflexivity of the intellect? In-
deed, does Thomas himself not write that “the sense knows neither itself
nor its operation; for instance, sight neither sees itself nor sees that it
sees. This self-reflexive power belongs to a higher faculty, as is proved in
De anima [III.2]”?118 The key to unlock Aquinas’s complex reflections on
apprehending actuality is a double analogy. Just as the multiplicity of the
proper senses paradoxically points to the unity of sensitive operations
which is the common sense, so the multiplicity of sensible objects para-
doxically intimates the unity of sensibles and the underlying principle
which is common being. Since “sense and intellect are similar” (Aris-
totle, De anima III.2, 427a9), Thomas concludes that
sense and intellect receive the forms of things spiritually and immate-
rially according to an intentional being, in such a way that they have no
contrariety. Hence sense and intellect can simultaneously receive spe-
cies of contrary sensible objects . . . sense and intellect not only receive
the forms of things, but also make a judgement about them. Now
judgement about contraries is not itself contrary, but something one
and the same, because by one of the contraries a judgement is taken
about the other.119
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118. “Nullus sensus seipsum cognoscit, nec suam operationem: visus enim non videt
seipsum, nec videt se videre, sed hoc superioris potentiae est, ut probatur in libro de anima”
(SCG II.66.5).
119. “sed sensus et intellectus recipiunt formas rerum spiritualiter et immaterialiter
secundum esse quoddam intentionale prout non habent contrarietatem. Unde sensus et
intellectus simul potest recipere species sensibilium contrariorum. . . . sensus et intellectus
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So far, I have argued that perception as the immaterial reception of sensi-
ble form constitutes according to Aquinas a physical event that affects
the sense organs and a spiritual transformation that affects the sensitive
part of the soul. The latter is passive and active, in that the sensitive part
of the soul is both the patient and the agent of sense power, which is acti-
vated by sensible objects and in turn activates the mind. As such, percep-
tion is in some sense sensitive as well as intellective. Conversely, intellec-
tion is in some sense reflexive as well as perceptual. As Thomas explains,
judgment is not concerned either with separate discrete entities or with
contraries but instead with the relational positioning of particular things
— the noetic correspondence to the ontological reality of common being
which enfolds all things. However, the accentuation of common being
and the common sense seems to be at odds with Aquinas’s double dis-
tinction between physical and spiritual change and between natural and
intentional being. In turn, this brings into sharp focus the question of
whether there is a single unitary or double binary principle of individua-
tion. I briefly explore this problem in the following subsection.
D. Perception, Individuation, and Common Being
Since there are two modes of being (natural and spiritual or intentional),
it would seem that there are also two principles of individuation — mat-
ter and spirit (or the intellect). The former constitutes the first principle
that individuates forms which are received according to the natural
mode of being. The latter is the second principle that individuates forms
which are received according to the spiritual or intentional mode of be-
ing. Anthony Kenny defends this thesis of two principles of individuation
against Peter Geach, who contends that there is only one principle of in-
dividuation and that Aquinas posits the important difference between
form and esse.120 Kenny is correct to highlight Thomas’s distinction of
substantial from accidental form. The senses grasp the latter (e.g., the
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non solum recipiunt formas rerum, sed etiam habent iudicare: iudicium autem quod faciunt
de contrariis non est contrarium, sed unum et idem, quia per unum contrariorum sumitur
iudicium de altero” (De Sen. c. 18, 449a17-18; my italics).
120. Anthony Kenny, “Intentionality: Aquinas and Wittgenstein,” in Thomas Aquinas:
Contemporary Philosophical Perspectives, ed. Brian Davies (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2002), pp. 243-56; Peter T. Geach, “Form and Existence,” Proceedings of the Aristote-
lian Society 54 (1954-55): 250-76.
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redness of this rose), whereas the intellect grasps the former (e.g., the
form of rose or ‘roseness’). However, Kenny ignores Aquinas’s further dis-
tinction between internal proper accidents ‘created’ from the principles
of their subjects (e.g., passions which are particular to species or individ-
ual accidents which are not present in every member of the same spe-
cies)121 and external accidents ‘received’ by a subject from without.
Since nothing except God has either form or existence by itself, there
must be a difference between form and esse, as Geach rightly insists. In-
deed, proper accidental forms are created by their subject insofar as the
subject is in act (actu), and substantial form is received by that subject
insofar as the subject is in potency (in potentia) to the act of being, as
Aquinas writes in the Summa Theologiae (ST I, q. 77, a. 6, resp.). And since
substantial form is in act to the potency of matter and in potency to the
act of being, form intimates the source which brings it into actuality.
John Wippel comments on this question in Summa as follows:
[I]nsofar as the soul is in potency in some way, he [Aquinas] has re-
marked, it can be the subject or receiving principle for those accidents
which reside in it . . . as the form or act principle of a human essence,
the human soul is still in potency with respect to the act of being
which it receives and communicates to its correlative matter. This, ap-
parently, is enough for it to be in potency in a second way as well, as
the receiving principle of its accident. And if we wonder why the soul
is in act (and therefore productive of its proper accidents), this must
ultimately follow from the fact that it is actualised by its correspond-
ing act of being.122
In perceiving sensible objects, we perceive the ‘double act of being’
which actualizes the substantial form or soul and produces its proper
accidents. Aquinas however is no hylomorphist. The individuation of
composite substances is not determined by form alone. Material em-
bodiment, far from being accidental or arbitrary, defines the particular-
ity of things that receive their particular form according a specific mode
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121. As Wippel attests, in his Commentary on the Sentences Aquinas uses ‘creantur’ as
an equivalent for ‘causantur’ to describe the relation between substantial subjects and
their accidents (In I Sent. d. 17, q. 1, a. 2, ad 2). See John F. Wippel, The Metaphysical Thought
of Thomas Aquinas. From Finite Being to Uncreated Being (Washington, DC: Catholic Uni-
versity of America Press, 2000), p. 266.
122. Wippel, The Metaphysical Thought of Thomas Aquinas, p. 272.
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of being: “[T]he principle of that mode of existence, namely the principle
of individuation, is not common, but differs in each individual: for this
particular thing is individualised by this matter, and that one by that
matter.”123 For this reason, the principle of individuation is matter, but
the ‘cause’ of individuation is the act of being, as I will demonstrate in the
remainder of this chapter.
6. The ‘Relativity’ of Individuals
In this and the following section, I will explore Aquinas’s account of indi-
viduality and the link he establishes between the ‘relativity’ of individu-
als and the self-diffusive Good of God which individuates all things
relationally. Individuality is not confined to God and separate sub-
stances but extends to the material universe. In composite material sub-
stances, individuality encompasses three aspects: first of all, the unity of
composites, i.e., that which unifies matter and form and makes it into
this rather than that compound; second, the plurality of numerically dis-
tinct forms within a single species. As early as his commentary on the
Sentences, Aquinas writes that “[t]wo features belong to the notion of an
individual, namely that it be actually existent either in itself or in some-
thing else; and that it be divided from other things that are or can be in
the same species, existing undivided in itself.”124 To say that something is
individual is to say that that thing is in itself undivided and differentiated
from other things in the same species.
In other texts, Thomas emphasizes a third feature of individual enti-
ties to highlight the connection with other individual entities. In De
veritate, he describes the order of things in relation to one another
(secundum ordinem unius ad alterum, De veritate q. 1, a. 1, corp.) and dis-
tinguishes between oneness or ‘undividedness’ (unum), ‘otherness’
(aliquid), and relation (ad aliud). These distinctions are not merely logical
properties but concern the metaphysical structure of the world and all
things therein. Just as Augustine speaks of the beauty of individual mate-
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123. “sed principium talis modi existendi quod est principium individuationis, non est
commune; sed aliud est in isto, et aliud in illo; hoc enim singulare individuatur per hanc
materiam, et illud per illam” (De potentia q. 9, a. 2, ad 1).
124. “. . . de ratione individui duo sunt: scilicet quod sit ens actu vel in se vel in alio; et
quod sit divisum ab aliis quae sunt vel possunt esse in eadem specie, in se indivisum existens”
(In IV Sent. d. 12, q. 1, a. 1, ad 3m).
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rial forms and the harmony that pertains between them, so Aquinas char-
acterizes the relation of an individual thing to other such things in terms
of convenientia (alio modo secundum convenientiam unius entis ad aliud,
De veritate q. 1, a. 1, corp.). As Gilbert Narcisse has documented, conveni-
entia is for Thomas an aesthetic term that is intimately connected with
notions such as analogia, proportio, harmonia, and ordinatio.125 As such,
it conveys the aesthetic nature of relations and describes the harmonious
proportions between individual things. So beyond the postmodern di-
chotomy of identity and difference (or différance), Thomas posits relation
as a third dimension of being that mediates between ‘undividedness’ and
differentiation. To be is to be ‘relative’ (ad aliud) to that which is, and ‘be-
ing relative’ is coextensive with being individual.126
So defined, an individual thing’s ‘relativity’ describes the horizontal
relations that pertain between beings. ‘Relativity’ is not merely an acci-
dental property or an external factor like the location of one thing com-
pared to another. Nor is ‘relativity’ the same as Aristotle’s category,
which is subordinate to substance. For Aquinas as for Plato, the ‘relativ-
ity’ of individuals is metaphysical because its foundation is being (esse),
for being is that in which all concur fittingly (omnia in esse conveniunt,
SCG I.42.16). Individuals are ‘relative’ and interrelated (rather than abso-
lute and isolated) because they all share in one and the same cause —
common being — which is created, as I have already documented. For
precisely this reason, there is a second form of relation that is vertical
and describes the link between being and God who gives being to all
things (dans esse rebus, In II Sent. d. 1, q. 1, a. 4, corp.; cf. ST Ia, q. 105, a. 5,
corp.). In the words of Thomas, “[ f]or creation is not a change, but that
dependence of created being on its source whence it is set forth. And so
it [creation] is of the category of relation.”127 Like Boethius and other
Christian Neo-Platonists who had knowledge of Aristotle’s categorial
‘theo-ontology,’ Aquinas reconfigures the preeminence of substance in
the direction of the primacy of relation.
Since God as esse ipsum subsistens is in no way affected by the rela-
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125. Narcisse, Les raisons de Dieu, esp. pp. 184-92.
126. For a detailed exposition, see the brilliant book by Philipp W. Rosemann, Omne
ens est aliquid. Introduction à la lecture du “système” philosophique de saint Thomas d’Aquin
(Louvain-Paris: Ed. Peeters, 1996), pp. 48-71.
127. “Non enim est creatio mutatio, sed ipsa dependentia esse creati ad principium a quo
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tion of creation, Aquinas views its relation as nonmutual and asymmetri-
cal. For the Creator is wholly outside the genus of created being (De
potentia q. 7, a. 10, corp.).128 As a result, all things are relational to God as
the universal origin and end of everything. Even though there is no tex-
tual equivalent in Thomas’s works, the term ‘relationality’ is conceptually
more accurate than the notion of ‘relation’ because the former highlights
not only the asymmetry and nonmutuality but also the absence of any
univocal foundation and instead an emphasis on the analogy of being.129
Relationality is dynamic and describes God’s act of being which brings ev-
erything into actuality, makes it what it is, and sustains it in being. Just as
God is the source of all being and as such lacks any shared basis with ev-
erything else, so common being is not an independent station in the cos-
mic order against which the Creator and creation are measured. Rather,
common being is the initial created effect of the first cause:
The first of all effects is being itself, which is presupposed to all other
effects, and does not presuppose any other effect.
[B]eing is the most common first effect and more intimate than
all other effects: wherefore it is an effect which it belongs to God alone
to produce by His own power.130
For Aquinas, the relationality of beings to God is the gift of being which
he bestows upon creation. The horizontal and the vertical models of
relationality in Thomas are intimately connected. Through God’s cre-
ative action, beings can share in the ecstatic relationality of the Trinity
and thereby perfect relations with other beings, not by becoming identi-
cal with the one and only triune God, but by manifesting his utter pleni-
tude, goodness, and love.
To say that relationality or relativity (ad aliud) is integral to individu-
ality has important implications for Aquinas’s account of individuation.
The reason why something is individuated cannot be purely formal be-
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128. A. Krempel, La doctrine de la relation chez saint Thomas (Paris: Vrin, 1952), pp.
554-62; Mark G. Henninger, Relations: Medieval Theories 1250-1325 (Oxford: Clarendon
Press, 1989), pp. 13-39.
129. Krempel, La doctrine de la relation chez saint Thomas, pp. 174-79.
130. “primus autem effectus est ipsum esse, quod omnibus aliis effectibus praesup-
ponitur, et ipsum non praesupponit aliquem alium effectum;” “ipsum esse enim est commu-
nissimus effectus primus et intimior omnibus aliis effectibus; et ideo soli Deo competit
secundum virtutem propriam talis effectus” (De potentia q. 3, a. 4, resp., and a. 7, resp.).
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cause members of the same species are formally identical but numeri-
cally different. Numerical difference suggests that matter explains how
things are undivided in themselves and differentiated from other things
of the same species. Indeed, Aquinas argued that matter is a necessary
condition for differentiating specifically or formally identical individuals
(In II Sent. d. 3, q. 1, a. 4, sol.; In IV Sent. d. 44, q. 2, a. 2, sol. 2). However, the
reason why things are individuated cannot be exclusively material be-
cause matter does not explain unity (or ‘undividedness’). So it would
seem as if the confluence of form and matter individuates composites.
Since neither individual forms nor particular bodies exist by themselves,
neither form nor matter can explain why this individual form coalesces
with that particular body (SCG II.81). Both depend on higher causes and
ultimately on the first cause for their existence.
For this reason, the double mark of Aquinas’s account of individua-
tion is the emphasis on the act of being (which brings everything into ex-
istence) and on the distinction between the cause and the principle of in-
dividuation. Contrary to Porreta’s logic, which begins with God’s essentia
and moves down via forms (‘quo ests’) to all things that are (‘quod ests’),
Aquinas eschews this grammatical and formalist Platonism in favor of a
more metaphysical and realist Platonism, which he inherits in part from
figures such as Gregory, Augustine, Boethius, and Dionysius. Since being
makes itself known to the mind via the senses, knowledge starts with the
supernaturally infused finite actuality of that which is (Boethius’ id quod
est or ens) rather than the naturally limited infinite possibility of essence
(Porreta’s ‘quo ests’). Joseph Owens puts this succinctly:
From the existence that comes and goes in sensible things, existence
that is accidental even though it is the basic actuality of those exis-
tents, one can reason to existence that is a nature [In I Sent. d. 8, q. 1, a.
2, sol.; d. 26, q. 1, a. 2, ad 1m; Quodl. VIII.1c]. . . . It contains and unites
everything within its own unity. It is the existence of all things and all
things have their primary existence in it. It necessarily individualizes
itself. Subsistent existence is its own individuation.131
The nature of the first cause of existence leads Aquinas to draw the dis-
tinction between the cause and the principle of individuation. Unity is
convertible with, and follows from, being. That which has being has
249
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131. Owens, “Thomas Aquinas (b. ca. 1225; d. 1274),” pp. 173-94 (174-75).
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unity and to have unity is to be an individual. For this reason, actualiza-
tion and individuation are coextensive. This is why “everything in accor-
dance with the way it has existence has unity and individuation.”132 In
the metaphysical order, being is the ‘cause of individuation’ (causa
individuationis), and it applies to separate substances and matter-form
compounds alike. Crucially, it does so analogously and specifically, not
univocally: “As existents, however, they differ, for a horse’s existence is
not a man’s, and this man’s existence is not that man’s.”133 For this rea-
son, being (esse), in bringing all things into actuality, individuates each
and every existent. As such, being is the universal cause of individuation
— it creates everything out of nothing into particular ‘somethings.’ To be
individuated is to be unique, for individuated beings are not copies of a
uniform exemplar that are merely differentiated by accidents. Instead,
all individual beings are unique particulars or singulars.
In other words, Aquinas makes the astonishing claim that the most
universal is also that which particularizes things. How and why might
this possibly be true and rationally intelligible? For Thomas, universal or
common being is received diversely in particular beings: “[E]verything is
received in something else according to the mode of the recipient.”134
This is why there is not only a cause but also a principle of individuation,
designated matter (materia signata) — that which receives being. In the
remainder of this chapter, I examine the implications of Aquinas’s con-
ception of the cause and the principle of individuation. In the following
chapter, I compare and contrast Thomas’s position with that of Scotus,
Ockham, and Buridan.
7. Bonum Diffusivum Sui and the Hierarchy of Relations
In the preceding section, I showed that individuation is for Aquinas a
philosophical problem because it concerns the metaphysical structure
of the world, in particular the simultaneous occurrence of unity and di-
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132. “. . . unumquodque enim secundum quod esse habet, habet unitatem at
individuationem” (Responsio ad Fr. Joannem Vercellensem de articulis XLII q. 108, in Op.
theol. I, no. 935 [240]).
133. “. . . differunt autem secundum esse; non enim idem est esse hominis et equi, nec
huius hominis et illius hominis)” (ST Ia, q. 3, a. 5).
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versity in material things. In this section, I show that the primary cause
which individuates matter-form compounds is the ultimate source of all
being — divine love and goodness (In II Sent. d. 1, q. 1, a. 4, corp.; SCG
III.24; ST Ia, q. 105, a. 5, corp.). Indeed, in his commentary on the Liber de
causis Thomas writes that the Good is itself individual and infuses all
things with pure goodness:
But if someone should say: the first cause must have yliatim, we will
say: its yliatim is infinite being and its individuality is the pure good-
ness that infuses the intelligences with all goodness and, with the me-
diation of the intelligence, [also infuses] the rest of things.135
In other words, divine creation is that event by which the infinity of united
‘definiteness’ is converted into the finitude of composite ‘definiteness.’ As
such, individual things reflect in particular and diverse ways the universal
triunity of their Creator whose goodness individuates all beings
relationally. For God’s ecstatic self-subsistence brings everything into be-
ing and makes it in the image and likeness of the relational Godhead.
Here one can distinguish three kinds or levels of relation in Aquinas:
first, the horizontal relation amongst beings that all share in common
being (e.g., ST Ia-IIa, q. 29, a. 1, ad 1; ST IIIa, q. 1, a. 2, resp.); second, the ver-
tical asymmetric relationality of created being to God upon which the
horizontal relation depends (e.g., De veritate q. 2, a. 11, corp.; Comp. theol.
I.67); third, the absolutely symmetric relationality between the Trinitar-
ian persons, which provides the ultimate source for the relational indi-
viduation of the whole of creation (e.g., De potentia q. 8, a. 2, ad 1; ST Ia, q.
28, a. 2, corp.).136 In the present subsection, I detail these three dimen-
sions of Thomas’s account of relationality.
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135. “Quod si dixerit aliquis: necesse est ut sit abens yliatim, dicemus: yliatim id est
suum esse infinitum, et individuum suum est bonitas pura, effluens super intelligentiam
omnes bonitates et super reliquas res mediante intelligentia” (In de causis prop. 9a [65/57]).
On the meaning of yliatim in Aquinas, see Jan A. Aertsen, Medieval Philosophy and the
Transcendentals: The Case of Thomas Aquinas (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1996), esp. p. 260; Andreas
Speer, “‘Yliathin quod est principium individuandi’ — Zur Diskussion um das Individu-
ationsprinzip im Anschluß an prop. 8[9] des ‘Liber de causis’ bei Johannes de Nova Domo,
Albertus Magnus und Thomas von Aquin,” in Individuum und Individualität im Mittelalter,
ed. Jan A. Aertsen and Andreas Speer (Berlin and New York: De Gruyter, 1996), pp. 266-86,
esp. 282-86.
136. Krempel, La doctrine de la relation chez saint Thomas, esp. pp. 170-79.
283
G:\Pabst\first corrections
Monday, January 16, 2012 2:52:05 PM
Color profile: Disabled
Composite  140 lpi at 45 degrees
I have already highlighted the influence of both Christian and pagan
Neo-Platonism on the metaphysics of Aquinas.137 Thomas’s hierarchy of
relations is a particular case in point. The Good, whose individuality is
pure goodness, infuses all things with goodness. This is because the
Good communicates itself (bonum diffusivum sui, De veritate q. 24, a. 3,
corp.; SCG I.37; ST Ia, q. 19, a. 2, corp.).138 As such, the Good is manifest in
all that is because each and every existent thing shares in goodness by
virtue of participating in common being. Goodness in beings is intelligi-
ble, for the good is convertible with being (ens et bonum convertuntur, In I
Sent. d. 44, q. 1, a. 1, corp.), and being is naturally oriented towards the
Good (e.g., In I Sent. d. 44, q. 1, a. 2, corp.; In Boeth. de Trin. 4). Likewise,
the intellect seeks the truth of things because intelligent nature is always
already instilled with a natural desire for knowledge and the Good:
The essence of goodness consists in this, that it is in some way desir-
able. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. i): “Goodness is what all de-
sire.” Now it is clear that a thing is desirable only in so far as it is per-
fect; for all desire their own perfection. But everything is perfect so far
as it is actual.139
252
MATTER AND FORM
137. Against the strongly Aristotelian interpretation of Étienne Gilson and A. C. Pegis,
other Thomist scholars have documented the importance of Platonism and Neo-
Platonism. In addition to L.-B. Geiger and C. Fabro, see, inter alia, André Hayen,
L’intentionnel dans la philosophie de Saint Thomas (Paris: Vrin, 1942); Joseph de Finance,
Être et Agir dans la Philosophie de Saint Thomas (Paris: Vrin, 1945); Louis de Raeymaeker,
Philosophie de l’être. Essai de synthèse métaphysique, 2nd ed. (Louvain: Editions
Nauwelaerts, 1947); William Norris Clarke, “The Limitation of Act by Potency in St.
Thomas: Aristotelianism or Neo-Platonism?” New Scholasticism 26 (1952): 167-94; W. N.
Clarke, “The Meaning of Participation in St. Thomas,” Proceedings of the American Catholic
Philosophical Association 26 (1952): 147-57; W. N. Clarke, “The Platonic Heritage of Thom-
ism,” Review of Metaphysics 8 (1954): 105-24; W. N. Clarke, “The Problem of the Reality and
Multiplicity of Divine Ideas in Christian Neoplatonism,” in Neoplatonism and Christian
Thought, ed. Dominic J. O’Meara (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1982), pp.
109-27; cf. Mark D. Jordan, The Alleged Aristotelianism of Thomas Aquinas (Toronto: Pontif-
ical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1992); O’Rourke, Pseudo-Dionysius and the Metaphysics
of Aquinas; and te Velde, Participation and Substantiality in Thomas Aquinas. For a concise
overview of this (ongoing) debate, see Fergus Kerr, After Aquinas: Versions of Thomism (Ox-
ford: Blackwell, 2002), esp. pp. 9-10, 48-50, 70-71.
138. W. N. Clarke, SJ, “Person, Being, and St. Thomas,” Communio 19 (Winter 1992):
601-18; W. N. Clarke, SJ, Explorations in Metaphysics: Being, God, Person (Notre Dame: Uni-
versity of Notre Dame Press, 1994), pp. 102-22, “To Be Is to Be Substance-in-Relation.”
139. “Ratio enim boni in hoc consistit, quod aliquid sit appetibile: unde Philosophus, in I
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Here Aquinas’s mention of actuality is crucial. A thing is good and de-
sires the good of its own perfection insofar as it actually exists (ST Ia, q. 5,
a. 1). Only that which is can be truly desired (sic nihil est appetibile nisi
ens, ST Ia, q. 5, a. 2, ad 4). All of which underscores Thomas’s hierarchical
conception of being.
Paradoxically, this metaphysical hierarchy reinforces relationality
between God and the world and also within the created order. Beyond
Boethius’ synthesis, Thomas combines Plato’s emphasis on the Good
which individuates all things relationally with the shared Platonist and
Aristotelian focus on the desirability of goodness and the perfectibility
of being. Since being and the good are coterminous in the Creator, all
things that are brought out of nothing into actuality share in the
plenitudinous reality of their creative source. For this reason, to desire
the good is a sign of creation and a means of preserving and perfecting
one’s unique form within God’s relational economy: “[A]ll things, each
according to its mode, desire to be in act; this is clear from the fact that
each thing according to its nature resists corruption. To be in act,
therefore, constitutes the nature of the good.”140 Indeed, like Plato (and
to some extent Aristotle), Aquinas views the Good as that which pro-
pels all intelligent substances to perfect their own form by pursuing
goodness intellectually and practically. All activities, speculative and
practical, that are governed by the Good enhance the actuality of be-
ings by fulfilling the unique forms of each thing. Since the form of cre-
ated things is ‘relative’ or relational, to act in accordance with intima-
tions of divine goodness is to promote both individual and communal
relationality by diffusing and distributing being and goodness to other
things:
The communication of being and goodness arises from goodness.
This is evident from the very nature and definition of the good. By na-
ture, the good of each thing is its act and perfection. Now each thing
acts in so far as it is in act, and in acting it diffuses being and good-
253
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Ethic., dicit quod bonum est ‘quod omnia appetunt.’ Manifestum est autem quod
unumquodque est appetibile secundum quod est perfectum: nam omnia appetunt suam
perfectionem. Intantum est autem perfectum unumquodque, inquantum est actu” (ST Ia, q. 5,
a. 1).
140. “Omnia autem appetunt esse actu secundum suum modum: quod patet ex hoc
quod unumquodque secundum naturam suam repugnat corruptioni. Esse igitur actu boni
rationem constituit” (SCG I.37.4).
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ness to other things. Hence, it is a sign of a being’s perfection that it
‘can produce its like,’ as may be seen from the Philosopher in Meteoro-
logica IV.141
This passage highlights Aquinas’s conception of horizontal relationality
among created things, which are not isolated self-contained entities but
instead relational beings. He emphasizes the perfectibility of beings-in-
act and the dynamic nature of the Good which is coextensive with being
and action. Pace Norman Kretzmann, who has alleged that the self-
diffusive good is subordinate to the good as final cause,142 it is clear that
Thomas associates both final and efficient causality with the Good:
“Now, the nature of the good comes from its being something appetible.
This is the end, which also moves the agent to act. That is why it is said
that the good is ‘diffusive of itself and of being.’ ”143 Thus there is a key dif-
ference with Aristotle, which is that Aquinas does not limit the Good to
the status of final cause but extends it to formal and efficient causality.
More in line with Plato and Christian Neo-Platonism, Thomas connects
the formal actuality of the Good with the actuality of creation.
So configured, the Good acts as both a final and as a formal-efficient
cause of particular sensible things and explains not just how but also why
intelligent beings pursue being and goodness by seeking ever more in-
tense actualization. At the first horizontal level — the creaturely station
in the metaphysical order — being (esse) is relational in the sense that ac-
tuality pours over into action which is not confined to the individual self
but extends to other beings too, establishing relations amongst them.
The self-diffusiveness of created esse implies that all things are always al-
ready relational because to be in act is to act upon other beings at the
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141. “Communicatio esse et bonitatis ex bonitate procedit. Quod quidem patet et ex ipsa
natura boni, et ex eius ratione. Naturaliter enim bonum uniuscuiusque est actus et perfectio
eius. Unumquodque autem ex hoc agit quod actu est. Agendo autem esse et bonitatem in alia
diffundit. Unde et signum perfectionis est alicuius quod ‘simile possit producere,’ ut patet per
Philosophum in IV Meteororum” (SCG I.37.4).
142. Norman Kretzmann, “A General Problem of Creation: Why Would God Create
Anything at All?” in Being and Goodness: The Concept of the Good in Metaphysics and Philo-
sophical Theology, ed. Scott MacDonald (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1991), pp.
208-29, esp. 219-23; N. Kretzmann, The Metaphysics of Theism: Aquinas’ Natural Theology in
Summa Contra Gentiles I (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), pp. 223-25.
143. “Ratio vero boni est ex hoc quod est appetibile. Quod est finis. Qui etiam movet
agentem ad agendum. Propter quod dicitur bonum esse ‘diffusivum sui et esse’ ” (SCG I.37.4;
cf. De veritate q. 21, a. 2, resp.).
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same time as being acted upon by them. Properly understood, meta-
physical relationality constitutes the source for the interconnectedness
throughout the cosmos and translates into practicing relations that es-
tablish human association at all levels, from the family and the house-
hold via communities to a common polity.144 Even though these have
different ends, they are all hierarchically ordered and governed by the su-
preme common good.145
An important point that emerges from Thomas’s metaphysics of cre-
ation and individuation is a certain vision of politics that is centered
upon the common good in which all beings share. Aquinas’s conception
of the common good has received widely and wildly different interpreta-
tions, ranging from Jacques Maritain’s existentialist defense to Michael
Novak’s liberal cooptation.146 However, both positions fail to recognize
that participation in the common good requires participation in com-
mon being because being and the good are coextensive. Crucially, to par-
take of common being presupposes relationality to the self-subsistent
being (ipsum esse subsistens), for only God’s gift of being enables partici-
pation. There can only be relationality among created beings if they are
relationally constituted by the Creator (In II Sent. d. 1, q. 1, a. 2, ad 4; De
potentia q. 3, a. 3, ad 2; ST Ia, q. 45, a. 3, ad 1): “[C]reation is really nothing
other than a relation with God with the newness of being.”147
Here the point needs to be made emphatically that Aquinas is more
Platonist than Aristotelian. Thomas’s account of God focuses on Trini-
tarian relationality rather than either on Aristotle’s substance alone (as
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144. Jan A. Aertsen, “Thomas Aquinas on the Good: The Relation between
Metaphysics and Ethics,” in Aquinas’s Moral Theory: Essays in Honor of Norman Kretzmann,
ed. Scott MacDonald and Elenore Stump (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1999), pp.
235-53; M. S. Kempshall, The Common Good in Late Medieval Political Thought (Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1999); Bernhard Blankenhorn, “The Good as Self-Diffusive in Thomas
Aquinas,” Angelicum 79 (2002): 803-37, esp. p. 810.
145. ST Ia, q. 65, a. 2; Ia-IIae, q. 113, a. 9, ad 2; IIa-IIae, q. 39, a. 2, ad 2; IIa-IIae, q. 47, a. 11,
resp.; De regno I.1. On horizontal relationality in Aquinas, see Philipp W. Rosemann, Omne
ens agit sibi simile: A “Repetition” of Scholastic Metaphysics (Leuven: Leuven University
Press, 1996), esp. pp. 279-305. On second- and third-act causality and the link to intra-
Trinitarian relations, see Milbank and Pickstock, Truth in Aquinas, esp. pp. 19-59.
146. Jacques Maritain, The Person and the Common Good (Notre Dame: University of
Notre Dame Press, 1947); Michael Novak, Free Persons and the Common Good (Lanham,
MD: Madison Books, 1989).
147. “creatio nihil est aliud realiter quam relatio quaedam ad Deum cum novitate
essendi” (De potentia q. 3, a. 3, corp.).
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John Zizioulas wrongly ascribes to Western theology from Augustine on)
or on a Platonized dyad of substance-in-relation (as William Norris
Clarke falsely associates with Thomist ‘ontology’).148 Zizioulas is right to
contrast the Trinitarian personalism of the Greek Fathers with the
essentialism of some Latin theologians (though not Augustine, Boethius,
or Aquinas, as I have shown), but he is wrong to claim that the unity of
God’s substance or being is somehow grounded in the freedom of the
three divine persons. Nor is it correct to suggest that Thomas supple-
ments Aristotelian substantiality with a greater Platonist emphasis on
relationality, as Clarke argues — even though his accentation of Aqui-
nas’s indebtedness to Platonism is crucial. Rather, God reveals himself as
both substance and relation, as Thomas maintains in all his works.149 On
a basic level, substance secures the unity of divine being whereas rela-
tion ensures the diversity and distinctness of the three Trinitarian per-
sons. But more fundamentally, God is beyond any genus (De potentia q. 7,
a. 3, ad 7; q. 8, a. 2, ad 1) and exceeds all languages and concepts. Here the
influence of Neo-Platonist negative theology in general and Dionysius’
mystical metaphysics in particular is key, as both Fran O’Rourke and
Rudi te Velde have shown. Beyond the binary link of the One and the
Many in both Plato and Plotinus, Aquinas shifts the focus to Trinitarian
relations of the Godhead and the triadic ordering of creation. More so
than his patristic Neo-Platonist forebears, he shows how the only con-
cept that applies to God is relation (In I Sent. d. 33, q. 1, a. 1, ad 5). In God
there cannot be any categorial relations that depend on substance. In-
stead, the three divine persons are subsistent relations (ST Ia, q. 29, a. 4).
Only subsistence secures ‘real’ distinction (In I Sent. d. 26, q. 2, a. 1 contra;
ST Ia, q. 36, a. 2) without undermining essential substantial unity (In I
Sent. d. 8, q. 4, a. 1, ad 4; De potentia q. 9, a. 5, ad 3). Since “in God relation
and essence do not differ from each other, but are one and the same,”150
God is the only fully relational substance or substantial relation. As such,
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148. See John Zizioulas, Being as Communion, (Crestwood, NY: St. Vladimir’s Sem-
inary Press, 1985), pp. 16-49; William Norris Clarke, “To Be Is to Be Substance-in-Relation,”
pp. 102-22. For a useful summary of their positions, see Matthew Webb Levering, Scripture
and Metaphysics: Aquinas and the Renewal of Trinitarian Theology (Oxford: Wiley-
Blackwell, 2004), pp. 197-251.
149. See, inter alia, In 1 Sent. d. 2, q. 1, a. 3; d. 22, q. 1, a. 3, ad 2; De potentia q. 10, a. 5; ST
Ia, q. 28, a. 2, ad 1.
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Thomas develops Augustine’s argument (De Trin. V.v) that “whatever is
in God is His substance”151 in the direction of divine, pure, unreserved,
absolute, and self-subsistent relationality, which is revealed to us in the
triple Book of Scripture, Nature, and History.
The common good is created by God’s love and self-diffusive good,
which individuates individuals relationally. It is the supreme good in
God which all beings are ordered to and which is mediated through the
cosmos and the city. The implications for politics and for individuation
within a common polity are significant. Unlike Maritain’s and Novak’s Ar-
istotelian separation of the material and the spiritual or the contempla-
tive and the practical,152 Aquinas — although he indeed makes such and
similar distinctions — emphasizes that all levels and dimensions are
equally ordered towards the one and only common good in God (ST Ia-
IIae, q. 113, a. 9, ad 2). And it is this more Platonist metaphysics of
relationality that distinguishes Aquinas most clearly from Aristotle. The
main difference with Plato is that Aquinas (building on Augustine and
Boethius) accounted for the relationality of being itself in terms of the
substantial relations of the Trinity and of the relationality of created in
terms of God’s outpouring love.153
The self-diffusiveness of the Good and the outpouring of divine love
is the reason why God creates everything out of nothing and individu-
ates all things relationally. Aquinas makes this argument by linking indi-
viduation, communication, and relation. Everything is what it is not
through itself but in relation to other things by receiving them and by
giving itself to them, as Philipp Rosemann has argued.154 The mode of
communication and relation amongst created things is perhaps best de-
scribed as a dynamic of gift-reception and return. This dynamic is sus-
tained by God’s original and continuous gift of being. That is why the di-
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151. “Quidquid est in Deo, Deus est” (De potentia q. 8, a. 2, corp.), where Aquinas men-
tions Augustine’s De Trinitate; “Quidquid est in Deo, est eius substantia” (De potentia q. 8, a.
2, corp.).
152. Maritain, The Person and the Common Good, pp. 15-30.
153. Cf. Clarke, “The Limitation of Act by Potency in St. Thomas: Aristotelianism or
Neo-Platonism?” esp. pp. 190-94. I agree with Clarke that Aquinas reconfigured Neo-
Platonism and produced an original synthesis that cannot be described as dominantly Ar-
istotelian. Beyond Clarke, I argue that the novelty of Thomist metaphysics consists in de-
veloping the three dimensions of relationality (amongst created beings, between creation
and the Creator, and within the Godhead) and showing how the triadic structure of the
world discloses the Trinitarian relations of the three divine persons.
154. Rosemann, Omne ens est aliquid, pp. 13-47.
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vine act of being is the ultimate source of individuation, the first cause
and final end of creation.
8. Prime Matter and Substantial Form
In this section, I analyze Aquinas’s account of the link between matter
and form. The reason why Aquinas posits not just a cause but also a prin-
ciple of individuation is that the divine act of being cannot itself account
for the diverse reception of form into materiality. Unlike Porreta’s ‘gram-
matical Platonism’ and his essentialist ontology, which focus on individ-
uating forms, Thomas follows the metaphysical Platonism and rela-
tional realism of his Christian Neo-Platonist forebears and transforms
Aristotle’s conception of matter as pure potency in the direction of cre-
ated matter that reflects the singularity of its transcendent source.
If prime matter is pure potentiality (De princ. nat. c. 2, 7), then matter
cannot individuate anything at all because pure potency is free of all de-
terminations and therefore unable to differentiate formally or specifi-
cally identical particulars, e.g., members of the same species (In I Sent. d.
8, q. 5, a. 2). The problem that this argument raises is how universal form
and the act of being that actualizes it can be limited by the pure potency
of matter. As William Norris Clarke has argued, Aquinas solves this prob-
lem by providing a new synthesis of Aristotle’s metaphysics of act and
potency and the (Neo-)Platonist framework of participation. Thomas’s
solution is to show that “act is not limited except by reception in a dis-
tinct potency.”155 This solution is the result of two fundamental transfor-
mations of the philosophical tradition he inherited. Aquinas replaces the
Neo-Platonic procession of universal concepts with the plenitudinous
pure act which is self-diffusive and infuses all things with being and
goodness. He also disengages Aristotle’s act and potency from its hith-
erto exclusive attachment to the phenomenon of substantial change and
emphasizes the limitations placed upon plenitude by the participation
of recipient beings in pure actuality.
The implications for matter as the principle of individuation are far-
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155. Clarke, “The Limitation of Act by Potency in St. Thomas: Aristotelianism or Neo-
Platonism?” p. 190. In support of this formula, Clarke cites the following textual refer-
ences: SCG I.43; II.52-54; De potentia q. 1, a. 2; q. 7, a. 2, ad 9; In De Div. Nom. c. 5, lect. 1; ST Ia,
q. 7, a. 1-2; q. 50, a. 2, ad 4; q. 75, a. 5, ad 1 et 4; De spir. creat. 1; De subst. sep. c. 3 and 6; In VIII
Phys. c. 10, lect. 21; Quodl. III.8.20; Comp. theol. 18-21.
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reaching. First, just as Plato introduces a conceptual difference between
relationality and participation (acquiring and possessing form), so Aqui-
nas distinguishes the self-diffusion of goodness and love through divine
creation from the participation in God’s plenitude through human
agency. God’s creative action provides the metaphysical ground for par-
ticipating in the relational life of the Trinitarian Godhead, a foretaste of
the beatific vision in this life (ST Ia, q. 12) which deifies us here and
now.156 Second, Aquinas develops Greek conceptions of causality to
their theological conclusion by arguing that nothing comes from noth-
ing and that for this reason prime matter cannot preexist form. Beyond
both Plato and Aristotle, he insists that prime matter has God as its first
cause (SCG II.16; ST Ia, q. 15, a. 3, ad 3, which mentions Plato). This is not
simply an application of the doctrine of creation ex nihilo to cosmogony
but follows from the very nature of the universe. If there is an ultimate
source of reality and if this source is being itself, then that which receives
being must have the capacity to do so. For this reason, pure potency can-
not exist by itself but only in relation to pure act. The essence of prime
matter, which is unable to actualize itself and cannot be ordered to any
operation (In I Sent. d. 3, q. 4, a. 2, ad 4), is neither utter nothingness nor
self-generation but instead the capacity to receive actuality from the
pure act of being (In I Phys. lect. 15). Since prime matter and form stand
in potency to God’s pure self-subsistent being, both receive actuality
from the divine act of being. Moreover, in created reality there is no pure
matter without form. As a result, prime matter is not created alone or by
itself (per se), but under its appropriate form (sub forma, De potentia q. 3,
a. 5, ad 3; cf. ST Ia, q. 44, a. 2, ad 3).
This conception of matter raises questions about the nature of the
relation between prime matter and substantial form. This relation is
not categorial, for otherwise it would be a property superadded to the
259
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156. On the beatific vision and deification in Aquinas, see the contrasting accounts
by Étienne Gilson, “Sur la problématique thomiste de la vision béatifique,” Archives
d’histoire doctrinale et littéraire au Moyen-Âge 31 (1964): 67-88; Maritain, “Réflexions sur la
nature blessée et sur l’intuition de l’être,” pp. 5-41; and, more recently, Olivier Boulnois,
“Les deux fins de l’homme. L’impossible anthropologie et le repli de la théologie,” Les
Études Philosophiques 9 (1995): 205-22; Anna N. Williams, “Mystical Theology Redux: The
Patterns of Aquinas’s Summa Theologiae,” Modern Theology 13 (1997): 53-74; A. N. Williams,
“Deification in the Summa Theologiae: A Structural Interpretation of the prima pars," The
Thomist 61 (1997): 219-55; A. N. Williams, The Ground of Union: Deification in Aquinas and
Palamas (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), esp. pp. 34-101.
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essence of matter (In I Phys. lec. 15). In this case, matter could not be
part of the essence of composite substances (De ente c. 2). Nor is this re-
lation transcendental (as has been argued by Thomists such as Louis de
Raeymaeker) or logical (as has been contended by A. Krempel).157 For
the relation of prime matter to substantial form is objective and extra-
mental, and therefore perhaps best described as metaphysical. The es-
sence of matter as pure potency is its ordering to form, for matter can-
not exist apart from or outside its relation with form.158 This is already
contained in the divine idea of matter (In I Sent. d. 36, q. 2, a. 3, ad 2). If
God is pure actuality, then there cannot be a perfect divine idea of
prime matter void of any being. Indeed, particular sensible things have
their proper ideas in God (In I Sent. d. 36, q. 2, a. 3, ad 3). For this reason,
individuation is a function of divine ideas and the act of being which
brings matter into actuality. John Wippel puts this well: “There is one di-
vine idea for the composite whole, and it serves as a productive princi-
ple for the entire composite, including both its matter and its form.”159
Only in the sense of similitude can there be a divine idea of prime mat-
ter, which can be considered distinctly without existing separately (De
veritate q. 3, a. 5, ad 3).
This is to suggest that matter has in some sense form, in that matter
has the capacity to receive actuality. The ‘form’ of matter is the potency
to be actualized. In reality there is no such thing as pure matter divorced
from form or existence. To say that prime matter is pure potency is to say
that it only exists by participating in the act of being. For this reason, the
act which is participated in by matter gives form to matter and is thereby
limited (Quodl. III, q. 1, a. 1). As Aquinas makes clear, this does not indi-
cate a deficiency in divine power. On the contrary, the limit of the act of
pure form by the potency of prime matter describes the (onto-)logic of
creation: to receive the pure act of being is to be brought out of nothing
260
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157. See de Raeymaeker, Philosophie de l’être, and Krempel, La doctrine de la relation
chez saint Thomas, esp. pp. 174-79, 361-68, 583-96.
158. Influential Franciscan theologians at the time of Aquinas and not long after his
death held that God’s absolute power is able to bring and keep matter in actuality apart
from any corresponding form. Among them were, inter alia, John Peckham, John Duns
Scotus, and William of Ockham. See Allan B. Wolter, “The Ockhamist Critique,” in The
Concept of Matter in Greek and Medieval Philosophy, ed. Ernan McMullin (Notre Dame:
University of Notre Dame Press, 1963), pp. 124-46; Wippel, The Metaphysical Thought of
Thomas Aquinas, pp. 312-13. See, infra, chapter 6.
159. Wippel, The Metaphysical Thought of Thomas Aquinas, p. 322.
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into actuality. The utter potency of prime matter somehow ‘echoes’ the
nothing ‘out of which’ creation is made.
The question that arises from this account is how we know the rela-
tion of matter to form. In his commentary on Boethius’ De Trinitate
(which, as I argued in chapter 3, is indebted to Augustine), Thomas ar-
gues that relationality is what the actuality of particular composite sub-
stance manifests to the senses and to the intellect:
For, since everything is intelligible insofar as it is in act, as the
Metaphysics says, we must understand the nature itself or quiddity of a
thing either inasmuch as it is a certain act (as happens in the case of
forms themselves or simple substances); or through that which is its
act (as we know composite substances through their forms), or
through that which takes the place of act in it (as we know prime mat-
ter through its relation to form).160
According to this passage, the human mind can know matter through its
relation to form. The idea of relation recurs in Aquinas’s treatment of
matter when he speaks of human knowledge of matter by analogy or pro-
portion (De princ. nat. c. 2; In Boeth. de Trin. q. 4, a. 2). Before linking this
relation to individuation, I will first discuss the nature of substantial
form and the relation with prime matter. Generally, form in Aquinas is
taken to mean that which causes or gives being to matter ( forma dat
esse). Yet at the same time, Thomas insists throughout his works that the
essence of composite substance is not only form, but rather the compo-
sition of matter and form (De ente c. 2; In VII Met. c. 10, lec. 9, no. 1467;
Comp. theol. c. 154). If form is part of essence, it cannot be the act of being
which actualizes the composite as a whole. Therefore, Aquinas posits
two distinct relations between matter and form at the level of composite
substances. First, prime matter stands in potency to form, which serves
as its act of being (esse). Second, the composite’s essence (composed of
matter and form) stands in potency to the act of being (actus essendi),
which actualizes the entire composite (De spir. creat. q. 1, a. 1, resp.). In
261
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160. “Cum enim unaquaeque res sit intelligibilis secundum quod est in actu, ut dicitur in
IX Metaphysicae, oportet quod ipsa natura sive quidditas rei intelligatur vel secundum quod
est actus quidam, sicut accidit de ipsis formis et substantiis simplicibus, vel secundum id
quod est actus eius, sicut substantiae compositae per suas formas, vel secundum id quod est
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Thomas’s own words, “[A] thing composed of matter and form partici-
pates in its act of being from God through its own form according to its
proper mode.”161
This double relation leads Aquinas to reject Porreta’s thesis of the mul-
tiplicity of forms in favor of the unicity of substantial form.162 If substantial
form communicates the act of being to prime matter and if a composite’s
unity follows from being (De veritate q. 1, a. 1; De Boeth. de Trin. q. 4, a. 1; SCG
II.58), then composite substance can only have a single form. Otherwise
there would be more than one act of being and more than one source of
unity. The unicity of substantial form is central to the question of individu-
ation because it modifies the Augustinian notion of ‘seminal reasons’ (In II
Sent. d. 18, q. 1, a. 2) by specifying that prime matter receives a single indi-
vidual substantial form (not a generic form) and that every subsequent
form is accidental. So prime matter has being (esse) from form, and the
matter-form compound as a whole has being from the act of being (actus
essendi). This raises questions about how the being of form and the act of
being are linked. Since Thomas excludes a plurality of substantial forms in
composites and any intermediary form between prime matter and its
unique individual substantial form, the form of the composite is God’s act
of being as it is received diversely in different particular composites. As
such, the actuality of universal form is particularized in relation to the po-
tency of prime matter. In common being form is universal, whereas in indi-
vidual things substantial form is unique to each particular thing. Individ-
ual substantial form derives from the act of being, which cannot be
reduced to any individual instance of being. As I show in the following sec-
tion, the confluence of substantial form and prime matter explains the in-
dividuation of concrete composite substances.
9. Materia Signata and the ‘Relationality’ of Creation
If prime matter limits God’s infinite actuality through reception of the
act of being, then prime matter ceases to be pure potency and becomes
actualized. The form that actualized matter takes is corporeity. Indeed,
the first substantial form that prime matter receives is corporeity, and
262
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161. “res composita ex materia et forma per suam formam fit participativa ipsius esse a
Deo secundum quendam proprium modum” (De subst. sep. c. 6).
162. Wippel, The Metaphysical Thought of Thomas Aquinas, pp. 327-51.
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corporeity informs the whole of matter (In I Sent. d. 8, q. 5, a. 2). What fol-
lows from the same substantial form of corporeity is quantitative
dimensionality, i.e., the extendedness of matter, which implies noniden-
tical locations in space and therefore the ability to receive different
forms.163 As such, in addition to the act of being and prime matter, there
is according to Aquinas a third factor that helps explain individuation —
quantity or quantitative dimension. However, this raises a fundamental
problem: Do accidents such as quantity differentiate different specifi-
cally identical substances and thereby account for their identity? Is
quantity the ultimate explanation of individuation?
Before examining Aquinas’s solution to this problem, I will discuss
his account of dimension in relation to matter. Drawing on Boethius’ De
Trinitate, Thomas explains that forms are not individuated by being re-
ceived in prime matter or corporeity but only insofar as they are received
in this matter, which is distinct from that matter and determined to the
‘here and now.’ So configured, matter is particular only through quantity
because it is divided into parts and subjected to spatial and temporal de-
termination. As such, quantity is self-individuating and individuates
matter, which in turn individuates form. However, what is it about quan-
tity that renders it determined in this way? Aquinas specifies the status
of dimensionality as follows. Dimension can either be terminate, in
which case it cannot explain the individuation of material substances
because the particular dimensions of individuals change over time. Or
dimension is indeterminate, in which case it makes matter this rather
than that — individual and designated. Properly understood, dimension
can account for individuation and numerical plurality within the same
species while also remaining constant over time and therefore not un-
dermining individual identity (In Boeth. de Trin. q. 4, a. 2).
However, to distinguish dimensionality in this manner leaves open
the question about how an accident (quantity) can individuate a sub-
stance. Indeterminate dimensions must be presupposed in matter for it
to be individuated and then to individuate form. But this might imply
that dimensions precede the substantial form which gives being both to
263
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163. Joseph Bobik, “La doctrine de saint Thomas sur l’individuation des substances
corporelles,” Revue Philosophique de Louvain 51 (February 1953): 5-41; J. Bobik, “Dimensions
in the Individuation of Bodily Substances,” Philosophical Studies 4 (1954): 60-79; J. Bobik,
“Matter and Individuation,” in McMullin, ed., The Concept of Matter in Greek and Medieval
Philosophy, pp. 281-92; Joseph Owens, “Thomas Aquinas: Dimensive Quantity as Individu-
ating Principle,” Mediaeval Studies 50 (1988): 279-310.
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matter and to accidents. In his early work (including the programmatic
treatise De ente et essentia),164 Aquinas’s solution is that dimension can
only be thought of as indeterminate. In reality, dimensions exist subject
to a certain kind of measure and proportion. But it is not clear in what
way this indeterminate dimension specifies matter and individuates it
prior to the reception of form. The account of individuation that Thomas
elaborates on this basis is so complex and open to misconception that
he abandons it in favor of a different terminology that marks a funda-
mental shift. In later texts such as the De veritate, he adopts the vocabu-
lary of designated matter (materia signata), which can be defined in the
following way: “matter insofar as it is considered with a determination of
its dimensions, i.e. with these or those given dimensions.”165 In other
words, whether in thought or in real existence, matter is always already
determined to dimensions because divine ideas of concrete material
composites encompass ideas about particularized matter. For example,
it is impossible to think of human beings independently of embodiment.
There is no idea or existence of a human body apart from a soul. So di-
mensions in matter are part of the idea and the reality of matter, which is
already constituted by its individual substantial form.
It is this ‘designated form’ of matter which is the principle of individu-
ation and from which the mind needs to abstract in order to cognize uni-
versals rather than perceive singulars (De veritate q. 2, a. 6; q. 10, a. 5). Cou-
pled with dimensive quantity, which is self-individuating and thus
constitutes the ultimate foundation for numerical diversity within the
same species, designated matter is Aquinas’s principle of individuation
because matter considered under dimensions is always already particu-
lar and therefore individuates the form that it receives (SCG IV.65; De
potentia q. 9, a. 1, a. 2, ad 1; ST Ia, q. 75, a. 4; q. 119, a. 1). Compared with
Porreta, what is significant about this account is not only the focus on
matter rather than exclusively on form but also the retrieval and exten-
sion of the patristic Neo-Platonist metaphysics of relationality. In the
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164. Martin Grabmann, “Die Schrift ‘De ente et essentia’ und die Seinsmetaphysik
des heiligen Thomas von Aquin,” in Mittelalterliches Geistesleben 1 (1926); Étienne Gilson,
“La preuve du De ente et essentia,” in Acta III Congressus Thomistici Internationalis: Doctor
Communis (Turin: Marietti, 1950), vol. 3, pp. 257-60; Joseph Owens, “Aquinas’ Distinction
at De Ente et Essentia 4.119-123,” Mediaeval Studies 48 (1986): 264-87; Alain de Libera and
Cyrille Michon, eds., L’être et l’essence. Le vocabulaire médiéval de l’ontologie: Deux traités
De ente et essentia de Thomas d’Aquin et Dietrich de Freiberg (Paris: Éditions du Seuil, 1996).
165. Wippel, The Metaphysical Thought of Thomas Aquinas, p. 367.
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present chapter, I have argued that for Aquinas everything is in some fun-
damental sense relational. God is self-subsistent unreserved Trinitarian
relationality. Angelic forms are in relation to the act of being and in this
sense are composites ( form-being compounds). Material things are like-
wise composites in this sense too: they are being-form compounds as well
as form-matter compounds. The crux is that matter only exists in relation
to form and that substantial form is always received in matter. Contrary
to Porreta’s theory, which begins with God and derives all other forms
from God’s absolute power (as I suggested in the previous chapter), Aqui-
nas’s account begins with the nature of particular sensible things and on
this basis demonstrates both the existence and (in some way) the essence
of the one triune God, in the sense that the relations amongst creatures
reflect approximately and imperfectly the relations within the Trinity
(even though this can never be fully grasped by reason alone).
As already mentioned, Rudi te Velde has shown how in Thomist
metaphysics the existence of God cannot be divorced from his essence:
an sit and quid sit are distinct yet related questions because to know that
God exists is also to know in some sense what he is — self-subsistent be-
ing (ipsum esse subsistens) and pure actuality (actus purus).166 If particu-
lars are relational and are created by divine being itself and if the effects
are in some way similar to the cause, then the first cause or self-
subsistent being is also in some sense relational. Since the cause exceeds
and encompasses its effects, the relationality of the cause surpasses that
of the effect. This is how Thomas explicates the doctrine of creation in
the image and likeness of God and provides an account of creation ex
nihilo that is amenable to natural reason.
Matter as the principle of individuation highlights the nature of
relationality in particular sensible things. Matter itself is relational in the
sense that dimensive quantity which individuates prime matter consti-
tutes a categorical real relation, as opposed to a relation of reason:
“[O]ther genera, as quantity and quality, in their strict and proper mean-
ing, signify something inherent in a subject.”167 Thomas also describes
categorial real relations in terms of esse in, existing only in an actual sub-
ject that gives it being. In the case of matter, there can only be dimensive
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166. Te Velde, “ ‘The First Thing to Know about God’: Kretzmann and Aquinas on the
Meaning and Necessity of Arguments for the Existence of God,” pp. 251-67.
167. “quantitas et qualitas, secundum propriam rationem significant aliquid alicui
inhaerens” (ST Ia, q. 28, a. 1, corp.).
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quantity because the individual substantial form gives being to prime mat-
ter. Likewise, form is relational, in the sense that it is received into particu-
lar matter and as such stands in relation to it as well as to the act of being.
For this reason, form can only be the form of a particular because universal
form, which is individual (though not particular), is limited by the potency
of matter. Just as particular matter cannot exist apart from form to which
it is ordered as potency is ordered to act, so too individual substantial form
cannot exist separately from matter by which it is limited, as act is limited
by potency. Both matter and form are really relational.
Moreover, the relation between matter and form is neither accidental
nor logical nor transcendental. Rather, it is real because it is objective and
extra-mental, and it is metaphysical because it intimates a real relation
with transcendent forms, as I have already indicated. Matter is the princi-
ple of individuation in the sense that it is always already designated, i.e.,
determined to dimensions and thus capable of receiving and individuat-
ing form. Why? Because the divine idea of materiality ordains matter to
actuality received from form (SCG II.81). Put differently, prime matter,
which is pure potency, becomes designated by a divine idea of a particu-
lar thing. The dimensionality of matter is not a function of the substantial
form but instead is the result of the creation by the divine mind. Only
once matter is designated can it then receive form. For example, God cre-
ates particular matter in the form of bodies which are relational to souls.
Individuation is therefore conceived in terms of relationality:
For just as it is competent to the human soul in respect of its species
to be united to a body of a particular species, so this particular soul
differs only numerically from that one through having a habitude to a
numerically different body. Thus human souls are individualized —
and consequently the possible intellect also which is a power of the
soul — in relation to the bodies, and not as though their individuality
were caused by their bodies.168
One point that emerges from this passage is that bodies per se cannot in-
dividuate souls because this would presuppose the capacity to receive
266
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168. “Sicut enim animae humanae secundum suam speciem competit quod tali corpori
secundum speciem uniatur, ita haec anima differt ab illa numero solo ex hoc quod ad aliud
numero corpus habitudinem habet. Et sic individuantur animae humanae, et per consequens
intellectus possibilis, qui est potentia animae, secundum corpora, non quasi individuatione a
corporibus causata” (SCG II.75.6).
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souls. This capacity is given by God’s idea of a particular body. Another
point in this passage is that both matter and form individuate the com-
posite matter by limiting the act of form which is ordered to a particular
body in virtue of a relation (habitudo).169 Just as matter only exists in re-
lation to form, so form only has numerical unity through its ordering to
matter. The nature of this relation is real in the sense that it is not a rela-
tion of reason but has an objective extra-mental reality. Likewise, the na-
ture of this relation is ‘essential’ in the sense that it is not accidental (like
quantity in the case of matter) but constitutive of both designated mat-
ter and individual substantial form.170
For Aquinas, the relationality of components and the composite as a
whole discloses the relationality of the universe and its author. Particu-
lar sensible things are both substantial and relational, as “in all things a
double perfection is found: one by which it subsists in itself and another
by which it is ordered to other things.”171 Elsewhere he defines such an
ordering as real relationality.172 Like Augustine and Boethius, Thomas
argued that a particular thing is not constituted and individuated by
substance and accident alone but that relations with other individuals
are part of what it is to be a properly individuated being:
[T]he perfection and good which are in extra-mental things follow not
only upon something inhering in things absolutely, but also upon the
order of one thing toward another, as also the good of an army con-
sists in the order of the parts of the army, for to this order the Philoso-
pher compares the order of the universe. Therefore it is necessary that
in those [extra-mental] things there be a certain order; but this order
is a certain relation. So it is necessary that in those [extra-mental]
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169. Robert A. O’Donnell, “Individuation: An Example of the Development in the
Thought of St. Thomas Aquinas,” New Scholasticism 33 (1959): 49-67, esp. pp. 57-67.
170. Henninger, Relations, pp. 13-39.
171. “in rebus omnibus duplex perfectio invenitur; una qua in se subsistit; alia qua ad res
alias ordinatur” (In III Sent. d. 27, q. 1, a. 4, corp.). Cf. ST Ia, q. 22, a. 1, resp.
172. “Relation in its own proper meaning signifies only what refers to another. Such
regard to another exists sometimes in the nature of things, as in those things which by
their own very nature are ordered to each other, and have a mutual inclination; and such
relations are necessarily real relations [Ea vero quae dicuntur ad aliquid, significant
secundum propriam rationem solum respectum ad aliud. Qui quidem respectus aliquando
est in ipsa natura rerum; utpote quando aliquae res secundum suam naturam ad invicem
ordinatae sunt, et invicem inclinationem habent. Et huiusmodi relationes oportet esse re-
ales]” (ST Ia, q. 28, a. 1, resp.).
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things there be certain relations, according to which one [thing] is or-
der to another.173
Thomas’s account of relation is both realist and conceptualist, in the sense
that the reality of particular relations in material beings is the source of
abstract concepts of universal relation in the immaterial intellect.
Aquinas’s metaphysics of pure actuality leads him to argue that the
relation between the universe and its author is real but that the relation
between God and creation is only one of reason. By transforming Aris-
totle’s account of categorial relation in the direction of the individuat-
ing Good in God, he shows that the relation between Creator and cre-
ation is nonmutual because God “is altogether outside the genus of
created being by which the creature is really referred to God.”174 In God
the act of existence and essence coincide — ipsum esse subsistens and
esse per essentiam. But in beings the act of existence is received from
God and limited by essence — esse creatum and esse participatum. Cre-
ation marks God’s gift of being that brings everything out of nothing
and imparts a share of goodness and common being in which beings
participate. Individuation marks the reception of the universal act of
being in created beings in accordance with their particular modes, so
that they may be what they are intended by the Creator — to be and to
abide in union with God.
10. Conclusion: Aquinas’s
Theological Metaphysics
In this chapter, I have argued that for Aquinas individual beings in act
are neither incommensurably different nor variations of the same; in-
stead, individual beings in act combine the unity of being with the di-
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173. “perfectio et bonum quae sunt in rebus extra animam, non solum attenditur
secundum aliquid absolute inhaerens rebus, sed etiam secundum ordinem unius rei ad
aliam, sicut etiam in ordine partium exercitus, bonum exercitus consistit: huic enim ordini
comparat philosophus ordinem universi. Oportet ergo in ipsis rebus ordinem quemdam esse;
hic autem ordo relatio quaedam est. Unde oportet in rebus ipsis relationes quasdam esse,
secundum quas unum ad alterum ordinatur” (De potentia q. 7, a. 9, resp.). Cf. In I Sent. d. 26,
q. 2, a. 1, corp.
174. “est omnino extra genus esse creati, per quod creatura refertur ad Deum” (De
potentia q. 7 a. 10 corp.). Cf. De potentia q. 7, a. 8, ad 3; ST Ia, q. 13, a. 7, corp.
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versity of beings: “[B]eing is diverse in different beings.”175 In synthesiz-
ing and extending Platonist and Aristotelian metaphysics, Thomas
argues that things-in-act tend naturally towards being (rather than
nonbeing [De princ. nat. c. 3, 8]), which is the actuality of supernatural
being in God (ST Ia, q. 5, a. 1). To be in act is to stand in potency to the
act of being which actualizes beings whose essence or form is to be:
“[E]verything is made in order that it may be, for making is the way to
being. It befits every caused thing to be made, even as it befits it to
be.”176 Individuation marks the reception of the universal act of being
in each and every being according to its particular mode of being, so
that it may be what it is — to be and to abide in the act of being. Being
is good, for it testifies to God’s gift of being in which all beings can par-
ticipate (In II Sent. d. 1, q. 1, a. 4, corp.; cf. ST Ia, q. 105, a. 5, corp.). For
Aquinas all beings are relational because being itself is unreservedly
relational. Unlike the static deity of substantialist metaphysics, the
Thomist God is self-subsistent being and pure act, utter and self-
ecstatic plenitude, and self-diffusive goodness. God is fully relational
ad intra and ad extra, between the Trinitarian persons and in relation
to creation.
To be made in the image and likeness of God is therefore to be con-
stituted by the creative relation of God with the world and to be per-
fected by participating in the infinite goodness of the pure act of being.
Man as the highest being in the created material order (ST Ia, q. 29, a. 3)
shares in the self-communicating love of God and participates in God’s
“everlasting bliss shared with the blessed”177 and in God’s Trinitarian
economy. As such, man is both substantial and relational, both a person
in the Boethian sense of an “individual substance of a rational nature”178
and a created being constituted relationally by the act of being. To be re-
lational is to be naturally oriented towards other relational beings
through friendship and community. To seek to perfect one’s own finite
relationality is to partake of God’s infinite Trinitarian relationality and
therefore to restore and enhance the relational order of creation.
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175. “esse est diversum in diversibus” (De ente c. 5, 1).
176. “Omne quod fit, ad hoc fit quod sit: est enim fieri via in esse. Sic igitur unicuique
causato convenit fieri sicut sibi convenit esse” (SCG II.43.4). Cf. “creatrix essentia” (In de Div.
Nom. c. 5, 2).
177. Kerr, After Aquinas, p. 157.
178. “naturae rationalis individua substantia,” Boethius, Contra Eut. III.1-5, quoted in
ST Ia, q. 29, a. 2.
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Interestingly, Aquinas’s first and his final major treatises provide a
summary statement of his account of individuation. Already in the De
ente et essentia, Thomas shifts the Avicennian focus on essence to the di-
vine act of being which is the ultimate cause of individuation. In his Com-
pendium Theologiae (probably written about a year prior to his death in
1274), he insists that God is in a meta-sense supremely individual and yet
contains all differences, for divine being is neither contained under any
genus nor a genus itself nor a species that is predicable of any individuals
(Comp. theol. 13-15). It is this divine act of being and not matter which indi-
viduates all things. For matter itself does not preexist God’s creation of ev-
erything out of nothing and as such cannot individuate universal form.
And since the diversity and unity of things depend on their existence,
matter cannot be the cause of individuation through actualization:
Again, the plurality or unity of things is dependent on their existence.
For, to the extent that anything is a being, it is also one. But forms do
not possess existence on account of matter; on the contrary, matter
receives existence from form. For act is more excellent than potency;
and that which is the reason for a thing’s existence must be the more
excellent component. Consequently forms are not diverse in order
that they may befit various types of matter, but matter is diversified
that it may befit various forms. (Comp. theol. 71)
In the following section of the Compendium, Aquinas states more clearly
than perhaps anywhere else in the Thomistic corpus that being is the ulti-
mate cause of individuation: “If the unity and multiplicity of things are
governed by their being, and if the entire being of things depends on God,
as has been shown to be the case, the cause of plurality in things must be
sought in God” (Comp. theol. 72). In this manner, Thomas explains that
things qua individuals most resemble God, whose plenitude is best re-
flected in this world by a multitude of diverse and uniquely distinct indi-
vidualities, for no single finite thing could ever be equal to God or contain
the divine ecstatic overflow of creative being and goodness (here Aqui-
nas’s indebtedness to Dionysius is once more in clear evidence).179
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179. In the Summa Contra Gentiles, he puts this as follows: “There would not be a per-
fect likeness of God in the universe if all things were of one grade of being. For this reason,
then, is there distinction among created things: that, by being many, they may receive
God’s likeness more perfectly than by being one” (SCG II.45.3; cf. SCG III.97.2).
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Furthermore when in the Compendium Aquinas gives a précis of
what he thinks, a Trinitarian metaphysics of relationality comes to the
fore. Everything is in terms of divinely created motion and a hierarchy of
more and more intimate procession. A metaphysics of three acts is also
foregrounded: first of all, substance is in some way in itself; second, sub-
stance is realized in the divine act of being; third, substance-in-act is al-
ways already towards another substance as communicated and related.
These three acts are ultimately the Augustinian conceptual triad of be-
ing, intellect, and will in man imaging the Trinity. Essence as such is seen
as communicating, which is how and why we can know — up to some
point — that the divine essence is Trinitarian. Following Augustine, the
idea of numerical series is also central, to which Aquinas adds that all
specific difference must be hierarchical (here following Dionysius).
Finally, there is barely any mention at all of the clear distinction, let
alone separation, of divina scientia and sacra doctrina. The one triune
God known to pagans is also the God of the Creed, while inversely the ar-
guments for the Trinity are of a highly cosmic kind — with intimations
and reflections in the natural, material world. In short, Aquinas defends
a relational, Trinitarian, and hierarchical metaphysics that avoids the
modern dualisms opposing substance to property/accidents (or cause to
effect), Christology to Trinitarianism, and transcendence to immanence,
as I suggest in the remaining chapters of this book.
271
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CHAPTER 6
The Invention of the Individual
1. Introduction: After the Thomist Synthesis
In the present chapter, I examine the link between creation and individu-
ation in the works of John Duns Scotus, William Ockham, and Jean
Buridan. I compare and contrast their accounts with that of Thomas
Aquinas because they associate individuation with formal principles
rather than transcendent causes. Such principles are located in beings
and lack any metaphysical relation with God’s creative activity. As a re-
sult, individuation becomes unhinged from creation, and the operation
of the natural world is cut off from transcendence. This shifts the onus of
individuation upon individual entities themselves and reinforces the
separation of potentia Dei ordinata and potentia Dei absoluta that was al-
ready incipient in Porreta’s twelfth-century theory of individuation.
I begin by sketching the conceptual context in which Scotus,
Ockham, and Buridan address the question of individuation, in particu-
lar the aftermath of the condemnations of 7 March 1277 at the University
of Paris.1 I then discuss the relation between creation and individuation
in some key texts before examining the growing importance of the con-
cept of potentia Dei absoluta for their conceptions of metaphysics and
politics. I conclude by arguing that Scotus, Ockham, and Buridan radi-
calize Porreta’s formalism and thereby undermine the realism that pa-
272
1. For a general overview of the condemnations, see Roland Hissette, Enquête sur les
219 articles condamnés à Paris le 7 mars 1277 (Louvain: Publications Universitaires de
Louvain, 1977), and David Piché, ed., La condamnation parisienne de 1277. Texte latin,
traduction, introduction et commentaire (Paris: Vrin, 1999).
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tristic and medieval theology had inherited from Plato and transformed
in the direction of Trinitarian relationality.
2. The 1277 Condemnations and the Implications for Metaphysics
St. Bonaventure notes in Book II of his commentary on the Sententiae
that the question of individuation caused “a dispute between philosophi-
cal men” (contentio inter philosophicos viros).2 At his time, some com-
mentators argued that matter individuates substances, while others
contended that individuation is a function of form. The shift from matter
to form as the principle of individuation preceded the works of John
Duns Scotus, as Rega Wood has documented. Already in the 1230s, Rich-
ard Rufus of Cornwall composed a tractate titled ‘On the cause of indi-
viduation’ (De causa individuationis), in which he spoke of a “clamorous
dispute of philosophers” over the question of individuation and attrib-
uted the cause that individuates substances to individual forms.3 In
chapter 4, I argued that form had already played a key role in twelfth-
century theories of individuation, especially Porreta’s conception of ‘to-
tal property’ composed of a collection of ‘quo ests’ or formae nativae. In
this chapter, I show how, after Aquinas, matter as the principle of indi-
viduation was abandoned in favor of form. This shift, which intervened
in the wake of the 1277 condemnations, marked a radicalization of the
earlier twelfth-century formalism. Porreta’s formalist account of the in-
dividual influenced Scotus’s, Ockham’s, and Buridan’s conception of indi-
viduality in the late thirteenth and early fourteenth century.4
Before I examine the main difference between Aquinas’s and subse-
quent theories of individuation, I briefly analyze the general change of
the philosophical and theological context that underlies this shift, above
273
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2. St. Bonaventure, In II Sent. d. 3, q. 2, a. 3.
3. Rega Wood, “Individual Forms: Richard Rufus and John Duns Scotus,” in John Duns
Scotus: Metaphysics and Ethics, ed. Ludgar Honnefelder, Rega Wood, and Mechthild Dreyer
(Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1996), pp. 251-72.
4. Étienne Gilson, La philosophie au Moyen Âge. Des origines patristiques à la fin du
XIVe siècle, 2nd rev. ed. (Paris: Ed. Payot & Rivages, 1999 [1922]), p. 266; Alain de Libera, La
querelle des universaux. De Platon à la fin du moyen âge (Paris: Éditions du Seuil, 1996),
p. 414; Grzegorz Stolarski, La possibilité et l’être. Un essai sur la détermination du fondement
ontologique de la possibilité dans la pensée de Thomas d’Aquin (Fribourg: Éditions
Universitaires, 2001), pp. 204-5.
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all the 1277 condemnations. On 7 March 1277 the Bishop of Paris Étienne
Tempier condemned 219 theses that had been taught in the Arts faculties
of the University. As both Stephen Brown and Jan Aertsen have shown,5
at least three theses directly concerned the question of individuation:
Thesis 81: That, because intelligences do not contain matter, God
could not produce many intelligences belonging to the same
species.
Thesis 96: That God cannot multiply many individuals in any given
species without matter.
Thesis 191: That forms do not admit division except by reason of mat-
ter.6
The theory of individuation that is censured by the 1277 condemnations
is the Aristotelian account, which focuses on matter. The last of the three
condemned theses concerns the general application of the material
principle to spiritual substances. According to the censors, the first two
theses pose a threat to the creative power of God. As I argue below, the
reconfiguration of the relation between potentia Dei absoluta and
potentia Dei ordinata by Scotus, Ockham, and Buridan had a significant
impact on late-thirteenth- and fourteenth-century metaphysics and pol-
itics and favored the rise of modern philosophy and ethics.
The importance of the 1277 condemnations has attracted extensive
scholarly interest and debate in the last thirty years or so. The principal
contention relates to the impact on the relations between theology and
philosophy in general and the teachings of Aquinas in particular. Pierre
Duhem’s argument that the condemnation of Aristotelian philosophy
precipitated the development of modern science has been disputed.7
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5. Stephen F. Brown, “Henry of Ghent (b. ca. 1217; d. 1293),” in Individuation in Scholas-
ticism: The Later Middle Ages and the Counter-Reformation 1150-1650, ed. Jorge J. E. Gracia
(Albany: State University of New York Press, 1994), pp. 195-219, esp. 195-96; Jan A. Aertsen,
“Die Thesen zur Individuation in der Verurteilung von 1277, Heinrich von Gent und
Thomas von Aquin,” in Individuum und Individualität im Mittelalter, ed. Jan A. Aertsen and
Andreas Speer (Berlin and New York: De Gruyter, 1996), pp. 249-65, esp. 250-52.
6. “Quod, quia intelligentiae non habent materiam, Deus non posset plures eiusdem
speciei facere — Error”; “Quod Deus non possit multiplicare plura individua sub una specie
sine materia — Error”; “Quod formae non recipiunt divisionem nisi secundum materiam —
Error” (quoted in Henry of Ghent, Quodlibet II, q. 8).
7. See Pierre Duhem, Études sur Léonardo de Vinci, vol. 13: Jean Buridan (de Béthune) et
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Alain de Libera, Luca Bianchi, and David Piché contend that the 1277
censure introduced an irreversible split between theology and philoso-
phy and inaugurated the rise of modern philosophy in the West.8 De-
spite important differences, these two interpretations are not necessar-
ily opposed or mutually exclusive: the separation of theology from
philosophy reinforced the idea of ‘pure nature’ separate from the super-
natural and thereby sundered physics from metaphysics and theology.
In any case, there can be little doubt about the initial impact of the 1277
condemnations. Less than twenty years after their publication, Godfrey
of Fontaines discussed in Book XII of his Quodlibet whether the then
Bishop of Paris ought to correct some of the condemned articles, espe-
cially regarding the question of individuation.9 Following some general
remarks on the need to have disputationes and foster theological de-
bate, Godfrey argues that the above-cited theses 81 and 96 are defend-
able (opinabilis) because Catholic ecclesial and lay authorities
(auctoritates) had advocated them in their teachings and writings, in-
cluding Thomas Aquinas whom Godfrey mentioned explicitly. This
alone is indicative of the effect of the condemnations on the status of
philosophy in the Arts faculties. It also highlights the extent to which
the censored articles were associated with the work of Aquinas, provid-
ing the advocates of 1277 with a questionable set of reasons to dismiss
his theological metaphysics.10
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Léonard de Vinci (Paris: A. Hermann, 1909); J. E. Murdoch, “Piere Duhem and the History
of Late Medieval Science and Philosophy in the Latin West,” in Gli studi di filosofia
medievale fra Otto e Novecento: Contributo a un bilancio storiografico. Atti del convegno
internazionale, Roma 21-23 settembre 1989, ed. Rudi Imbach and A. Maierù (Rome: Edizioni
di Storia e Letteratura, 1991), pp. 253-302; J. E. Murdoch, “1277 and Late Medieval Natural
Philosophy,” in Was ist Philosophie im Mittelalter? ed. Jan A. Aertsen and Andreas Speer
(Berlin and New York: De Gruyter, 1998), pp. 111-21.
8. See Alain de Libera, “Philosophie et censure. Remarques sur la crise universitaire
parisienne de 1270-1277,” in Aertsen and Speer, eds., Was ist Philosophie im Mittelalter? pp.
71-89; Luca Bianchi, “1277: A Turning Point in Medieval Philosophy?” in Aertsen and Speer,
eds., Was ist Philosophie im Mittelalter?, pp. 90-110; Piché, La condamnation parisienne de
1277, pp. 159-288. For alternative accounts, see Jan A. Aertsen, Kent Emery, Jr., and Andreas
Speer, eds., After the Condemnation of 1277: Philosophy and Theology at the University of
Paris in the Last Quarter of the Thirteenth Century (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2001).
9. Aertsen, “Die Thesen zur Individuation in der Verurteilung von 1277, Heinrich von
Gent und Thomas von Aquin,” esp. pp. 251-52.
10. On Aquinas, see John F. Wippel, “Thomas Aquinas and the Condemnations of
1277,” The Modern Schoolman 72 (1995): 233-72; J. F. Wippel, “Bishop Stephen Tempier and
Thomas Aquinas: A Separate Process against Aquinas?” Freiburger Zeitschrift für
307
G:\Pabst\first corrections
Monday, January 16, 2012 2:52:07 PM
Color profile: Disabled
Composite  140 lpi at 45 degrees
Concerning the impact of the 1277 condemnation, it is also instruc-
tive to refer to Henry of Ghent (c. 1217-1293), who was one of the sixteen
theologians on the commission that examined the positions subse-
quently censored by Bishop Tempier.11 In the same year as the condem-
nations — at Christmas 1277 — Henry discussed the question of individ-
uation in his second disputatio de quolibet and dismissed matter as
either cause or principle that individuates composites. His critique of
both matter and quantity is certainly directed at Aristotle but also
applies to Aquinas. Referring to the divine power of creation, he argues
that individual substantial form could by itself have several individual
instantiations, were it not for the limits of matter. Compared with Aqui-
nas, Henry emphasizes God’s absolute power at the expense of perfect
divine ideas of particular things (not ideal-types with multiple
instantiations, as Porreta seems to suggest). So not unlike Gilbert, Henry
reasons from abstract possibility to concrete actuality: logically speak-
ing, there could be multiple individuals with an identical form in the ab-
sence of materiality. Matter imposes limits, which is of course not the
same as saying that matter individuates form through its divinely in-
tended dimensionality, as Thomas held.
Henry of Ghent also claims that the essence of created being is such
that it can be multiplied in many substrates or supposita, including
without matter. In other words, matter is no longer an integral part of
the individuation of corporeal substances. This is why he argues that
“matter and quantity cannot be called the exact reason or cause of the
individuation and distinction of individuals belonging to the same spe-
cies.”12 What is questionable about Henry’s conception of created be-
ings is that they contain in themselves unrealizable possibilities. Yet for
Aristotle and Aquinas, in nature nothing is in vain because everything is
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Philosophie und Theologie 44 (1997): 117-36; H. Thijssen, “1277 Revisited,” Vivarium 35 (1997):
72-101. See also criticisms of Wippel’s interpretation by Roland Hissette, “Thomas d’Aquin
directement visé par la censure du 7 mars 1277? Réponse à John F. Wippel,” in Roma,
Magistra mundi. Itineraria cultura medievalis, ed. J. Hamesse (Louvain-la-Neuve:
Mélanges L. E. Boyle — FIDEM, 1998), pp. 425-37; R. Wielockx, “A Separate Process against
Aquinas: A Response to John F. Wippel,” in Hamesse, ed., Roma, Magistra mundi, pp. 1009-
30; R. Wielockx, “Procédures contre Gilles de Rome et Thomas d’Aquin,” Revue des Sci-
ences Philosophiques et Théologiques 83 (1999): 293-313.
11. Brown, “Henry of Ghent (b. ca. 1217; d. 1293),” esp. p. 195.
12. “materia et quantitas non possunt dici praecisa ratio et causa individuationis et
distinctionis individuorum eiusdem speciei” (Henry of Ghent, Quodlibet II, q. 8).
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oriented towards being and the good, as I showed in chapters 1 and 5.
The consequence of the primacy of possibility over actuality means that
individuation is no longer a primarily metaphysical problem but rather
becomes a question of modal logic. Having ruled out matter as the prin-
ciple of individuation and actualization as its cause, Henry concludes
that God’s absolute power is the first cause and also the efficient cause
that brings things into being and makes them what they are. There is no
mention of the act of being which is common to all beings yet received
diversely and as such the cause that individuates substances relation-
ally, as Thomas had already demonstrated. The shift that occurred since
the time of Aquinas and that Henry’s position tends to consolidate can
be stated as follows: like Damiani and Porreta before him, Ghent aban-
dons the interaction of transcendent causes and immanent principles
in favor of the transcendentality of God’s absolute power which over-
rides everything else. This prefigures the separation of philosophy and
theology and the emphasis on the self-individuation of composite sub-
stances in the works of Scotus, Ockham, and Buridan to which I now
turn.
3. Metaphysics and Formalism in Duns Scotus
“At the heart of the real, in Thomas Aquinas, there is the act of being; in
Duns Scotus, one finds haecceity.”13 Gilson’s concise summary of the
difference between Aquinas’s and Scotus’s metaphysics highlights a fun-
damental shift in high and late medieval theories of individuation.
Whereas the Angelic Doctor attributes individuation to God’s pure ac-
tuality, the Subtle Doctor situates it within each particular thing. In-
deed, haecceitas refers to the hoc aliquid (or Aristotle’s tËde ti), the ‘this-
ness’ of things. In this and the following section, I trace the Scotist ac-
count of individuation. Compared with Thomas, Scotus identifies a for-
mal principle that abstracts from the actuality of things. As a result, in-
dividuation becomes unhinged from actualization and is severed from
God’s creative action.
Coupled with the univocity of being and the formal distinction of ex-
277
The Invention of the Individual
13. “Au coeur du réel, chez Thomas d’Aquin, se trouve l’acte d’être; chez Duns Scot on
y trouve l’haeccéité,” in Étienne Gilson, Jean Duns Scot. Introduction à Ses Positions
Fondamentales (Paris: Vrin, 1952 [orig. pub. 1922]), p. 466.
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istence and essence,14 Scotus reconfigures theological realism and lo-
cates a certain kind of formalism at the center of metaphysics by elevat-
ing the formality of essence over and above the actuality of existence.
This move paves the way for the modern separation of philosophy from
theology and the self-individuation of particular things independently
from God’s act of being.15 As such, it is a metaphysical change that un-
derpins the long and uneven transition from the Middle Ages to moder-
nity, as I already suggested in chapter 4.
Allan Wolter has documented that Scotus’s position on individua-
tion did not undergo any significant change in the course of his aca-
demic life.16 Already in the Lectura (his commentary on the Sentences),
Scotus provides a comprehensive statement of his theory and adds only
minor qualifications in the Ordinatio. I therefore focus on the text in the
Lectura. One salient feature of Scotus’s account is that he gives the 1277
278
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14. On Scotus’s ‘double destruction’ of analogy and the real distinction, see Olivier
Boulnois, “Analogie et univocité selon Duns Scot: La double destruction,” Les Études
Philosophiques 3 (juillet-décembre 1989): 347-69; O. Boulnois, Être et représentation. Une
généalogie de la métaphysique moderne à l’époque de Duns Scot (XIIIe-XIVe siècle) (Paris:
Presses Universitaires de France, 1999); Catherine Pickstock, After Writing: On the Liturgi-
cal Consummation of Philosophy (Oxford: Blackwell, 1998), pp. 122-31. For a recent debate
on Scotus’s metaphysics, see a special issue of Modern Theology 21, no. 4 (October 2005)
with contributions by the following: Catherine Pickstock, “Duns Scotus: His Historical
and Contemporary Significance,” pp. 543-74; Thomas Williams, “The Doctrine of
Univocity Is True and Salutary,” pp. 575-85; Matthew Webb Levering, “Participation and
Exegesis: Response to Catherine Pickstock,” pp. 587-601; Olivier Boulnois, “Reading Duns
Scotus: From History to Philosophy,” pp. 603-8; Mary Beth Ingham, “Re-situating Scotist
Thought,” pp. 609-18; and Emmanuel Perrier, OP, “Duns Scotus Facing Reality: Between
Absolute Contingency and Unquestionable Consistency,” pp. 619-43.
15. On Scotus and the rise of modern philosophy, see Gilson, La philosophie au
Moyen-Âge, esp. p. 600; Ludgar Honnefelder, Ens inquantum ens. Der Begriff des Seienden
als solchen als Gegenstand der Metaphysik nach der Lehre des Johannes Duns Scotus
(Münster: Aschendorff, 1979); L. Honnefelder, Scientia transcendens. Die formale
Bestimmung der Seiendheit und Realität in der Metaphysik des Mittelalters und der Neuzeit
(Duns Scot, Suarez, Kant, Peirce) (Hamburg: F. Meiner, 1990); Jean-François Courtine,
Suarez et le système de la métaphysique (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1990), esp.
pp. 137-54; Eric Alliez, Les Temps Capitaux. Tome 1: Récits de la conquête du temps (Paris:
Éditions Cerf, 1991), pp. 269-322; Louis Dupré, Passage to Modernity: An Essay in the Herme-
neutics of Nature and Culture (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1993), esp. ch.
1; Olivier Boulnois, “Théologie, métaphysique et représentation de l’être selon Duns Scot,”
Revue de théologie et de philosophie 21 (1999): 83-102.
16. Allan B. Wolter, “John Duns Scotus (b. ca. 1265; d. 1308),” in Gracia, ed., Individua-
tion in Scholasticism, pp. 271-98, esp. 271-72.
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condemnations universal doctrinal authority, beyond their limited ca-
nonical applicability to the diocese of Paris.17 As I show below in greater
detail, he tends to accept Bishop Tempier’s dismissal of Aristotle’s theory
of individuation in general and Aquinas’s emphasis on matter and quan-
tity in particular. This critique leads him to develop an alternative prin-
ciple, centered on the notion of haecceity (haecceitas).
The context in which Scotus addresses the question of individuation
throughout his work is primarily philosophical and focuses on the prin-
ciple that individuates material substances. Divergences about this prin-
ciple lead to different treatments of angelic individuation (Lect. II Sent. d.
3, pars 1, q. 1, n. 1). In other words, concerning the problem of individua-
tion philosophy has absolute priority over theology. This priority is dif-
ferent from the autonomy of metaphysics in Aquinas because in Scotus,
there is no subordination of philosophy to Scientia Dei. In Aquinas,
metaphysics refers its subject matter (being) to a higher cause (God) and
the Science of God, as I showed in the previous chapter. By contrast, in
Scotus metaphysics (both its subject matter and its operation) is inde-
pendent of Scientia Dei. For this reason, metaphysics becomes detached
from cosmology and nature, and physics is elevated into a quidditative
science that is no longer confined to change and motion.18 As the sci-
ence of the quiddity of mobility, physics imitates the metaphysical focus
on quiddities and thus becomes more autonomous from metaphysics. In
part, the shift away from a hierarchical subordination of the sciences to-
wards an increasing degree of autonomy of physics and metaphysics
from theology inaugurated modern science and the emergence of phys-
ics divorced from both metaphysics and revealed theology.19
The origin of this turn can be traced to the centrality and nature of
knowledge in Scotist metaphysics. Scotus distinguishes between com-
mon notions and universals. The former denote general aspects of ob-
jects whereas the latter are forms in the mind. If intellectual cognition is
by definition abstract and grasps some common or general aspect of the
objects it apprehends, then it is not concerned with that which makes ob-
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17. Olivier Boulnois, Duns Scot. La Rigueur de la charité (Paris: Éditions Cerf, 1998),
ch. 1.
18. Olivier Boulnois, “Au-delà de la physique?” in Duns Scot à Paris, 1302-2002: Actes du
colloque de Paris, 2-4 septembre 2002, ed. Olivier Boulnois, Elisabeth Karger, Jean-Luc
Solère, and Gérard Sondag (Paris: Éditions Brepols, 2004), pp. 219-54, esp. 245-54.
19. Amos Funkenstein, Theology and the Scientific Imagination from the Middle Ages to
the Seventeenth Century (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986), esp. pp. 25-63.
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jects individual or singular. What the intellect grasps is ‘natura communis,’
which can be described as something in an object that is isomorphic with
the sort of thing we think it to be. In other words, the ‘common nature’ is
some common feature, characteristic, or property that it shares with
other similar objects. In this sense, natura communis provides the meta-
physical ground for being and knowledge. Put differently, nothing can be
or be known without natura communis because everything shares a sub-
stantial likeness with other things that belong to the same species. Cogni-
tion of commonality which abstracts natura communis from material sin-
gularity wields supreme sway. Sense perception of the actuality of things
has no cognitive import at all in relation to cognition of haecceity (Rep.
par. II, d. 3, q. 3, n. 15; d. 12, q. 8, n. 10; In Metaph. VII, q. 13, n. 26). As a result,
singularity cannot be known by either sense perception (because it deliv-
ers only confused images) or intellection (because it abstracts from indi-
vidual things altogether). In our present condition (pro statu isto), the hu-
man intellect only has an approximate grasp of individuality through
intuitive knowledge (notitia intuitiva) — the immediate intuition of things
themselves (in se), that is, both their objectity and their proper existence
and presence (Ord. II, d. 3, q. 6, n. 16; III, d. 14, q. 3, n. 14; Quodlib. q. 6, a. 1; q.
7, a. 2; q. 13, a. 2).20
This position contrasts with the natural priority of ens or entia in
Avicenna and Aquinas, i.e., individual beings which constitute the first
objects of the senses and the intellect. The difference lies with Scotus’s
formalism, which is halfway between Aquinas’s realism and Ockham’s
nominalism. Scotus defends a variant of realism against contemporary
nominalists such as Roger Marston and Peter de Falco. He rightly rejects
the claim that existence must be reduced to particularity and that uni-
versality is purely mental or nominal. Nor is singularity by or of itself, for
otherwise a thing’s unity would be merely numerical, not qualitative
(Lect. II Sent. d. 3, pars 1, q. 1, nn. 28-30). Moreover, Scotus’s natura
communis is not a nominalist concept, because it is founded upon a real
similarity among individual beings that enables the knowing mind to
discern a substantial likeness in the known object.
However, Scotus’s realism is qualified by the nature of this similarity.
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20. Cf. John F. Boler, “Intuitive and Abstract Cognition,” in The Cambridge History of
Later Medieval Philosophy: From the Rediscovery of Aristotle to the Disintegration of Scholas-
ticism, ed. Norman Kretzmann, Anthony Kenny, and Jan Pinborg (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1982), pp. 460-78, esp. 463-75.
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His account of similarity is formal, in the sense that it is indifferent of it-
self to existence in things or existence in the intellect. So conceived, sim-
ilarity is neither one nor many, neither singular nor universal. As a result,
the identity of each thing and the difference with other things is formal
rather than actual because it is limited to essence and does not encom-
pass the actuality of existent things. Not unlike Porreta’s ‘dividuality,’
which is neither individual nor universal (and based on his own distinc-
tion of universals from common notions), Scotus defines the source of
unity of things and their differentiation from one another as neither uni-
versal nor singular: “I understand ‘it is not of itself one’ of numerical
unity, and ‘it is not several’ of the plurality opposed to that unity; and
that it is actually ‘universal’ (viz. in the sense that, as an object of the in-
tellect, something is universal), nor is it of itself ‘singular.’ ”21
Following Porreta’s concept of ‘dividual,’ Scotus also views the simi-
larity between things as prior to actual individual things. For this pecu-
liarly nontheological reason, he privileges essence over existence in the
analysis of what individuates material composite substances. The
above-cited quotation continues as follows:
For though it is never in reality without some one of these features, of
itself it is not any one of them, but it is something naturally prior to all
of these — and according to this natural priority the “what it is” is the
per se object of the intellect, and as such it is considered by the meta-
physician and is expressed by an [essential] definition.22
This nature is of itself indifferent to existence as a universal or as a par-
ticular because it is indifferent to being in things or in the intellect. Un-
like patristic and medieval Christian Neo-Platonism, Scotus separates
the reality of likeness from the actuality of its manifestation.
The concept of this nature is neither universal because it is
grounded in an extra-mental reality nor particular because it is always
already common to more than one thing. The indifference to existence is
281
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21. “Unde sicut apud intellectum non est tantum singulare nec tantum universale, sic
nec natura extra intellectum de se est una nec multa; unde nec includit natura de se hanc
unitatem numeralem nec illam” (Lect. II Sent. d. 3, pars 1, q. 1, n. 31).
22. “sic in exsistentia extra animam nec est primo una numero nec multa numero, sed
habet unitatem propriam sibi, quae minor est unitate quae convenit illi singulari: et illud est
‘esse’ quiditativum lapidis et rei universaliter, secundum quod ‘esse’ datur de re definitio”
(Lect. II Sent. d. 3, pars 1, q. 1, n. 32).
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explained by the argument that the real unity of individual things “lies
within the essential notion of the nature ( for ‘equinity is only equinity,’
according to Avicenna, V Metaphysics)” (Lect. II Sent. d. 3, pars 1, q. 1,
n. 34). So Scotus’s metaphysics is realist in the sense that the commonal-
ity is in things rather than exclusively in the mind or in names. Yet at the
same time, his metaphysics tends towards formalism in that natura
communis concerns the essence or form of things, not their existence.
Therefore it abstracts from actuality and is unrelated to the universal act
of being. It is this formalism in Scotus’s metaphysics and epistemology
that underlies his theory of individuation, as I will suggest in the follow-
ing section.
4. The Principle of Haecceitas
Scotus sets out his critique of existing accounts of individuation (includ-
ing Aquinas’s) before elaborating his concept of haecceity. His critique
centers upon the status of existence, quantity, and matter. Against exis-
tence as a principle that individuates particulars, he argues that exis-
tence is common and as such cannot differentiate anything. The unicity
and difference of all particulars implies that each must have its own
proper principle of individuation (Lect. II Sent. d. 3, pars 1, q. 1, nn. 55-57;
cf. Ord. II, d. 3, pars 1, q. 1, nn. 61-62). Against quantity, he repeats his
claim that each thing has its unique principle of individuation because
all things have their own proper ‘this-ness’ (haecceitas), which is per se
and as such requires explanation. He then invokes God’s absolute power
and maintains that God can make substances exist without the initially
individuating quantity because individual form can be separated from
materiality (Lect. II Sent. d. 3, pars 1, q. 1, nn. 73-76; cf. Ord. II, d. 3, pars 1, q.
1, nn. 77-80). Moreover, quantity as an accident cannot account for an es-
sential feature, that which makes something this unique thing rather
than that equally unique thing. Finally, quantity qua quantity is general
and not this singular quantity. As such, quantity cannot explain how or
why something is a ‘this’ because it lacks specification.
Against matter, Scotus contends that the individuating principle
must be diverse and nonidentical. Just as the form ‘humanity’ can be
abstracted from this man and that man, so materiality can be ab-
stracted from this matter and that matter. If this is true, then matter
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pars 1, q. 1, n. 133). Rather than explaining singularity, matter raises the
question of how and why materiality itself can be individuated. The only
aspect on which material substances can be compared is their relation
to the common nature and to God. For two individuated things or
‘haecceities,’ the relation to common nature differs and therefore pro-
vides an element of differentiation. However, Scotus insists that relation
is not an integral part of the nature of particular sensible things. For
this reason, relation does not individuate individuals. This is also true
for the link between composite substances and God. Aquinas’s position
is described as follows: a thing’s relation to God is real because compos-
ites are dependent on God, but God is not really related to things be-
cause he is simply and lacks nothing (Ord. I, d. 30, q. 2, nn. 49-51). Insofar
as this relation of God with creatures is identical for all created things, it
cannot differentiate them from one another. On this basis, Scotus dis-
misses Thomas’s argument that the divine act of being is the cause of in-
dividuation and divinely created matter its principle. This rejection of
Aquinas’s proposed solution to the problem of what individuates differ-
ent species within a genus means that for the Subtle Doctor, the meta-
physical link between God and creation is irrelevant for the individua-
tion of material substances.
This conclusion follows from Scotus’s formal distinction between
the foundation of things and their relation to God, their existence, and
their essence, as Catherine Pickstock has demonstrated. Indeed, the for-
mality of this distinction relativizes the ontological link between crea-
tures and their Creator to the point where actuality is devalued in favor
of possibility and the real actualization of individuated things subordi-
nated to the logical possibility of their existence. Scotus does stress the
real dependence of all things on God (Ord. II, d. 1, q. 5, n. 257 and textus
interpolatus).23 But contrary to the metaphysical realism of Christian
Neo-Platonists like Gregory, Augustine, Boethius, Dionysius, or Aquinas,
he excludes the option that something can be both substantial and rela-
tional (Ord. II, d. 1, q. 5, textus interpolatus). Creatures are formally abso-
lute (purely substantial) and not relational (Ord. II, d. 1, q. 5, nn. 189, 276-
50) because the relation to God does not enter into the essential defini-
tion of a creature. Nor does it add any perfection to it. This rejection of
relationality seeks to preserve the absolute character of a creature (even
283
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23. Mark G. Henninger, Relations: Medieval Theories 1250-1325 (Oxford: Clarendon
Press, 1989), pp. 68-97.
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though it is really identical with its dependence on God): “[T]he founda-
tion [of a creature] is not only the relation (which it contains through
identity), but is as absolute as if the relation had been added to it or it
had no relation altogether.”24 Moreover, the focus on essence at the ex-
pense of existence entails a further devaluation of actuality and a separa-
tion of the essential relation of a thing to God from the existential rela-
tion. Because of divine infinity, God’s presence is effectively removed
from the actuality of finite things.
Taken together, the critique of existence, quantity, and matter and
the rejection of existential relation constitute the metaphysical basis for
the Scotist theory of individuation in terms of haecceitas. The question
that frames this theory is the following: “Is a material substance individ-
ual through something positive determining the nature to be just this in-
dividual substance?”25 First, Scotus rejects Godfrey of Fontaines’ at-
tempted solution, which is that quantity is not the formal reason for the
unity of material substances, but that it is a dispositional cause for their
divisibility. For Scotus, this could mean one of two things. Either that “the
same material substance undivided and indistinct in itself is informed by
many quantities, and for this reason there are many individuals of that
species,”26 in which case quantity (or dimensionality) itself individuates
things. Or that quantity is a necessary but insufficient condition and that
nature itself becomes several singularities by receiving this or that quan-
tity (Lect. II Sent. d. 3, pars 1, q. 1, n. 153). Scotus then rejects both possible
interpretations: the first on grounds of an extreme unwarranted realism
and the second because material substance may be divisible by nature
without being actually divided before receiving quantity.
This objection already indicates Scotus’s proposed alternative,
which does not appeal to accidents (e.g., quantity) but to the substantial
nature itself. Even though originally it is not divided, it is divisible qua
nature, in virtue of an individuating difference (haecceitas) which is a
positive entity in itself and intrinsic to a substantial nature (Lect. II Sent.
d. 3, pars 1, q. 1, n. 162). This individuating difference is formally distinct
from the nature of the quiddity of an individual thing. Rather than being
284
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24. “fundamentum non est tantum relatio (quam continet per identitatem), sed est ita
absolutum sicut si relatio esset sibi addita, vel omnino nullam haberet relationem” (Ord. II, d.
1, q. 5, n. 275).
25. “utrum substantia materialis sit individua per entitatem positivam determinantem
naturam ad essendum hanc substantiam individualem” (Lect. II Sent. d. 3, pars 1, q. 6, n. 139).
26. Wolter, “John Duns Scotus (b. ca. 1265; d. 1308),” p. 285.
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accidental to the individual, it forms a per se unity with it (Lect. II Sent. d.
3, pars 1, q. 1, n. 166). Moreover, this difference must be different in each
individual, otherwise it would be formally identical (like a quiddity) and
therefore unable to account for the real diversity of specifically equal in-
dividuals — that which makes an individual a ‘this’ and another one a
‘that’ (Lect. II Sent. d. 3, pars 1, q. 1, n. 166; cf. Ord. II, d. 3, pars 1, q. 1, n. 170).
The mark of Scotus’s haecceitas is that it is a reality which is formally
distinct from a thing’s quiddity. In the Ordinatio, he defines haecceity as
that which
is not matter or form or the composite insofar as each of these is a “na-
ture,” but it is the ultimate reality of the being which is matter or form
or which is the composite; so that wherever something is common
and nevertheless determinable, even though it involves one real thing,
we can still distinguish further several formally distinct realities, of
which this formally is not that; and this is formally the entity of singu-
larity and that is formally the entity of a nature. Nor can these two re-
alities ever be two distinct real things, in the way the two realities
might be that from which the genus is taken ( from which two realities
the specific reality is taken), but in the same real thing there are al-
ways formally distinct realities (be they in the same real part of the
same real whole).27
In short, haecceity or the individuating difference is a positive entity that
is formally distinct from, but really identical with, the specific quiddity of
a material substance. As such, the entity is self-individuating because as
a ‘formal reality’ haecceitas is not part of the act of being which actual-
izes such substances. Instead, it is closer to essence, with which it forms
a real unity (though according to Scotus essence is and always remains
indivisible). In some sense, it constitutes the intrinsic mode of being of
285
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27. “non est igitur ‘ista entitas’ materia vel forma vel compositum, in quantum quodlibet
istorum est ‘natura,’ sed est ultima realitas entis quod est materia vel quod est forma vel quod
est compositum; ita quod quodcumque commune, et tamen determinabile, adhic potest
distingui (quantumcumque sit una res) in plures realitates formaliter distinctas, quarum
haec formaliter non est illa: et haec est formaliter entitas singularitatis, et illa est entitas
naturae formaliter. Nec possunt istae duae realitates esse res et res, sicut possunt esse realitas
unde accipitur genus et realitas unde acciptur differentia (ex quibus realitas specifica
accipitur), sed semper in eodem (sive in parte sive in toto) sunt realitates eiusdem rei,
formaliter distinctae” (Ord. II, d. 3, pars 1, q. 6, n. 188).
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essences, the individual distinct particular way one essence is a ‘this’ and
another essence is a ‘that,’ as I have indicated in the present chapter. For
this reason, haecceity is unintelligible to the human mind because in our
present state the intellect has knowledge of universals but not of
singulars.
In summary, the key difference with Aquinas’s account of individua-
tion is that Scotus abstracts from the actuality of particular sensible
things and focuses almost exclusively on the formality of haecceity. In so
doing, he ignores the reality of the individuating act of being which
brings everything from nothing into actuality and makes it what it is, as
Aquinas had already demonstrated.28 As a result of this fundamental dif-
ference, the onus of individuation shifts from the interaction between
God’s transcendent cause of being and the immanent principle of desig-
nated matter towards the self-individuation of essences independently
of their actual materiality. This reinforces the primacy of formal essence
over actual existence and deepens the divide between metaphysics and
theology. Both these conceptions constitute a marked departure from
Aquinas’s Neo-Platonist synthesis and a return to more radically Aristo-
telian tendencies that were already incipient in Porreta and Avicenna, as
I showed in chapters 4 and 5.
5. Nominalism and Absolute Singularity in Ockham
Strictly speaking, William of Ockham rejects the very concept of individ-
uation because everything outside the mind is always already a ‘this’ and
owes its individuality to nothing but its own proper self. Individuality is
an essential property that belongs to a thing immediately and intrinsi-
cally, not in virtue of any relation with anything else. There are no es-
sences or natures that are both common to many individuals and also di-
versified in each. Since individuals do not have natures or essences
distinct from themselves, Ockham opposes realist, formalist, and con-
ceptualist accounts of the relation between universals and particulars
(Ord. I, d. 2, q. 7). In reality, everything is radically individual, and outside
of names (nomina), nothing is common or universal.29 As a result, he
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28. Étienne Gilson, Jean Duns Scot. Introduction à Ses Positions Fondamentales, p. 110.
29. Ockham, Ordinatio, I, d. 2, q. 6, in Guillelmi de Ockham. Opera Theologica, ed.
Gedeon Gál et al. (St. Bonaventure, NY: Franciscan Institute, 1967-1984), vol. 7, p. 350. On
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reconfigures individuation in terms of the extrinsic and intrinsic causes
that determine a thing’s existence — efficient and final causes, as well as
form and matter. Given the absolute singularity of each and every indi-
vidual thing, the question is not what individuates matter or form but
how we can speak of the four Aristotelian causes as common or univer-
sal (Ord. I, d. 2, q. 6).
Even though Ockham’s treatment of individuals covers most of his
philosophical works (including his Summa Logicae, Quodlibets, and
Questions on Aristotle’s Physics), the most comprehensive account is in
the first book of his commentary on the Sententiae known as the
Ordinatio (d. 2, q. 4-8).30 This discussion of universals is divided into a
critique of variants of realism and the presentation of Ockham’s
nonrealist alternative, upon which I will focus. The first position that
Ockham dismisses maintains that universals are univocal things (res)
that exist outside the mind in every individual and belong to its essence.
So conceived, every universal is really distinct from individuals and from
all other universals. Accordingly, universals are uniform and in no way
diversified or multiplied in different individuals (Ord. I, d. 2, q. 4). What is
instructive about Ockham’s critique of this extreme form of realism is his
emphasis on divine omnipotence and language. He argues that by his ab-
solute power God could create universals void of individual instantia-
tion and individuals independently of their participation in universals.
Moreover, to predicate humanity of Socrates is merely to substitute a
term or name for the individual man Socrates himself and to posit a real
distinction at the heart of his essence (Ord. I, d. 2, q. 4). These objections
indicate Ockham’s own position, to which I turn after outlining his cri-
tique of further variants of realism.
The second position on universals that Ockham attacks is that of
Gilbert Porreta (even though Ockham does not mention him explicitly).
While agreeing with the previous position that universals have an extra-
mental reality and are really distinct from individuals, this position views
universals as being composed with the individual and being contracted by
an individuating difference that individuates things. Ockham recognizes
287
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singularity in Ockham, see Pierre Alféri, Guillaume d’Ockham. Le Singulier (Paris: Minuit,
1989), pp. 15-146. For a different account, see Marilyn M. Adams, William of Ockham (Notre
Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1987), vol. 1, pp. 3-141.
30. Armand Maurer, “William of Ockham (b. ca. 1285; d. 1347),” in Gracia, ed., Individ-
uation in Scholasticism, pp. 373-96, esp. p. 374 n. 6.
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that this is not Duns Scotus’s position because the latter posits a formal
distinction. However, Ockham repeats his point that the real distinction
between individuals and universals is open to the possibility that divine
absolute power can separate individuals from universals and keep both in
existence separately from one another (Ord. I, d. 2, q. 5). As Maurer notes,
this second critique foreshadows Ockham’s alternative: “The humanities
of Socrates and Plato, being really distinct, could exist in separation from
their individuating differences. They would then be really distinct by
themselves (seipsis) and not through individual differences really distinct
from them. This is the position Ockham himself will defend.”31
The third position that he opposes is Scotus’s formalist realism, in
particular the claim that the individuating difference is really identical
with, but formally distinct from, the nature or essence of material sub-
stances. The universal is real in that it exists outside the mind, but its
extra-mental existence is incompletely universal as a result of its compo-
sition and contraction with the individual thing. This position is identi-
fied with “the opinion of the Subtle Doctor [i.e., Duns Scotus] who sur-
passed the others in keenness of judgement.”32 Ockham’s main objection
concerns the indifference of the Scotist natura communis, which oscil-
lates ambiguously between the physical reality of a real thing (res realis)
and the mental reality of a being of reason (res rationis). According to the
logic of Ockham’s ‘Razor,’ it is a superfluous entity that is not essential to
individuals or universals.33 Against Scotus’s argument that an essence is
universal in the mind and particular in reality, he contends that a defini-
tion is a concept and all concepts denote individuals. Humanity refers to
all particular human beings, not to some shared common ground or na-
ture. The difference is not predicative but suppositional, as ‘universal hu-
manity’ is a simple supposition, while ‘particular humanity’ is a personal
supposition (Ord. I, d. 2, q. 6). The semantic logic of supposition replaces
the onto-logic of Thomist real difference. Maurer puts this well: “Thus,
with an adroit use of his theory of suppositio, Ockham banishes common
natures from the real world.”34 Ockham also rejects the Scotist formal dis-
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31. Maurer, “William of Ockham (b. ca. 1285; d. 1347),” p. 377.
32. “ista opinio est, ut credo, opinio Subtilis Doctoris, qui alios in subtilitate iudicii
excellebat” (Ord. I, d. 2, q. 6).
33. Armand Maurer, “Method in Ockham’s Nominalism,” Monist 61 (1978): 426-43, esp.
pp. 427-31; A. Maurer, “Ockham’s Razor and Chatton’s Anti-Razor,” Mediaeval Studies 46
(1984): 463-75; Adams, William of Ockham, esp. pp. 156-61.
34. Maurer, “William of Ockham (b. ca. 1285; d. 1347),” p. 378.
320
G:\Pabst\first corrections
Monday, January 16, 2012 2:52:09 PM
Color profile: Disabled
Composite  140 lpi at 45 degrees
tinction between nature and haecceitas by arguing that there are only
three types of distinctions (Ord. I, d. 2, q. 6) — a real distinction between
things (res), mental distinctions between beings of reason (ens rationis),
and as yet unspecified distinctions between a real thing (ens reale) and a
being of reason (ens rationis).
Finally, in question seven of the second distinction in Book One of
the Ordinatio, Ockham considers further variants of realism and attacks
an account that is identified with that of Aquinas or one of his disci-
ples.35 Ockham’s main charge is that this variant of realism defends a
doctrine of multiple being (multiplex esse). Natures or essences do not
have being or unity by themselves. Rather, through actualization they
can acquire the universality of mental existence and the particularity of
real existence (Ord. I, d. 2, q. 7). Against this conception, Ockham con-
tends that everything that is thought can become universal without ac-
tually being universal, e.g., Plato as an object of thought can be universal
and thus common to Aristotle. Moreover, universality cannot be added
extrinsically through the act of existence to an individual nature. So, sim-
ilarly to Scotus, Ockham dismisses the Thomist argument that actuality
has individuating effects. Instead, he holds that existence and essence
are merely nominal distinctions, for otherwise potentia Dei absoluta
could maintain both of them separately in being. As the noun and the
verb of the same thing, res and esse have identical signification. The
whole of reality is radically singular and as such cannot communicate
anything at all: “There is nothing in [any two individuals] that is one and
the same: whatever is in one simply and absolutely of itself is not some-
thing that exists in another.”36 Both the creator and his creation have be-
ing, but for Ockham this warrants neither Augustine’s definition of God
as the highest being in which all other beings share nor Aquinas’s divine
act of being that brings all things into existence and makes them what
they are. Instead, Ockham’s ontology posits a strict duality between the
one sovereign omnipotent God and the individual many.
This critique paves the way for Ockham’s nominalism, which is an
application of his metaphysics of singularity to the question of the uni-
versality of concepts and words. He begins, however, by rejecting
Roscelin of Compiègne’s claim that universals are but a flatus vocis, for
289
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35. Maurer, “William of Ockham (b. ca. 1285; d. 1347),” p. 382.
36. “. . . nihil est unum et idem in utroque, sed quidquid est in uno simpliciter et absolute
de se non est aliquid quod est in alio” (Ord. I, d. 2, q. 6, in Opera Theologica, vol. 7, p. 350).
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genera and species are natural rather than merely linguistic conventions
(the universality of genus and species is natural in the sense of a general-
izing likeness). Words are universal in the sense that they signify many
different individual things, but this does not mean that things are univer-
sal too. Universals are not real beings that exist either actually or poten-
tially in the world. They are acts of knowing, i.e., particular concepts
whose object is one individual (Quodl. IV.35; Qu. in Phys. I.6). There are
also general acts of knowing, i.e., universal concepts whose object is a
number of individuals with some similarity. But unlike Aquinas’s ens
commune in which all beings share and which is diversely distributed in
them, for Ockham similarity so configured lacks any correlate in reality.
The negation of any ontological commonality is at the origin of
Ockham’s metaphysics of singularity: “[W]hatever is universal is a singu-
lar thing.”37 Universals are mental, spoken, or written names. As mental
names (nomina mentalia) they constitute the mark of Ockham’s nomi-
nalism. In some sense, to speak of a ‘singular thing’ is a tautology be-
cause each thing is by definition and by nature singular. There are no
nonsingular things and everything, including each and every nature, is
singular in and of itself (de se haec). Ockham rejects the very possibility of
a cause or principle of individuation because all things are always al-
ready radically singular, and unreservedly so (Ord. I, d. 2, q. 6).
Compared with Aquinas, the main difference is that relations be-
tween individual things are severed from relations with God. Things
entertain real (extra-mental) relations between one another, not in vir-
tue of a common source to which they are ordered, but on the basis of
an intrinsic similarity. This similarity is so general that the reality of
such relations is very weak. The degree of likeness determines whether
a generic or specific concept best captures this similarity (humanity in
the case of human beings and animate substances in the case of ani-
mals and plants). But likeness does not in this way intimate a real rela-
tion with a transcendent instance. The absolute primacy of the singu-
lar and the denial of real universality shifted the focus from God’s free
gift of being onto God’s absolute power and the divine prerogative to




37. “quodlibet universale est una res singularis” (SL I.3). Cf. Gérard Sondag, Duns Scot:
La métaphysique de la singularité (Paris: Vrin, 2005), pp. 77-164.
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6. The Ontology of Political Sovereignty
By denying the reality of transcendent universals in immanent things,
Ockham restricts human knowledge of divine self-revelation in the
world to uncertain intuition and experience. And by subordinating di-
vine intellect to divine will, he also separates God’s volition from the in-
carnate Logos and natural law. The combined result of univocal being
and the unreality of universals is to introduce a split between creator and
creation and to privilege divine intervention in the world through God’s
omnipotent will at the expense of nature infused by divine grace and
wisdom (as for much of patristic and medieval theology). Ockham’s
nominalist and voluntarist theology is of special significance for the gen-
esis of the dominant modern model of sovereign power because it estab-
lishes the primacy of the individual over the universal and posits a radi-
cal separation between the infinite eternal and the finite temporal
‘realm,’ which provides the foundation for state supremacy vis-à-vis the
church and all other institutions within the temporal-spatial realm of
the saeculum.
First, Ockham abandons the Neo-Platonist emphasis on God’s free
gift of being and the divine act of being binding together all individual
things in favor of God’s absolute, unmediated power (potentia Dei
absoluta) that keeps all beings in separate existence, without any unify-
ing bond of being,38 as I have already indicated. Based on this ontological
priority of the individual, Ockham denies the reality of universals in
things and limits universality to concepts in the mind alone. Universals
are mental names of concepts and not real ‘things’ in actually existing
beings.39 Individuality is an essential property that belongs to a thing im-
mediately and intrinsically — not in virtue of any relation with anything
else.
The reason for this ‘ontological individualism’ is of course theologi-
cal. Ockham contends that after the Fall there can be no metaphysical
link between God and the world. This absence of real relations extends
to all beings within creation. Different beings can be called animals, not
because they participate in a really existing universal called ‘animality’
or ‘animal-ness,’ but because their individual essences exhibit a certain
291
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39. William of Ockham, Ordinatio I, d. 2, q. 6, in Opera Theologica, vol. 7, p. 350.
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similarity that can be described by the mind as a universal. This similar-
ity is generic ( for all animals) or specific ( for all humans), but in either
case no real, ontological relation pertains between individual beings. Be-
sides the individuality of each and every thing, there is only the overrid-
ing absolute power of God’s arbitrary will. In the postlapsarian world,
God grants humans two powers: to designate those who rule and to ap-
propriate only individual (rather than also communal) property.40 In this
way, he lays the theological and philosophical foundations for the pri-
macy of the individual over the universal in which all can participate.
Any form of commonality is now based on individual power and not on a
shared divine gift of being.
Second, Ockham’s political thought largely mirrors his ontology.
Secular authority comes from God via the people. As such, he combines
elements of hieronic sovereignty (with power descending from above)
with elements of popular sovereignty (with power ascending from be-
low). Nevertheless Ockham, like his fellow secularists and their papalist
opponents, argues for the unity of governmental rule. A single monarchy
is the most appropriate regime because it combines the unity of ‘the sov-
ereign one’ with the freedom of ‘the many’ who are born individual and
who are invested with the power of designating their ruler. In principle,
secular sovereignty is not absolute, as the monarch can be legitimately
corrected or deposed.41 Likewise, the empire is not a unitary state but
instead accommodates kingdoms, dukedoms, and autonomous groups.
However, in practice, the emperor rules over the entire temporal sphere,
and the common good which he has the obligation to defend tends to
serve the interests of the state against the transnational papacy and the
national church. The reason is that for Ockham, church authority comes
from Christ and his apostles, who all refused to have any civil jurisdic-
tion or political power. As such, the church has no legitimate temporal
power in her own right. Ockham, like Marsilius of Padua (c. 1270-1342),
argues that whenever the Pope or the clergy exercise temporal jurisdic-
tion, they can only do so by the will of the people.42 In effect, it is the
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42. Ockham, Dialogus de imperio et pontificia potestate, III.2.3.vi. On Marsilius, see
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monarch’s God-given duty to defend the independence of the temporal
realm vis-à-vis the papacy and the church. By contrast, Aquinas develops
a more mediated account of papal plenitudo potestatis in the political
sphere. Ockham equates the temporal sphere with coercive jurisdiction,
which is a monopoly of the state. In consequence, ecclesiastical sen-
tences based on papal and clerical authority have no legal force without
the sanction of the secular authorities.
In the name of individual freedom and monarchical sovereign
power, ecclesiastical power is subordinated to the state and the author-
ity of the papacy is curtailed.43 (On Ockham’s advice, King Louis of Ba-
varia used this argument to limit the imperial jurisdiction of the papacy
in his dispute with Pope John XXII.)44 As a result, state sovereignty is no
longer framed by the church, and religious limits on secular power are
progressively loosened. As Janet Coleman concludes, the consequence is
that
secular politics not only has its own process of self-correction, but
that it is independent of ecclesial power. . . . Because the temporal
sphere is imperfect, he [Ockham] argued that secular sovereignty,
once established, could be legitimate even when ‘absolute,’ in that
there need not be regular participation of the people in government,
nor need there be institutions to restrain the power of kings.45
Ockham’s political philosophy is therefore governed by the unilateral
link between ‘the sovereign one’ and ‘the many,’ as reflected in the pri-
macy of the individual over the universal and the supremacy of the state
over the church. These ideas tend to remove religious limits on secular
politics and to legitimate the de facto absolute power of monarchs. Since
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lutist,’ ” History of Political Thought 20 (1999): 35-64 (48, 50).
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the temporal realm is monopolized by the state at the expense of the
church and other intermediary institutions that mediate the vision of a
substantive common good as partaking of the highest good in God,
Ockham’s account of popular sovereignty cannot prevent monarchical
absolutism. As I will show in chapter 7, this strand of thought was rein-
forced by Francisco Suárez (1548-1616), who prioritized popular sover-
eignty over the corpus mysticum and in so doing eliminated from the pol-
ity both the Eucharist as the manifestation of God’s reconciliation with
the world and the church as universal community.
7. Semantics and Universal Individuality in Buridan
Like Ockham, Jean Buridan maintains that individuation does not con-
stitute a metaphysical problem because things are individual in and of
themselves and do not require any cause or principle that individuates
them. Individuality is an a priori datum which is self-explanatory be-
cause it is self-founded. Everything that exists in its own right or as a
constituent of a thing in a thing is individual. In reality there simply are
no nonindividual entities at all. The specificity of Buridan’s position is
the priority of semantics over ontology. Instead of treating the question
of individuality as a metaphysical problem, he recast the related issues
formally and located them exclusively in semantics. Since all entities are
presupposed to be singular, the challenge is to explain how expressions
can be universal and yet identify individuals qua individuals. My conten-
tion is that Buridan’s account of individuals and universals seals the late
medieval exit from the metaphysics of relationality and participation in-
sofar as his semantic theory frames ontology and makes mental lan-
guage more fundamental than actual particular sensible beings.46
As Peter King has argued, Buridan’s semantic framework dictates
his ontology in general and his account of individuality in particular.47
Buridan distinguishes between mental, written, and spoken language
and holds that written and spoken terms ultimately signify that which is
conceived by the concept. Put differently, inscriptions and utterances
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46. Pace Lambertus M. de Rijk, “John Buridan on Universals,” Revue de Métaphysique
et de Morale 97 (1992): 35-59.
47. Peter O. King, “Jean Buridan (b. ca. 1295/1300; d. after 1358),” in Gracia, ed., Individ-
uation in Scholasticism, pp. 397-430, esp. 407-13. Cf. P. King, Jean Buridan’s Logic
(Dordrecht: D. Reidel, 1985).
326
G:\Pabst\first corrections
Monday, January 16, 2012 2:52:09 PM
Color profile: Disabled
Composite  140 lpi at 45 degrees
signify particular things more immediately than concepts (Tract. Sup.
III.ii.8). However, unlike spoken and written language, only mental lan-
guage is natural (not conventional) and universal (applicable to all
thinking beings except God). As such, mental language frames written
and spoken language: “[I]t is the vehicle through which written and spo-
ken language are ‘given meaning’ or have an ultimate signification, in the
last analysis due to the ways in which a concept may signify that of
which it is a concept.”48 In extending Ockham’s theory of suppositio,
Buridan also distinguishes between signification and supposition and
argues that supposition denotes the actual use of terms in order to refer
to significates (as opposed to signification, which merely correlates
terms with their significates).49 The difference between reference and
correlation is that reference links words to things, whereas correlation
establishes linguistic conventions and therefore helps constitute a lan-
guage. Crucially, Buridan’s theory of meaning and reference structures
his ontology. For example, only individual absolute terms of mental lan-
guage involve ontological commitments because only concepts relate to
actually existing individual entities (Tract. Sup. I.iv.1, 8; V.i.1; V.ii.5; Soph-
ism. I, th. 6). Buridan’s semantic approach to metaphysics is evinced by
his definition of singularity:
The name ‘singular’ is opposed to the name ‘plural,’ according to
grammar, but this is not relevant for us; rather, we shall take it as op-
posed to the name ‘common’ or ‘universal,’ and then it seems to me
that according to the logician these terms ‘singular’ and ‘individual’
are taken as synonymous terms to which [these terms] ‘common’ and
‘universal’ are opposed. These are all names of second intention,
suppositing for significative terms: ‘singular’ and ‘individual’ supposit
for discrete terms, and ‘universal’ supposits for common terms.50
295
The Invention of the Individual
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In this passage, Buridan argues that the singular and the individual are
terms of second intention, which signify other terms, not things. Such
terms are also described as discrete terms that are “predicable of only
one,” e.g., a statement of identity such as ‘this is Plato’ (Tract. Sup. III.iii.1).
As a result, he conceives singularity and individuality primarily as prop-
erties of terms before they are properties of things.
As properties of things, they describe the indivisibility of a thing and
its differentiation from other things (Qu. Met. IV, q. 7; VII, q. 17, q. 19).
Buridan is particularly interested in the numerical unity of things, and
he stresses that things which can exist by themselves (e.g., substances as
opposed to accidents) cannot be divided either “into beings [specifically]
similar to themselves” or “into subjective parts” (Qu. Met. VII, q. 19). In
other words, individuality in the sense of indivisibility excludes anything
like Aquinas’s ens commune and relations among things in virtue of their
collective sharing in the same source of being.
The differentiation of individuals from other individuals leads him
to emphasize the semantic rather than metaphysical nature of differ-
ence between species and sameness within species. Not only do individ-
uals from different species have different substantial forms (as Aquinas
and Scotus also held), but individuals of the same species also differ in
terms of their forms. The only way to group them together as members
of the same species exhibiting a certain similarity is by way of a general
term or supposit, not a metaphysical principle that is diversely received
by different particulars (Qu. Met. VII, q. 17).
Radicalizing Ockham’s absolute singularity, Buridan excludes all
forms of universality and commonality: “Every thing exists as singular
such that it is diverse from any other thing, since it is never possible
that a term suppositing precisely for one thing be truly affirmed of a
term suppositing precisely for another [thing]” (Qu. Phys. I, q. 7). Since
they are always already individual in and of themselves, things do not
require a cause or principle of individuation. Individuality is a funda-
mental mark of reality as a whole. Everything is individual, substances
as well as accidents, material as well as immaterial beings. Individuality
is irreducible and indicates the unicity of each and every thing. Yet at
the same time, Buridan denies any common source or origin of individ-
uality. He replaces Ockham’s metaphysics of singularity with a seman-
tics and logic of individual terms. As King argues, “Concepts, even gen-
eral concepts, are individual acts of understanding in individual
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ances or inscriptions.”51 This account of the world rules out the exis-
tence of any entities that might not be self-individuating or any meta-
physical links between individual things.
The primacy of individuality brings Buridan into engagement with
the medieval question of the reality of universals and the nature of the
distinction between universals and particulars. He attributes the posi-
tion that defends a real distinction to Plato and dismisses it as “com-
pletely absurd” (Qu. Met. VII, q. 15). He also claims that the separation of
‘Plato’ and ‘man’ undermines the unity of the man Plato, and that the
universality of man in Plato and Aristotle entails an identity of the man
Plato and the man Aristotle. Either unaware or unconvinced of the
Platonist framework of participation, Buridan reduces this problem to a
set of semantic questions and rejects the very possibility that forms may
be separate: “Something is not intrinsically a being by a thing separate
[ from it]; yet nothing is a being except intrinsically by its entity; there-
fore, if the entity of this [individual] were separate from it, it would not
be a being.”52 This position seeks to secure the coherence of identity and
characterized as nonsensical any idea that there might be universals.
However, this critique of the real distinction between singular things and
universal forms fails to explain how and why individuals that are differ-
ent from one another are nevertheless like other individuals. Why is
there an immediately perceptible likeness amongst diverse things?
Buridan’s refusal to address this kind of question explains his rejection of
both Thomist designated matter and Scotist haecceitas as universal
principles of individuation (Qu. Met. VII, q. 16).
His de-ontologized semantics and logic propel him to read Aristotle
in an entirely nonmetaphysical way. In his discussion of the distinction
between essence and being, he posits at the outset that essences are by
definition singular and that there is no ontological difference between a
thing’s essence and its esse. Essences are denied universality, for “I un-
derstand by ‘essence’ the thing itself ” (Qu. Met. IV, q. 8). Likewise, esse is
stripped of any commonality or universality, as each individual is both
its essence and its being. The difference that pertains between them is
purely mental, in the sense that these two terms involve distinct conno-
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tations that are unrelated to differences in supposition.53 The result is
that Buridan locates universality exclusively at the semantic level and
denies universals any reality. The question this anti-metaphysical move
raises is how and why knowledge of things can be said to be universal.
Buridan’s solution is to say that intelligible species deliver a likeness
that applies to more than a single individual. However, this likeness is a
product of the mind in the mind for the mind. Beyond intellective gener-
ality, the human mind can cognize a thing’s singularity by way of intu-
itive cognition (Qu. Met. VII, q. 20), which circumvents both the confu-
sion of sense perception and the abstraction of intellection. True
knowledge of the world is immediate intuition of singulars, and there-
fore to intuit singulars is to intuit the coincidence of their essence and
their being.
Compared with Aquinas’s account of God’s act of being which brings
everything into actuality and makes it what it is, Buridan excludes divine
creative activity from individual existence. Instead, he attributes the ex-
istence of individual entities either to themselves or to the absolute
power of God. Self-subsisting substances do not require any cause or
principle in order to be. Prime matter, which is a being in itself, can exist
per se by God’s power: “[Prime] matter is in act, and it would be in act
even if it were to exist without either substantial or accidental form in-
hering [in it]”; the natural composition of matter with forms makes mat-
ter nonindividual, “unless God were to conserve it without them” (Qu.
Phys. I, q. 20).
The exit from metaphysics and relationality is sealed when Buridan
severs all ties between the Aristotelian categories and ontology, includ-
ing ontological relation.54 Only individuals exist, and any properties they
might exhibit are merely semantic. Nothing reflects in any way more
than its own proper singular self. Individuation is a purely semantic
question that is severed from metaphysics because, contrary to Aquinas,
Buridan asserts that particular sensible things do not intimate God’s
creative and individuating action. As such, Buridan is instrumental in
the invention of the individual.
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8. Potentia Dei Absoluta and Individuation
An important theory that Scotus, Ockham, and Buridan draw on for
their respective accounts of individuation is potentia Dei ordinata. The
context in which they deploy the concept of divine absolute power in
relation to the question of actualization was framed by previous inter-
pretations and the 1277 condemnations. Thirteenth-century theology
tended to distinguish between ordained and absolute power: “[P]otentia
ordinata was equated with the total pre-ordained, providential will of
God, while potentia absoluta was divine power without considering the
divine will or the created order.”55 The 1277 condemnations did not fun-
damentally alter this theological distinction, but what changed was the
growing emphasis on the possibility of immediate, direct, and preor-
dained divine action which suspends or even violates the laws of nature.
More importantly, the distinction between ordained and absolute power
was henceforth applied to the analogy of divine and human will, in par-
ticular the question of the sovereignty of individuals and communities.
Scotus favors the canonical concept of free choice between de facto
(ordained) and de iure (absolute) action over the theological distinction
between ordained and absolute power. As a result of the univocity of be-
ing, free choice applies univocally to God and to man. Moreover, potentia
absoluta does not define the realm of possibility whence God chooses to
create one of many possible worlds. Instead it is the power to act outside
of an already established order (Ord. I, d. 44). Scotus’s canonical inter-
pretation shifts the focus towards a real distinction of divine power and
a formal distinction between divine action and divine will. The use of
potentia absoluta is now above the law (supra legem).56 Ockham reacts
against this distinction and reasserts the unity of divine power. Since in
God, being and activity are one, divine power and divine essence must be
united. At the same time, Ockham’s conception of the analogy between
divine and human freedom leads him to separate the temporal from the
spiritual realm and to assert the independence and sovereignty of hu-
man law-making,57 independently of natural law (Breviloq. III.7-8, 14-15;
IV.8; Dial. III.2.3; III.2.5-10). Individuals have inalienable rights given to
them by God directly, but the exercise of this power is not mediated by
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any community, whether the temporal political community of the state
or the spiritual community of the church.
In this way, Ockham lays the theological foundations for the primacy
of the individual over the collective. All forms of commonality are based
on individual power. In the name of individual autonomy, the power of
the papacy over the temporal sphere is limited. This primacy also under-
lies the creation of the state. States emerge as a result of individuals
freely consenting to specific ordinances that govern their individual and
collective behavior. However, once this consent has taken place, the
transfer of power from individuals to the state is irreversible, as the state
is the absolute sovereign that rules unopposed over its constituents.
That is why Janet Coleman is right to describe Ockham’s politics in gen-
eral and his conception of royal power in particular as absolutist, as I
have already indicated.
The reason why Ockham’s theory of sovereignty licensed absolute
secular power is that he severed the ties between God’s continuous cre-
ative activity and the operation of the natural world. God’s action is di-
vided into the original act of creation which bestows inalienable rights on
the individual and the extraordinary act which suspends the natural or-
der. By eliminating God from the dispensation of political power, Ockham
grants the secular sphere unprecedented de iure autonomy and de facto
independence. Relations amongst individuals are dictated by the individ-
ual will alone, not the common sharing in God’s continuous creative act.
Likewise, relations between the world and God are confined to the initial
act of creation. The operation of the natural order is autonomous and in-
dependent from divine activity. Ockham’s account not only denied God
any import in the individuation of created beings but also eliminated pol-
itics from the formation of individuals. Individuality is an a priori datum,
a static condition, not a dynamic process. As such, it marks a rupture with
the Christian Neo-Platonist metaphysics of relationality.
9. Conclusion: Rationalism and Fideism
In the previous and the present chapter, I compared and contrasted dif-
ferent medieval accounts of the link between creation and individuation.
Aquinas connects actualization and individuation to God’s creative ac-
tion and in so doing argues that the divine gift of being is the gift of
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image. Thus, relations amongst created beings intimate in some sense,
approximately and imperfectly, divine relationality within the Trinity.
This is not to say that for Aquinas Trinitarian relations could be known in
any other way than by the supernatural gift of faith. Duns Scotus defends
a variant of realism but introduced a formal distinction between the foun-
dation of things and their relation to God. The formality of this distinc-
tion relativizes the ontological link between creatures and the Creator.
The dependence of all created things on God is real, but (contrary to Au-
gustine, Boethius, and Aquinas) creatures are purely substantial and not
relational. This is so because the relation to God does not enter into the
essential definition of a creature. Nor does it add any perfection to it. This
rejection of relationality seeks to preserve the absolute character of a
creature (even though it is really identical with its dependence on God).
Ockham denies the real presence of universals in particulars and ar-
gues that singularity is the most fundamental mark of reality. This re-
moves any kind of commonality and relationality among created beings.
Likewise, the ontological link between God’s creative action and the indi-
viduation of composites becomes unhinged. The absolute primacy of the
singular and the denial of real universality shifted the focus away from
God’s free gift of being onto God’s absolute power and the divine prerog-
ative to keep all singulars in existence separately. So configured, individ-
uals do not share in common being. They have nothing real in common
because they are not bound together by God’s act of being. There are
thus no real relations amongst created beings or between the world and
God. Buridan radicalizes this turn by elevating semantics over ontology.
Like Ockham, he argues that only individuals exist. Universal properties
such as humanity are purely semantic, not real. Things subsist either by
themselves or in virtue of God’s absolute power. Every existing thing rep-
resents nothing more than its own singular self. Individuation is a purely
semantic question that is disconnected from ontology because contrary
to Augustine, Boethius, and Aquinas, Buridan asserts that particular
sensible things do not in any way intimate God’s creative action. There
are no causes or principles of individuation because individuality is an a
priori datum and as such cannot be explained.
As will by now be clear, the alternative to modernity is not simply to
return to ancient philosophy but rather to retrieve and develop the fu-
sion of reason and revelation and to bind together faith and works in a
new compact. The shape of such a synthesis in both the Islamic and the
Christian tradition will have to be pursued elsewhere. But we can say
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that this will have to involve a recovery of Neo-Platonic philosophical
and mystical theology that was at different moments at the heart of
Christianity and also central to Islam. In the Christian case, this vision
runs from St. Paul and Augustine via Dionysius and Eriugena to Aquinas,
Eckhart, and Cusa. From Leo XIII’s encyclical Æterni Patris via John
Paul II’s Fides et Ratio to Benedict XVI’s Regensburg lecture, successive
pontiffs have not so much opposed modernity as a whole but rather re-
jected the secular outlook of modern thought that has destroyed the
union between biblical revelation and ancient philosophy. Neither the
secularization of Christianity by liberal Christians nor the fundamental-
ist hijacking by evangelical-pentecostal sects will be mitigated or re-
versed without a profound theological renewal of the old mainstream
traditional faith in all the episcopally based churches.
In the Islamic case, figures such as Al-ArabI and (with some qualifi-
cations) Mull# Sadr# view existence as primary and real and essence as
embodied in actual beings, as I suggested in chapter 4. In consequence,
they endorse a theological metaphysics that combines an illumina-
tionist account of knowledge with an ontological realism centered on
the presence of universals in the human mind and in particular things.
By viewing truth as that which descends from God and induces a desire
for wisdom and salvation, they fuse philosophy ( falsafa) with mysticism.
Crucially, this combination of spiritual contemplation and transfor-
mative practices mitigates the emphasis on absolute divine unity in Is-
lamic theology (kal#m) in the direction of diverse divine mediations and
deification. This stretches from nonliteral readings of the Qur}an to the
teaching of social and political virtues, making man theomorphic while
preserving God’s ineffability. A revival of mystic SufIsm would not just
mark a renaissance of Islamic Neo-Platonism but also contain Islamic
fundamentalism and deprive extremists of their primary motivating
principle — that they alone know the will of God totally and are therefore
justified in enforcing it absolutely upon the earth.
Pope Benedict’s Regensburg address combines a critique of violence
in religion (both Islam and Christianity, albeit for different reasons) with
a call to integrate faith with reason in new ways so that the world’s reli-
gious cultures could once more debate their rival claims to universality.
What this requires is nothing less than a postsecular nonliberal vision of
politics, the economy, and society. The kind of liberal interfaith dialogue
that has been prevalent for the past half century or so has done little to
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ideas about the shared essence of different creeds and belief in the same
God.58 As a number of religious authorities have remarked, we can no
longer ignore the fundamental differences that distinguish diverse
faiths. The best hope for real peace and tolerance between world reli-
gions is to have a proper theological engagement about the nature of
God and the meaning of peace and justice.
Of course, this does not preclude pragmatic cooperation between
the faiths on issues and problems of common concern such as aggressive
secularism, militant atheism, and perhaps most importantly, violence in
religion. But the fundamentalists on all sides will be intellectually de-
feated and politically marginalized only by reasoned belief and rational
argument. Faith can play a positive role in debates between religions and
cultures only if it expands rather than reduces the scope of rational cog-
nition and promotes the ‘grandeur of reason.’
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PART I I I
Transcendence and Immanence
If one is to believe much of contemporary philosophy, modern meta-
physics is constitutively and irreducibly onto-theological. As such, the
only genuine alternative is a postmodern, pure philosophy of imma-
nence stripped of all traces of theological transcendence. But if ‘post-
modernity’ is in the end an intensification of certain modern ideas
rather than a new phase of history, perhaps it is then also the case that
modern onto-theology and postmodern philosophy are not diametri-
cally opposed to each other but instead part of the same tradition which
inaugurated modernity and underpinned neo-scholasticism as well as
the (English, French, and German) Enlightenment. That tradition the
mixed Scotist-Cartesian-Kantian legacy which combines a metaphysics
and epistemology of representation either with a transcendental priority
of infinity over finitude or a critical limitation of knowledge to the finite.1
Nor is this profound continuity between the modern and the post-
modern confined to ontology (Husserl and Heidegger), metaphysics
(Levinas and Badiou), or some pure phenomenology (Marion). The insis-
tence on a sphere of pure immanence is correlated with a conception of
theology as an exclusively regional science (here uncritically following
Heidegger) and also with the idea that the supernatural virtue of faith is
disconnected from the natural virtues governing societies. Linked to this
is a bizarre failure on the part of many (phenomenological) philosophers
305
1. See, inter alia, André de Muralt, “Kant, le dernier occamien. Une nouvelle définition
de la philosophie moderne,” Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale 80 (1975): 32-53; Olivier
Boulnois, Être et représentation. Une généalogie de la métaphysique moderne à l’époque de
Duns Scot (XIIIe-XIVe siècle) (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1999).
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to recognize that religion was never eliminated from the public realm or
that it has already reverted to political significance. More fundamentally,
the notion of sheer givenness without either gift or giver seems to pre-
clude any way in which asymmetrical gift-exchange can subvert and
transform the dominant modern logic of social contract and monetary
exchange that accompanies the modern biopolitical fusion of constitu-
tional democracy with market capitalism, as I have argued elsewhere.2
The apolitical and aneconomic stance in much of contemporary phe-
nomenology betrays a strange, ahistorical view of phenomenal disclosure
that in turn is based on the modern separation of transcendent infinite
eternity from immanent finite temporality. All of which suggests that the
‘theological turn of French phenomenology’ centered on God without be-
ing (as in the work of Marion) is mired in irreconcilable tensions between
philosophy and theology and perhaps best described as an attempt to en-
gineer a ‘phenomenological turn of theology.’3 For these reasons, the most
significant work in this trajectory is by those scholars who refuse a clear
and distinct separation of theology and philosophy and who are open to
the Neo-Platonic framework (like Jean-Louis Chrétien), which avoids in
advance the modern idolatry of onto-theology.4
Other influential contemporary philosophers such as Jacques
Derrida, Gilles Deleuze, and Alain Badiou also look back to early moder-
nity, notably Duns Scotus’s reduction of the infinite and the finite to
univocal being as well as Spinoza’s deconstruction of analogical being in
favor of univocal substance. But once more there are profound continui-
ties between the ‘early modern’ thought of Scotus and Spinoza and the
‘late scholasticism’ of Descartes (who stands between the two) and Kant,
notably the turn to subjectivity and the separation of transcendence from
immanence which also can be traced in part to Baroque scholasticism.
That is why the third and final part of this essay turns to early mod-
306
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2. Adrian Pabst, “Modern Sovereignty in Question: Theology, Democracy and Capi-
talism,” Modern Theology 26, no. 4 (October 2010): 570-602.
3. Dominique Janicaud, Le tournant théologique de la phénoménologie française
(Paris: Éditions de l’Éclat, 1991), English translation: Phenomenology and the “Theological
Turn”: The French Debate (New York: Fordham University Press, 2001). Cf. Jean Greisch,
“Un tournant phénoménologique de la théologie?” Transversalités 63 (1997): 75-97.
4. In terms of alternatives to Husserl, Heidegger, and Marion, I am thinking of ele-
ments in the work of Maurice Blondel, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Michel Henry, Jean-Yves
Lacoste, and above all Jean-Louis Chrétien (as well as the recent publications by Emman-
uel Falque). See, infra, chapter 9.
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ern philosophy and theology. Chapters 7 and 8 explore the works of Fran-
cisco Suárez (1548-1617) and Benedict (Baruch de) Spinoza (1632-1677). In
the wake of Porreta, Scotus, Ockham, and Buridan, Suárez completes the
exit from the patristic and medieval metaphysics of relational participa-
tion by severing the links between individuation and creation. The pri-
macy of metaphysics in his scholastic system, aimed at securing a ratio-
nal space within which theology investigates the main articles of faith
concerning the Trinity and the Christological doctrines, has implica-
tions for the relation between philosophy and theology and between rea-
son and faith. Revealed theology is divorced from nature and relegated
to a separate realm that is disconnected from the natural drive towards
the supernatural. Likewise, reason no longer requires faith, and faith no
longer intensifies reason. Instead, just as the order of nature and that of
revelation become independent from one another, so the order of reason
precedes the order of faith and grounds all knowledge (Dis. Met. prol.; De
Fide III, intro.).
The consecration of metaphysics as an overarching system completes
the late scholastic turn from patristic and medieval theology to early mod-
ern philosophy. In consequence, the idea of individuating relations be-
tween a transcendent God and his creation is abandoned in favor of an al-
ternative theory of individuation that revolves around two tenets of early
modern philosophy: first, the transcendental dependence of effects upon
their cause and the self-individuation of entities (Suárez); second, the im-
manent generation of individual beings and their individuation in a per-
petual rivalry with other groups of individual beings (Spinoza).
In the final chapter, I argue that much of modern metaphysics is in
fact little more than the post-Scotist and post-Suárezian ontological sci-
ence of being qua being which erases the ontological difference between
divine and created esse and in the end collapses into the transcendental
science of what can be known about univocal being. By contrast, the
metaphysical science of ens commune preserves the ‘analogical differ-
ence’ between Creator and creation; it also binds together kenotic,
cataphatic descent with apophatic ascent, which perfects degrees of be-
ing and goodness through mystical elevation and union with God. As
such, the alternative to modern transcendentalism (and the mirror im-
age of positivism) is not some postmetaphysical phenomenological or
analytic philosophy but rather a revivified theological metaphysics that
overcomes ancient and modern monism or dualism (as well as post-
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CHAPTER 7
Transcendental Individuation
1. Introduction: On Scholastic Transcendentalism
In this chapter, I trace the genealogical links between high medieval the-
ology and early modern philosophy. In the wake of John Scotus and Wil-
liam of Ockham, Francisco Suárez (1548-1617) embraces and reinforces
the separation of revealed theology from metaphysics and the incipient
dualism of reason and faith as well as nature and grace.1 Without a theol-
ogy that can secure analogical being and relational participation, the au-
tonomy of metaphysics gives rise to a scholastic transcendentalism that
makes reason primary to faith and grace extrinsic to nature. As such,
post-Scotist and post-Ockhamist scholasticism consolidates the ‘pas-
sage to modernity’ (Louis Dupré), above all the erasure of God from the
world and the consecration of the human mind as the ultimate arbiter of
meaning and value. In some sense, this shift marks a metaphysical elab-
oration of the early Renaissance idea of man as the measure of all
things.2 By contrast with Porreta and Buridan however, Suárez chal-
lenges the primacy of logic and semantics over metaphysics. He does so
by recovering elements of Thomist realism against the formalism of
Scotus’s haecceitas and the nominalism of Ockham’s singularity. More-
308
1. John Montag, SJ, “Revelation: The False Legacy of Suárez,” in Radical Orthodoxy: A
New Theology, ed. John Milbank, Catherine Pickstock, and Graham Ward (London and
New York: Routledge, 1999), pp. 38-63.
2. Louis Dupré, Passage to Modernity: An Essay in the Hermeneutics of Nature and Cul-
ture (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1993), pp. 15-90.
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over, he strongly qualifies late medieval nominalism with a stronger em-
phasis on the divine intellect and the human mind. However, Suárez’s
scholastic transcendentalism subordinates both the physical and the
theological dimension of individuality to a metaphysics of transcenden-
tal individuation that is paradoxically rationalist and fideist, as I will sug-
gest in this chapter.
In defending a purely metaphysical theory of individuation, Suárez
makes the questionable claim that theology has nothing to say about the
nature of individuality and that creation cannot account for why things
are individual and what the telos of individuation might be. Indeed, indi-
viduality is for Suárez and those who follow him an undemonstrated da-
tum. It is part of the posita of metaphysics, that is to say, one of the pre-
suppositions that form its subject-matter, which is posited beyond
doubt and secured prior to the investigation of actual objects.3 By con-
trast, for patristic and medieval Christian Neo-Platonists the subject of
each science is not an a priori positum but is defined by an a posteriori
demonstration that constitutes the foundation of scientific inquiry.4
Suárez’s division of the sciences and his definition of metaphysics sepa-
rate the subject of a science (subiectum) from the objects it explores
(quaesitum). Paradoxically, since individuality is inscribed in the subject
of metaphysics, it eludes metaphysical investigation.
Following Scotus, Suárez founds theology upon metaphysics, mak-
ing ‘metaphysical doctrine’ an absolute prerequisite for all theological
knowledge: “As it is impossible for one to become a good theologian
without having first been established on the solid foundations of meta-
physics, thus I always believed it important, Christian reader, to offer you
previously this work [the Disputationes Metaphysicae] . . . in order to
grant — or better to restore — to metaphysical doctrine the place that be-
longed to it.”5 The priority of metaphysics over theology reverses
Porreta’s and Buridan’s primacy of logic and semantics and restores the
idea that individuality is real (esse in re) and that individuation is meta-
physical. Yet at the same time, the formalization of metaphysics and the
309
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3. Jean-François Courtine, Suarez et le système de la métaphysique (Paris: Presses
Universitaires de France, 1990), pp. 13-19.
4. Rudi te Velde, “ ‘The First Thing to Know about God’: Kretzmann and Aquinas on
the Meaning and Necessity of Arguments for the Existence of God,” Religious Studies 39
(2003): 251-67, esp. pp. 254-59.
5. Suárez, Dis. Met., “Ratio et discursus totius operis: ad lectorem,” quoted by Montag,
“Revelation: The False Legacy of Suárez,” p. 53 (my italics).
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predominance of abstraction over sense perception and judgment aban-
don the patristic and medieval Christian Neo-Platonist quest for a ratio-
nally intelligible account of why entities are individual and to what end
they ‘desire’ to be individuated. Coupled with the emergence of modern
skepticism, Suárezian metaphysics threatens the status of theology as
the queen of sciences by predefining the space within which sacra
doctrina can operate.6 In this manner, his theological realism is more
akin to the philosophical formalism of Porreta with which it shares the
separation of existence from essence and the exclusion of God’s act of
being from the operation of the created order.
2. Early Modern Scholasticism
The work of Suárez on creation and individuation was instrumental to the
emergence of early modern metaphysics. First, he systematized the mod-
ern epistemological project inaugurated by Ockham and developed by
Buridan, in particular the idea that with the help of God’s absolute power
(potentia Dei absoluta) the mind either could or in some instances actually
does cognize things independently of their actualization. Second, he built
on Duns Scotus in order to reestablish the primacy of metaphysics over all
other sciences, in particular theology (Aquinas), logic (Porreta), and se-
mantics (Buridan), as I argued in Part II of this essay. Metaphysics as de-
fined by Suárez is grounded in a priori objective concepts such as the indi-
viduality and singularity of all actually existing things (Dis. Met. V.i.4).
Likewise, metaphysics is reconfigured as the foundation for revealed the-
ology in the sense of defining the realm in which sacra doctrina operates.
Since only metaphysics provides a rationally intelligible account of the
most general principles, it must foreground all other sciences.
The significance of Suárez’s system is that individuality applies
univocally to all actual beings, including God. Because everything that
exists is always already individual (Dis. Met. V.i.4), individuation is not a
function of the relation between God and creation but is internal to each
and every individual thing. According to Suárez, entities are in fact self-
individuating (Dis. Met. V.i.2). In turn, this conception reflects and con-
firms fundamental changes in late medieval and early modern theories
of causation. For Aquinas and faithful Thomists, the first cause or God
310
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6. Cf. Montag, “Revelation: The False Legacy of Suárez,” esp. pp. 55-58.
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gives being, whereas secondary created causes specify beings. By con-
trast, for Scotus, Ockham, and their numerous disciples, God’s creative
action as the first cause exercises a general influence (influentia
generalis) from which a specific influence is largely disconnected, as I in-
dicated in chapters 5 and 6.7 In Suárez’s metaphysical system, secondary
causes are sufficient and provide the foundation of the state of nature,
which is upheld by the concurrence of the primary cause but operates
independently of God’s creative action (Dis. Met. XXII.iv).
Compared with his nominalist and voluntarist predecessors, Suárez’s
innovation is to make the general influence or concurrence purely extrin-
sic and superadded to the state of nature. God’s concurrent causal activity
is thus consonant with naturalism. The separation of general from specific
influence and the sufficiency of secondary causes give rise to two orders,
one natural and the other supernatural. As such, it foreshadows the thesis
of ‘pure natural capacity’ (ex puris naturalibus) and ‘pure nature’ (pura
natura), as Henri de Lubac described it in his seminal work Surnaturel.8
Coupled with the primacy of metaphysics over theology, Suárez’s empha-
sis on the causation and operation of things independently of their depen-
dence on the Creator God leads him to discard the patristic and medieval
Christian Neo-Platonist metaphysics of relationality and participation.
More specifically, he questions Aquinas’s esse commune and the
Thomist conception of human beings as in some way through their very
humanity already oriented towards grace.9 Compared with Thomas,
Suárez’s post-Scotist and post-Ockhamist dualism of will and intelli-
gence entails a demotion of the will to a mere faculty, rather than an in-
tegral part of humanity and its natural desire for the beatific vision.10
Therefore, the natural desire for the supernatural is no longer intrinsi-
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7. For a more detailed account of this shift, see André de Muralt, L’Enjeu de la
philosophie médiévale. Études thomistes, scotistes, occamiennes et grégoriennes (Leiden: E. J.
Brill, 1991), pp. 331-51; A. de Muralt, “La causalité aristotélicienne et la structure de pensée
scotiste,” Dialectica 47 (1993): 121-41; Jacob Schmutz, “La doctrine médiévale des causes et
la théologie de la nature pure (XIIIe-XVIIe siècles),” Revue thomiste 101 (2001): 217-64.
8. Henri de Lubac, Surnaturel. Études historiques (Paris: Aubier-Montaigne, 1946), pp.
261-321.
9. De Lubac, Surnaturel, pp. 231-60.
10. Olivier Boulnois, “Les deux fins de l’homme. L’impossible anthropologie et le repli
de la théologie,” Les Études Philosophiques 9 (1995): 205-22; O. Boulnois, “Surnaturel,” in
Dictionnaire critique de théologie, ed. Jean-Yves Lacoste (Paris: Presses Universitaires de
France, 1998), pp. 980-95; John Milbank, The Suspended Middle: Henri de Lubac and the De-
bate concerning the Supernatural (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2005), esp. pp. 20-28.
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cally present in human nature but instead is now elicited extrinsically.
This removes the orientation towards the beatific vision from the realm
of being and locates it exclusively in the realm of knowing (as either in-
nate or radically contingent and superadded).11 In either case, this meta-
physics runs counter to the scripturally and naturally revealed presence
of creation in the Creator and the manifold intimations of the supernatu-
ral in the natural.
Moreover, Suárez embraces the concept of univocal being and edges
closer to the idea of ‘pure nature’ (pura natura) drained of any phenom-
enally visible trace of God.12 He brackets out everything that exceeds na-
ture itself in order to attain natural man per se (De Ult. Fin. XV.ii). André
de Muralt has traced a genealogical account of intentionality in which
Suárez is the central late scholastic figure. His bracketing of the super-
natural is effectively the early modern metaphysical precursor of
Edmund Husserl’s late-modern epistemological epoche.13 Suárez’s ten-
dency towards pura natura severs natural beings from supernatural
goods and thereby consolidates the transition towards the modern sepa-
ration of nature from grace and reason from faith. In consequence, he
consigns the human natural orientation towards the beatific vision en-
tirely to the special realm of theology and adopts a rival anthropology
centered on the metaphysical nature of man (natura metaphysica
hominis), which is cognoscible in itself and as such.14 Conjointly, erasing
the transcendent presence of God from nature and immanentizing the
principle of individuation mark the consecration of modern thought:
“For Suárez,” as Alasdair MacIntyre notes, “both in his preoccupations
and in his methods, was already a distinctively modern thinker, perhaps
more authentically than Descartes the founder of modern philosophy.”15
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11. On the difference of the relation between nature and grace in Aquinas and Suárez,
see Montag, “Revelation: The False Legacy of Suárez,” pp. 38-63, and Milbank, The Sus-
pended Middle, esp. pp. 15-32.
12. For an account that situates Suárez in the genesis and evolution of the term pura
natura, see de Lubac, Surnaturel, pp. 101-27, 129-55.
13. Cf. André de Muralt, La métaphysique du phénomène: Les origines médiévales et
l’élaboration de la pensée phénoménologique (Paris: Vrin, 1985).
14. For a systematic comparison of Aquinas and Suárez on the beatific vision and the
ultimate finality of man, see Jean-François Courtine, Nature et Empire de la Loi. Études
suaréziennes (Paris: Vrin, 1999), pp. 45-67.
15. Alasdair MacIntyre, Three Rival Versions of Moral Enquiry: Encyclopaedia, Geneal-
ogy, and Tradition (London: Duckworth, 1990), p. 73. Cf. José Ferrater Mora, “Suárez and
Modern Philosophy,” Journal of the History of Ideas 14 (1953): 528-47.
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In the following section, I examine Suárez’s contribution to early modern
epistemology and metaphysics before I provide a critical reading of his
account of creation and individuation.
3. Singularity without Actuality
Influenced by Petrus Damianus’s Letter on Divine Omnipotence (c. 1060),
much of medieval theology explored the nature and modality of God’s
power and its relation to human intellection, as I discussed in chapter 4.
Among the most important stages in the evolution of this and cognate
themes were, first of all, the systematic treatment of power and possibil-
ity in the Sentences of Peter Lombard (c. 1105-1164); second, the distinc-
tion of potentia absoluta and potentia ordinata, which was first conceptu-
alized by Hugo of St. Cher (c. 1200-1263); third, the idea of a plurality of
worlds, which was first articulated by Augustinus Triumphus of Ancona
(c. 1243-1328).16 Following the 1277 condemnations, the growing empha-
sis on divine power and possibility led to the abandonment of Aquinas’s
real distinction between existence and essence and the emergence of
Scotus’s formalist and Ockham’s nominalist alternative, as I indicated in
chapters 5 and 6. Coupled with the continued impact of Avicenna and
Porreta on Christian theology since the twelfth and the thirteenth cen-
tury (as detailed in chapter 4), essence (essentia) and singular being (ens)
— rather than being itself (esse ipsum) and common being (ens com-
mune) — became the focus of both epistemology and metaphysics.
Central to the rise of early modern philosophy was Petrus Aureoli
(c. 1280-1322), a forerunner of Ockham who radicalized Scotus’s theory of
intuitive knowledge (notitia intuitiva) or the immediate intuition of
things themselves (in se) — that is to say, both their objectity and their
proper existence and presence.17 Aureoli’s theory goes beyond Scotus’s
by positing that intuition provides something absolute (aliquid abso-
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16. See Olivier Boulnois, ed., La puissance et son ombre. De Pierre Lombard à Luther
(Paris: Aubier, 1992), pp. 71-78, 131-34, 253-56.
17. Cf. André de Muralt, “La doctrine médiévale des distinctions et l’intelligibilité de
la philosophie moderne (I) et (II),” Revue de théologie et de philosophie 112 (1980): 113-32,
217-40; John F. Boler, “Intuitive and Abstract Cognition,” in The Cambridge History of Later
Medieval Philosophy: From the Rediscovery of Aristotle to the Disintegration of Scholasticism,
ed. Norman Kretzmann, Anthony Kenny, and Jan Pinborg (Cambridge: Cambridge Univer-
sity Press, 1982), pp. 460-78.
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lutum), which can be described as the sole foundation ( fundamentum)
upon which all knowledge is built.18 For this reason, immediate intuition
does not require a thing’s existence and/or its presence (existentia et
praesentia rei) because they are no longer indispensable to cognition. In-
stead of the self-manifestation of things that reflects and intimates God’s
revelation to his creation, it is henceforth the mind and God’s absolute
power that are determinative of what is and can be known.
In the wake of Al-F#r#bI’s theory of abstraction, late medieval and
early modern accounts of cognition focus increasingly on the relation
between the intellect and things outside the soul (extra animam) and
between concepts and words (including mental language). Key to these
accounts is the distinction between objects of cognition and inten-
tions.19 If the object is extra animam, then the intention is a first inten-
tion. If, by contrast, the object is itself an intention, then the intention
is a second intention. Aureoli’s innovation is to separate predication
from acts of cognition and claim that predication concerns the objec-
tive concept of the thing, i.e., the conceptual content that is immedi-
ately present to the intellect, not the thing as it appears to the senses
and is mediated to the mind. His theory shifts knowledge towards the
“objective content of the first-order concept that is formed”20 by the in-
tellect (In Sententias I, d. 23, a. 2). Second intentions are no longer
founded upon the primary cognition of beings themselves but rather
on intentional being (esse intentionale). Intentional being is an objec-
tive or represented being (esse obiective sive repraesentatum), i.e., being
abstracted from actual existence and present to the senses and the
imagination.21
Intentional being is paramount in Suárez’s epistemology, in particu-
lar his understanding of ‘objective reality’ (realitas obiectiva). For it is as
‘objective or represented being’ that things are ‘presented’ to the mind, in
the form of objective concepts which are predicable but not present in the
314
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18. Peter Aureoli Scriptum super Primum Sententiarum, Proemium, sect. II, art. 3, no.
93, quoted by Courtine, Suarez et le système de la métaphysique, p. 164.
19. Christian Knudsen, “Intentions and Impositions,” in Kretzmann et al., eds., The
Cambridge History of Later Medieval Philosophy, pp. 479-95. I am indebted to Knudsen for
some arguments in this paragraph.
20. Knudsen, “Intentions and Impositions,” p. 490.
21. Timothy J. Cronin, Objective Being in Descartes and Suarez (Rome: Gregorian Uni-
versity Press, 1966), pp. 77-89; Robert Pasnau, Theories of Cognition in the Later Middle Ages
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), pp. 161-294.
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very things themselves.22 For this reason, ‘objective and represented be-
ing’ can be cognized immediately, in itself and as such. Concepts are no
longer that with which the mind has knowledge of reality (as for Boethius)
but become themselves the objects of knowledge, a theory that Suárez
pushes further to the point where the very act of intellection comes to
possess its own reality, realitas obiectiva (as I will show in the present
chapter). Incidentally, Aureoli’s account helps inaugurate Ockham’s
nominalism, in particular the immediate cognition of singulars and the
independence of the intellect from the light of faith (lumen fidei).
After Ockham, essence is separated from existence and actuality is
devalued in favor of possibility, as I argued in chapter 6. Indeed, the hu-
man intellect can be set in motion by divine will rather than by actually
present and existing things (in actu). The absoluteness of God’s power
(potentia Dei absoluta) and divine volition presents the mind with ob-
jects of knowledge that can not be.23 In turn, this requires a mental ability
to cognize things without sense perception, judgment, or the imagina-
tion. By contrast with Christian Neo-Platonist relationality, this account
privileges individual singular things as the ultimate foundation of con-
cepts and knowledge. Singulars extra animam are the primary cause for
all concepts and the first object of cognition. However, concepts encom-
pass essences that neither exist nor bear any relation to things in the
world. As such, Ockham transforms concepts of objects into “objective
concepts without actual present objects.”24
The epistemology that underpins Ockham’s account of divine om-
nipotence provides the basis for Suárez’s system. First of all, this system
is based on rejecting the patristic and medieval convertibility of being
and knowing and the aesthetic judgment involved in cognition, includ-
ing Aquinas’s idea that in God being is fully intellectual and beings can
come to cognize it as such in the beatific vision. Second, the system also
315
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22. See Jan Pinborg, “Zum Begriff der Intentio Secunda — Radulphus Brito, Harvaeus
Natalis und Petrus Aureoli in Diskussion,” Cahiers de I } Institut du Moyen-Age grec et latin
13 (1974): 49-59.
23. The separation of potentia dei ordinata and potentia dei absoluta can be traced to
Damianus and was reinforced by Ockham’s account of the nature of creation. Cf. Alain de
Muralt, “Epoché — Malin Génie — Théologie de la toute puissance divine: Le concept
objectif sans objet, recherche d’une structure de pensée,” Studia Philosophica 26 (1966):
159-91.
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consecrates the reign of a rival account of knowledge centered upon im-
mediate intuition of objectity and mediate abstraction from actuality
(intuitive knowledge being the direct cause of abstractive knowledge).
Most importantly, the object of cognition is no longer the relation among
individual beings (ens) through their sharing in common being (esse com-
mune) as well as their relationality to self-subsistent being (ipsum esse
subsistens). Instead, the first object of knowledge is singular being in it-
self and as such. For universality and commonality are of the mind in the
mind, not grounded in the actuality of things.
4. The Reality of Singular Essence
and the Possibility of Universal Existence
For all the reasons adduced above, this epistemological shift is impor-
tant for the relation between being and knowing. Building in part on
Scotus and Ockham, Suárez posits a new doctrine of objective knowl-
edge independently of any actual objects. His epistemology extends the
idea of pure nature (pura natura) and develops a conception of possibil-
ity according to which essences are real in the sense of existing in logi-
cally possible worlds and capable of existing in the real, actual world
(Dis. Met. II.iv.9). Since essences can be without actually existing, exis-
tence is subordinated to essence. The reality of beings is abstracted from
their actual presence and consequently becomes unhinged from their ef-
fective manifestation.25 As a result, nature (natura) is cleared of all traces
of transcendence and being (esse) is drained of any mysterious profun-
dity. Beings no longer intimate their transcendent source which brings
them into actuality. The distinction between existence and essence is
neither real (Aquinas) nor formal (Scotus) but instead purely mental
(tantum ratione).26 Even though the distinction between a thing’s exis-
tence and its essence is ultimately grounded in that thing (distinctio
rationis cum fundamento in re),27 it is the mind that alone can ascertain
it. Since objectivity is determined by the mind, there is no objectively real
difference between the reality of essence and the actuality of existence.
Therefore, what counts as a being is primarily determined by the intel-
lect and its concepts, not by the actual reality of being itself.
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25. Courtine, Suarez et le système de la métaphysique, pp. 157-94.
26. Dis. Met. XXXI.i.13 (English translation, pp. 225, 231).
27. Dis. Met. XXXI.vi.23 (English translation, p. 250).
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Suárez’s claim that objectivity — or perhaps more accurately
objectity28 — is primarily in the mind and that things outside the mind
are objective in a secondary sense also builds on Ockham’s idea of an in-
tuition of nonexistence, by which the latter meant that we can appre-
hend the reality of things abstracted from their existence.29 One key dif-
ference between the Platonist metaphysics of Gregory, Augustine,
Boethius, Dionysus, and Aquinas, on the one hand, and the Aristotelian-
ized ontology of Gilbert, Scotus, Ockham, Buridan, and Suárez, on the
other hand, is the nature of the relation of mind to world. For the former
thinkers, things make themselves known to the mind in virtue of their
beauty and harmony that intimates God and discloses his ongoing cre-
ative activity to us, which we can apprehend via sense perception, judg-
ment, and the imagination (as I showed in relation to Aquinas in chapter
5). By contrast, for the latter thinkers it is the mind’s intentionality that
with the help of divine absolute power discerns a thing’s essence and ob-
jective reality independently of its actual existence and manifestation.
Suárez’s distinct contribution to the rise of modern epistemology is
his idea of ‘real essence’ (essentia realis), i.e., “actually existing essence”
(Dis. Met. XXXI.i.13). If essences can exist independently of any act of be-
ing or existing, then the distinction between essence and existence is
mental because the real foundation ( fundamentum in re) is intelligible
only to the intellect, not to sense perception, judgment, or the imagina-
tion. Suárez’s account is indebted, first of all, to Henry of Ghent’s concep-
tion of being, in which the notion (intellectus) of being is prior to God and
to creatures, and second, to Ghent’s concept of the being of essence qua
essence (esse essentiae), which is the being proper to a thing’s singular es-
sence. Indeed, Suárez embraces Henry’s redefinition of singular being as
a ‘real thing’ (res), rather than a being-in-act (ens in actu). The being of
real things (esse reale) constitutes the content of what is presented to the
mind, i.e., a being abstracted from any reality outside the intellect (extra
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28. Intentionality and objectity are of course central concepts in modern and con-
temporary phenomenology, starting with Husserl. See, for instance, Edmund Husserl, Pro-
legomena zur reinen Logik (Tübingen: Max Niemeyer Verlag, 1900), §3. Cf. de Muralt, La
métaphysique du phénomène, pp. 161-77; Jean-Luc Marion, Réduction et donation.
Recherches sur Husserl, Heidegger et la phénoménologie (Paris: Presses Universitaires de
France, 1989), pp. 11-118.
29. William of Ockham, Ordinatio sive Scriptum in librum primum Sententiarum,
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intellectum). As such, esse reale is more objective than esse in actu be-
cause it is reduced to the being of pure essence (esse essentiae), freed
from the constricting shackles of actuality.
Thus, from Henry to Suárez a twofold change occurs: first of all,
identifying esse essentiae with esse reale and, second, equating esse reale
with esse obiectivum. The significance of this double shift is that the be-
ing of essence is the true objective reality of things — a thing’s genuine
objectity. Jean-François Courtine summarizes this well: “Suárez operates
the reduction of a thing to its reality and then from the reality to the
objectity.”30 Since concepts derive from particular things (entia), ‘real es-
sence’ is singular, not universal. After Scotus and Ockham, knowledge of
being no longer concerns cognition of universals in re but instead the
formation of concepts of singularity and the quest for principles that in-
dividuate things in the first place.
To say that Suárez reinforces the modern turn away from a theologi-
cal metaphysics towards a formalized ontology and epistemology is not
to say that within his system logic and semantics determine metaphys-
ics and theology. Rather, in his Disputationes Metaphysicae Suárez ap-
pears to embrace Aquinas’s theory of subordination of metaphysics and
theology to Scientia Dei (Dis. Met. proem.). However, such is Suárez’s be-
lief in the foundational nature of the highest natural principles proper to
metaphysics or first philosophy (prima philosophia), that they also se-
cure and confirm the principles of all other sciences, including sacra
doctrina (Dis. Met. proem.; Dis. Met. I.v.15). Moreover, the object of meta-
physics encompasses all that falls under the univocity of ens, not least
God and all separate substances:
We have shown that the adequate object of this science [metaphysics]
must include God and other immaterial substances, but not only
those. It must also include not just substances but real accidents too,
and not beings of reason and those which are exclusively by accident;
however, no object can be such if it is not ens ut sic; it is therefore this
which constitutes the adequate object.31
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30. Courtine, Suarez et le système de la métaphysique, p. 194.
31. “Ostentum est enim, obiectum adequatum huius scientiae debere comprehendere
Deum, et alias substantias immateriales, non tamen solas illas. Item debere comprehendere
non tantum substantias, sed etiam entia realia, non tamen entia rationis, et omnino per
accidens; sed huiusmodi obiectum nullum aliud esse potest praeter ens ut sic; ergo illud est
obiectum adequatum” (Dis. Met. I.i.26).
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The guiding principle of metaphysics is formal reason (ratio formalis
sub qua), according to which all the various investigations of ens are sys-
tematically ordered towards the unity of being. So from Aquinas’s the-
ory of subalternation via Scotus’s univocity of being, Suárez’s definition
of the adequate object of metaphysics extends the autonomy of first
philosophy from theology and its subsequent primacy over all sciences,
all in the name of the univocity and unity of being which precede the
analogy and the plurality of beings. Since God is granted the status of
‘principal object’ (obiectum praecipuum), which signifies the special ob-
ject (that which has more of which everything else has less — the power
of possibility), metaphysics so configured “subjects God to the realm of
this science.”32
Moreover, Suárez specifies the adequate object of metaphysics as
ens in quantum ens reale, i.e., being insofar as it is real being, defined as
“that which has a real essence,”33 independently of its manifestation and
abstracted from actuality. This confirms the break with the patristic and
medieval account of beings in relation with God who can be participated
in. On the basis of ‘real essence’ and ‘real being,’ Suárez develops a meta-
physics that exceeds Scotus’s elevation of univocal being above God by
positing a common subject-matter (univocal ens reale) and a common
‘reason’ both to metaphysics and to theology. In response to the separa-
tion and increasing autonomy of natural and revealed theology since
Scotus and Ockham, the rationale for Suárez is to include God and all
that is created under one and the same logic of investigation (Dis. Met.
I.i.11 and 13). The significance of the redefinition of the object of philoso-
phy and theology is that abstraction from the actuality of existence and
the reduction of reality to objectity are (epistemo-)logical preconditions
for all sciences, including theology (Dis. Met. I.i.21).
Having thus expanded the boundary of metaphysics to include the-
ology, Suárez completes the crucial modern turn of Baroque scholasti-
cism by identifying the subject of metaphysics with its proper object.
Since substantiality is the ultimate ground or foundation for all entities,
including accidents (Dis. Met. I.i.21), the subject of metaphysics is the
substance insofar as it is substance. As cited above, the ‘adequate object’
of metaphysics, which must include all substances, is being as such (ens
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32. “. . . ergo absolute Deus cadit sub obiectum huius scientiae [. . .]” (Dis. Met. I.i.19).
33. “quod sit habens essentiam realem” (Dis. Met. II.iv.5). See Courtine, Suarez et le
système de la métaphysique, pp. 243-76.
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ut sic).34 This is why Suárez follows Buridan in arguing that the proper
object of metaphysics is substance qua substance, freed from all deter-
minations, materiality and immateriality, infinity and finitude, actuality
and possibility.35 So Suárez equates substantiality with beingness
(étantité) or being as such (ens ut sic). For both are absolutely indetermi-
nate and thereby encompass God who has neither first principles nor fi-
nal ends. The only concept that is common to all substances and all be-
ings qua beings is the ‘objective concept of being’ (conceptus obiectivus
entis, Dis. Met. I.i.21), obtained by the reduction of a thing’s actuality to its
reality and from its reality to its objectity.
The reason why for Suárez the actuality of existent things does not
disclose anything about their singularity is that a thing’s ‘real essence’ is
always already singular. Curiously, essences do not need to be actualized
in order to be individuated. Since essences are endowed with their own
being (esse essentiae) and in this sense are real (Dis. Met. II.iv.9), essences
do not call forth actualization. In fact, being in itself and as such (ens ut
sic) is ‘real being’ (ens reale) and has a higher reality than actual beings
precisely because it is “that which has a real essence.”36 Contrary to the
Christian Neo-Platonism discussed in this essay, Suárez’s real being is not
a being in act — id quod est or ens, i.e., an existence-essence compound
that is brought into being by ipsum esse. But instead the Suárezian real be-
ing is the substratum for singularity, an existent that is at the service of a
singular essence. As I argue in the following section, existence makes no
difference to the singularity of ‘real essences.’ That is how individuation
becomes unhinged from divine creation and actualization.
5. Singularity as Transcendental Precondition
Suárez outlines his account of individuation in Part V of his Disputa-
tiones Metaphysicae, which are composed of fifty-four disputations and
were first published in Salamanca in 1597.37 As Gracia indicates, the fact
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34. See, supra, note 31.
35. Suárez writes that “Sexta opinio, quae Buridani esse dicitur, est obiectum
adaequatum huius scientiae esse substantiam, quatenus substantia est, id est, ut abstrahit a
materiali et immateriali, finita et infinita” (Dis. Met. I.i.21). The reference to Buridan is Qu.
Met. VII, q. 1.
36. See, supra, note 33.
37. Francisco Suárez, De unitate individuali eiusque principio, English translation:
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that Suárez discusses individuation in the fifth disputation highlights
the importance he attaches to this question.38 Only four other questions
precede it: the nature of metaphysics, the essential nature or concept of
being, the transcendental attributes of being (unity, truth, and good-
ness), and transcendental unity. The discussion of individuation or indi-
vidual unity is followed by that of formal and universal unity (in the sixth
and the seventh disputation). The order of the disputations is significant
because it reflects the order within Suárez’s metaphysical system. Just as
unity is prior to truth and goodness in Suárez’s metaphysical system, so
individuality is prior to universality. Before I discuss this double priority,
I will set out the structure of Suárez’s discussion of individuality in the
fifth disputation.
His discussion is divided into nine sections. The first two sections
concern the metaphysical determination of the unity of individuals, in
particular the definition and the formal delimitation of the ‘individual
difference’ (differentia individualis) in terms of the link between the spe-
cific difference and the genus. Sections 4, 5, and 6 focus on the physical
determination of the unity of individuals, namely the physical real foun-
dation of the individual (or individuating) difference. Sections 7, 8, and 9
address the principle of individuation of accidents. The metaphysical de-
termination as set out in sections 1 and 2 frames Suárez’s entire account
of individuation. Section 1 raises the question of the nature and the ex-
tent of individuality in things that exist or can exist. This question con-
cerns the relation between simplicity and plurality. Suárez argues that
this problematic is common to the metaphysics of the one and the many
and the theology of creation (Dis. Met. V.i.1). Likewise, he posits in the
same section 1 the following assumption which underlies his entire
metaphysical treatment of individuation: “[A]ll things that are actual be-
ings or that exist or can exist immediately, are singular and individual.”39
For Suárez, individuality is a positum, not a quaesitum, and it is ulti-
mately an a priori claim, not an object of investigation. For a thing’s indi-
viduality always already is and as such provides the foundation for indi-
321
Transcendental Individuation
Suárez on individuation: Metaphysical disputation V, Individual Unity and Its Principle,
trans. and ed. J. J. E. Gracia (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1982).
38. Jorge J. E. Gracia, “Francis Suárez (b. 1548; d. 1617),” in Gracia, ed., Individuation in
Scholasticism: The Later Middle Ages and the Counter-Reformation 1150-1650 (Albany: State
University of New York Press, 1994), pp. 476-77.
39. “res omnes quae sunt actualia entia, seu quatenus existunt, vel existere possunt im-
mediate, esse singulares ac individuas” (Dis. Met. V.i.4).
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viduation. Entities are self-individuating in virtue of the individual unity
that constitutes them. In this way, Suárez immanentizes the principle of
individuation and thereby excludes divine creation as an account of why
things are individual and to what end they desire to be individuated.
Suárez’s definition of individuality in terms of unity derives from his
treatment of transcendental unity in the fourth disputation. In line with
the scholastic idea of the convertibility of the transcendentals which was
systematized by Thomas Aquinas (as I discussed in chapter 5),40 Suárez
defines transcendental unity as the unity that is ‘convertible with being.’
Since everything that is one is a being and everything that is a being is
one, being (ens) and the one (unum) are coterminous. As such, unity is
not accidental to being; it is essential to being. However, the disagree-
ment among scholastics is about whether unity adds anything to being
and, if so, what the nature of this addition might be — real or conceptual.
For Suárez, who invokes Aristotle, Aquinas, and Cajetan, unity does not
add anything at all to being: “Unity and being are one and the same na-
ture, because unity does not express any positive notion other than the
notion of being.”41
However, unity and being are not identical because they are distin-
guished by nominal as well as formal and objective differences: “not only
because it [unity] is one of its attributes, but because the names [‘one’
and ‘being’] are not synonymous, and to them correspond diverse formal
and objective concepts in the mind.”42 As I argued in the previous section,
the objective concept of being (conceptus obiectivus entis) is more objec-
tive than an actually existing thing because it captures a thing’s real sin-
gular essence. So just as there is an objective concept of being in the
mind that is more real than beings in actuality because it abstracts es-
sence from existence, so there is an objective concept of unity that is also
more real in the mind than in the actual beings in act because it ab-
stracts from individual unity. The implication is that the actuality of indi-
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40. ST Ia, q. 11, a. 1. Cf. Jan A. Aertsen, “Die Transzendentalienlehre bei Thomas von
Aquin in ihren historischen Hintergründen und philosophischen Motiven,” in Albert Zim-
mermann, ed., Thomas von Aquin. Werk und Wirkung im Licht neuer Forschung (Berlin and
New York: De Gruyter, 1988), pp. 82-102.
41. “unum et esse unam ac eamdem naturam, quia nimirum nullam rationem positivam
dicit praeter rationem entis” (Dis. Met. V.i.6).
42. “unum aliquo modo distingui ab ente, quia et est passio eius et illa nomina non sunt
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vidual beings does not disclose anything about their unity. Instead, a pri-
ori transcendental unity is an absolute precondition for things being
known as unified and individuated. Likewise, the a priori transcendental
unity of univocal being is an absolute precondition for things to be uni-
fied and individuated.
Suárez’s variant of the convertibility of being and the one implies that
transcendental and individual unity are coextensive, i.e., transcendental
unity as an attribute of ‘real being’ applies univocally to being as such and
to individual beings. Put differently, transcendental unity can be and is
instantiated in actual individual existing things. What is new in Suárez is
the idea that objects without any actual existing equivalents also embody
transcendental unity. Unity is both univocal and transcendental. Unity
applies univocally to the Creator and his creation. Transcendental unity
cannot be discerned on the basis of the unity of individual things. Instead,
the intellect needs to abstract from actually existing individuals and form
an objective concept of unity before it can cognize the unity of beings.
Even though individual unity has a fundamentum in re,43 Suárez discards
Aquinas’s aesthetic judgment in the discernment of convenientia between
transcendentals in favor of a conceptualism based on reason alone.
In fact, Suárez rejects two different positions: first of all, Scotus’s idea
that there can be two kinds of unity in a thing (the unity of the nature and
the unity of the individual); second, Aquinas’s idea that unity is propor-
tional and analogous to an individual’s station in the hierarchical order
of being — God’s unity is different from that of angels whose unity is dif-
ferent from that of humans. Suárez’s conception of unity in terms of a
univocal transcendental category destroys not only the incipient dual-
ism in Scotus’s idea of a double unity but also and above all Aquinas’s
analogy between the transcendent Creator and his creation. Unity as a
transcendental prepares the modern path towards Descartes’s ‘objective
reality’ of ideas independently of the object represented by them as well
as Kant’s transcendental a priori and the conditions of possibility of
knowledge outside the direct relation between subject and object,44 as I
will suggest in chapter 9.
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43. See, supra, note 27.
44. For a concise genealogical account from Scotus and Ockham via Suárez and Des-
cartes to Kant, see de Muralt, “Kant, le dernier occamien. Une nouvelle définition de la
philosophie moderne,” Revue de Métaphysique et de Morales 80 (1975): 32-53; de Muralt,
L’unité de la philosophie politique. De Scot, Occam et Suarez au libéralisme contemporain
(Paris: Vrin, 2002), pp. 17-28.
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The emphasis on reason at the expense of sense perception and
judgment has important consequences for Suárez’s metaphysics of indi-
viduality. The priority of unity over other attributes like truth and good-
ness implies that unity precedes all forms of distinction and diversity. In
this way, he seeks to safeguard God’s oneness and simplicity against the
multiplicity and plurality of creation (Dis. Met. IV.i.16). This amounted to
a devaluation of particular sensible things. Rather than being a diverse
reflection of the single self-diffusive Good, particulars manifest nothing
but their singular self. Likewise, the preeminence of transcendental
unity betrays the primacy of metaphysics over all other sciences and the
univocity of ens reale vis-à-vis both God and his creation. Metaphysics as
first philosophy conditions theology and subordinates the theo-onto-
logic of creation to the heno-logic of the one.
This account has far-reaching implications for the question of indi-
viduation. Individual unity is transcendentally determined and thus
constitutes an a priori assumption rather than an object of metaphysical
investigation that can be demonstrated. If a thing’s individuality is its
real singular essence, then individuation is ‘situated’ exclusively within
things themselves. Indeed, in paragraph 2 of section 1 of the fifth disputa-
tion on individual unity, Suárez defines individuality in terms that sug-
gest individuals are self-individuating rather than being individuated
through relations with other individuals or with God — as Augustine,
Boethius, Aquinas, and other Christian Neo-Platonists argued:
That is called ‘common’ or ‘universal’ which is communicated to many
entities or is found in many entities according to one single nature. On
the other hand, that is called ‘one in number’ or ‘singular’ or ‘individ-
ual’ which is one being in such a way that, according to that nature of
being through which it is called ‘one,’ it is not communicable to many
entities. For example, to those that are lower to or placed below it, or
to those that are many under that nature. . . .45
Suárez agrees with Aquinas that to be individual is not to be able to com-
municate oneself to any other entity because an individual cannot be di-
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45. “Commune enim seu universale dicitur quod secundum unam aliquam rationem
multis communicatur seu in multis reperitur; unum autem numero seu singulare ac
individuum dicitur quod ita est unum ens, ut secundum eam entis rationem, qua unum
dicitur, non sit communicabile multis, ut inferioribus et sibi subiectis, aut quae in illa ratione
multa sint” (Dis. Met. V.i.2).
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vided into entities without being destroyed as an individual. Nor can it be
participated in. The contrast that Suárez draws is between individuals
and universals. The latter are communicable because they are divisible
and participable.46 The incommunicability of individuals paradoxically
implies their ‘self ’-communication. All individual self-communicative
things are entities that express nothing but their own individual unity, se-
cured by the transcendental unity of univocal being.47
However, Suárez disagrees with Aquinas on why individuality is in-
communicable. Unlike Aquinas, for whom individuality and relationality
are coextensive and thus individuation and differentiation are simulta-
neous, unity for Suárez precedes individuality and individuation. The
incommunicability of individuality follows not only from Suárez’s em-
phasis on the unity of individuals but also from the concomitant subor-
dination of differentiation and multiplicity. He argues that to be an indi-
vidual precedes being differentiated from other individuals and being
numerically multiplied within the same species (Dis. Met. V.i.7; V.iii.12).
For Suárez then, unity and self-identity ground individuality and deter-
mine individuation.
Moreover, Suárez makes individuality in God and in all creatures
identical and thereby denies that individuality (and also universality) is
analogous rather than univocal. He also argues that all actual beings are
individual because individuality is intrinsic to individuals, prior to and
independent of any relations with other individuals (Dis. Met. V.ii.28). In-
dividuality belongs to everything that exists immediately (Dis. Met.
V.i.4).48 For there is only one kind of individuality in the entire cosmos,
grounded in the reality of transcendental unity. Since unity is convertible
with being, everything that is actual exhibits necessarily the unity of in-
dividuality. Actual beings (including spiritual beings, composite beings,
material beings, and all their properties) are individual. By contrast,
forms, universals, and natures such as humanity are not — they have a
purely conceptual unity which is not individual. If all actually existing
things are individual because they derive from the individuality of tran-
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46. See Courtine, Nature et Empire de la Loi, pp. 69-90, esp. pp. 74-81.
47. Courtine, Nature et Empire de la Loi, pp. 81-90. However, on the question of ‘ex-
pression’ Courtine omits Spinoza from his account of Suárez’s legacy. Suárez’s conception
of individual unity as an instantiation of transcendental unity marks a move that fore-
shadows Spinoza’s understanding of all finite individuals as expressions of the unique infi-
nite substance. See, infra, chapter 8, section 6.
48. See, supra, note 39.
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scendental unity which is a priori, then this raises questions of how indi-
viduals can be individuated and why.
6. The Self-Individuation of Entities
Suárez’s own account of individuation attempts to chart an alternative
beyond the realism of Aquinas’s idea of designated matter, the formalism
of Scotus’s haecceitas, and the nominalism of Ockham’s singularity (Dis.
Met. V.ii.2-6). This alternative consists of four elements. First of all,
Suárez argues that the individual adds something real to common na-
ture (not as the concept in the mind but as it is found in real things) be-
cause individuality gives the common nature an individual unity that is
real because the one and being are convertible: “I say, first, that the indi-
vidual adds something real to the common nature, by reason of which it
is such individual and there comes to it the negation of divisibility into
many [individuals] similar [to itself].”49 Individuality is not a mere name
or concept but is in a thing because it is only in virtue of individuality
that something is this rather than that.
However, second, individual unity — that which is added to the com-
mon nature — is not really or modally different from it because the com-
mon nature is not real independently of the individual: “I say, second,
that the individual as such does not add anything distinct ex natura rei
from the specific nature.”50 After Scotus and Ockham, a reversal occurs
in the order of universality and individuality. Whereas for Aquinas the
question is how the particular can entertain a relation with the univer-
sal, for Scotus, Ockham, and Suárez the question is how the common or
the universal can be in the singular. For humanity per se is not real in the
same way as an individual. Humanity is only real in Plato, in Aristotle,
etc. There is no composition of humanity and individuality. There is
identity because, transcendentally secured, individual unity is indivisi-
ble. And since the objective concept of being is the ultimate arbiter of
what can be known, the difference between individual unity and the
common nature is conceptual: “I say, third, that the individual adds to
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49. “Dico primo: individuum aliquid reale addit praeter naturam communem, ratione
cuius tale individuum est et ei convenit illa negatio divisibilitatis in plura similia” (Dis. Met.
V.ii.8).
50. “Dico secundo: individuum, ut sic, non addit aliquid ex natura rei distinctum a
natura specifica” (Dis. Met. V.ii.9).
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the common nature something conceptually distinct from it, belonging
to the same category and metaphysically composing the individual as an
individual difference which contracts the species and constitutes the in-
dividual.”51
But what does ‘conceptual’ difference mean? According to Gracia,
“conceptual distinctions do not hold between mental entities: they are
grounded in reality.”52 Without sense perception and judgment, there is
no way for the mind to ascertain the reality of things upon which this
conceptual distinction is founded — other than by way of abstract con-
cepts that the mind somehow projects onto the world. For Suárez, all
knowledge is knowledge by abstraction and through concepts that refer
to singular essences (Dis. Met. V.i.4). So while he insists that individuality
is not confined to the concept of individual unity but extends to real
things, only mental abstraction of singular essences from a thing’s exis-
tence gives the mind access to that thing’s individuality, not its phenom-
enal manifestation and sensory apprehension or judgment. Unlike Au-
gustine, Boethius, and Aquinas, Suárez sees the mind as the final arbiter
of what individual unity is. Indeed, the devaluation of phenomenality in
favor of the conceptualism of reason is evinced by the application of in-
dividual unity to material and immaterial beings alike: “I say, fourth, that
the individual adds something conceptually distinct to the species not
only in material things and accidents, but also in created and finite im-
material substances.”53 Therefore, against Thomas’s idea of matter-form
compounds, Suárez denies that in things there is composition and real
difference between the essence and the act of being which brings things
into actuality.
To deny composition and real difference is to exclude existence (or
the act of being) as the cause of individuation. Suárez’s exclusively con-
ceptual approach to actuality and possibility reinforces his rejection of
this Thomist account. But his approach can be questioned. At the level
of objective concept, there is no difference between the individuality of
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51. “Dico tertio: individuum addere supra naturam communem aliquid ratione dis-
tinctum ab illa, ad idem praedicamentum pertinens, et individuum componens meta-
physicae, tamquam differentia individualis contrahens speciem et individuum constituens”
(Dis. Met. V.ii.16).
52. Gracia, “Francis Suárez (b. 1548; d. 1617),” p. 493.
53. “Dico quarto: individuum non solum in rebus materialibus et accidentibus, sed
etiam in substantiis immaterialibus creatis et finiteis addit aliquid ratione distinctum supra
speciem” (Dis. Met. V.ii.21).
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an existing actual and a nonexisting possible individual. However, at the
level of reality, there is a genuine difference. As I argued in chapter 5, for
Thomas nothing other than God can bring itself into existence. Likewise,
everything except God stands in potency to the actuality of being which
causes all things to be and makes them what they are. As such, each be-
ing (ens) exhibits a real difference between its actuality and its potency
and by extension between existence and essence. For form instantiated
in body (or form joined to being in the case of angels) is not fully actual-
ized but instead desires perfection. This is what individuation is — the
ever more intense formation of individuals. On the contrary, for Suárez
who ‘locates’ objective reality at the level of the intellect and its con-
cepts, the difference between actuality and potency and between exis-
tence and essence is exclusively conceptual. Actuality adds nothing to
individuality and so, according to Suárez, existence (Aquinas’s act of be-
ing) cannot possibly individuate beings.
Having dismissed individuation by matter, form, and existence, the
logic that underpins Suárez’s conceptualism leads him to develop the
idea that the principle of individuation is entity (entitas). This claim is
that entities are self-individuating: “[I]t seems that every singular sub-
stance is singular in itself, that is, by its entity, and needs no other princi-
ple of individuation in addition to its entity, or in addition to the intrinsic
principles that constitute its entity.”54 The entity that constitutes an indi-
vidual thing is nothing but “the essence as it exists” (Dis. Met. VII.i.12 and
19). So Suárez argues that individuals self-individuate because individu-
ality is the nature of the existence of essences — individuality is how es-
sences exist. Since the essence of individual finite things is the com-
pound of form and matter, he concludes his fifth disputation by stating
that “the adequate principle of individuation is this matter and this form
in union. The form alone is the sufficient and chief principle so that the
composite, as an individual thing of a certain species, can be considered
numerically one and the same thing.”55 This signifies that the actually ex-
isting essence is its own immanent principle of individuation because it
does not require a transcendent act of being in order to be brought into
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54. “omnem substantiam singularem [se ipsa, seu per entitatem suam, esse singularem]
neque alio indigere individuationis principio praeter suam entitatem, vel praeter principia
intrinseca quibus eius entitas constat” (Dis. Met. V.vi.1).
55. “. . . adequatum individuationis principium esse hanc materiam et hanc formam
inter se unitas, inter quae praecipuum principium est forma, quae sola sufficit, ut hoc compo-
situm, quatenus est individuum talis speciei, idem numero censeatur” (Dis. Met. V.vi.15).
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existence. A real essence always already exists because it is endowed
with its own being (esse essentiae). So configured, individuation becomes
unhinged from creation, as Suárez locates the principle of individuation
within individual things and limits God’s creative action to efficient cau-
sality, which the following section shows.
7. Creation as Efficient Causality
In the Disputationes Metaphysicae XX-XXII, Suárez argues that creation
ex nihilo is amenable to human reason and that it explains the coming
into being and the preservation of material substances, as well as their
concurrence with divine action.56 But unlike the patristic and medieval
metaphysics of relationality and participation, Suárez’s system redirects
the focus away from the actuality of effects that intimate the first cause
towards the univocity of being and a priori transcendental unity. All
things are created by God in the sense of being brought into existence
and sustained in being. However, the reality of essences precedes the ac-
tuality of existence, which signifies that a thing’s actual phenomenal ap-
pearance does not disclose any relation with God, first principle, and fi-
nal end. The subordination of existence to essence implies that the
createdness (or creatureliness) of things is purely conceptual and lacks
any phenomenality. Creation provides a general framework that explains
the causation of things, but it cannot account for their singularity.
Indeed, just as Suárez proceeds from the transcendental ens reale to
the concrete reality of an individual thing, so he moves from creation in
general to the specific causation of particulars (Dis. Met. XX.ii.24-26).57
As a result, he maintains that entities are principally created by God but
some specific things may not be: “[A] power that corresponds ade-
quately to a certain sort of creation, rather than to creation as such, need
not be absolutely universal; therefore, it is not necessary that such a
power should be proper to the First Cause.”58 Moreover, his emphasis on
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56. Translated by Alfred J. Freddoso in “Introduction: Suárez on Metaphysical In-
quiry, Efficient Causality, and Divine Action,” in Francisco Suárez, On Creation, Conserva-
tion, and Concurrence: Metaphysical Disputations 20, 21, and 22, trans. and ed. Alfred J.
Freddoso (South Bend, IN: St. Augustine’s Press, 2002), pp. xi-cxxiii.
57. Schmutz, “La doctrine médiévale des causes et la théologie de la nature pure
(XIIIe-XVIIe siècles),” pp. 217-64.
58. “potentia quae non respicit adequate creationem ut sic, sed talem creationem, sit
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abstraction at the expense of sense perception and judgment leads him
to privilege the probability of a general theory of creation rather than the
certainty of demonstration based on the ‘created’ shape of actual things
and the phenomenal visibility of creative action: “I believe that on the
basis of the things that have been made it can be shown with a very high
degree of probability that an absolutely infinite power is required for the
creation of any entity whatsoever.”59
Ultimately, Suárez cuts the links between creation and final causes
and identifies God’s creative action with efficient causality alone. For the
exclusion of actuality from metaphysics and the shift towards immanent
self-individuation eliminated the relation between the actualization of
things and their telos. Ever more intense existing (or participation in the
act of being) is no longer crucial to a thing’s fulfillment of its God-given
form because existence does not matter to essence. Since entities self-
individuate, independently of God’s creative action, creation explains
how something is produced, but not to what end. Suárez’s identification
of creation with efficient causality deprives his metaphysics of the ability
to explain why all things desire to be individuated and how God’s creativ-
ity is fundamental to the individuation of entities that are created indi-
vidual. His commitment to conceptualism — the claim that ‘objective re-
ality’ is more real than the actuality of things — rules out any account of
the difference that actualization makes and why things, as it were, desire
to be brought into being and to be actualized further.
As I argue in the following chapter, Spinoza attempts precisely to an-
swer these two questions. First, what difference does actuality make to
individuality (and actualization to individuation)? Second, why do enti-
ties ‘wish’ to be individuated? Before I can give an account of Spinoza’s
theory of individuation, I will conclude on Suárez. In this section I have
argued that his negotiation of the relation between metaphysics and the-
ology and his theory of the self-individuation of entities identifies God’s
creative action with efficient causality. Suárez excludes God’s creativity
from final and formal causality and therefore could not explain why indi-
viduals desire ever more intense individuation, an idea that Augustine,
Boethius, and Aquinas call the perfectibility of form and the perfection
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universalissimae potentia, ergo non oportet sit propria primae causae” (Dis. Met. XX.ii.26
[English translation, p. 761]).
59. “censeo ex rebus factis probabilissime ostendi ad cuiusvis rei creationem requiri
potentiam simpliciter infinitam” (Dis. Met. XX.ii.40 [English translation, p. 766]).
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of individuality. Suárez’s conception of creation in terms of efficient cau-
sality and his account of pure nature and expression prepare the way for
Spinoza’s system. Instrumental to this transition is Suárez’s transforma-
tion of the natural law tradition. In the following section, I discuss
Suárez’s account of natural law and analyze the link between the meta-
physical and political dimension of individuation.
8. Natural Law and Transcendental Politics?
Sovereignty and Alienation
Suárez’s metaphysics of individuality has a decisive impact on his under-
standing of natural law theory and on the natural law tradition as a
whole. In line with his shift from the actuality of existence in the world to
the reality of essence in the mind, his account of law and ethics moves
the precept of natural law away from a phenomenally visible order in ex-
ternal nature to an order that is internal to the intellect. He accom-
plishes this modern turn of the natural law tradition by grounding the
natural law both in the will and in reason. Unlike lumen naturale and
synderesis in Aquinas, Suárez maintains that will is essential to law be-
cause law is “an act of a just and right will by which a superior wills to
oblige his inferiors to do this or that.”60
At the same time, natural law requires reason, in the sense that only
reason (and not faith) can ascertain whether an obligation is integral to
the demands of nature. In other words, Suárez attempts to conjoin late
medieval rationalism which we owe to Scotus’s separation of reason
from faith with late medieval voluntarism which we owe to Ockham’s
separation of potentia Dei absoluta from potentia Dei ordinata.61 The
voluntarist dimension of Suárez’s conception of natural law prevails over
the rationalist dimension because will has a normative function while
reason makes normativity intelligible but does not decree it: “For the in-
tellect is able merely to point out a necessity existing in the object itself,
and if such necessity does not exist, the intellect cannot impart it;
whereas the will endows the object with a necessity which did not for-
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60. “. . . actum voluntatis iustae et rectae, quo superior vult inferiorem obligare ad hoc,
vel illud faciendum” (De Leg. I.v.24 [English translation, p. 82]).
61. William Courtenay, Capacity and Volition: A History of the Distinction of Absolute
and Ordained Power (Bergamo: Pierluigi Lubrina Editore, 1990), esp. pp. 119-26.
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merly characterize it.”62 According to Suárez, law is binding, not because
reason validates it but because the lawgiver confers onto law its obliga-
tory quality. This is why neither nature nor reason is sufficient to secure
natural law:
Although the rational nature is the foundation of the objective good-
ness of the moral actions of human beings, it may not for that reason
be termed law; and, by the same token, that nature may be spoken of
as a standard, yet it is not correct to conclude on that ground that it is
law, for ‘standard’ is a term of wider application than is ‘law.’63
This passage highlights Suárez’s departure from the shared theological
realism of Christian Neo-Platonism and his embrace of Porreta’s and
Scotus’s formalism and Ockham’s nominalism, insofar as nature or the
world no longer discloses God’s will or intentionality and as such does
not provide a source for objective knowledge of natural law. This moves
knowledge from the reality of actual particular sensible things to the
mind and the will. Sense perception and judgment are subordinate to
abstraction and volition. For individual judgment has a directive rather
than a legislative function: it orients the rationality of the mind towards
the necessity of the law “but it does not sanction it as law.”64 Human will
is the key determinant of natural law.
The prominence of voluntarism and rationalism in natural law the-
ory is not new in seventeenth-century scholastic Spain but can in fact be
traced back to the first half of the fourteenth century when a number of
nominalist theologians, chief of all Ockham, provided a theological justi-
fication for the divine right of kings in general and the absolutist rule of
King Louis of Bavaria in particular.65 Suárez is part of this tradition of
natural law theory to the extent that he espouses the primacy of will over
judgment and the devaluation of the divine cosmos in favor of the ratio-
nality of the intellect.
However, he diverges from this legacy in two related ways that have
direct consequences for his theory of individuation. First, he rejects
Ockham’s idea that God’s will is unintelligible to the human mind. In-
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62. De Leg. I.v.15 (English translation, p. 66).
63. De Leg. II.v.6 (English translation, p. 181).
64. Dupré, Passage to Modernity, p. 137.
65. Coleman, “Ockham’s Right Reason and the Genesis of the Political as ‘Absolutist,’ ”
History of Political Thought 20 (1999): 35-64.
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stead, he seeks to tie divine volition to nature by arguing that God’s will
can in fact be rationally known and God wills what is good in the nature
of things (De Leg. II.vi.11). As such, knowledge of the divine will enables
knowledge of what is good in beings as they are. This constitutes a reac-
tion against the attempt of nominalism to erase God from nature and to
replace the relation of creation with a model of arbitrary divine interven-
tion.
Following Aquinas on this point, Suárez views the good as real inso-
far as things that actually exist are good in the sense of actualizing their
form. Not unlike the Christian Neo-Platonist idea of the natural desire of
the supernatural good in God, goodness in actually existing beings can
also be for Suárez an inclination or capacity for the good because the
good adds agreeability to being (Dis. Met. X.i.12). And what is agreeable is
rightly desired. There is then between a thing that is good and a being
that is inclined towards goodness a real relation (Dis. Met. XLVII), a con-
figuration that opposes in advance Descartes’s dualism between the
knowing subject and the known object. This real relation individuates
the subject insofar as it actualizes the subject’s potency to know and ful-
fills the subject’s desire for the good.
However, as I indicated in the previous section, Suárez’s natural law
theory differs from the Thomist tradition in terms of the metaphysical
and theological status of nature. The turn away from self-transcendent
to pure nature and the concomitant separation of nature and grace (and
reason and faith) undermine the relational dimension of individuation.
For the ultimate cause that individuates corporeal substances is no lon-
ger the real relation between creatures and their Creator God but instead
is the nature of individual entities themselves, i.e., their real essences,
cognoscible in themselves and as such. Equally, from the hypothesis of
pure nature follows a profoundly abstract conception of natural law that
separates knowledge of legal entitlements and obligations from actual
political practices. This fundamental change is evinced by three distinct
yet connected moves: first of all, Suárez’s conception of reason sundered
from faith; second, his separation of the will from the faculty of judg-
ment; third, the bestowal of individual rights independently of shared
political structures.
This abstractness introduces a formality into the natural law tradi-
tion which threatens the reality of actually practicing relations between
members of living communities. Rather than relating natural law to the
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ties solely in the will and thereby separates knowledge and exercise of
the law from any collective discernment and joint practices, thereby un-
dermining the social and communal nature of the individual. This opens
up an autonomous space for individual rights independently of shared
political institutions and mutual practices. Accordingly, human beings
are individuated by exercising their sovereign will rather than by partici-
pating in a common polity.
The second way in which Suárez departs from the thirteenth- and
fourteenth-century natural law tradition is by challenging the absolute-
ness of monarchical power which purports to be divinely sanctioned. He
does so in the name of reason and revelation and by founding sover-
eignty upon human community, rather than the monarchy or the indi-
vidual.66 Indeed, imperial decrees are only binding insofar as they corre-
spond to the exigencies of reason and the truth of revelation. Likewise,
sovereignty emanates from the people:
[T]his [legislative] power, viewed solely according to the nature of
things, resides not in any individual man but rather in the whole body
of mankind. . . . In the nature of things all men are born free; so that,
consequently, no person has political jurisdiction over another per-
son, even as no person has dominion over another; nor is there any
reason why such power should [simply] in the nature of things, be at-
tributed to certain persons over certain other persons, rather than
vice versa.67
Neither reason nor revelation warrants the primacy of the individual
over the collective or of the sovereign all-powerful monarchy over the
people. Instead, sovereignty is grounded in the social and political body
composed of all men who are born free and equal. As André de Muralt
has documented, Suárez’s Defensio fidei is an attack on the doctrine of
the divine right of kings championed by James VI of Scotland (James I of
England).68 The aim is to reconfigure the relation between the absolute
sovereignty of the people and the absolute sovereignty of the king who
does not invoke the divine authority directly in order to establish his
power and righteousness. The main innovation is to say that the original
334
TRANSCENDENCE AND IMMANENCE
66. De Muralt, L’unité de la philosophie politique, pp. 115-22.
67. De Leg. III.ii.3 (English translation, p. 374).
68. De Muralt, L’unité de la philosophie politique, pp. 115-56.
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organic unity of the body politic is neither the result of divine volition
nor the product of a social contract. Rather, in virtue of God’s creation of
human nature, this unity is both divine and natural and its constitution
is an equal function of divine and natural law (Def. fidei III.i.7). For cre-
ation marks the immediate investment of the people with the power that
is from God (potestas a deo). The power of the prince is grounded exclu-
sively in the absolute sovereignty of the people (Def. fidei III.iv.1).
What distinguishes Aquinas’s medieval account of metaphysical
and political power from Suárez’s early modern alternative is the
nonhierarchical nature of popular unity. Unlike the patristic and medi-
eval Christian Neo-Platonist idea of different degrees of being and good-
ness that characterize the created order, Suárez’s formalism (be-
queathed by Porreta and Scotus, as I have already indicated) flattens the
whole of creation by eliminating any hierarchical differentiations
amongst individuals. The natural state of created being in general and
humanity in particular is an original democracy, the rule of entire people
without any real distinction, for all humans share a natural desire for
natural blessedness: “[T]he finality of civilian power is the natural felicity
of the perfect human community.”69 It is the unity of this natural desire
that constitutes the people as a ‘single mystical body’ (unum corpus
mysticum).
So to describe the organic social and political community as pri-
mary is to secularize the patristic and medieval vision of the corpus
mysticum as the highest community on earth, the profound and perma-
nent spiritual union within the church in the reciprocal love of the Holy
Spirit, in the words of Saint Paul. This constitutes a fundamental differ-
ence between Suárez’s and Aquinas’s account of politics. Whereas the
Doctor Angelicus draws a real distinction between the theological com-
munity of the corpus mysticum and the secular realm of political gover-
nance,70 the Doctor Eximius posits a formal distinction within a real
identity. As such, the theological body is conflated with the secular body
and the mystical body now denotes primarily the population — not the
ecclesial community. What generates and sustains the unity of mankind
is not God’s creative and concurrent action coupled with human agency.
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69. “[Potestatis civilis] finem esse felicitatem naturalem communitatis humanae
perfectae” (De Leg. III.xi.7 [English translation, p. 456]).
70. Henri de Lubac, Corpus mysticum. L’Eucharistie et l’Église au moyen âge (Paris:
Aubier-Montaigne, 1949), pp. 123-52.
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Instead, Suárez’s embrace of Porretan and Scotist formalism prizes apart
matter and form and by extension (as a result of the metaphysical foun-
dation of politics) divorces the human embodied community from its
immaterial form.
In consequence, the natural organic unity of the social body pre-
cedes the supernatural spiritual unity of the theological body. Thus, the
operation of the corpus mysticum is severed from divine creative activity.
This rupture has two implications. First, the mystical community as a
primarily political entity is cut off from divine creative action. For the op-
eration of the human secular sphere is now thought to be independent of
God’s creativity. Second, the political community is not unified and sus-
tained by any collective ‘drive’ to the supernatural as there is in Aquinas’s
account of corpus mysticum.71 For grace is now conceived of as being so
extrinsic that the communal dimension of the mystical community is
completely naturalized. The state of nature is in some sense indepen-
dent of human creatureliness and defines the space within which the
God-given desire for the supernatural operates. According to Suárez, na-
ture is not infused with this desire by God’s supernatural grace, as it is for
Aquinas.
Likewise, the priority of the organic body over the political body im-
plies that the state of nature is somehow apolitical — a radical break
away from the ancient, patristic, and medieval tradition of man as a po-
litical animal and the irreducibly political dimension of the created or-
der. In consequence, the constitution of political communities and a
common polity is in some fundamental sense counter-natural and as
such causes alienation. Suárez accounts for this claim as follows. First,
his emphasis on will leads him to relate community not to God’s act of
creation and the renewed covenant in Christ but to the sovereign “will of
all who were assembled therein [in the community].”72 This would sug-
gest that will is after all collective and as such provides a safeguard
against the incipient individualism of an anarchic democracy based on
the equal rights of all men. Indeed, for Suárez what is required in order to
form a political union is a
special volition or common assent, by which they [men] are gathered
together into one political body through one bond of fellowship and
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71. De Lubac, Corpus mysticum, pp. 123-52.
72. De Leg. III.ii.3 (English translation, p. 374).
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for the purpose of aiding one another in the attainment of a single po-
litical end. Thus viewed, they form a single mystical body which, mor-
ally speaking, may be termed essentially a unity; and that body ac-
cordingly needs a single head.73
However, collective will and common assent are only exercised in two in-
stances: when forming the corpus mysticum (conceived as the popula-
tion that gives rise to the political community) and when transferring
sovereignty from the people to the ruler. Both instances are unique, irre-
versible, and caused the abandonment (largitio) of power, rather than
the revocable delegation (De Leg. III.iv.11). Suárez argues that the transfer
of power amounts to something like alienation (quasi alienatio) and he
likens it to slavery (De Leg. III.iv.6). As a result of a ‘special volition,’ the
community submits itself to the unrestrained power of the sovereign
who reigns unopposed. Paradoxically, by exercising will, the collectivity
surrenders any free communal discernment of the natural order to the
power of the sovereign. Obedience and alienation replace freedom and
individuation. Suárez seeks to defend the social and collective nature of
man, yet at the same time deprives human beings of regular common
discernment. As subjects of absolute monarchy, they are members of a
body that is subjugated to the discipline of the head.
The parallel emphasis on the inalienable rights of individuals and
the supreme power of the ruler prefigures secular theories of the social
contract and the substitution of empires for absolute monarchies and
the state model they embody. This is not to say that Suárez formulates a
wholly secular political philosophy of the modern state.74 As is the case
with his metaphysics, Suárez’s politics is neither exclusively scholastic
nor purely modern nor merely intermediary. Rather, he provides the
metaphysical foundations for later modern secular political philoso-
phies. In contrast to Hobbes, Suárez rejects the idea of a violent state of
nature that is prepolitical and governed by perpetual war of all against
all. Instead, power is invested in the people as a whole and as such na-
ture is always already political. The corpus mysticum exceeds both the
natural rights and duties and those imposed and policed by the state. In
consequence, the political dimension of individuation is not confined to
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73. De Leg. III.ii.4 (English translation, p. 375).
74. Benno Teschke, The Myth of 1648: Class, Geopolitics and the Making of Modern In-
ternational Relations (London: Verso, 2003), esp. pp. 151-96.
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the state but extends to the mystical community which is prior to state-
hood. Individuals cannot perfect their particular form unless they are
part of such communities that are political because they acknowledge
the social nature of human beings and frame their lives in cooperative
association with one another.
However, Suárez’s variant of the natural law tradition does not consti-
tute a genuine alternative to theories of the social contract in Hobbes,
Locke, and Rousseau because Suárez shares the presupposition that indi-
viduality precedes and grounds communality.75 By contrast, the Christian
Neo-Platonists discussed in this essay view the individual and the com-
munal as coextensive with one another. The conjunction of transcenden-
tal unity and self-individuating entities entails a reconfiguration of sover-
eignty: Suárez’s understanding of sovereignty as popular power uniquely
bestowed by God (not continuously so) and uniquely transferred to the
prince amounts to a theological defense of political power that helps pro-
duce the secular logic of the modern state and its monopoly power over
the entire citizenry. The transfer of sovereignty from the people to the
prince is irreversible. As such, the constitution of a political community
embodies the permanent alienation of its constituents: “Even though the
king has received his authority from the people by donation or contract,
the people is no longer entitled to strip the king of it nor to reclaim its
freedom,”76 for this would be an illegitimate usurpation.
What this signifies is the permanent elimination of God’s creative
action from the activity of politics and the operation of the state. Instead
of the more orthodox distinction between the church as corpus mysticum
and the state as body politic, Suárez’s conception of the population as
the ‘single mystical body’ constitutes a turn away from the superiority of
the ecclesial community towards the supremacy of the state over the
people. Even though Suárez rightly rejects the divine right of kings and
338
TRANSCENDENCE AND IMMANENCE
75. William T. Cavanaugh, “ ‘A Fire Strong Enough to Consume the House’: The Wars
of Religion and the Rise of the State,” Modern Theology 11 (1995): 397-420; Thomas Ertman,
Birth of the Leviathan: Building States and Regimes in Medieval and Early Modern Europe
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997); W. T. Cavanaugh, “The City: Beyond Secu-
lar Parodies,” in Milbank, Pickstock, and Ward, eds., Radical Orthodoxy, pp. 182-200; W. T.
Cavanaugh, “Killing for the Telephone Company: Why the Nation-State Is Not the Keeper
of the Common Good,” Modern Theology 20 (April 2004): 243-74.
76. “Ergo quamvis rex habuerit a populo illud dominium per donationem vel
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sketches the contours of a natural democracy,77 he emphasizes absolute
state sovereignty and the primacy of the governing king. As Courtine has
documented, this provides the conceptual basis for the dangerous
sacralization of the state.78 Coupled with an increasingly centralized
church and state, the unprecedented focus on sovereignty follows from
replacing God’s creative activity at the heart of the world with human
agency founded on the will.79 The erasure of God from nature paved the
way for a separation of the transcendental realm from the immanent do-
minion. Suárez, in rejecting the divine right of kings, invests the people
with power, yet at the same time sanctifies total state sovereignty and
the absolute rule of the monarch. Politics and power are severed from
the relationality of the world to God. This shift was part of a tendency to-
wards the modern dualism between the temporal and the eternal, the fi-
nite and the infinite, the individual and the communal, the transcendent
and the immanent. As I argue in the final chapter, Spinoza dismissed the
monotheist theology of transcendence altogether and attempted to re-
place it with a philosophy of immanence.
9. Conclusion: Abstract Individuality
and the Rise of the Modern State
In this chapter, I have shown that Suárez develops an account of individ-
uation that inaugurates modern philosophy and politics. All particular
339
Transcendental Individuation
77. De Muralt, L’unité de la philosophie politique, pp. 115-39.
78. For some genealogical elements, see Courtine, Nature et Empire de la Loi, pp. 8-43. It
has also been argued that the supreme sovereignty of the modern state is modeled on the
quasi-theocratic turn of the papacy since Petrus Damianus’s eleventh-century separation of
potentia Dei absoluta and potentia Dei ordinata. As the vicarius Christi, the Pope was given
absolute power in the temporal realm. The rise of a Roman ‘theocracy’ was part of the secu-
larization within the church and provided the path towards state sacralization. See Ernst H.
Kantorowicz, The King’s Two Bodies: A Study of Political Theology in the Middle Ages (Prince-
ton: Princeton University Press, 1957), chs. 4-5; Dupré, Passage to Modernity, chs. 2-3.
79. See, inter alia, John Neville Figgis, Studies of Political Thought from Gerson to
Grotius, 1414-1625 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1916), pp. 1-30, esp. 11-15; Otto F.
von Gierke, Das deutsche Genossenschaftsrecht, 4 vols. (Berlin: Weidmann, 1868-1913),
trans. of four subsections as Natural Law and the Theory of Society, 1500-1800, trans. and
intro. Ernest Barker (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1934); Joseph R. Strayer, On
the Medieval Origins of the Modern State (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970), esp.
pp. 15-27; Robert I. Moore, The Formation of a Persecuting Society: Power and Deviance in
Western Europe, 950-1250 (Oxford: Blackwell, 1990), esp. pp. 101-53.
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material things self-individuate and as such do not require God’s cre-
ative activity for their individuality. This leads Suárez to equate creation
with efficient causality and to exclude both formal and final causality
from divine creativity. If the cause and principle of individuation is no
longer transcendent but immanent, then God is also eliminated from re-
lations between individuals and the operation of the polis. Indeed,
Suárez’s metaphysics views relations as the product of the will and the
intellect, which is disconnected from divine creativity and in no way re-
flects divine relationality. Likewise, his politics replaces divine agency
with human agency. His critique of the divine right of kings entails a de-
fense of popular power that lapses into alienation because the transfer of
sovereignty from the people to the king is irreversible.
As such, Suárez’s attempt to establish a natural democracy prepared
the rise of the modern secular absolutist state. This was reinforced by his
account of the mystical body as a political body that is prior to that of the
ecclesia and grants the state primacy over the church. Individuation was
thus rendered immanent and made subordinate to the secular logic of
state power and sovereignty. This move was mirrored by the emphasis
on the transcendental nature of unity and the relegation of God to a sep-
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CHAPTER 8
The Creation of Immanence
1. Introduction: ‘True Politics Is Metaphysics’
In this chapter, I argue that Benedictus (Baruch) de Spinoza (1632-1677)
develops an account of individuation that is both indebted to late scho-
lastic theology and shapes modern (and postmodern) philosophy. As
such, it marks a significant moment in the history of the concept of indi-
viduality, which has been neglected by philosophical and theological ge-
nealogies of (post)modernity alike.1 This omission is all the more sur-
prising since in contemporary thought, Spinoza has been widely
credited with providing an original philosophy that rejects both Jewish
and Christian understandings of the nature of creation and refutes both
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1. Spinoza is largely absent from a number of prominent philosophical and theologi-
cal genealogies, including Hans Blumenberg, Die Legitimität der Neuzeit (Frankfurt am
Main: Suhrkamp, 1996 [orig. pub. 1966)]; Michael J. Buckley, At the Origins of Modern Athe-
ism (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1987); Charles Taylor, Sources of the
Self: The Making of Modern Identity (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1989), and,
more recently, Jerrold E. Seigel, The Idea of the Self: Thought and Experience in Western Eu-
rope since the Seventeenth Century (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005). On the
centrality of Spinoza in the genesis of modernity, see Louis Dupré, Passage to Modernity:
An Essay in the Hermeneutics of Nature and Culture (New Haven and London: Yale Univer-
sity Press, 1993); Jonathan I. Israel, Radical Enlightenment: Philosophy and the Making of
Modernity 1650-1750 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001); J. I. Israel, Enlightenment Con-
tested: Philosophy, Modernity, and the Emancipation of Man 1670-1752 (Oxford: Oxford Uni-
versity Press, 2006). On the importance of Spinoza in the history of the concept of individ-
uation, see Don Garrett, “Spinoza’s Conatus Argument,” in Spinoza: Metaphysical Themes,
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Greek and Christian conceptions of the relation between universals and
particulars. He is acclaimed by leading contemporary philosophers such
as Gilles Deleuze for inventing a radical ontology and politics that blend
individuality with commonality.2
This interpretation has led a number of commentators to assert that
Spinoza’s ‘true politics is his metaphysics’ (Antonio Negri) and that his
system liberates the individual from the repressive forces of the divinely
sanctioned absolute monarchy and the feudal society alike, while also
resisting the alienation of capitalist production.3 Thus, Spinoza’s con-
ception of politics is thought to constitute an alternative to the (proto-)
Enlightenment liberalism of Locke (1632-1704), Rousseau (1712-1778), and
Kant (1724-1804). Spinoza’s vision is also said to foreshadow the philoso-
phy of life that has been attributed to Schopenhauer (1788-1860), Marx
(1818-1883), and Nietzsche (1844-1900).4
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2. References to Deleuze’s work on Spinoza can be found throughout this chapter.
Alexandre Matheron’s much-vaunted book Individu et communauté chez Spinoza (Paris:
Éditions de Minuit, 1988 [orig. pub. 1969]), is perhaps the best statement of this reading of
Spinoza. See chs. 1-4, pp. 9-78. The predominant accounts of individuation in Spinoza
agree with Matheron’s main thesis that Spinoza blends the individual with the common.
See Lee C. Rice, “Spinoza on Individuation,” The Monist 55 (1971): 640-59; William J. Edgar,
“Continuity and the Individuation of Modes in Spinoza’s Physics,” in Spinoza’s Metaphysics:
Essays in Critical Appreciation, ed. James B. Wilbur (Assen: Van Gorcum & Co, 1976), pp.
85-132; Frederick Ablondi and Steven Barbone, “Individual Identity in Descartes and
Spinoza,” Studiana Spinozana 10 (1994): 69-92; Don Garrett, “Spinoza’s Theory of Meta-
physical Individuation,” in Individuation and Identity in Early Modern Philosophy: Des-
cartes to Kant, ed. Kenneth F. Barber and Jorge J. E. Gracia (Albany: State University of New
York Press, 1994), pp. 73-101; Genevieve Lloyd, Part of Nature: Self-knowledge in Spinoza’s
Ethics (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1994); Charles Ramond, Quantité et qualité
dans la philosophie de Spinoza (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1995); and Steven
Barbone, “What Counts as an Individual for Spinoza?” in Koistinen and Biro, eds.,
Spinoza: Metaphysical Themes, pp. 89-112. In the present chapter, I contend that Spinoza’s
metaphysics posits rather than demonstrates individuality and that it defends common-
ality for essentially negative reasons.
3. Cf. Étienne Balibar, Spinoza et la politique (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France,
1990), English translation: Spinoza and Politics, trans. and ed. Peter Snowdon (London:
Verso, 1998); Steven Barbone and Lee C. Rice, “La naissance d’une nouvelle politique,” in
Architectures de la raison. Mélanges offerts à Alexandre Matheron, ed. Pierre-François
Moreau (Fontenay-aux-Roses: ENS Éditions, 1996), pp. 47-61.
4. Antonio Negri’s book The Savage Anomaly is a comprehensive account of this sort
of reading of Spinoza’s project. See A. Negri, L’anomalia selvaggia. Saggio su potere e
potenza in Baruch Spinoza (Milan: Feltrinelli, 1981), English translation: The Savage Anom-
aly: The Power of Spinoza’s Metaphysics and Politics, trans. and ed. Michael Hardt (Minne-
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Other commentators have contended that Spinoza defended an ac-
count of the state that limits the authority of those in power and ties lex
(command) to ius (law), which explains his advocacy of democratic
forms of government. In so doing, his politics secures both individual
freedom of expression and the well-being of the commonwealth as a
whole. The reason why one of the protagonists of nineteenth-century
liberal thought, T. H. Green (1836-1882), viewed Spinoza (rather than
Hobbes) as the historical precursor of liberalism is not in virtue of his
metaphysical or meta-ethical conceptions. Rather, it is because his polit-
ical theory defended liberal values.5
However, I argue that such and similar readings of Spinoza are ques-
tionable premises and claims because they tend uncritically to accept a
number of assumptions and assertions, chief of all Spinoza’s own conten-
tion to demonstrate the following three claims. First, that everything has
two parallel aspects, the ideal and the material, which pertain to separate
attributes or orders, Extension and Thought; concomitantly, ideas (ideae)
and their objects (ideata) do not interact because the two orders are
wholly unrelated. Second, that every phenomenon is irreducibly individ-
ual, while also being inexorably interconnected with other phenomena
within each of the two orders. Third, that essence, existence, and act are
all caused by the one and only all-encompassing substance or God, that is
to say, nature (Deus sive natura, Ethica IV, pref.). Yet at the same time, the
principle of individuation is not God but the fixed laws of the eternal or-
der (motion and rest in the order of Extension and common notions in
the order of Thought), and the act of individuation is the natural striving
for self-preservation (the conatus) that inheres in all things.
In what follows, I begin by questioning on Spinoza’s own terms the
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apolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1991), p. 257 for the quote “True politics is his meta-
physics.” See Konrad Hecker, Gesellschaftliche Wirklichkeit und Vernunft. Untersuchungen
über die immanente Systematik der Gesellschaftsphilosophie Spinozas im Zusammenhang
seines philosophischen Gesamtwerks und zum Problem ihres ideologischen Sinngehalts
(Regensburg: Kommissionsverlag Buchhandung Pustet, 1975); Étienne Balibar, “Jus —
Pactum — Lex. Sur la constitution du sujet dans le Traité Théologico-Politique,” Studiana
Spinozana 1 (1985): 105-42; Alexandre Matheron, Individu et communauté chez Spinoza. On
Negri and Hecker, see Manfred Walther, “Philosophy and Politics in Spinoza,” Studiana
Spinozana 9 (1993): 49-57. On Spinoza’s philosophy of life and its influence on modern and
late modern thinkers, see Sylvain Zac, L’idée de vie dans la philosophie de Spinoza (Paris:
Presses Universitaires de France, 1963).
5. Douglas Den Uyl and Stuart D. Warner, “Liberalism and Hobbes and Spinoza,”
Studiana Spinozana 3 (1987): 261-317.
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logic and coherence of the parallelism and noninteraction of the two or-
ders. Interaction within the extensional and the ideational order (but
not across them) is exclusively determined by the fixed laws of the eter-
nal universe and the adequate common notions that correspond to
them. There are two related reasons why this system runs into philo-
sophical and theological problems. First, Spinoza envisages the union of
the mind with the body and with the ‘whole of Nature’ (Tract. de Intel.
Em. 13.4). This is significant for individuality and individuation because
mind-body compounds constitute single individuals. Likewise, only the
union of the mind with the ‘whole of Nature’ can provide knowledge of
the oneness of the unique substance. Yet at the same time, he maintains
that ideas and their ideata do not interact, since they are parallel. The
question then is how the coincidence yet separation of the order of ideas
and the order of things (Ethica II, P7) is compatible with the real union of
minds and bodies and with knowledge of the universe based on bodily
affections of the soul.
The second reason for questioning the noninteraction between the
extensional and the ideational is Spinoza’s conception of the infinite and
the finite. This problem concerns the link between the infinite sub-
stance, its attributes (each of which constitutes the essence of the sub-
stance) and its modes (affections of the substance, which are divided
into infinite immediate, infinite mediate, and finite modes). On the one
hand, the infinite and the finite are separate, as the finite modes cannot
be determined to exist or to act by the infinite substance (Ethica I, P28).
On the other hand, the substance is in everything as the immanent (not
transitive) cause (Ethica I, P18) and everything (including finite modes) is
in the substance as its effects: “[A]ll things that are, are in God, and de-
pend on God in such a way that they can neither be nor be conceived
without him.”6 Moreover, infinite and finite modes alike belong to Natura
naturata (Ethica I, P29, Schol.) and as such follow from the necessity of
God’s nature, that is to say, the modes of God’s attributes which are in
God and can neither be nor be conceived without God. Not unlike Duns
Scotus and Descartes, Spinoza posits the priority of the infinite over the
finite. But he cannot explain how and why the infinity of the substance
involves the finitude of modes. In the absence of such an account, his
system begs the question as to why there are any finite modes at all in
344
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6. “omnia quae sunt in Deo sunt et a Deo ita dependent, ut sine ipso nec esse, nec concipi
possint” (Ethica I, P28, Schol.).
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the substance. How can finite modes be self-individuating or individuat-
ing each other (in virtue of the conatus) while also depending on the sub-
stance for their existence and their essence?
Therefore I question Spinoza’s system on account of the undemon-
strated formality of the parallelism between the ideational and the
extensional and the equally undemonstrated formality of the separation of
the infinite and the finite. In turn, this parallelism and this separation raise
a third problem. How can Spinoza’s parallelism square the eternity in the
order of Thought (e.g., the sharing of singular essences in the eternity of
the substance) with the transience in the order of Extension (the mortality
of finite material things)? Without an account of how mind-body com-
pounds are individual things whose dual aspects do not interact, individu-
ality and commonality are little more than undemonstrated claims.
2. Parallel Order and Common Notions
Broadly speaking, there are two rival interpretations of Spinoza’s method.
The first interpretation claims that Spinoza’s work marks the apogee of
seventeenth-century rationalism, notably the self-evidence of a priori pre-
mises from which the main parameters of the all-encompassing system
can be deduced.7 By contrast, the second interpretation suggests that
Spinoza’s philosophy is part of empiricism and combines an analytic ap-
proach to a posteriori data (given by sense-perception) with a synthetic
approach that discovers the system and makes all its components intelli-
gible.8 However, I contend that both empiricism and rationalism underpin
his entire œuvre. This is one reason for the parallelism of the ideal and the
material — the correspondence of a priori ideas in the order of Thought
and a posteriori material contingencies in the order of Extension.
Spinoza develops some of the constitutive elements of the doctrine
of parallelism already in the treatise on the intellect, one of his earlier
345
The Creation of Immanence
7. Richard H. Popkin, The History of Skepticism from Erasmus to Spinoza (Berkeley:
University of California Press, 1979), pp. 229-48, esp. p. 233 n. 24; Bernard A. O. Williams,
“Descartes’s Use of Skepticism,” in The Skeptical Tradition, ed. Myles Burnyeat (Berkeley:
University of California Press, 1983), pp. 337-52.
8. Edwin M. Curley, Spinoza’s Metaphysics: An Essay in Interpretation (Cambridge, MA:
Harvard University Press, 1969); Isaac Franck, “Spinoza’s Logic of Enquiry: Rationalist or
Experientialist?” in The Philosophy of Baruch Spinoza, ed. Richard Kennington (Washing-
ton, DC: Catholic University of America Press, 1980), pp. 247-72.
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writings.9 In the first part of this treatise, he argues that all finite mutable
things are determined by the eternal infinite order of fixed natural laws.
Happiness depends on the nature of the object of love and “love towards
a thing eternal and infinite feeds the mind wholly with joy.”10 As a result,
the highest good (summum bonum) is knowledge of the eternal order and
fixed laws of nature (aeternum ordinem et secundum certas naturae leges,
Tract. de Intel. Em. 12.3). Human nature per se is capable of attaining such
knowledge, which fosters a ‘stable character,’ “that is, the knowledge of
the union existing between the mind and the whole of nature.”11 Even
though the multitude and general customs prove to be a hindrance in ac-
quiring such a ‘character,’ “all our actions and thoughts must be directed
to this one end.”12 Thus, in the name of the mind’s longing for certainty,
Spinoza posits the primacy of the eternal and infinite order of stability
over the ephemeral and finite chaos of disorder.
Another constitutive element of Spinoza’s parallelism between the
ideational and the extensional is the claim that we can only know “the
union between the mind and the whole of nature” on the basis of sensa-
tion, which is the effect of the union of the mind with the body (Tract. de
Intel. Em. 21.1; Ethica II, P21). In order to overcome the dualism between
mind and body and mind and world in Descartes, Spinoza argues that
we infer the cause (the body-mind union) from the effect (sensing a cer-
tain body). This is not to say that the body affects the mind. Rather,
bodily affections that we can sense have a mental correlate. Since body
and mind are united yet pertain to attributes that share nothing in com-
mon (Extension and Thought),13 there is, as Spinoza writes in the Ethics,
346
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9. On this point I disagree with Matheron, who asserts that the doctrine of parallel-
ism “was entirely unavailable to him [Spinoza] in the TIE [Tractatus de Intellectus
Emendatione].” See Alexandre Matheron, “Ideas of Ideas and Certainty in the Tractatus de
Intellectus Emendatione and the Ethics,” in Spinoza on Knowledge and the Human Mind: Pa-
pers Presented at the Second Jerusalem Conference (Ethica II), ed. Yirmiyahu Yovel (Leiden:
E. J. Brill, 1994), pp. 83-91 (91).
10. “amor erga rem aeternam et infinitam sola laetitia pascit animum” (Tract. de Intel.
Em. 10.1).
11. “cognitionem unionis, quam mens cum tota natura habet” (Tract. de Intel. Em. 13.4).
12. “omnes nostrae operationes simul et cogitationes ad hunc sunt dirigendae finem”
(Tract. de Intel. Em. 16.3).
13. Spinoza stipulates the noncommonality of attributes already in the Short Treatise:
“Things that have different attributes, as well as those that belong to different attributes,
have nothing in themselves the one from the other [i.e., nothing in common with one an-
other]” (Kor. Verh. App. I, Ax. 4). Cf. Ethica I, P10 and P11.
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“no common measure between the will and motion . . . no comparison
between the powers or strength of the Mind and the Body.”14 Thus, there
is in everything the coincidence yet nonidentity of the extensional and
the ideational. He defines this in terms of complete noncausal corre-
spondence of body, such that “the Mind and the Body . . . are one and the
same thing which, when considered under the attribute of Thought and
explicated through Thought, we call decision, and when considered un-
der the Attribute of Extension and deduced from the laws of motion-
and-rest, we call a physical state.”15
As a result of this configuration, everything is both intellectual and
real, both ideal and material. Concerning the mind, Spinoza wrote in the
Ethics that “the first thing which constitutes the actual being of the hu-
man mind is nothing other than an idea of some single thing actually ex-
isting.”16 Concerning material things, he argues that for every mutable
individual existent there is always already an eternal singular essence in
the divine mind. Thus, Spinoza embraces the early modern skepticism
concerning the cognitive inadequacy of sense perception, judgment, and
the imagination. In response, he claims that an empirically framed ratio-
nal method can enable the finite intellect to cognize the infinite sub-
stance and all it encompasses, thereby attaining the certain knowledge
of the eternal order of fixed natural laws.
Such knowledge is knowledge of the parallel order of the ideational
and the extensional. The intellectual unfolding of ideal possibilities
marks the real unfolding of material actualities. It is therefore in virtue of
the parallelism between the ideational and the extensional that finite
minds can cognize their utter dependence on the infinite substance. If
this account of the parallelism in Spinoza is correct, then three con-
nected questions arise. First of all, how and why does the infinite sub-
stance express itself in an infinity of attributes that divide in parallel
from the outset? Second, how and why do the finite modes of the infinite
347
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14. “nulla detur ratio voluntatis ad motum, nulla etiam datur comparatio inter mentis et
corporis potentiam seu vires” (Ethica V, pref.).
15. “. . . unam eandemque rem, quam, quando sub cogitationis attributo consideratur et
per ipsum explicatur, decretum appellamus, et quando sub extensionis attributo consideratur
et ex legibus motus et quietis deducitur, determinationem vocamus” (Ethica III, P2, Schol.).
Cf. Roger S. Woolhouse, Descartes, Spinoza, Leibniz: The Concept of Substance in Seven-
teenth Century Metaphysics (London: Routledge, 1993), pp. 170-73.
16. “Primum, quod actuale mentis humanae esse constituit, nihil aliud est, quam idea
rei alicuius singularis actu existentis” (Ethica II, P11).
379
G:\Pabst\first corrections
Monday, January 16, 2012 2:52:14 PM
Color profile: Disabled
Composite  140 lpi at 45 degrees
substance constitute distinct individuals, while at the same time being
composed of ideality and materiality, which never interact? Third, if sen-
sation is at the origin of cognizing the mind-body union and its depen-
dence on ‘the whole of nature,’ how does Spinoza negotiate sense percep-
tion and intellection? I will now address these questions, beginning with
the third.
Since neither sensory experience nor intellectual cognition is self-
sufficient, Spinoza’s method is both empiricist and rationalist. Without
sense perception, there can be no intellection because physical affections
produce sensory imprints (imagines) on the body and reflexive correlates
in the mind (ideae). Affection is always already sensory and intellectual. By
itself, the mind cannot think anything at all; there is no pure self-
reflexivity, thought thinking nothing but itself. Reflexivity is the product of
mental and bodily affectiveness on the basis of sensation. The mind’s self-
consciousness is primarily an approximate idea of material modification,
“not — pace Descartes — a monadic mental event that can occur even
without a body.”17 True knowledge is knowledge of adequate ideas. Just as
ideality has a perceptible material correlate because each adequate idea
has a real object for its ideatum, so materiality has an intellective ideal cor-
relate because there is a true adequate idea of each thing.
Equally, without intellection sense perception leads to error because
the ideas of impressions are confused, since they correspond neither to
the perceived objects nor to the affected body. By itself, sense perception
does not know anything at all because it sees things in isolation from
‘the whole of nature’ and solely from a limited perspective, the single lo-
cation that the body happens to occupy within the extended universe.18
As a result, things appear as locally related parts and seem to be con-
fined to a finite spatiotemporal position. So sensory perception gives
rise to the first kind of knowledge, the experientia vaga of the memory
and the imagination, a confused discernment of things in terms of the
‘common order of nature’ (Ep. XXXII) which contrasts sharply with na-
ture as a whole — the parallel order and connection of things and of
348
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17. Yirmiyahu Yovel, “The Second Kind of Knowledge and the Removal of Error,” in
Yovel, ed., Spinoza on Knowledge and the Human Mind, pp. 93-110 (95).
18. In a letter to Oldenburg, Spinoza describes this perspective in terms of a worm in
a bloodstream, mistaking each particle of blood for a whole instead of a part (Ep. XXXII,
esp. pp. 210-11). Cf. William Sacksteder, “Spinoza on Part and Whole: The Worm’s Eye
View,” in Spinoza: New Perspectives, ed. Robert W. Shahan and John I. Biro (Norman: Uni-
versity of Oklahoma, 1978), pp. 139-59.
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ideas (Ethica II, P7). As I argue below, this confusion leads Spinoza to dis-
tinguish between the sages and the ignorant, which affects his account
of democracy.
Cognition of adequate ideas is therefore required to correct the er-
rors of sense perception and to reconnect ideae with their specific
ideata. In this process, the mind first acquires reason (ratio), the second
kind of knowledge. Ultimately, cognition attains scientia intuitiva — the
third kind of knowledge which marks the intellection of things solely
through their essences. The mind does so via the formation of common
notions (notiones communes). Common notions are “the foundations of
our reasoning ( fundamenta rationis)” (Ethica II, P40, Schol. 1; cf. Ethica II,
P44, Cor. 2, D). Even though common notions are a priori, Spinoza’s
method is not purely rationalist because both sensation and common
notions are grounded in the inherence of the mind-body union in the ex-
tended and ideated order of nature. Indeed, just as sensation is the
mind’s self-consciousness of its union with the body, so common notions
are notions of things that have existence in virtue of being modes of the
substance whose essence it is to exist. Unlike Descartes’s unfettered
cogito — disembodied and worldless — Spinoza’s intellect is firmly in-
scribed into the ordered structure of nature.
Moreover, common notions themselves have both an a priori and an
a posteriori dimension. They are inborn clear and distinct ideas which
the mind discovers in itself, independently of all experience. Yet at the
same time, cognition of the self and of nature as a whole via common no-
tions is refined by contact with actually existing things that constitute
the true objects of ideas in the mind: “. . . the mind apprehends itself
better in proportion as it understands a greater number of natural ob-
jects . . . the more things the mind knows, the better does it understand
its own strength and the order of nature.”19 The mind can form a priori
common notions because this is what the nature of reflexivity and
intellection is. These innate intellectual instruments constitute not only
tools for further inquiry but also and above all a kind of knowledge, re-
flective knowledge, which he defines as “the idea of an idea” and which
“has for its objective the most perfect being” (Tract. de Intel. Em. 38.1-3;
31.3; 69.1-2; 71.4).
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19. “. . . quomodo mens plura intelligendo alia simul acquirat instrumenta, quibus
facilius pergat intelligere . . . quo plura mens novit, eo melius et suas vires et ordinem naturae
intelligit” (Treat. de Intel. Em. 39-40).
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Before I discuss what the mind knows when it grasps common no-
tions, it is important to relate common notions to Spinoza’s division of
sciences. Since common notions constitute the foundations of reason-
ing, they provide the basis for logic and geometry. And since they have a
correlate in nature, they also ground physics. As such, there is no separa-
tion of the formal from the empirical sciences. Instead, all sciences are
concerned with the substance, its attributes and modes. As Yovel re-
marks, “Logic, too, is not abstract, but describes uniform patterns in
which all physical and mental things in the universe act and exist. No sci-
ence is ‘formal’ in the sense of ‘not being about the world,’ since all true
ideas have reality as their ideata.”20 Common notions are the most
proper exercise of reason, purely immanent and unaided by the divine il-
lumination of transcendent revelation. In this sense, Spinoza exceeds
Descartes’s skepticism regarding both natural and revealed theology. He
also excludes the supernatural light of faith from the natural light of rea-
son: “[C]ommon notions are the foundations of Philosophy and should
be drawn from nature alone.”21
As such, common notions are the axioms and first principles of all
branches of rational knowledge, including logic, mathematics, physics,
psychology, and politics. They give the mind immediate access to God:
“For we cannot imagine God, but we can indeed conceive him” (Ep. LVI).
In this way, rational inquiry corresponds more closely to empirical na-
ture: in the Ethica, Spinoza speaks of the proper order of philosophical
inquiry according to which the divine nature is prior in cognition and in
Nature (Ethica II, P10, Schol.). This is why common notions structure
philosophical investigation and pertain to metaphysics. On this basis
metaphysics is concerned with the eternal order of nature and the fixed
laws that govern all that is in the substance. Metaphysics is therefore the
queen of sciences and has the exclusive claim to universal rationality.
Theology is stripped of the status of science, separated from philosophy
and relegated to the realm of faith, itself confined to Scripture and no
longer amenable to natural reason.22
Thus liberated from any constricting shackles of transcendence, rea-
son enables the mind to grasp the eternal laws of nature directly in virtue
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20. Yovel, “The Second Kind of Knowledge and the Removal of Error,” p. 100.
21. Tract. Theol.-Pol XIV, fine.
22. Alan Donagan, “Spinoza’s Theology,” in The Cambridge Companion to Spinoza, ed.
Don Garrett (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), pp. 343-82.
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of the intellect’s inscription into the immanent cosmic order. According
to the parallel order that structures Spinoza’s entire system, the ideated
correlate of the laws of extended nature is the set of common notions,
cognized immediately without any induction or abstraction. As a result,
knowledge of common notions is knowledge of the causes and operation
of nature beyond the particular spatiotemporal location of an individual
body that is affected by other individual bodies. In perceiving particular
modes of the universal substance, we perceive immutable ideas or no-
tions that “are equally in the part and in the whole.”23
Indeed, common notions give the mind access to the universe as a
whole. The mind sees that it is determined by the one and only universal
law of the divine intellect and not by laws that govern proximate causes.
In this way, Spinoza substitutes substantive universals (the fixed laws of
the eternal order) which are characteristic of modern “mechanical prin-
ciples of philosophy” (Ep. XIII; Prin. Phil. Cart.) for universals embodied
in particulars which are the mark of patristic and medieval metaphysics.
As a result, common notions are ideas of those things “in which all bod-
ies agree” (Ethica II, P40, Schol. 1). The things in which all bodies agree
are, first of all, that they have the same attribute of extension and, sec-
ond, that “they are capable of motion and rest, and of motion at one time
quicker and at one time slower.”24 In Spinoza’s system, motion and rest
are therefore the principle of individuation for bodies.
For this reason, the common notion or idea of motion and rest is in-
strumental to the cognition of a body as individuated or singular. Coupled
with the primacy of metaphysics over theology, the method of inquiry
which is grounded in common notions is significant for the question of in-
dividuation because knowledge of the substantive universals (‘the fixed
laws of the eternal order’) is not confined to the general patterns of the
universe but extends to individual things in virtue of their share in the infi-
nite substance. This is why Spinoza asserts that “[e]very idea of any body
or particular thing existing in actuality necessarily involves the eternal
and infinite essence of God.”25 Reason is capable of knowing God or sub-
stance and the dependence of all that is in the universe on it because rea-
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23. The full citation is as follows: “illa, quae omnibus communia, quaeque aeque in
parte ac in toto sunt” (Ethica II, P38).
24. “quod iam tardius, iam celerius, et absolute iam moveri, iam quiescere possunt”
(Ethica II, P13, L2, D).
25. “Unaquaeque cuiuscumque corporis, vel rei singularis actu existentis idea Dei
aeternam et infinitam essentiam necessario involvit” (Ethica II, P45).
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son itself is constituted by the common notions. As such, “[i]t is in the na-
ture of reason to perceive things in the light of eternity.”26 Thus, reason
views things as necessary rather than contingent and since the essence of
the infinite substance is to exist, “this necessity is the very necessity of
God’s eternal nature.”27 Through reason, common notions enable the
mind to see the nomological link between individual things and ‘the whole
of nature.’ So if we grasp common notions such as motion and rest, then we
can know the particular station of each thing in the universal order.
Finally, common notions equip the mind not only with the activity of
reasoning (the second kind of knowledge) but also lay the ground for in-
tuition of essences by themselves (the third kind of knowledge). For it is
from cognition of things sub specie aeternitatis that the mind can deduce
their utter dependence on the infinite substance whose essence is neces-
sarily to exist. In so doing, the mind can intuit their station in the eternal
order of nature according to the fixed laws of the universe (Ethica II, P47,
Schol.). In this sense, Spinoza produces an immanentized version of
Parmenides’ metaphysics of the one and the many.28 He dismisses the
patristic and medieval account of relationality and develops the idea of
nomological links between the modes and the substance in order to
demonstrate that things are individual by natural necessity and individ-
uated by the fixed ratio of motion and rest. In the following section, I ex-
amine the status of individuality in Spinoza’s metaphysics and politics
and his conception of individuation.
3. A Hierarchy of Relative Individuality
The importance of individuality and singularity in Spinoza emerges in
the light of the two constituent elements of his system, metaphysics and
politics. First of all, a metaphysics that is grounded in the clarity of the
geometric method (more geometrico) and seeks to overcome the dualism
of both late scholastic theology and early modern philosophy. Second, a
politics that is founded upon the rationality of argument and debate and
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26. “De natura rationis est res sub quadam aeternitatis specie percipere” (Ethica II, P44,
Cor. 2).
27. “haec rerum necessitas est ipsa Dei aeternae naturae necessitas” (Ethica II, P44,
Proof).
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seeks to protect the individual and the commonwealth against the ob-
scurantism of absolutist regimes. The overriding objective of his meta-
physics and politics is to free the mind from mysticism and superstition,
to liberate individuals from the constricting shackles of despotism, and
to enable citizens to maximize their particular well-being within a uni-
versal commonwealth that defends freedom of judgment and the uncon-
strained exercise of any religion.29 Since he maintains that both nature
and society are composed of individuals with singular essences that are
all in God (Ethica II, P45, Schol.), individuality and singularity are central
to Spinoza’s metaphysics and politics.
Individual things (individua) are modes of the single unique infinite
substance and modes conjoin in order to form a single thing (res singu-
laris), as everything is composed of lower-order individual parts and is it-
self a component in a higher-order whole (Prin. Phil. Cart. II, P5, Dem.;
Ethica II, D7). Equally, the universal commonwealth is constituted by a
collection of particular citizens, and their well-being depends on the
preservation and perfection of their individuality and their commonality
(Ethica IV, P37, Schol. 2). Individuation is at once metaphysical and politi-
cal in the sense that individuality is perfected by preserving and enhanc-
ing the self-identity of each individual phenomenon and the shared be-
longing of all phenomena in the common order of nature and society.
For Spinoza, individuality is ultimately grounded in the oneness and
indivisibility of the all-encompassing substance which is absolute and
infinite. This claim is summarized in propositions 13-16 of Part One of
the Ethics:
Prop. 13: Absolutely infinite substance is indivisible.
Prop. 14: There can be, or be conceived, no other substance but God.
Prop. 15: Whatever is, is in God, and nothing can be or be conceived
without God.
Prop. 16: From the necessity of the divine nature there must follow
infinite things in infinite ways (i.e., everything that can come
within the scope of infinite intellect).30
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29. Tract. de Intel. Em. 7.3; Kor. Verh. I.1; Cog. Met. I.1-2; Ethica I, App.; Tract. Theo.-Pol.
pref.; Tract. Pol. ch. 1.
30. “Substantia absolute infinita est indivisibilis; Praeter Deum nulla dari neque concipi
potest substantia; Quicquid est in Deo est, et nihil sine Deo esse neque concipi potest; Ex ne-
cessitate divinae naturae infinita infinitis modis (hoc est, omnia, quae sub intellectum infini-
tum cadere possunt) sequi debent” (Ethica I, P13, 14, 15, 16).
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To say that there is only one substance and that this substance is God is
to say that substance is in some fundamental sense single (not dual) and
individual (not multiple). Moreover, to say that everything which exists is
in God is to say that all individual things are modes of the one unique
substance rather than substances or attributes in their own right: “Par-
ticular things are nothing but affections of the attribute of God, that is,
modes wherein the attributes of God find expression in a definite and de-
terminate way.”31
However, this “doctrine of the uniqueness of substance”32 casts
doubt on the self-identity of individual things and raises questions about
how and why the single infinite substance gives rise to a multiplicity of
individual finite things. Since everything is a mode of the substance, it
expresses the substance’s individuality. The individuality of modes is
therefore relative to that of the substance. According to Spinoza, a thing
can be said to be individual if it constitutes a whole composed of distinct
parts. However, he does not identify parts with atoms because atoms are
indivisible entities, whereas each thing is extensional and as such divisi-
ble. In his Principles of Cartesian Philosophy, Spinoza dismisses atomism
by arguing that everything is always both a part of a greater whole and it-
self a composition of smaller components:
because the nature of matter consists in extension (Prop. 2 Part 2),
which by its own nature is divisible, however small it be (Ax. 9 and Def.
7); therefore however small a part of matter may be, it is by its own na-
ture divisible. That is, there are no atoms, or parts of matter that are by
their own nature indivisible. Q.E.D.33
In this passage, Spinoza argues that nothing is indivisible because every
part is constituted by yet smaller parts and in turn constitutes a compo-
nent in a larger entity. This critique of atomism derives from his argu-
ment that everything is a part of ‘the whole of Nature’ because every-
thing is produced by the one and only substance and only persists in
existence in virtue of being in some sense in the substance.
Ultimately, individuality is not an absolute mark of something that
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31. “Res particulares nihil sunt nisi Dei attributorum affectiones, sive modi, quibus Dei
attributa certo et determinato modo exprimuntur” (Ethica I, P25, Cor.).
32. Lloyd, Part of Nature, p. 5.
33. Prin. Phil. Cart. II, P5, Dem.
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follows from that thing’s singular essences. On the contrary, to be an in-
dividual is a relative quality that indicates a certain degree of individual-
ity and is itself a function of the complexity of the composition of individ-
ual parts:
When a number of bodies of the same or different magnitude form
close contact with one another through the pressure of other bodies
upon them, or if they are moving at the same or different rates of
speed so as to preserve an unvarying relation of movement among
themselves, these bodies are said to be united with one another and
all together form one body or individual thing, which is distinguished
from other things through this union of bodies.34
Spinoza deploys the term ‘body’ to emphasize that entities are both com-
posed of smaller parts and constitute elements of a larger individual.
Since to be an individual is to entertain a certain link with other individ-
ual entities that have different sizes determined by the complexity of their
composition, it follows that individuality is relative. This notion of relativ-
ity is fundamentally different from the Christian Neo-Platonist concept of
relationality, as the latter requires a theological account of transcendent
creation rather than immanent production. By contrast, the whole uni-
verse ( facies totius universi) is for Spinoza an infinite series of relative in-
dividuals, a hierarchical ordering from the one and only absolute infinite
substance to infinitesimally small things that it encompasses (Ep. LXIV).
All entities are in some important sense individual. This applies not only
to simple bodies (corpora simplissima, Ethica II, P13) but also to compos-
ites (Ethica II, P12, Lem. 3, A2 Dem.) and to groups of individual things
that form a singular thing (Ethica II, D7). In the Ethics, he describes his
conception of relative individuality as follows:
We thus see how a composite individual can be affected in many ways
yet preserve its nature. Now previously we have conceived an individ-
ual thing composed solely of bodies distinguished from one another
355
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34. “Cum corpora aliquot eiusdem aut diversae magnitudinis a reliquis ita coercentur,
ut invicem incumbant, vel si eodem aut diversis celeritatis gradibus moventur, ut motus suos
invicem certa quadam ratione communicent, illa corpora invicem unita dicemus, et omnia
simul unum corpus, sive individuum componere, quod a reliquis per hanc corporum unionem
distinguitur” (Ethica II, P13, Lem. 3, Ax. 2, Def.). Cf. Étienne Balibar, “Individualité et
transindividualité chez Spinoza,” in Moreau, ed., Architectures de la raison, pp. 35-46.
387
G:\Pabst\first corrections
Monday, January 16, 2012 2:52:15 PM
Color profile: Disabled
Composite  140 lpi at 45 degrees
only by motion-and-rest and speed of movement; that is, an individual
thing composed of the simplest bodies. If we now conceive another in-
dividual thing composed of several individual things of different na-
tures, we shall find that this can be affected in many other ways while
still preserving its nature. . . . If we thus continue to infinity, we shall
readily conceive the whole of Nature as one individual whose parts —
that is, all the constituent bodies — vary in infinite ways without any
change in the individual as a whole.35
Thus configured, the individuality of the infinite substance is the sum of
its parts whereas the Christian Neo-Platonist Creator God is pure excess
which is both more immanent and more transcendent than the self-
expression of Spinoza’s productive substance. Within ‘the individual as a
whole,’ there are infinite ways in which the ‘constituent bodies’ can en-
tertain different links. Individuality is relative because all things are al-
ways already connected with other things and with the entire universe.
Nothing is individual in isolation from other individuals because every-
thing is a body, not in a material sense but in the sense of being com-
posed of parts. Spinoza identifies the link between individual bodies
with ‘motion-and-rest and speed of movement’ and conceives this link as
the principle of individuation of bodies. I now turn to the problem of in-
dividuation in his system.
4. The Problem of Individuation in Spinoza’s System
The hierarchy of relative individuality that I sketched in the previous sec-
tion raises three problems. First of all, why does the oneness of the sub-
stance divide into the duality of Thought and Extension? This question
follows from Spinoza’s understanding of identity and noninteraction of
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35. “His itaque videmus, qua ratione individuum compositum possit multis modis affici,
eius nihilominus natura servata. Atque hucusque individuum concepimus, quod non, nisi ex
corporibus, quae solo motu et quiete, celeritate et tarditate inter se distinguuntur, hoc est,
quod ex corporibus simplicissimis componitur. Quod si iam aliud concipiamus ex pluribus
diversae naturae individuis compositum, idem pluribus aliis modis posse affici reperiemus,
ipsius nihilominus natura servata. . . . Et si sic porro in infinitum pergamus, facile
concipiemus, totam naturam unum esse individuum, cuius partes, hoc est, omnia corpora
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individual ideas and their corresponding individual objects. To say that
both immaterial ideas and material things are individual is not to say
that ideas are individual because they are the ideas of individual things
or that things are individual because they are the product of individual
ideas in God’s intellect. Indeed, Spinoza denies any relations between
ideas and things and instead posits two separate yet somehow identical
orders, the ideational-extensional parallelism: “The order and connec-
tion of ideas is the same as the order and connection of things.”36 Rather
than envisioning any relation between materiality and ideality, he insists
on the radical singularity of both things and ideas and the interaction
within each order, not across them.
The second problem relates to the question as to how an immaterial
substance produces material things that are modes of that same sub-
stance and whose essences are in that same substance. This question fol-
lows from an apparent paradox in Spinoza’s metaphysics and his politics.
On the one hand, he argues that unity and plurality are merely modes of
thinking that do not add anything real to the things to which they apply:
[U]nity is in no way distinct from the thing itself or additional to being
and is merely a mode of thinking whereby we separate a thing from
other things that are similar to it or agree with it in some respect. . . .
[P]lurality . . . likewise obviously adds nothing to things, nor is it any-
thing but a mode of thinking.37
This conception might suggest that Spinoza’s system is nominalist, in
the sense that unity and plurality are solely in the mind and not in things.
Correspondingly, concepts like humanity or society are nothing but col-
lective nouns that point to a complex set of interconnections.38 On the
other hand, Spinoza is adamant that for each mode of thought there is a
corresponding mode of extension and that everything is grounded in Na-
ture, which consists of two identical yet somehow distinct orders, the or-
der of things and the order of ideas. This paradox, which can perhaps be
described as a form of ‘nominalist naturalism,’ raises the question of how
singular essences in God’s immaterial intellect relate to individual mate-
rial things in nature.
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36. “Ordo et connexio idearum idem est, ac ordo et connexio rerum” (Ethica II, P7).
37. Cog. Met. I.6.
38. Robert J. McShea, “Spinoza on Power,” Inquiry 1 (Spring 1969): 133-43.
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The third problem is how and why the infinite substance and the in-
finity of attributes that express the essence of the substance are modified
by finite modes. This question arises in relation to Spinoza’s paradoxical
claim that the substance is the immanent and proximate (not transitive
and remote) cause of all things (Ethica I, P18 and P28, Schol.). Yet at the
same time, the finite individual modes are actualized and individuated
by other such finite individual modes, and not by the substance itself
(Ethica I, P28).
These three questions can be summarized as the division of the sub-
stance, the production of materiality, and the passage from infinity to
finitude. Taken together, they raise the problem of why things are indi-
vidual and how they are individuated. Nowhere does Spinoza give a co-
herent account of why and how finite individual material modes are
caused by the infinite immaterial substance, yet at the same time are
neither actualized nor individuated by it. There are two competing inter-
pretations of Spinoza’s attempted resolution. Either the substance is the
immanent cause of all things (Ethica I, P18), in which case it causes both
the finite modes themselves and the fixed laws of the eternal order (mo-
tion and rest) that individuate them (Ethica II, P13, Lem. 1, Lem. 3, Dem.,
Lem. 7, Schol.). In this case, Spinoza’s principle of individuation is motion
and rest, which determine the exact proportions of individual things in
themselves and in relation to other things. If so, then the substance
causes not simply the essence and the coming into existence (secundum
fieri, Ethica II, P10, Schol.) of finite modes, but also their preservation in
being and their perfection of virtue.39
Or else the infinite substance is the remote cause of finite modes
(Ethica I, P28, Schol.), in which case the finite modes are produced
through the medium of primary things (immediate and mediate infi-
nite modes). In this case, Spinoza’s principle of individuation is this
motion and this rest (motion and rest proper to each and every individ-
ual). If so, then finite modes are actualized and individuated by them-
selves and by other modes in a perpetual struggle against other groups
of finite modes. Why? Because Spinoza’s conception of finitude is such
that different groups of finite modes are rival, for each mode requires a
group of other modes in order to be brought into existence and to re-




39. Steven Barbone, “Virtue and Sociality in Spinoza,” Iyuun 42 (1993): 383-95.
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But paradoxically it is the mode of their communal existence that is
itself conflictual. Since modes do not exist in, of, or by themselves, they
do not come into actuality unconditionally. They are only actualized on
the condition that related modes are actualized simultaneously as well.
If not, then they remain virtual. If they are actualized, then their duration
is limited because they depend on the other modes of their group in or-
der to remain in being. The actualization of a hitherto nonexisting group
of finite modes requires the elimination of an already-existing group of
finite modes. Thus, groups of modes are rival. As a result, the individua-
tion of such modes is the self-preservation of individual beings by their
own power, the conatus (Ethica III, P6). The power of self-preservation is
both metaphysical and political because it constitutes the essence of fi-
nite modes (Ethica III, P7) and the foundation of their natural right
(Ethica IV, P22).
Spinoza attempts to square this circle by arguing that the causa-
tion, actualization, and individuation of finite modes depend on the
substance but are not fully determined by it. The all-encompassing
substance enfolds all things and causes the infinite immediate modes
(motion and rest) but somehow does not determine the fixed propor-
tions of motion and rest that pertain both between separate individual
bodies and among the single parts that constitute a collective body
(Ethica II, P13, Lem. 7, Schol.). Instead, these proportions are deter-
mined by finite modes themselves. Motion-and-rest is the principle
that individuates all bodies, and the fixed proportions of motion and
rest are maintained by the power of self-preservation (conatus) which
inheres in each thing.
These claims are arbitrary because they represent assertions and
rely on presuppositions that are part of Spinoza’s method and as such
remain no more than undemonstrated assumptions. His argument that
only infinite modes (and not finite modes) are caused by the infinite
substance derives from his undemonstrated separation of the infinite
and the finite — a claim that follows from his equally undemonstrated
parallelism of the ideational and the extensional. In order to substanti-
ate my argument, I will therefore briefly examine his account of the con-
nection between the substance and its attributes and modes. In the fol-
lowing section, I focus on the causation of modes. In the section
thereafter, I discuss the implications for his theory of causal laws as the
principle of individuation.
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5. Substance and Attributes:
Monism, Dualism, and the ‘Reality’ of the Natural Order
The two constitutive elements of Spinoza’s metaphysics are the ‘doctrine
of the uniqueness of substance’40 and the ‘doctrine of the infinity of at-
tributes.’41 Spinoza also emphasizes the unity of the infinite substance
and the union of finite modes like body-mind compounds (Kor. Verh. I.2;
Tract. de Intel. Em. 13.4, 21.1; Ethica II, P13, Dem. and Cor.). The infinite
substance does not coincide with, or correspond to, the extended corpo-
real world but encompasses infinite modes and the eternal essences of
the ‘ideated world’: “Nothing, then, can happen in Nature to contravene
her own universal laws [N.B. Here, by Nature, I do not mean simply mat-
ter and its modifications, but infinite other things besides matter].”42 In-
deed, the positum that the infinite substance is the most real being (ens
realissimum) and enfolds all things that exist — ideas as well as their ob-
jects (Kor. Verh. I.2; Cog. Met. II.2) — is one compelling reason for the the-
sis that Spinoza does not defend pantheism but instead panentheism, a
term coined by Karl Christian Friedrich Krause (1781-1832) who argues
that, while the material world is embedded in God, God nonetheless ex-
ceeds nature and cannot be equated with it.43
For Spinoza to be real is to be in the substance, Deus sive natura,
even though God surpasses nature. Reality is the natural order, which is
equally ideational and extensional. There is God and the idea of God,
and for God to exist is for God to act (Ethica I, P34-35): God’s being is his
360
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40. Lloyd, Part of Nature, p. 5.
41. As Roger Woolhouse has documented, these two claims distinguish Spinoza from
the other two eminent seventeenth-century metaphysical systems founded upon sub-
stance and attribute, that of Descartes and that of Leibniz. See Woolhouse, Descartes,
Spinoza, Leibniz, pp. 28-53.
42. Tract. Theol.-Polit. ch. 6. Cf. “. . . I [Spinoza] believe that I have shown clearly
enough . . . that matter is by Descartes badly defined in terms of extension; whereas it
must necessarily be explained in terms of an attribute which expresses an eternal and infi-
nite essence” (Ep. LXXXIII).
43. On Krause, see Keith Ward, God: A Guide for the Perplexed (Oxford: Oneworld,
2002), p. 161; cf. Friedrich Bülow, “Einführung,” Die Ethik, 7th ed. (Stuttgart: Alfred Kröner
Verlag, 1976), pp. vii-xxx. See also Michael P. Levine, Pantheism: A Non-Theistic Concept of
Deity (New York and London: Routledge, 1994), p. 21; Richard V. Mason, The God of
Spinoza: A Philosophical Study (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), p. 32;
Douglas Hedley, “Pantheism, Trinitarian Theism and the Idea of Unity: Reflections on the
Christian Concept of God,” Religious Studies 32 (1996): 61-77.
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self-expression and his production, as Gilles Deleuze has rightly ar-
gued.44 Since God expresses himself in both and both are in God, ideas in
Thought and things in Extension, it follows for Spinoza that there are
ideas and their objects and that both are equally real.45 The attribute
parallelism mirrors the parallelism between the being of God and the
idea of God. Just as God’s necessary existence (which is his essence) is
the cause of God’s production (which is his self-expression), so the nec-
essary idea of God (which is the idea of his essence) is the cause of all
other ideas (which express his essence).
This double parallelism implies that reality is not confined to the be-
ing of God and to the order of Extension but also encompasses the idea
of God and the order of Thought. As such, reality is above and beyond
materiality and physicality. Indeed, Spinoza expands the orbit of the real
to include all essences. For this reason, essences qua essences are real in
the sense that they exist independently of their corresponding objects
(Ethica I, P8, Schol. 2; II, P8 and Cor.). Deleuze also argues that Spinoza’s
pure ontology demonstrates the existence of all essences insofar as they
are essences, not because essences are causa sui, but because essences
require their own cause of existence which differs from the cause of exis-
tence of existents (Ethica I, P24 and Dem.). Essences are therefore nei-
ther logical possibilities nor mathematical structures nor metaphysical
entities. Instead, essences are themselves physical realities (res physicae).
This represents an extension not only of Scotus’s formal distinction, as
Deleuze notes,46 but also of Suárez’s ‘objective reality,’ as I explained in
the previous chapter. Spinoza shares with both the priority of essence
over existence and the concomitant devaluation of actuality. By contrast,
the Christian Neo-Platonist metaphysics of Augustine, Boethius, Aqui-
nas, and others establishes the epistemological priority of existence and
the metaphysical primacy of the highest being or pure act of God.
On the philosophical status of essences, Deleuze’s reading must how-
ever be questioned. Essences cannot be equated with his notion of ‘physi-
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44. Gilles Deleuze, Spinoza et le problème de l’expression (Paris: Éditions de Minuit,
1968), pp. 87-113. Cf. G. Deleuze, Spinoza. Philosophie pratique (Paris: Éditions de Minuit,
1981).
45. As Deleuze has documented, the unity between the oneness of the infinite sub-
stance and the plurality of finite objects and their singular essences is secured by the
univocity of the attribute parallelism. For attributes are forms that are common to the
substance and its modes. Deleuze, Spinoza et le problème de l’expression, pp. 33-43.
46. Deleuze, Spinoza et le problème de l’expression, pp. 173-96.
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cal realities’ because they can be in God without being in actuality (Ethica
II, A1): to be in God is to be essentially (or virtually), not existentially. This
follows from my earlier argument that for Spinoza the actualization of in-
dividual finite modes depends on the actualization of other finite modes.
Since modes are modifications of the substance’s attributes, modes in
some sense disclose the nature of God and the coincidence of essence and
existence of God in God: God who includes both existents and
nonexistents and who is constituted by Extension and Thought exceeds
‘physical reality’ and real actuality. Since God is both causa sui (Kor. Verh.
I.1) and the efficient cause of all essences and existences (Ethica I, P25) in-
cluding all immaterial ideas and material things, the ‘reality’ of the infi-
nite substance — Deus sive natura — is best described as eternally pres-
ent possibility and not actuality. Woolhouse puts this well:
The reality of Spinoza’s single substance is . . . in no way that of existent
instantiation. It is, rather, a reality of a kind which makes it possible
for there to be actual instantiations of extension, actual extended
modes. . . . When he [Spinoza] says ‘God exists’ or ‘extended substance
exists,’ he means it ‘essentially’ rather than ‘existentially.’ It would not,
however, be quite correct to say that Spinoza’s extended substance or
God is actually a nature or essence. It is rather . . . that it is what sup-
ports natures or essence, or where they are located.47
Spinoza equates God with possibility, which contrasts not only with the
act of Aristotle’s Prime Mover but also and above all with the pure act
and self-diffusive goodness of God according to Aquinas. As such, to be
in God is to be in the highest possibility, which is virtual, not actual. The
actualization of finite modes is not integral to their being because higher
than actuality stands reality. Nor is God’s possibility utter transcendence
which exceeds our grasp. On the contrary, Deus sive natura marks the
identity of immanence with possibility, an idea that recurs in modern
and contemporary phenomenology, in particular in the works of Martin




47. Woolhouse, Descartes, Spinoza, Leibniz, pp. 45, 49. Matheron argues that attrib-
utes cannot produce all the finite modes at the same time, so that the essences of some
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If the reality of the whole natural order is possibility and not actual-
ity, then there are far-reaching implications for Spinoza’s entire system
and his theory of individuation, above all the unresolved passage from
the infinity of God to the finitude of individual modes that do not neces-
sarily exist. It is as if Spinoza’s formal distinction between the order of
ideas and the order of things had ‘real’ consequences — if the ideational
were identical with the infinite immaterial and the extensional identical
with the finite material. This requires a brief discussion of the connec-
tion between attributes and modes and existence and essence.
6. Attributes and Modes: Existence or Essence?
For Spinoza, only in God do essence and existence coincide and are
one (Ethica I, P20). The uniqueness or unicity of God’s eternal and infi-
nite essence is necessarily to exist and to consist of an infinity of attrib-
utes, each of which expresses the divine eternal and infinite essence
(Ethica I, P11). All modes are affections of the substance and are both
extensional and ideational. Infinite immediate modes always already
exist because they follow directly from the absolute nature of the sub-
stance. So do infinite mediate modes because they are caused through
the medium of the primary modes (Ethica I, P28, Dem.). But finite
modes are not automatically brought into existence: each finite mode
has a singular essence (essentia singularis), which is in God’s intellect
but does not necessarily exist (Kor. Verh. App. I, P4; Ethica II, A1). Finite
modes are actualized, not by the transcendence of divine will, but by
the immanent self-caused activity of the substance which expresses it-
self in and through attributes and modes. The connection between the
substance and its modes is provided by the attributes, which are com-
mon univocal forms that constitute the essence of the substance and
encompass the essence of the modes. The community of forms be-
tween the substance and its modes ensures the dual inherence of God
in all things and of all things in God (Ethica I, P28, Schol.). Likewise, the
univocity of the attributes guarantees the essential difference between
the necessary existence of God and the possible (though not contin-
gent) existence of finite modes (Ethica IV, D4).48
Another way of explaining the distinction of essence in the sub-
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48. Deleuze, Spinoza et le problème de l’expression, pp. 33-43, 87-98.
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stance and in the modes is to highlight the two key differences between
attributes and modes. First of all, attributes express the essence of the
substance formally or qualitatively, whereas modes express the sub-
stance modally or quantitatively. As such, attributes are infinite, whereas
modes can be both infinite and finite because quantity is divisible into
infinitesimally small parts, including finite modes that express the sub-
stance in a “definite and determinate way” (Ethica I, P28, Dem.). Second,
attributes not only express God’s essence but also constitute God’s exis-
tence (Ethica I, P20, Dem.). This does not apply to modes because their
essence is distinct from their existence. The essence of modes expresses
God intensively and the existence of modes expresses God extensively,
but the modes do not constitute or modify the essence of God at all (Kor.
Verh. I.2).
However, the nature of the link between the substance and its modes
raises fundamental questions about Spinoza’s theory of individuation.
Univocity is not confined to the attributes (which are forms common to
substance and modes) but also extends to causes, as God is both causa
sui and the immanent and proximate cause of all things (Kor. Verh. I.3;
Ethica I, P18, P28, Schol.), though not the transitive and remote cause.
Coupled with the formal distinction between the essence of the sub-
stance and the essence of modes, this double univocity severs the meta-
physical relation between God and all finite things. For finite modes are
actualized and individuated by other modes which are themselves finite
and have a “determinate existence” (Ethica I, P28, Dem. and Schol.), not
by God. This does not mean that God is wholly erased from finitude.
Spinoza’s embrace of the mechanical principles of early modern philoso-
phy (Ep. XIII) implies that God is the cause of all things and that all
things depend on him for their reality and their conception.49 But the ac-
tualization and the individuation of finite modes are cut off from God’s
causative productive action, as I have already indicated in the previous
section.
This implication also emerges from Spinoza’s understanding of fi-
nite modes: “A body in motion or at rest must have been determined to
motion or rest by another body, which likewise has been determined to
motion or rest by another body, and that body by another, and so back to
364
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49. “All things which are, are in God, and depend on God, in such a way that they can
neither be nor be conceived without him (At omnia quae sunt in Deo sunt et a Deo ita de-
pendent, ut sine ipso nec esse, nec concipi possint)” (Ethica I, P28, Schol.).
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infinity.”50 As David Rappaport Lachterman has argued, this conception
of modality eliminates God from actualization and individuation be-
cause finite modifications do not and cannot emanate directly from
God.51 There is then in Spinoza’s metaphysical system an unresolved
question concerning the deduction of the finite from the infinite. Ulti-
mately, it is not clear why the infinite substance would generate finite
things and how it would cause infinite immediate modes which in turn
actualize and individuate finite modes. Spinoza’s claim that finite modes
exist necessarily and do so in a definite and determinate manner is not
an explanation of why the infinite substance expresses itself in finite
modes.
Even if we accept Spinoza’s distinction between the existence of singu-
lar things in God’s attributes as ideas (Ethica II, P8, Cor.) and their exis-
tence in reality as objects (Ethica V, P29, Schol.),52 we are faced with the
non-correspondence of the two parallel orders because ideas are infinite
and eternal, whereas objects are finite and temporal. This raises the ques-
tion of why the essences of singular things are at all instantiated in finite
materiality. Equally, to say that God acts because he is and because his es-
sence is power (Ethica I, P34) fails to give an account of why God would ex-
press himself in finite rather than in infinite modes. Divine self-expression
explains multiplicity, but not finitude: Spinoza asserts that “[p]articular
things are nothing but affections of the attributes of God, that is, modes
wherein the attributes of God find expression in a definite and determi-
nate way.”53 But he fails to demonstrate why the ‘definite and determinate’
self-expression of the infinite requires material instantiation and how the
difference between the finite and the infinite does not undermine the per-
fect parallelism and formal identity of Extension and Thought. Without an
365
The Creation of Immanence
50. “Corpus motum vel quiescens ad motum vel quietem determinari debuit ab alio
corpore, quod etiam ad motum vel quietem determinatum fuit ab alio, et illud iterum ab alio,
et sic in infinitum” (Ethica II, P13, Lem. 3). Here I follow the translation in Woolhouse, Des-
cartes, Spinoza, Leibniz, p. 89.
51. David R. Lachterman, “The Physics of Spinoza’s Ethics,” in Shahan and Biro, eds.,
Spinoza: New Perspectives, pp. 71-111, esp. pp. 88-90.
52. Emilia Giancotti, “On the Problem of Infinite Modes,” in God and Nature: Spinoza’s
Metaphysics. Papers Presented at the First Jerusalem Conference (Ethica I), ed. Yirmiyahu
Yovel (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1991), pp. 97-118, esp. 108-13. Cf. John Carriero, “On the Relation-
ship between Mode and Substance in Spinoza’s Metaphysics,” Journal of the History of Phi-
losophy 33 (1995): 245-73.
53. “Res particulares nihil sunt nisi Dei attributorum affectiones, sive modi, quibus Dei
attributa certo et determinato modo exprimuntur” (Ethica I, P25, Cor.).
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account of the relation between the finite and the infinite, Spinoza’s meta-
physical system in general and his theory of individuation in particular are
incomplete and incoherent. To say that these two orders coincide or corre-
spond to the two constitutive aspects of reality (or ‘the whole of Nature’) is
an assertion, not a demonstration. As such, it fails to address the real dif-
ference between the finite material and the infinite ideal.
In this and the previous section, I have argued that the distinction of
the parallel orders is formal but also involves the tendency to identify
the infinite with the ideational and the finite with the extensional, such
that the doctrine of parallelism is paradoxically founded upon the sepa-
ration of the finite from the infinite (as for Duns Scotus and Descartes).
Since motion-and-rest is the principle that individuates finite modes
and is part of the infinite immediate modes, this separation has conse-
quences for Spinoza’s theory of individuation and requires a discussion
of his conception of modality, which is the focus of the next section.
7. The Causal Laws of Nature and the Nature of Causal Laws
Substance exceeds and enfolds the extended world because the latter is
a mode of the substance, in this instance an infinite mediate mode that
pertains to natura naturata rather than natura naturans.54 In Part One of
the Ethics, Spinoza defines modes as “the affections of substance, that is,
that which is in something else and is conceived through something
else.”55 This definition is developed into a complex three-tiered struc-
ture: infinite immediate modes, infinite mediate modes, and finite
modes. The first two are eternal and infinite (Ethica I, P21-23). Infinite
immediate modes derive absolutely and directly from one of God’s at-
tributes (Kor. Verh. I.8-9; Ethica I, P21 and Dem.), whereas infinite medi-
ate modes derive from the divine attributes indirectly and “through the
mediation of some modification which follows from the absolute nature
of the attribute.”56 The third group can be described as finite modes,
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54. Natura naturans is defined as “that which is in itself and is conceived through it-
self; that is, the attributes of substance that express eternal and infinite essence” (Ethica I,
P29. Schol.). For an earlier account of this distinction, see Kor. Verh. I.8-9.
55. “Per modum intelligo substantiae affectiones, sive id quod in alio est, per quod etiam
concipitur” (Ethica I, D5).
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each of which “is finite and has a determinate existence” and follows
from other such modes, not from God absolutely and directly. As a result,
finite modes are from “God or one of his attributes insofar as it was mod-
ified by a modification which is finite and has a determinate existence.”57
Examples of infinite immediate modes are ‘absolutely infinite un-
derstanding’ and ‘motion and rest,’ which are modes of the attribute of
Thought and of Extension respectively (Ep. LXIV). The “body of the
whole universe” ( facies totius universi) is one of the few examples of infi-
nite mediate modes within Spinoza’s system, and it should be seen in re-
lation to his definition of ‘the whole of Nature’ as one individual.58 Most
importantly for the purposes of my argument, finite modes are also de-
scribed as singular things (res singulares). Indeed, already in the Short
Treatise, Spinoza excludes substance from the definition of individual
things and instead associated motion and rest with individuality:
“[E]xtension contains no other mode than motion and rest, and . . . ev-
ery particular material thing is nothing else than a certain proportion
of motion and rest.”59 This definition is repeated in the Ethics, where
Spinoza writes that “[b]odies are distinguished from one another in re-
spect of motion-and-rest, quickness and slowness, and not in respect of
substance.”60
It is however doubtful whether motion and rest can account for the
individuation of bodies and whether the fixed proportions (or ratios) of
motion and rest adequately capture the singularity of each and every
body. Based on Jonathan Bennett’s idea of Spinoza’s ‘field metaphysics,’
Don Garrett maintains that Spinoza’s conception of motion and rest as
the principle of individuation is coherent. This is so because in his Prin-
ciples of Cartesian Philosophy, Spinoza argues that the principle of mo-
tion and rest denotes not only a single pervasive feature of the universe
in virtue of being an infinite immediate mode but also a double force —
the quantity of motion and the quantity of rest. This double force, ac-
cording to Garrett, explains the local motion and rest of particular bod-
ies because the correlation between the quantity of force and the quan-
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57. “finita est et determinatam habet existentiam . . . a Deo, vel aliquo eius attributo,
quatenus modificatum est modificatione, quae finita est et determinatam habet existentiam”
(Ethica I, P28 and Dem.).
58. Cited, supra, note 11. Cf. Giancotti, “On the Problem of Infinite Modes,” p. 102.
59. Kor. Verh. App. II.
60. “Corpora ratione motus et quietis, celeritatis et tarditatis, et non ratione substantiae
ab invicem distinguuntur” (Ethica II, P13, Lem. 1).
399
G:\Pabst\first corrections
Monday, January 16, 2012 2:52:16 PM
Color profile: Disabled
Composite  140 lpi at 45 degrees
tity of rest constitutes singular things. As such, motion and rest can
differentiate qualitatively between bodies and therefore explain what in-
dividuates bodies over time and across space.61
However, this account rests on the questionable assumption that
Spinoza’s complex three-tiered structure of modes in the Ethics, accord-
ing to which motion-and-rest is an infinite immediate mode, is quali-
fied by an earlier argument about local motion in the Principles. The
point is that motion is not just universal or general but also particular
and local. As such, it is the principle that individuates this and that fi-
nite mode, whereas motion-and-rest is the universal cause of individua-
tion. But this is all the more questionable since Spinoza does not seem
to refer to the concept of local motion and local rest in his account of fi-
nite modes in the Ethics. His core argument is instead that there is a
fixed ratio of motion and rest for individual bodies ‘back to infinity’ and
thus for Nature as a whole (Ethica II, P13, Lem. 3 and Lem. 7, Schol.). To
say that universal motion-and-rest somehow individuates particular
things begs the question.
Philosophically, Spinoza denies any relation between the particular
(local motion and rest) and the universal (the infinite immediate mode
of motion and rest) because he rejects the idea of relationality and in-
stead posits the priority of the nomological infinite over the determinate
finite — a claim that rests on the veracity of the mechanical laws which
are said to govern the entire universe. These laws are the extended corre-
late of the ‘ideated’ common notion, as I suggested in section 2. My ob-
jection to this account is twofold. First of all, Spinoza himself wonders
whether the human mind has the capacity to cognize these laws as uni-
versal. In the Theological-Political Treatise, composed after Part One and
Two of Ethics, he writes:
[W]e ought to define and explain things through their proximate
causes; generalisations about fate and the interconnection of causes
can be of no service to us in forming and ordering our thoughts con-
cerning particular things. Furthermore, we plainly have no knowledge
as to the actual co-ordination and interconnection of things — i.e. the
368
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61. Garrett, “Spinoza’s Theory of Metaphysical Individuation,” esp. pp. 79-82. The ref-
erence to Spinoza is Prin. Phil. Cart. II, D8 and P21-22. Jonathan Bennett’s term ‘field meta-
physics’ can be found in Jonathan Bennett, A Study of Spinoza’s Ethics (Indianapolis:
Hackett, 1984), ch. 4.
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way in which things are in actual fact ordered and connected — so
that for practical purposes it is better, indeed, it is essential to con-
sider things as contingent.62
Our effective inability to know “the actual coordination and intercon-
nection of things” not only casts doubt on Spinoza’s metaphysical system
but has far-reaching implications for his politics, in particular his nega-
tive defense of democracy as the regime best suited to deal with the con-
sequences of a lack of understanding the substance, its attributes and
modes. Indeed, democracy is about diffusing power in order to prevent
the formation of oligarchies and to cancel out conflicting narrow self-
interest as a result of the failure to grasp one’s own true station within
the universe.
My second objection is that Spinoza fails to explain how motion,
which follows immediately from extension, can be deduced a priori from
the conception of extension on the basis of common notions that the
mind cognizes without induction or abstraction. Ultimately, this prob-
lem is the result of Spinoza’s failure to account for how and why matter is
first set in motion, which he himself admits he has not solved.63 In the
following section I argue that Spinoza’s identification of creation with ef-
ficient causality strips his metaphysical system of a conception of cau-
sality that would be in a position to account for the setting into motion
of matter.
I will conclude this section by briefly examining Spinoza’s account
of the fixed proportions. In line with his doctrine of the parallel orders,
Spinoza suggests that each and every thing is individual in virtue of hav-
ing a certain determinate quantity of motion and rest (Kor. Verh. II, pref.,
app. II; Ethica II, P13). This quantity remains constant as a result of a
fixed pattern or proportion (ratio), which is ultimately determined by
the fixed laws of the eternal universe (Ethica II, P13, Lem. 7, Schol.; Ep.
LXII). The actual quantity of motion and rest pertains to Extension,
while the ratio and the laws pertain to Thought. In defense of Spinoza,
Don Garrett claims that these conditions are less restrictive than they
might seem.64 As a result, Spinoza’s idea of a certain kind of pattern,
which describes the interrelation between the parts of a body, consti-
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62. Tract. Theol.-Polit. chap. 4, 2 (my italics).
63. Cf. his last letter to Tschirnhaus of 15 July 1676 (Ep. LXXXIII [p. 365]).
64. Garrett, “Spinoza’s Theory of Metaphysical Individuation,” p. 86.
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tutes — so Garrett’s argument goes — a reasonable and coherent theory
of individuation.
However, such and similar interpretations fail to recognize that the
specificity of Spinoza’s conception is to eliminate God from the process
of individuation altogether and to shift the onus onto the individual itself
and its tendency towards self-preservation vis-à-vis other individuals.
(The conatus, which I discuss below, provides the link between Spinoza’s
metaphysics and his politics.) As Étienne Balibar has noted, the formula-
tion “there is preserved in all together, that is in the whole universe, the
same proportion of motion and rest”65 derives from Descartes (cf. Prin.
Phil. Cart. II.36).66 But the crucial difference is that conservation is no
longer attributed to the constant action of God’s omnipotence but to an
even closer union of each part with its whole. Given that individual bod-
ies are “determined to exist and to act by another cause which is also fi-
nite and has a determinate existence,”67 divine creative action is limited
to efficient causality and has no import in the actualization and individ-
uation of finite modes. While motion and rest at the cosmic level follow
directly and absolutely from God, the fixed proportion at the level of the
finite individual is determined by other finite individuals. This leads us
to a discussion of Spinoza’s understanding of creation.
8. Naturalized Creation
In this section, I argue that Spinoza’s understanding of creation is philo-
sophically and theologically questionable. This is significant for the
question of individuation because his identification of God’s creative ac-
tion with efficient causality has the paradoxical effect of both immanent-
izing God and denying God any import in the production and individua-
tion of singular things. I first summarize Spinoza’s critique of creation ex
nihilo before examining his theory of God’s creative action. Spinoza dis-
misses the monotheistic conception of creation ex nihilo on three related
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65. Ep. XXXII (p. 211).
66. Étienne Balibar, “Individualité, Causalité, Substance. Réflexions sur l’ontologie de
Spinoza,” in Spinoza: Issues and Directions. The Proceedings of the Chicago Spinoza Confer-
ence, ed. Edwin M. Curley and Pierre-François Moreau (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1990), pp. 58-76
(61).
67. “ad existendum et operandum determinetur ab alia causa, quae etiam finita est et
determinatam habet existentiam” (Ethica I, P28).
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accounts. First, “something cannot come from nothing,” and the theolog-
ical claim that nothing is real is philosophically untenable (Kor. Verh. I.2;
Cog. Met. II.7, 10). Second, creation implies that there is a finality that is
external to God and acts upon him (Cog. Met. II.10; Ethica I, App.). Third,
the theological idea of preserving beings in being in virtue of God’s con-
tinuous creation is incompatible with the theological assertion of the
free will. Philosophically, to say that God produces and sustains all be-
ings is to say that nothing except God has free will because everything is
and acts necessarily and in a divinely determined way (Kor. Verh. II.16;
Ethica I, P16, P21-23, P26-27).
However, Spinoza wrongly claims that creation ex nihilo grants
nothingness the same metaphysical station as reality. This is clearly not
true for the Christian Neo-Platonism of Gregory of Nyssa, Augustine,
Boethius, Dionysius, and Aquinas, who all maintain that ‘nothing’ (nihil)
does not have the same metaphysical status as ‘something.’ For nothing-
ness is privation of being. Spinoza himself recognizes that creation does
in fact mean bringing things into being from nothingness:
[B]ecause God has created all things wholly, not generating them from
something else, and because the act of creation acknowledges no
other cause but the efficient cause ( for this is how I define ‘creation’),
which is God, it follows that before their creation things were nothing
at all, and therefore God was also the cause of their essence.68
In this passage, Spinoza emphasizes the difference between creation and
generation. Like the Christian Neo-Platonists analyzed in this essay, he
argues that before being created, a being is nothing at all. But unlike
them, he insists that creation must be equated with efficient causation:
“We say that creation is an operation in which no causes concur beyond
the efficient cause or that a created thing is that which presupposes
nothing except God for its existence” (Cog. Met. II.10). As a result, God’s
creative action does not encompass material, formal, and final causality.
The reality of the substance does not create directly and immediately the
materiality of the modes; instead, the three types of modes follow from
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68. Prin. Phil. Cart. I, P12, Cor. 2, Dem. Elsewhere Spinoza equates being with perfec-
tion and nonbeing with imperfection: “In a created thing, it is a perfection to exist and to
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the infinity of the attributes. Moreover, the substance does not deter-
mine the form of things: “The being of substance does not pertain to the
essence of man, i.e., substance does not constitute the form of man.”69
Finally, in the Ethics, he excludes final causation from creation and
insists that philosophy must be purged of all forms of teleology: “[A]ll fi-
nal causes are but figments of the human imagination.”70 Finality cannot
apply to creation because nothing can be outside the all-encompassing
substance. For the substance lacks nothing at all and is always already all
that is and can be. God is not only the efficient operation that brings
things into actual existence but also the condition of possibility for es-
sences to be. For existence and act are coextensive in God: to exist is to
act and to act is to exist (Ethica IV, preface). To reduce formal causality to
efficient causality means that if an absolute infinite substance exists,
which according to Spinoza it does necessarily, then the substance must
give rise to an infinity of individual things.71 Thus to identify creative ac-
tion with efficient causality is to say that creation is God’s self-expression.
As such, creation is necessary, not free. But theologically, this proposition
is incompatible with God’s absolute freedom and omnipotence as well as
with the freedom and autonomy of creation.
The second respect in which creation is philosophically and theolog-
ically problematic concerns the question of God’s existence. In order to
constitute the formal ground for existence for all things, God himself
must of course exist. At first, this appears to be a rigorous (onto)-logical
proof of the existence of God because it can be rationally derived from
the existence of finite things that are knowable (Spinoza’s a posteriori
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69. “Ad essentiam hominis non pertinet esse substantiae, sive substantia formam
hominis non constituit” (Ethica II, P10).
70. “omnes causas finales nihil nisi humana esse figmenta” (Ethica I, App.). The philo-
sophical rationale for Spinoza is that the doctrine of final causes turns Nature upside
down, “for it regards as an effect that which is in fact a cause, and vice-versa. And it makes
that which is by nature first to be last” (Ethica I, App.). Cf. Don Garrett, “Teleology in
Spinoza and Early Modern Rationalism,” in New Essays on the Rationalists, ed. Rocco J.
Gennaro and Charles Huenemann (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), pp. 310-35.
71. In Spinoza’s own words, “From the necessity of the divine nature there must fol-
low infinite things in infinite ways (i.e. everything that can come within the scope of infi-
nite intellect)” (Ethica I, P16). “From God’s supreme power or infinite nature an infinity of
things in infinite ways — i.e. everything — has necessarily flowed or is always following
from that same necessity, just as from the nature of a triangle. . . . Therefore God’s omnipo-
tence has from eternity been actual and will remain for eternity in the same actuality”
(Ethica, I, P17, Schol.).
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proof in the Short Treatise I.1). Conjointly, the reality of the one substance
and the formality of the attribute parallelism imply that each thing is
both idea and object and that each idea and each object require a first
idea and a first object that coincide. However, on closer inspection, the
structure of Spinoza’s metaphysics subjects God to an (onto-)logic of
possibility which is above and prior to actuality. Indeed, drawing on Des-
cartes’s definition of God as causa sui,72 Spinoza specifies that “[b]y that
which is self-caused I mean that whose essence involves existence; or
that whose nature can be conceived only as existing.”73 This definition of
causa sui implies one of two things. Either God’s effective existence is
formally deduced from his a priori essence — but Spinoza excludes this
by arguing that in God essence and existence are coterminous.74 Or God
exists necessarily because there is no reason to suppose why he would
not: “[E]ither nothing exists, or an absolutely infinite Entity necessarily
exists, too. But we do exist, either in ourselves, or in something else
which necessarily exists. Therefore, an absolutely infinite Entity — that
is, God, necessarily exists.”75
This kind of reasoning subjects God to an (onto-)logic of abstract
possibility. God necessarily exists because there is no logical reason for
his nonexistence,76 even though ontologically there could be: “For every
thing a cause or reason must be assigned either for its existence or its
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72. On Descartes’s account of God as causa sui, see Jean-Luc Marion, Sur le prisme
métaphysique de Descartes. Constitution et limites de l’onto-théo-logie dans la pensée
cartésienne (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1986), esp. §7, pp. 88-111. On the differ-
ence and similarities between Spinoza and Descartes concerning causa sui, see Vincent
Carraud, Causa sive ratio. La raison de la cause, de Suarez à Leibniz (Paris: Presses
Universitaires de France, 2002), pp. 295-341. I am indebted to Carraud for some of the ar-
guments in this and the following paragraph.
73. “Per causam sui intelligo id, cuius essentia involvit existentiam, sive id, cuius natura
non potest concipi, nisi existens” (Ethica I, D1). Subsequently in the Ethics, Spinoza of course
writes that “existence belongs to the nature of substance” and that “substance cannot be
produced by anything else and is therefore its own cause” (Ethica I, P7 and proof).
74. Kor. Verh. App. I, P4; Cog. Met. I.2.
75. “vel nihil existit, vel ens absolute infinitum necessario etiam existit. Atqui nos, vel in
nobis, vel in alio, quod necessario existit, existimus. Ergo ens absolute infinitum, hoc est, Deus
necessario existit” (Ethica I, P11, Dem. 3).
76. In the words of Spinoza, “If there can be no reason or cause which prevents God
from existing or which annuls his existence, we are bound to conclude that he necessarily
exists [Si itaque nulla ratio, nec causa dari possit, quae impedit, quominus Deus existat, vel
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non-existence.”77 Put differently, God exists not only because he is his
own cause but also and above all because ultimately there is no reason
or cause why he would not exist.78 Paradoxically, nonexistence is the
condition of logical possibility for God’s necessary a priori existence.
The implication for creation and individuation is that the actuality
of individual finite modes does not disclose anything about God because
God’s self-expression is complete in the infinity of attributes. Matheron
would reject this interpretation on the ground that for Spinoza, “every-
thing does indeed end up existing.”79 However, the unresolved passage
from the infinite to the finite shifts the onus of actualization of the finite
modes away from the directly creative action of the substance onto the
infinite immediate and mediate modes.80 As a result, the actualization of
finite modes is severed from creation.
The third respect in which Spinoza’s account of creation is philo-
sophically and theologically dubious stems from the priority of essential
possibility over existential actuality and the nature of actualization.
Since God is at the same time causa sui and cause of all phenomena
(their singular essences as well as their individual existences),81 it fol-
lows that formal causality is univocal for the substance as well as for its
modifications. This is because both the substance and all its modifica-
tions require a cause or a (principle of) sufficient reason (causa seu ra-
tio)82 in order to be. So not unlike Duns Scotus’s development of a theory
of univocity of being, Spinoza defends the idea of a univocity of cause for
the Creator and for creatures alike. As I have indicated, God exists be-
cause there is no reason for him not to exist. But for all things other than
the substance, essence does not involve existence — as essences, entities
can be in God’s intellect without their actually existing objective corre-
lates. Yet at the same time, God’s necessary existence is his equally nec-
essary creative activity. So the actuality of individual modes is either ac-
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77. Ethica I, P11, second proof.
78. This sort of reasoning calls forth arguments about theodicy, as was indeed the
case with Leibniz.
79. Alexandre Matheron, “Essence, Existence and Power in Ethics I: The Foundations
of Proposition 16,” in Yirmiyahu Yovel, ed., God and Nature: Spinoza’s Metaphysics (Leiden:
E. J. Brill, 1991), pp. 23-34 (29).
80. As I argue in the following section, this configuration shifts the onus of individua-
tion onto the finite modes themselves, i.e., the conatus, which inheres in each and every
one of all the modes.
81. Ethica I, P25, Schol. and II, P10, Schol.
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cidental or arbitrary. This conclusion emerges from Spinoza’s own
definition of existence in relation to essence:
[F]ormal essence is not self-generated nor again is it created — for
both these would presuppose that it is a thing existing in actuality —
but it depends on the divine essence alone, in which all things are con-
tained. And so in this sense we agree with those who say that the es-
sences of things are eternal.83
So the formal difference of the infinite and the finite and the ideational
and the extensional amounts to a real primacy of the eternity of essences
in God’s mind over the finitude of existences that unfold. For God does
not create all possible actualities at once.
Most importantly Spinoza, by rejecting creation ex nihilo, also dis-
misses two key concepts: first of all, the patristic and medieval idea that
God is beyond substance and, second, the idea of a real difference and
real relations between ideas and objects and ultimately between the sub-
stance and its modes.84 Instead, Spinoza reconfigures Aristotelian meta-
physics in the direction of an asymmetric inherence of the substance in
the modes and of the modes in the substance by positing God’s self-
expression as the cause of creative inherence and dependency as the
cause of created inherence. Spinoza’s variant of metaphysics cannot
demonstrate why God creates and why he creates individual things. To
say, as Spinoza does, that individual phenomena and ‘the whole of Na-
ture’ (the sum total of the infinity of individual phenomena) exist be-
cause they are the self-expression of God is not to enquire into the ques-
tion of why God would wish to express himself and why his self-
expression takes the form of individuals. His account of creation and in-
dividuation is therefore philosophically and theologically problematic.
In the following section, I relate this to Spinoza’s theory of the individual
power of self-preservation — the conatus.
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82. Inter alia, Ethica IV, App.
83. Cog. Met. I.2. In chapter 3 of the same text, Spinoza writes that “if it is in the divine
decree that a thing should exist, it will necessarily exist” (Cog. Met. I.3).
84. Kor. Verh. I.8; I.10. Cf. Marcelo Dascal, “Unfolding the One: ‘Abstract Relations’ in
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9. Conatus or the Ethics of Self-Individuation
and the Politics of Democracy
In the previous sections, I argued that in Spinoza’s system creation be-
comes unhinged from actualization and individuation. Paradoxically,
the onus shifts away from the one infinite substance to the infinite im-
mediate and infinite mediate modes, which are the direct mediation
through which finite modes are generated. Likewise, finite modes are in-
dividuals as a result of a certain ratio (or proportion) of motion and rest,
determined by the fixed laws of the eternal order which are part of the
infinite immediate and the infinite mediate modes respectively. In this
section, I argue that individuation is for Spinoza the endeavor for self-
preservation of all things. Self-preservation is a function of the natural
power that inheres in each and every thing, or Spinoza’s idea of the
conatus (Ethica III, P6).
The conatus marks the coincidence of metaphysics, ethics, and poli-
tics on three related accounts. First of all, the striving towards self-
preservation applies to animate and inanimate beings alike (Ethica III,
P7). Second, the activity involved in this striving defines the nature and
the scope of each thing’s natural right (Ethica IV, D8; Tract. Pol. II.3).
Third, the power of this striving defines each person’s virtue (Ethica IV,
D8). As a result, actualization and individuation are metaphysical, ethi-
cal, and political. Before I highlight the ethical and political dimension, I
will briefly outline Spinoza’s argument for the conatus and the underpin-
ning theory in relation to his metaphysical system, notably his concep-
tion of inherence.
Part One of the Ethics on God lays the foundation of Spinoza’s theory
of the conatus, in particular the necessary coincidence of essence and ex-
istence in the one substance which is the immanent and proximate (not
transitive and remote) cause of “the whole of Nature” and all that is in it.
God is in all things and all things are in God (Ethica I, P28, Schol.). As
such, each individual thing depends on God for its essence, existence,
and sustenance in being. All singular things are modes that express in a
certain and determinate way God’s essence, i.e., the power by which God
is and acts (Ethica I, P25, Cor., and I, P34). In Parts Two and Three,
Spinoza extends this metaphysical system by arguing that “nothing can
be destroyed except by an external cause” (Ethica III, P4, Dem.) because
there is nothing in a thing’s essence that can destroy that thing. Con-





Monday, January 16, 2012 2:52:17 PM
Color profile: Disabled
Composite  140 lpi at 45 degrees
ing,” a universal endeavor that Spinoza describes elsewhere as the
conatus.85 In virtue of the conatus, each thing resists that which can take
its existence away (Ethica III, P6, Dem.). As such, the conatus is the actual
essence of all things (Ethica III, P7).
Spinoza argues that the power of persevering in one’s being is a func-
tion of the extent of being in oneself. In consequence, one key question this
definition raises is the meaning of being in itself (in se est). If, as he main-
tains, all modes, including singular finite modes, are modes of God (Ethica
I, D5; I, P25, Cor.) and must therefore be in God (Ethica I, P28, Schol.), then
how can they also be partly in themselves? According to Don Garrett,
Spinoza’s argument is coherent because there are infinitely many “ways of
being in God” and being partly in oneself is just one such way: “[W]hatever
is to any extent in a singular thing is in God as well, in God through being in
one of his finite modes.”86 Garrett describes this position as Spinoza’s
metaphysics of inherence. But the problem that Spinoza fails to resolve is
how all things are to some extent in themselves (in se), while also lacking
any freedom because they exist necessarily and are utterly dependent on
the one substance. The question then is whether Spinoza’s metaphysical
system can conjoin the absolute power of the substance with the relative
autonomy of the finite modes.
Spinoza’s own answer is that finite modes and their striving for self-
preservation are an expression of God’s eminent being and his omnipo-
tence. However, it is not clear in what manner the infinite substance,
which alone sustains everything in being, can be squared with a self-
preserving power that is proper to finite modes. To say that finite modes
are endowed with their own endeavor for preservation as well as a share
in God’s infinite power fails to explain how there can be anything in addi-
tion to the infinity of divine power. Either the conatus is part of God’s self-
expression, in which case finite modes cannot be partly in themselves be-
cause they depend absolutely on God and only are in virtue of being in
God. Or else the conatus is distinct from God’s self-expression, in which
case there appears to be something beyond the substance, something for
which the causal productive action of the substance cannot account.
Since modes are not directly caused by God, yet at the same time nothing
is outside the all-encompassing substance, neither configuration is com-
patible with the tenets of Spinoza’s own metaphysical system.
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85. “Unaquaeque res, quantum in se est, in suo esse perseverare conatur” (Ethica III, P6).
86. Garrett, “Spinoza’s Conatus Argument,” p. 140 (original italics).
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The unresolved connection between God’s productive power and
the finite power of self-preservation can be traced back to the equally
unresolved link between the single substance and the dual attributes
and between the infinite and the finite. For the formality of these two dis-
tinctions precludes any real difference and therefore any real relation be-
tween the finite modes and the substance. There is a marked contrast
with the patristic and medieval Christian Neo-Platonist vision of
relationality. Instead of the metaphysics that describes how the whole of
creation is constituted by its relation to God, which testifies to the utter
ecstatic plenitude of God’s goodness and love, Spinoza advocates a
meta-logic that merely asserts the coincidence and nonidentity of a pro-
ductive God and the whole of Nature, which constitutes nothing but di-
vine self-expression.
This shift from the patristic and medieval metaphysics of relation-
ality, which centers on the ontological difference and participation, has
significant consequences for individuation. Both actualization and indi-
viduation are situated at the level of the three-tiered structure of modes,
as I argued in the previous section. The actualization of hitherto nonex-
isting modes (i.e., the coming into actual existence of eternal essences)
requires the displacement of already existing modes. Each thing has its
ascribed place, which is determined by the fixed laws of the cosmos, as I
suggested in section 6. Coupled with Spinoza’s mechanistic principle
that there is a constant quantum of motion and rest (or energy) in the
universe, the consequence is that the advent of a new set of modes in-
volves the destruction of an established group of modes.
Thus, at the heart of Spinoza’s account of the creation (or produc-
tion) of modes, there is a necessary and inevitable competition and ri-
valry among different groups of modes. This shaped his theory of indi-
viduation, as individuals qua individuals are limited in their knowledge
of the ‘whole of Nature’ and therefore ignore their particular station
therein. As a result, there is potential conflict between individual finite
modes. Moreover, only those individuals who can attain the third kind of
knowledge (the immediate grasp of essences) can transcend their own
finitude and individuality and rise to the point where they are able to
cognize the commonality of the substance in which all modes inhere.
The aporia in Spinoza’s system is that individuality is at once a necessary
reality and a contingent illusion: necessary and real because the sub-
stance is individual and everything is of the substance; contingent and il-
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of modes. In Spinoza’s system, true knowledge of one’s simultaneous in-
dividuality and commonality is in some crucial sense a privilege granted
only to the sages. Among those who do not attain the third kind of
knowledge there is conflict because illusions about individuality collide.
In fact, individual knowledge is governed by the confusion of the
particular environment with the universal order. Individuals, not unlike
the worm in the bloodstream (Ep. XXXII),87 tend to ignore the fixed laws
of the eternal order and thereby fail to recognize their true station
therein. The ensuing transgression requires a democratic regime, which
represents the best attempt to conjoin majority rule with the protection
of individual natural rights in order to strike a balance between conflict-
ing interest and legitimate power. Both commonality and democracy
constitute responses to a metaphysics that posits the violence of opposi-
tion and an inherently conflictual state of nature (in the absence of third
knowledge). This contrasts with the shared Christian Neo-Platonist vi-
sion of a created order whose relationality intimates the peace of recon-
ciliation and a harmonious mediation of difference.
This account has significant implications for ethics and politics, in
particular the metaphysical foundations of commonality and democ-
racy. First of all, the parallelism of the extensional and the ideational sig-
nifies that there is coincidence yet noninteraction between being and
knowing. Just as commonality follows from the nature of individual be-
ing, so democracy follows from the nature of individual knowledge. Indi-
vidual being is dictated by the struggle for self-preservation against rival
groups of individuals, such that commonality is the result of causally de-
termined relations that ascribe fixed stations in the hierarchical order of
the universe. Commonality marks the attempt, first, to enforce hierarchy
according to the particular share in the absolute power of infinite sub-
stance, second, to secure equality by granting each and every thing a nat-
ural right to exist and to act and, third, to proscribe transgressions of
this order by denying freedom of the will.
Indeed, Spinoza’s vision of politics follows from his metaphysics and
is a complex mixture of the hierarchical and the egalitarian. Just as
metaphysics and politics are coextensive, so the “existential contract”
(Alexandre Matheron) between the finite modes and the substance is the
basis for the social contract and natural law. This fundamental egalitari-
anism is qualified by an equally fundamental hierarchy of power. Finite
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87. Sacksteder, “Spinoza on Part and Whole: The Worm’s Eye View,” pp. 139-59.
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modes act according to their naturally given power and each strives for
self-preservation and a station in the natural order according to power
thus distributed. Only the sages are apt to rule over others because only
they are in a position to attain the third kind of knowledge. Not unlike
Aristotle’s aristocracy, Spinoza posits absolute divisions between those
who are able to engage in contemplative activity and those who are con-
fined to nonintellectual work. This is markedly different from Plato’s
idea of the Good, which infuses all things with goodness and thus en-
ables all things to have some knowledge of it.
The second implication for Spinoza’s ethics and politics is that com-
monality and democracy are embodied by a politics that seeks to regu-
late the rivalry and competition between individual finite modes that
follows from his metaphysics, instead of aiming at real reconciliation
and genuine peace. Commonality is a necessary consequence of the na-
ture of individual being, i.e., the hierarchy of relative individuals where
each individual is at once composed of lower-order individual parts and
itself a component of a higher-order individual. This hierarchy is poten-
tially violent because it is grounded in the idea that beings are distin-
guished by their power to destroy other beings: “There is in Nature no in-
dividual thing that is not surpassed in strength and power by some other
thing. Whatsoever thing there is, there is another more powerful by
which the said thing can be destroyed.”88 The pursuit of self-preservation
involves exclusion and elimination and therefore men are naturally ene-
mies (Tract. Pol. VIII.12). As a result, all beings are always already in-
scribed in causally determined relations with other beings. But these re-
lations are absolutely necessary and serve nothing but survival. Indeed,
the formation of communities occurs because men cannot lead an iso-
lated solitary existence, and the sustenance of life requires mutual assis-
tance (Ethica IV, App. 12).
Equally, democracy is a necessary consequence of the nature of indi-
vidual knowledge, i.e., the limits on human understanding according to
which each individual (by analogy with the worm in the bloodstream
[Ep. XXXII]) mistakes its environment for the whole world and fails to
grasp the universal fixed laws of the eternal universe. As a result, individ-
uals confound their own self-interest with the common interest. In order
to avoid the formation and consolidation of oligarchic clusters of power,
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88. “Nulla res singularis in rerum natura datur, qua potentior et fortior non detur alia.
Sed quacumque data datur alia potentior, a qua illa data potest destrui” (Ethica IV, Ax.).
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what is required is a democratic regime that tends to diffuse power and
to cancel out conflicting self-interest. So configured, democracy seeks to
regulate the opposition and ensuing conflict between natural enemies.
Yet at the same time, the very logic of democracy — policing rival inter-
ests — does not overcome the violence of rivalry and competition and
foreshadows the path towards two ideologies — the libertarianism of
J. S. Mill and the organicism of Marx. As such, Spinoza’s metaphysics in-
augurates the modern (and postmodern) dualism and opposition be-
tween two false alternatives — liberalism and communism. This conflict
mirrors the nature of finite modality, which is at once a necessary reality
and a contingent illusion. Only the sages transcend this aporetic condi-
tion and can grasp the commonality of the substance below and beyond
the individuality of finite modes. Neither free nor individuated, Spinoza’s
vision of politics oscillates between a de facto autocracy of the wise and a
de iure democracy of the ignorant.
10. Conclusion: Ontology of Production
In this chapter, I have argued that Spinoza’s rejection of ancient and me-
dieval philosophy and theology leads him to discard both transcendent
causes of individuality and transcendent principles of individuation.
Things are not individual because they are particular substances but by
virtue of being finite modes of the single infinite substance. Likewise,
things are not actualized by the substance but by the infinite immediate
and the infinite mediate modes. Finally, things are not individuated by
matter or form but by the power of preservation and perfection (the
conatus), which is immanent to each and every mode. Moreover,
Spinoza’s dismissal of the idea of creation ex nihilo redefines creation in
terms of efficient causality and to accomplish the late scholastic turn
that had been inaugurated by Scotus and extended by Suárez. This turn
establishes the absolute primacy of metaphysics over theology. I have
also shown that in reducing formal to efficient causality Spinoza makes
divine creative action utterly necessary.
Spinoza’s claim about the necessity of all existing things raises the
problem of how to combine individuality and commonality. If everything
is a mode of the one substance and if, as such, everything is an integral
part of the universe which exists necessarily because the essence of the
all-encompassing substance is to exist and to express itself in an infinity
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of modes, then all singular modes require a community in order to exist.
Yet at the same time, since attributes cannot produce all modes at the
same time, groups of modes compete with each other over their place in
the universe.
Spinoza attempts to blend the particular and the communal by argu-
ing that there is no rivalry between the conatus of singular modes because
each individual has a certain power of perseverance, which determines
its proportionate participation in the all-inclusive substance. Just as the
conatus grounds the natural right of all individuals, so democracy secures
both individuality and commonality. However, I contend that the basis for
community and democracy is the need to overcome the conflict that
arises from a lack of knowledge and understanding. There is competition
because individuals fail to grasp their own station within the natural or-
der. While the rule of the sages is the ideal form of government, the rule of
the many is the best of all actually available forms. The tension between
self-preservation and the commonweal can be traced to Spinoza’s meta-
physics of necessary self-production and marks a significant contrast
with the Christian Neo-Platonist metaphysics of free creation.
Ultimately, my argument is that Spinoza cannot give an account of
how and why nature at once individuates and enfolds all phenomena.
Why would the one and only absolute infinite indivisible substance ex-
press itself in finite material divisible things? Why — in the absence of
any final causes — would individual finite things want to be individuated
(Ethica I, App.)? How would they be so by their connection with a sub-
stance that does not need them and is not their proximate cause (Kor.
Verh. I.3)? I therefore conclude that his account of individuation fails on
its own terms because it is unable to demonstrate its specific claims
about the individuality and interconnection of particular phenomena
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CHAPTER 9
Ontology or Metaphysics?
1. Introduction: The Modern End of Metaphysics
In this final chapter, I argue that modernity radicalizes the late medi-
eval, scholastic redefinition of metaphysics as the transcendental sci-
ence of ontology and the concomitant relegation of theology to the sole
sphere of the supernatural. Late modern critics from Nietzsche to
Heidegger to Jacques Derrida to Jean-Luc Marion are wrong to dismiss
the whole western tradition of metaphysics since Plato as onto-
theological. Rather, the dominant traditions of modern thinking are
founded upon a more Aristotelian ‘categorial ontology’ and ‘causal the-
ology’ that rejected the Christian Neo-Platonist metaphysics of cre-
ation. In fact, the rise of modernity is linked to the development of a
mechanistic natural theology (based on efficient causality) and an
atomistic ontology (grounded in univocal being and radical singularity)
that supplanted the symphonic — albeit imperfect — synthesis of meta-
physical theology, teleological cosmology, and relational anthropology
in the tradition of Christian Neo-Platonism, as I have argued in the pre-
ceding chapters. The present chapter goes further and suggests that
‘the modern’ collapses divine being and created being into a single
univocity and singularity whose virtual formality is transcendentally
prior even to the possibility of essence and the actuality of existence. By
contrast, Neo-Platonist theology defends the idea of a metaphysical re-
ality of God’s transcendent creative act of being in which all immanent
beings participate. In this sense, modern philosophy is correlated with
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It follows that the real alternative to the transcendental science of
ontology is neither an ontology purged of all theology (Husserl and
Heidegger) nor a pure phenomenology without being (Marion), nor even
an ‘ontological’ metaphysics beyond the phenomenological and analytic
divide (Levinas and Badiou). Instead, the only genuine alternative that
will be proposed in the present chapter is a revivified theological meta-
physics that develops Plato’s notion of relational participation in the di-
rection of Trinitarian relationality, which upholds the ‘ontological differ-
ence’ between Creator and creation through analogical relation and
anagogical union with God. This account — which can be traced to the
plural tradition of patristic and medieval Christian Neo-Platonism from
Gregory of Nyssa, Augustine, and Dionysius via Boethius and Aquinas to
Meister Eckhart and Nicholas of Cusa — finds its modern expressions in
a variety of distinct yet converging strands. First of all, the metaphysical
theology of Renaissance Italian civic humanism and the Neapolitan En-
lightenment (Marsilio Ficino, Pico della Mirandola, Leonardo Bruni,
Paolo Mattia Doria, Gianbattista Vico, Antonio Genovesi, and Pietro
Verri).1 Second, the Cambridge Platonism of Shaftesbury and Cudworth
(and, to a lesser extent, the Scottish Enlightenment of Hume and Smith
via Hutcheson).2 Third, nineteenth- and early-twentieth-century Rus-
sian sophiology. Fourth, nouvelle théologie and its contemporary devel-
opments in Europe and North America. It is the unrealized potential of
this rival tradition of Renaissance and Enlightenment philosophy and
theology which offers a path towards an alternative modernity that is far
more theologically orthodox and politically radical than the dubious at-
tempts to rehabilitate the mainstream English, French, German, or
American enlightenments championed by Anglo-Saxon and continental
European thinkers of the left or the right.3
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1. On the Platonist civic humanism of the Italian Renaissance and Enlightenment,
see Eugenio Garin, L’umanesimo italiano (Bari: G. Laterza, 1958), English translation: Ital-
ian Humanism: Philosophy and Civic Life in the Renaissance, trans. Peter Munz (Oxford:
Blackwell, 1965); Henri de Lubac, Pic de la Mirandole. Études et discussions (Paris: Aubier-
Montaigne, 1974); John Milbank, The Religious Dimension in the Thought of Giambattista
Vico, 1668-1744, 2 vols. (Lampeter, UK: Edwin Mellen Press, 1991); James Hankins, Plato in
the Italian Renaissance, 2 vols., rev. ed. (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1994).
2. On the shared intellectual foundations of the Italian and the Scottish Enlighten-
ment, which combine key aspects of Christian Neo-Platonist metaphysics with Epicurean
and Stoic elements, see John Robertson, The Case for the Enlightenment: Scotland and Na-
ples 1680-1760 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), pp. 201-405.
3. See, inter alia, Jürgen Habermas, Der gespaltene Westen (Frankfurt am Main:
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A detailed discussion of the main theories of individuation in moder-
nity is beyond the scope of this chapter. Instead, I will relate the late medi-
eval and early modern shifts within theology to modern accounts of indi-
viduation. As in previous chapters, the focus will be on theological
alternatives to purely philosophical conceptions, in this case the new sci-
ence of transcendental ontology and the concomitant idea that individu-
ality is grounded in immanent things themselves rather than linked to the
transcendent source of being in which all things participate.
2. Modern Metaphysics as Transcendental Ontology
This section of this chapter challenges the dominant terms of debate
framing the relation between philosophy and theology. Traditionally mo-
dernity has been equated with metaphysics and ‘postmodernity’ with
postmetaphysics, whether a phenomenological science of pure appear-
ing without being or an analytic philosophy of language and logic prior
to being. However, this foundational distinction relies on a questionable
reading of the origins and the nature of the ‘modern’ and the
‘postmodern.’ Here one can say with the French philosopher of science
Bruno Latour that “we have never been modern,” for there was never any
absolute, irreversible break in history that gave rise to a coherent system
of ideas and institutions which we commonly call ‘modernity.’4 Rather,
there are profound continuities between the late Middle Ages and the
modern era that continue to shape our contemporary ‘postmodern con-
dition’ (Jean-François Lyotard).5 Indeed, both modern philosophy and
theology emerged from the confluence of three significant shifts within
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Suhrkamp, 2004), English translation: The Divided West, ed. Ciaran Cronin (Cambridge:
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French, and American Enlightenments (New York: Random House, 2004); Jonathan I. Israel,
Radical Enlightenment: Philosophy and the Making of Modernity, 1650-1750 (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2001), and Enlightenment Contested: Philosophy, Modernity, and the
Emancipation of Man 1670-1752 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006).
4. Bruno Latour, Nous n’avons jamais été modernes. Essai d’anthropologie symétrique
(Paris: Éditions la Découverte, 1991), English translation: We Have Never Been Modern,
trans. Catherine Porter (New York and London: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1993).
5. Jean-François Lyotard, La condition post-moderne. Rapport sur le savoir (Paris:
Éditions de Minuit, 1979), English translation: The Postmodern Condition: A Report on
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the ‘Western’ traditions of late medieval scholasticism: first of all, the
Avicennian primacy of essence over existence (chapter 4); second, the
Scotist destruction of (what would later be validly described as) Thomist
analogia entis in favor of the univocity of being (chapters 5 and 6); and
third, the Suárezian priority of metaphysics as the science of general be-
ing over theology as the science of revelation and the concomitant sepa-
ration of ‘pure nature’ from the supernatural (chapter 7).6
Taken together, these shifts amount to the substitution of transcen-
dental ontology for metaphysics. Following Scotist univocity and
Suárezian general metaphysics, the German thinker Johannes Clauberg
or Clauvergius (1622-1665) replaced the term ‘metaphysics’ with
‘ontosophia’ or ‘ontology’ in order to describe the science of being qua
being7 — a science that theorizes the common nature or degree of being
that is both in God and in creatures. In turn, this conception underpins
three traditions that have dominated philosophy ever since: first, the ra-
tionalist or idealist transcendentalism of Descartes, Hobbes, Wolff, and
Kant; second, the empiricist or vitalist immanentism of Spinoza, Locke,
Smith, and Bergson; third, the residually transcendental science of on-
tology masquerading as an atheological, pure philosophy ( from Husserl
and Heidegger via Sartre to Deleuze and, perhaps to a lesser extent,
Marion). Moreover, much of postmodern philosophy (especially in its
phenomenological guise) retrieves and extends the late medieval, onto-
theological scholasticism that inaugurated the modern era, as the work
of John Milbank and Catherine Pickstock has shown.8 So if ‘post-
modernity’ is in the end an intensification of certain modern trends
rather than a new phase of history, perhaps it is then also the case that
386
TRANSCENDENCE AND IMMANENCE
6. As the previous chapters indicate, this argument is based on the pioneering work
of Étienne Gilson and Henri de Lubac’s nouvelle théologie in the first half of the twentieth
century, which was subsequently refined and developed by scholars as varied as André de
Muralt, Jean-Luc Marion, Jean-François Courtine, Olivier Boulnois, Ludger Honnefelder,
and Louis Dupré (amongst others).
7. Johannes Clauberg, Elementa philosophiae sive ontosophiae (Groningen: Joannis
Nicolai, 1647). See Étienne Gilson, L’Être et l’Essence, 2nd ed. (Paris: Vrin, 1972), pp. 144-86;
Jean-François Courtine, Suarez et le système de la métaphysique (Paris: Presses
Universitaires de France, 1990), pp. 246-92, 436-57.
8. For a summary statement of this thesis, see the two complementary articles by
Catherine Pickstock, “Postmodern Scholasticism: Critique of Postmodern Univocity,”
Telos 126 (2003): 3-24, and “Modernity and Scholasticism: A Critique of Recent Invocations
of Univocity,” Antonianum 78 (2003): 3-46.
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the modern is in fact synonymous with transcendental ontology and not
after all with metaphysics.
How so? First of all, much of modern philosophy — and theology — re-
jects the metaphysical realism that views being and God as the transcen-
dental reality in which everything participates. Since the important schol-
arship of Jean-Luc Marion, we know that René Descartes’s ‘mechanistic
metaphysics’ is not reducible to an epistemological project predicated on
early modern skepticism but instead seeks to renew and surpass Aris-
totle’s ‘first philosophy’ by grounding knowledge of the self and God’s exis-
tence in a ‘gray ontology’ and a ‘white theology.’9 Here one can go beyond
Marion’s proto-phenomenological reading and argue that Descartes oper-
ates a double substitution. First, he replaces the metaphysics of participa-
tion with an onto-theology of representation, and second, he replaces the
politics of transcendently ordered objectivity governed by the good with a
politics of transcendentally secured immanent subjectivity ruled by God’s
absolute power. Both representation and subjectivity derive from two Car-
tesian claims that are diametrically opposed to the Neo-Platonist meta-
physics of creation: first, Descartes’s undemonstrated separation of the in-
finite from the finite; second, fusing God’s arbitrary will (beyond even
Ockham’s voluntarism) and divine causa sui (beyond even Aristotle’s theo-
ontology) in order to explain the ultimate ground of being. Accordingly,
the finite ego cogitates the foundationalism of deus infinitus based on clear
and distinct, divinely caused eternal ideas which are innate in the human
mind — an account that is at odds with Augustine’s theological epistemol-
ogy of divine illumination and his ‘musical metaphysics’ (as detailed in
chapter 2).
Empiricism, like rationalism, is similarly founded upon the destruc-
tion of the Neo-Platonist vision of analogical relation between the finite
things of creation that participate in the infinite plenitudinous actuality
of the Creator. For example, Descartes’s empiricist critic John Locke at-
tacks the idea of creation’s sharing in intra-Trinitarian relations on the
basis of his dogmatic commitment to ontological atomism and posses-
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9. Jean-Luc Marion, Sur l’ontologie grise de Descartes: Science cartésienne et savoir
aristotélicien dans les Regulae, 2nd ed. (Paris: Vrin, 1981); J.-L. Marion, Sur la théologie
blanche de Descartes: Analogie, création des vérités éternelles et fondement (Paris: Presses
Universitaires de France, 1981); J.-L. Marion, “Descartes et l’Onto-théologie,” Bulletin de la
Société Française de Philosophie 76 (1982): 117-71; J.-L. Marion, Sur le prisme métaphysique
de Descartes. Constitution et limites de l’onto-théo-logie dans la pensée cartésienne (Paris:
Presses Universitaires de France, 1986).
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sive individualism, as I will argue later in this chapter. Beyond rational-
ism and empiricism, Kant seeks to ground his metaphysics of morals in a
critically bounded rationality, which in his late work mutates into a rea-
son reaching infinity (rather like Spinoza) and a transcendental ontology
combining subjective immanence with objective transcendence.10 But
more fundamentally, Kant’s critique replaces the metaphysically given
natural desire for the supernatural (central to Christian Neo-Platonism)
with an onto-theological positing of auto-volition as the highest and
most general cause. Even the attempt of speculative idealists like Fichte,
Schelling, and Hegel to eschew the modern transcendental science of
onto-theology does in the end privilege subjectivity11 and immanence at
the expense of a more mediated metaphysic. Such a metaphysic links the
subject and the immanent to cosmic objectivity and divine transcen-
dence by cutting across the false divide between existence and essence,
actuality and possibility, or finitude and infinity bequeathed by
Avicenna, Scotus, and Descartes.
Contemporary philosophy is perhaps even more transcendental and
certainly no less anti-metaphysical. Since Nietzsche and Heidegger, vir-
tually the whole of ancient thought and Christian metaphysics has been
wrongly identified with the absolutism of the will to power and the idola-
try of onto-theology. Following Foucault and Derrida, western philoso-
phy in its entirety has been falsely associated with Plato’s alleged (phal-)
logo-centrism and the rationalist God of classical theism. As such, both
premodern and modern metaphysics is simply and simplistically
equated with the illusion of clear and distinct foundations and the for-
getting of the ‘ontological difference.’ In part, that’s why the pure and un-
adulterated philosophy proposed by phenomenological philosophers
(chief of all Heidegger and Marion) promised a new dawn — liberated
from the constricting shackles of God, faith, and theology.12
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10. Alberto Toscano, The Theatre of Production: Philosophy and Individuation Between
Kant and Deleuze (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), pp. 19-106.
11. Cf. Robert Pippin, Persistence of Subjectivity: On the Kantian Aftermath (Cam-
bridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005).
12. On Heidegger’s reduction of theology to a regional science, see Martin Heidegger,
“Phänomenologie und Theologie,” in Gesamtausgabe (Frankfurt am Main: V. Klostermann,
1976), vol. 9, pp. 45-78. On Marion’s genealogy of metaphysics and ontology, see Jean-Luc
Marion, “Une époque de la métaphysique,” in Jean Duns Scot ou la révolution subtile, ed.
C. Goëmé (Paris: FAC Éditions Radio-France, 1982), pp. 87-95. Cf. Jean-Luc Marion,
Réduction et donation. Recherches sur Husserl, Heidegger et la phénoménologie (Paris:
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The second set of reasons why late modernity marks the destruction
of metaphysics is that both phenomenology and analytic philosophy re-
main caught within the modern logic of absolute immanence that im-
poses arbitrary limits on both divine and human reason. The rationality
of God’s Logos is subordinated to divine volition, which is as unintelligi-
ble as it is fideistic — a blending of nominalism and voluntarism first
proposed by Ockham. And since neither self-willing nor pure intention-
ality without transcendent teleology can adequately account for the ex-
cess of infinite reason which envelopes finite reason, it is also the case
that neither Kant’s practical reason nor Husserl’s transcendental I out-
side being nor even Marion’s reduction of phenomenality to sheer
givenness without gift or giver can escape modern dualisms. None of
these three ‘solutions’ can either break the circle of infinitized finitude of
immanence or else account for the paradox of transcendence at the
heart of immanence, “more interior to me than I to myself,” as St. Augus-
tine writes in the Confessions.13
Likewise, much of recent and current theology has embraced the tri-
ple Baroque scholastic separation of nature from grace, reason from
faith, and metaphysics from revealed theology — including Barthian
neo-orthodoxy and Catholic neo-scholasticism. As such, both contem-
porary philosophers and theologians are secretly complicit in bracketing
the natural desire for the supernatural, the participatory nature of all be-
ings, the Trinitarian ‘shape’ of all that is given by the divine donum, and
389
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Presses Universitaires de France, 1989); J.-L. Marion, Étant donné. Essai de phénoménologie
de la donation, rev. ed. (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1997); J.-L. Marion, De
surcroît. Études sur les phénomènes saturés (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 2001);
J.-L. Marion, Le phénomène érotique (Paris: LGF, 2004); J.-L. Marion, Le visible et le révélé
(Paris: Éditions Cerf, 2005). For a compelling critique of the multiple tensions between
Marion’s phenomenological ontology and his theology (which are ultimately irreconcil-
able on Marion’s own terms), see Emmanuel Falque, “Larvatus pro Deo — Phénoméno-
logie et théologie chez J.-L. Marion,” Gregorianum 86 (2005): 45-62.
13. Marion’s claim in his recent book Au lieu de soi. L’approche de Saint Augustin
(Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 2008) that Augustine’s theology is nonmeta-
physical and free of any debt to Christian Neo-Platonism is textually and historically un-
persuasive, as chapter 2 of the present essay suggests. Rather than providing a better un-
derstanding of Augustine, this sort of approach seeks to legitimate Marion’s own
phenomenological method and his theologically questionable concepts of saturated phe-
nomena and the I as ‘adonné.’ For a longer statement of my critique of Marion, see Adrian
Pabst, “Jean-Luc Marion,” in Introduction à la phénoménologie contemporaine, ed. Philippe
Cabestan (Paris: Éditions Ellipses, 2005), pp. 83-96.
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the transformative dimension of culture and all forms of human making.
The metaphysics of relational participation is beyond the division be-
tween philosophy and theology, as if the former could really be su-
premely autonomous or the latter merely regional. Rather, the idea and
reality of relationality and participatory being is always already part of a
wider economy that encompasses donation, excess, deification (theosis),
and theurgy — as articulated in the works of Russian sophiology, nou-
velle théologie and Radical Orthodoxy.14
Thirdly and for the reasons adduced above, ‘postmodern’ philosophy
and theology fail to distinguish between the science of transcendental
ontology and the Christian Neo-Platonist metaphysics of creation. Tran-
scendental ontology is not attributable to Aristotle or Boethius but can
be traced to the confluence of Avicennian and Porretan essentialism
which paved the way for the acceptance of Duns Scotus’s destruction of
analogia entis, as I argued in chapters 4 and 6. Similarly, onto-theological
metaphysics did not start with Plato, Augustine, or Aquinas. Instead, it
was inaugurated by Duns Scotus’s conflation of the highest being in God
with the most common being in beings.15 This new account was further
developed by Suárez’s conception of metaphysics as a general science
that foregrounds all other sciences and predefines the realm in which re-
vealed theology operates, as I suggested in chapter 7. As the work of the
Swiss philosopher André de Muralt attests, there is a clear genealogy
that links the priority of possibility over actuality in Scotus, the primacy
of the will over the intellect and the denial of universals in things in
Ockham, and the transcendental status of being qua being in Suárez to




14. On the enduring importance of nouvelle théologie, see John Milbank, The Sus-
pended Middle: Henri de Lubac and the Debate Concerning the Supernatural (Grand Rapids:
Eerdmans, 2005). For an account of how Russian sophiology echoes and surpasses the
metaphysical idealism of Schelling, see J. Milbank, “Sophiology and Theurgy: The New
Theological Horizon,” in Encounter between Eastern Orthodoxy and Radical Orthodoxy:
Transfiguration of the World through the Word, ed. Adrian Pabst and Christoph Schneider
(Aldershot, UK: Ashgate, 2009), pp. 45-85. On the importance of Vladimir Solovyov’s meta-
physical critique of positivism, see my chapter in the same collection, “Wisdom and the
Art of Politics,” pp. 109-37.
15. Olivier Boulnois, “Quand commence l’ontothéologie? Aristote, Thomas d’Aquin et
Duns Scot,” Revue thomiste 95 (1995): 85-108.
16. See, inter alia, André de Muralt, “Kant, le dernier occamien. Une nouvelle
définition de la philosophie moderne,” Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale 80 (1975): 32-53;
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By contrast, the Neo-Platonic metaphysics of participation stretches
not only from Plato to Aquinas but also underpins the alternative, prop-
erly theological ‘modernity’ envisioned by figures as diverse as Meister
Eckhart, Nicholas of Cusa, the Cambridge Platonists, the nineteenth-
century Russian sophiologists, and the protagonists of nouvelle théologie,
as I have already indicated. The problem with the dominant traditions of
(post)modern philosophy is that they all seek in different ways to replace a
theologically mediated metaphysic with a certain ontology. That ontology
oscillates between the transcendental category of being that encompasses
God and absolute divine volition, on the one hand, and quasi-positivist no-
tions of human will or cognition that are severed from divinely infused
grace and the natural desire for the supernatural Good in God, on the
other hand. Thus, the idea that transcendental ontology has not been the
dominant modern philosophy is just as misguided as the idea that a theo-
logical metaphysic that upholds the ‘ontological difference’ in terms of
analogia entis ever fell into total oblivion. Likewise, the notion that meta-
physics is constitutively onto-theological and needs to be overcome in the
direction of a philosophy of pure appearance or pure language/logic is just
as erroneous as the notion that it cannot return to the heart of philosophy
and restore a theological ordering of all the sciences.
In the remainder of this chapter, I will argue that the twin thematic
of individuation in philosophy and individuality in politics is central to
the modern passage from metaphysics to ontology. Connected with this
is a series of theoretical shifts and practical transformations that
brought about modernity — first of all, a growing focus on individual
substance instead of real relations; second, the primacy of individual
will, social contract, and commercial exchange at the expense of social
sympathy and charity which are integral to a theologically ordered econ-
omy of mutuality, reciprocity, and gift-exchange.
3. Transcendental Ontology as a Science of the Individual
No single shift within the Western Latin tradition of scholasticism can
account for the passage from the patristic and medieval Christian Neo-
391
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A. de Muralt, L’Enjeu de la philosophie médiévale. Études thomistes, scotistes, occamiennes et
grégoriennes (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1991); A. de Muralt, L’unité de la philosophie politique. De
Scot, Occam et Suarez au libéralisme contemporain (Paris: Vrin, 2002).
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Platonist metaphysics of creation to the modern transcendental science
of ontology. However, rival accounts of individuation encapsulate the
conceptual change which both reflected and reinforced practical trans-
formations that led to the primacy of abstract, formal individuality over
real relations embodied in liturgical, political, and socioeconomic prac-
tices. What binds together all the aforementioned shifts is the idea
shared by Scotus, Ockham, Suárez, and Spinoza that in some important
sense things self-individuate, a claim that is central to the genesis and
evolution of modern ontology.
Indeed, Scotus inverts the former scholastic sequence of studying
the problem of universals before exploring the principle of individuation.
By arguing that the ultimate source of individuation of all things is in fact
an entity’s haecceitas, Scotus posits individuality as
a fundamental and primitive component of reality. . . . For Scotus, indi-
viduality, that is haecceitas, was not subject to further analysis; indeed
it was not even subject to definition. And Ockham was not far from
this position when he maintained that individual things are individual
essentially, for, if individuality is a matter of essence, it cannot be sub-
ject to analysis. Thus Scotus explained individuation in terms of a
primitive and unanalyzable principle, and Ockham indicated that in-
dividuality needs no explanation because everything is individual by
itself.17
Here one can go further than Gracia and link Scotus’s substitution of an
ontology of representation for a metaphysics of participation to
Ockham’s ontology of individuality without individuation. For the con-
ceptual key that reconciles the apparent opposition between Scotist real-
ism and Ockhamist nominalism is the shift away from both analogical be-
ing and the divine act to the idea of univocal being and this-ness
(haecceitas) or singularity. Paradoxically, Scotus’s defense of common na-
ture is compatible with Ockham’s denial of the real presence of universals
in particular things because natura communis describes the essence of a
thing, which is indifferent to that thing’s really existent instantiation and
embodiment. As such, both Scotus and Ockham — in an attempt to tie to-
392
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17. Jorge J. E. Gracia, “Epilogue: Individuation in Scholasticism,” in Individuation in
Scholasticism: The Later Middle Ages and the Counter-Reformation 1150-1650, ed. J. J. E.
Gracia (New York: State University of New York Press, 1994), pp. 543-50 (548).
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gether individual, empirical reality with universal, conceptual intelligibil-
ity — conclude that the source of individuality is the thing itself rather
than its creative source in God. The transcendental ontology that sup-
plants the Neo-Platonist metaphysics of creation is in this sense a science
of the individual that nonetheless leaves individuality unexplained.
On this both Scotus’s and Ockham’s onto-theologies are much closer
to Aristotle’s theo-ontology than Plato’s metaphysical theology. The
Stagirite separates all composite substances in the sublunary world
from the efficient causality of the Prime Mover, which merely acts as fi-
nal cause. By contrast, Plato views things as existing through the partici-
pation in the forms and the Good as the form of all forms which is de-
scribed as the author of all things — a conception that arguably implies
both efficient and final causality as well as the idea of a gift of being
whereby particulars have neither existence nor essence outside their re-
lations to forms and to other particulars.
This fundamental difference between Aristotle and Plato was al-
ready glossed over by early Neo-Platonists such as Porphyry, who in his
Isagoge — the standard introduction to Aristotle’s Categories for many
centuries — wrongly attributes to Plato an ontology and epistemology of
essentially individual things. Writing that individuals “which are predi-
cated of one alone . . . are infinite,” Porphyry adds that “[t]his is why Plato
exhorts us to stop going down from the most general to the most spe-
cific, to go down through the intermediary levels and to divide by differ-
ences. He tells us to leave the infinite [individuals] alone. For there is no
knowledge of them.”18 While it is true that Plato rules out absolute
knowledge of individuals qua individuals, he argues that things are indi-
viduated and known as such in relation to the Good which endows them
with goodness. For this reason, Plato balances the metaphysical and the
epistemic modality of individuation. By contrast, Aristotle privileges the
epistemic modality because he shifts the onus from relation to sub-
stance and from the relational individuation of the Good to the unity of
individual substance and proximate matter, as I argued in chapter 1.
The link between Aristotle and Scotus is the twin thematic of being
and intelligibility. On the question of individuation, Bruno Pinchard has
made the point that Aristotle’s science of generation and corruption is
over-determined by his science of abstraction and predication in such a
393
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18. Quoted in Paul Vincent Spade, ed., Five Texts on the Medieval Problem of Universals:
Porphyry, Boethius, Abelard, Duns Scotus, Ockham (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1994), pp. 5-6.
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way that unintelligible matter is paradoxically the main epistemic (and
genetic) principle of individuation.19 Leaving aside problems with
Pinchard’s interpretation, it is instructive to consider Alberto Toscano’s
argument (based on Pinchard) that “[t]he determination of what is
proper to thought — the binding of thought to the question of universal-
ity — generates an impasse in the interrogation of the relationship be-
tween being and individuality. This relationship becomes explicitly
thematized only within medieval scholasticism, and specifically in the
work of Duns Scotus.”20 Aquinas (and others before him) had already
conceptualized the convertibility of being and unity, so beyond Toscano
one can suggest that both Scotus and Ockham eschew a metaphysics of
creation in favor of an abstract ontology of self-individuation — an ac-
count that is clearly more Aristotelian than Neo-Platonist.
Even though Suárez rejects some key aspects of the Scotist and
Ockhamist account of individuation, he does accept their argument that
the Aristotelian category of individual substance is a superior explana-
tion of reality compared to the Platonist notion that participable univer-
sals are instantiated in participating particulars. This break with the
Neo-Platonist metaphysics of relationality is reflected in Suárez’s discus-
sion in his Disputationes metaphysicae of individuality as a fundamental
kind of unity that precedes formal unity and underpins universality.
Likewise, Spinoza’s insistence on conatus as the self-individuating power
of finite, immediate modes confirms and radicalizes the disjunction be-
tween the individuality of particular things and the universality of the in-
finite substance, for substantial infinity cannot explain why there would
be modal finitude.
Common to these accounts is the assumption that individuality qua
individuality is more fundamental than any link that might pertain be-
tween universals and particulars. This ontological claim is correlated
with a shift away from the patristic and medieval theological argument
(made by Origen, the Cappadocians, and Cyril of Alexandria, and later de-
veloped by Aquinas) that the event of the Incarnation marks the fusion of
the divine and the human in Christ through whom we ascend to union
with God. Thus, Christological and Trinitarian theology is inextricably
bound up with a theological metaphysics of creation and individuation.
394
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19. Bruno Pinchard, “Le principe d’individuation dans la tradition aristotélicienne,”
in Le problème de l’individuation, ed. Pierre-Noël Mayaud (Paris: Vrin, 1991), pp. 27-50.
20. Toscano, The Theatre of Production, pp. 6-7.
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For the manifestation of the Son in the created order reveals the Trinitar-
ian economy in which we can participate through him and in this manner
perfect our own unique form as well as the whole of creation.
Crucially, the transcendental science of ontology reinforces the early
modern notion that the ancient, patristic, and medieval problem of indi-
viduation has been resolved and that the question of individuality no
longer requires detailed analysis, as evinced by the absence of any signif-
icant discussion in Descartes’ Meditationes, which were written a mere
forty-four years after Suárez had devoted more than 150 pages in his
Disputationes metaphysicae in 1597.21 Although Descartes himself recti-
fies this lacuna elsewhere in his oeuvre, much of early modern philoso-
phy viewed all things as irreducibly and somehow unexplainably individ-
ual. Empiricist philosophers from Locke via Berkeley to Hume go even a
step further and treat individuality as an a priori given that is coexten-
sive with the existence of all things: “All Things, that exist, being particu-
lars . . .”; “But it is a universally received maxim, that every thing which
exists, is particular”; “. . . this a principle generally receiv’d in philosophy,
that every thing in nature is individual.”22 As such, the perennial problem
of the causes and principles of individuation mutates into the modern
maxim of fixed individual identity in space and time. Coupled with the
idea of pure nature (which was a modern theological invention linked to
Duns Scotus’s substitution of univocal being for analogical being and
Suárez’s theory of general and specific metaphysics),23 the concept of in-
dividual substances as self-individuating entities in Descartes, Spinoza,
and Leibniz is integral to the foundation of modern philosophy.
In the following sections, I will trace the connections between late
medieval and modern conceptions of individuation in greater detail,
notably in Kant’s ontology. My argument is that a theological metaphys-
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21. Jorge J. E. Gracia, “The Centrality of the Individual in the Philosophy of the Four-
teenth Century,” History of Philosophy Quarterly 8 (1991): 225-51.
22. John Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, III.27.iii, III.3.i, ed. P. H.
Nidditch and intro. Pauline Phemister (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), p. 409;
George Berkeley, Three Dialogues Between Hylas and Philonous, 2:192, in The Works of
George Berkeley, ed. A. Luce and T. E. Jessop (London: Thomas Nelson & Sons, 1948); David
Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, I.i.7, ed. L. A. Selby-Bigge (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 1958), p. 19.
23. For an overview and important extension of this argument, see Jacob Schmutz,
“La doctrine médiévale des causes et la théologie de la nature pure (XIIIe-XVIIe siècles),”
Revue thomiste 101 (2001): 217-64.
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ics of relational participation outflanks the modern dichotomy between
autonomous, self-organizing modalities of individuation (Suárez and
Spinoza) and heteronomous, mechanistic modalities of individuation
(Descartes and Leibniz) by inscribing human agency and natural laws
into the ecstatic excess of divine creativity which underpins all natural
motion and social activity. The emphasis on relational being and triadic
structures in the world also outwits in advance the later modern opposi-
tion between transcendentalism (Wolff and Kant) and positivism
(Comte and Bentham).
4. Being Transcendentalized (Descartes and Leibniz)
In this and the following section, I will relate modern ontology as a sci-
ence of the individual and the transcendental status of being (ens) to the
primacy of abstract individuality over primary real relations in modern
political thought. The conceptual link is the ontological replacement of
analogical being with univocal being and the epistemological reduction
of actual things to abstract entities.
A. The Transcendental Status of Being (ens)
As Alberto Toscano has rightly argued, the wider implications of Scotus’s
thesis of univocity for the new science of ontology can only be fully ap-
preciated in relation to his account of individuation.24 Indeed, Scotus’s
claim that the indifferent essence of a being (its natura communis) and
its this-ness (or haecceitas) are both real and intelligible as such is key to
his closely connected claim that being is neither analogical nor equivo-
cal but instead univocal. Furthermore, Scotus surpasses the divide in Ar-
istotle’s theo-ontology between the conceptual intelligibility of univer-
sals (arrived at by abstraction) and the empirical reality of particulars
(apprehended by sensory perception) by suggesting that both being and
individuality (not unity) are coterminous.
By contrast, Aquinas had defended the thesis that being and unity are
transcendentally convertible and that individuality in the created order
dimly reflects the Creator’s meta-individual nature — in a similar way that
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analogical common being does not exist by itself but instead is by sharing
in God’s pure act (as I showed in chapter 5). Taken together, the Scotist
univocity of being as well as the coextension of what is (ens) and what is in-
dividual imply that being insofar as it is being (ens qua ens) can now be in-
vestigated by metaphysics independently of either theology or physics.25
The absolute unity of the object of metaphysics — which encom-
passes being (ens), thing (res), and something (aliquid) — means that be-
ing and individuality are collapsed into a single category that must be
univocal and transcendental so that it contains all the equivocal mean-
ings of being (esse) and unity (unitas). For this reason, the status of meta-
physics shifts from being inscribed in a theological ordering of sciences
(as for Aquinas) towards a new science of transcendental ontology
whereby being is now seen as a spatialized object and entity abstracted
from its constitutive relations with other things which can be known by
reason alone. On the contrary, Aquinas argues that being (ens) is more
like a mysterious reality that involves trust and faith but can neverthe-
less be apprehended by the senses (always physical as well as spiritual)
and the imagination (as detailed in chapter 5).
Crucially, just as Aristotle’s theo-ontology over-determines the
epistemic modality over the genetic modality of the process of individua-
tion, so Scotus’s onto-theology privileges the epistemological dimension
over the metaphysical dimension of theories of individuation. The reason
for this parallel has to do with their shared emphasis on the foundations of
individuality in beings themselves (rather than in the source of being,
which brings all things into actuality). In either case, this reduces real be-
ings either to effects that are ordered towards God in virtue of final causal-
ity (Aristotle) or to an abstract concept that conflates being and individu-
ality — secured by the transcendental form of unity that characterizes
both the natura communis and haecceitas of all things (Scotus).
By contrast with the Angelic Doctor’s theological metaphysics of tran-
scendent individuation, the Subtle Doctor’s transcendental ontology of
immanent self-individuation goes beyond Aristotle’s theory by superim-
posing “being and thought in the transcendental unity of a concept of the
ens within a unified science of ontology.”26 Moreover, univocal being elimi-
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26. Toscano, The Theatre of Production, p. 9.
429
G:\Pabst\first corrections
Monday, January 16, 2012 2:52:19 PM
Color profile: Disabled
Composite  140 lpi at 45 degrees
nates the real difference between existence and essence and therefore
prioritizes the formality of a thing’s essence over the reality of its actual
instantiation and embodiment. In this manner, Scotus reduces things in-
scribed in cosmic space and time to spatialized objects and even to ab-
stract entities or mere ‘somethings’ (aliquid), as Eric Alliez has docu-
mented.27 This shift is central to the emergence and evolution of modern
ontology, for it abstracts beings from the metaphysical relations that con-
stitute them as unique, particular, individuated, real things. As set out in
chapter 7, Petrus Aureoli builds on Scotus’s epistemologically over-
determined ontology of representation and reconfigures intentional being
(esse intentionale) as an objective or represented being (esse obiective sive
repraesentatum), which is the objective content of the first-order concept
formed by intellective abstraction from a thing’s actual instantiation. On
the contrary, Aquinas defines esse intentionale as a spiritual mode of cogni-
tion whereby the senses mediate to the mind the species form of compos-
ites or form in relation to material embodiment (chapter 5). Like Scotus,
Aureoli devalues real actuality in favor of formal possibility by focusing on
form or essence fully abstracted from material existentiality.
In turn, Suárez inverts the patristic and medieval Neo-Platonist pri-
ority of being over knowledge by making the ‘objective reality’ of repre-
sented being the focus of knowing — rather than beings in their full ac-
tuality.28 In this way, concepts are no longer that with which the mind
has knowledge of reality (as for Boethius or Aquinas) but become them-
selves the objects of knowledge. Linked to this is the shift in emphasis
from the virtuality of Scotus’s formal possibility to the reality of existent
essence, a shift that marks a return to Thomist realism in name alone. In
fact, Suárez reinforces the earlier Scotist displacement of actuality by
equating a being’s reality with the objectity of its real essence (essentia
realis). Since the adequate object of metaphysics is ens in quantum ens
reale (defined as that which has a real essence), being (ens) is drained of
its metaphysical reality and reduced to an entity of abstraction. As
shown in chapter 7, this is why he follows Buridan in defining the proper
object of metaphysics as substance qua substance — freed from all de-
terminations, materiality and immateriality, infinity and finitude, actual-
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ity and possibility.29 Compared with Aristotle, substance as real essence
is not just extracted from the union with proximate matter but also
stripped of any teleological links with God’s actuality. In part, it is this
scholastic legacy that underpins both Descartes’s and Leibniz’s theory of
individuation, to which I briefly turn now.
B. On Descartes’s Spiritual Monism
Broadly speaking, the post-scholastic metaphysics of substance seeks to
explain the individuality of things and their continuity over time in space
by focusing on fixed laws and ratios of motion. These laws eschew the
shared Platonist and Aristotelian teleological ordering of things to their
final end in favor of self-individuating substances that either constitute a
Cartesian/Malebranchian system or represent something like Lockean
atoms and Leibnizian monads. As a result, Aristotelian primary sub-
stances, which had previously been the essence of things, are reduced to
secondary substances. Specifically, Descartes was first to radicalize Aris-
totle’s causal theology in the direction of divine causa sui, which is the
foundation for essentially arbitrary ratios and laws of motion (here sur-
passing even Ockham’s voluntarism). Understood primarily in terms of
effectivity, God’s causal activity is severed from divine love and the infu-
sion of everything with shares of goodness. As such, the individuating ac-
tualization of things is mechanistic (rather than creative) and immanent
(rather than connected with intra-Trinitarian relations). In what follows,
I also suggest that the Cartesian dualism between res cogitans and res
extensa is secured by an equally questionable monism of the Spirit as
consciousness into which both God and souls are collapsed.
Descartes’s Principles set out his theory of individuation in terms of
a thing’s spatiality as well as the underlying geometric and kinematic
principles. I will discuss these two principles in turn. First of all, unlike
the patristic and medieval Neo-Platonist idea of particular beings as mi-
crocosms that reflect in some limited and imperfect manner the macro-
cosm of the universe, the Cartesian view emphasizes the identity of a
thing’s substance and its internal space:
Nor in fact does space, or internal place, differ from the corporeal sub-
stance contained in it, except in the way in which we are accustomed
399
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to conceive of them. For in fact the extension in length, breadth, and
depth which constitutes the space occupied by a body, is exactly the
same as that which constitutes the body.30
Descartes’s assumption is that the nonrelational spatiality intrinsic to
each thing is absolutely independent from its extrinsic spatial relations.
Except for causality and space, there is thus no ontological link between
the modulations of the universe (as Augustine would put it) and all the
individual things therein.
This focus on internal space at the expense of cosmic place is based
on Descartes’s claim that the spatial features of a composite substance
are essential, not accidental properties, and that extension is cotermi-
nous with essence. In turn, properties such as color are particular to a
composite and cognizable through the essence alone.31 Here it is impor-
tant to point out that Descartes views substance and extension as being
so intimately intertwined that abstraction from materiality renders no-
tions of extension incomplete. So rather like Aristotle, he insists on the
link between form and matter (e.g., the ‘substantial union’ of body and
soul), but rather like Scotus and Suárez he emphasizes essence instead
of existence. Since the relation between species and individuals is col-
lapsed into the relation between species and genus, both are treated as
relations of abstraction between concepts. For this reason, the concep-
tion of an object’s individuality is now twice removed from particular be-
ings themselves: first of all, the concept of an extended thing abstracts
from the actuality of the thing (e.g., abstracting from a cubic thing to the
concept of cube) and, second, the objective reality of the idea of a repre-
sented thing is a further abstraction from the entity of that thing (ab-
stracting from the concept of cube to the concept of polyhedron). In the
words of Descartes, “by the objective reality of an idea I mean that in re-
spect of which the thing represented in the idea is an entity,”32 a concep-
tion that strongly echoes Scotus’s and Suárez’s shared accentuation of
400
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representation (not participation) and ‘objectity’ (not actuality). At the
same time, knowledge of individuals qua individuals requires the reverse
of abstraction whereby we apply ideas of things in a series of instantia-
tions until we have knowledge of something that has no further instance.
However, this process is grounded in prior cognition of the I or ego as
an isolated and immanent, finite thinking substance and of God as a self-
caused and transcendent, infinite ‘other.’ As such, ideas are not univer-
sals in things (as for Plato and Christian Neo-Platonism) but rather rep-
resentations of entities already abstracted from their real actualization.
Knowledge of individuals involves projecting ideas back onto reality un-
til we encounter noninstantiable things, as I have already indicated.
Moreover, this process of reverse abstraction runs into intractable prob-
lems, notably a discrepancy between the shape or ‘internal space’ of an
object and its positioning within temporality and spatiality. For example,
even if the concept of cube were to include position and location in an
indeterminate way, it is still not clear how this relates to position and lo-
cation in material reality. Nor is the move from genus to species the same
as the move from species to individual, physical instantiation. Here Des-
cartes’s ontology of individuality is framed by the a priori knowledge of
mathematical entities which precedes and determines any encounter
with the material world, as the Fifth Meditation makes clear.33 Mathe-
matics and physics predefine the space within which ontology and the-
ology operate — a striking resemblance with the work of Porreta, as set
out in chapter 4.
In addition to geometric principles, the Principles (sections 23-53 of
Part II) also set out the kinematic dimension of individuation. Descartes
describes the motion that is divinely injected into matter and operates
between contiguous bodies as the transference of a particular body
whose parts move together. So configured, transference — a term that
also occurs in the work of Porreta (even though Descartes does not seem
to have had any knowledge of this) — and the laws of impact must be
added to geometric shape and metric location as co-principles that indi-
viduate substances. In this manner, Descartes links divine causal activity
to the individuation of things, though the reason for this link is arbitrary
and not governed by God’s Logos of love and goodness (as in Christian
Neo-Platonism). Rather, Descartes appeals to divine necessary existence
401
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as the extrinsic source of motion that provides the conditions of possibil-
ity for the formal unity of things that exist as individuals (bodies whose
parts move together):
For I can well enough recognize that that idea [of a perfect body] has
been put together by my mind uniting together all corporeal
perfections, because it can equally well be affirmed and denied of
them. Nay, because when I examine this idea of body I see in it no force
by means of which it may produce or preserve itself, I rightly conclude
that necessary existence [a term that resonates with Avicenna and
Scotus], which alone is here in question, does not belong to the nature
of a body.34
Descartes can only appeal to his doctrine of continuous creation in or-
der to account for this extrinsic source of motion. This conception con-
firms that his theologically independent physics is paradoxically over-
determined by his causal theology.
However, it would be misguided to conclude that Descartes’s theory
of individuation runs into the same problems as the dualism between res
cogitans and res extensa. As I have already suggested, knowledge of mate-
rial things presupposes and requires knowledge of the self and God, both
of which are cognized as nonmaterial entities (the self as a thinking
thing and God as separate from divine physical creation). Since mathe-
matical concepts provide knowledge of physical things only from the
perspective of generality (not particularity), both the knowing subject
and the known object must be embodied, and the intellect necessitates
the testimony of the senses as well as confirmation of the imagination. It
is only because ideas in the mind are infinite that the human intellect
can see the self and God as transcendent objects of knowledge exceeding
determinate concepts, a vision that is spiritual as much as intellectual.
But Descartes denies the objects of physics this kind of natural transcen-
dence and views them as complex machines that somehow stand behind
the collision of simple bits of matter that are not fully individuated. For
this reason, his epistemology reinforces the — otherwise undemon-
strated — onto-theological gulf between Creator and creation and re-
stricts proper individuation to the finite, imperfect individuality of the
402
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self and the infinite, perfect individuality of God. Here the finitude of the
self is absolutely separate from divine infinity and at the same time qual-
ified by the permanent intrusion of God’s seemingly arbitrary volition
which transgresses the dualism of res extensa and res cogitans.
Moreover, mathematical and geometrical ideas — which are not in-
dividual but instead general — cannot explain how the disembodied in-
tellect of the thinking self can come to know the individuality of ex-
tended physical objects. It is not enough to object that these ideas
introduce stability and structure into the volatile and uncertain flux of
sensory experience. For this does not explain where they are located, as
Emily Grosholz has rightly remarked. Extension cannot be discovered in
the unextended ego thinking nothing but itself. Nor can such an idea be
embodied in nature, which can after all be undone by God’s overriding,
absolute will. And since the immaterial God is not an instance of exten-
sion, the only remaining locus is the divine mind which thinks eternal es-
sences. If this is the case, then the Fifth Meditation describes the self ’s
encounter of God’s necessary existence (and divine essence) as an en-
counter with eternal ideas in the divine intellect, which transgresses
both the autonomy and self-certainty of the ego.
The Cartesian system, by radicalizing Scotus’s representational epis-
temology and Suárez’s transcendental ontology, transcendentalizes both
knowing and being. In this manner, Descartes rules out any possibility of
a real, ontological difference and an analogical relation between Creator
and creation that would secure both the integrity of the latter and its
participation in the former. Without the unity of form and matter as well
as their shared relationality vis-à-vis the divine source of being, both God
and souls “tend to collapse back into an undifferentiated spiritual one-
ness. . . . Spirit, as consciousness, is always one; thinking that thinks
thinking is just more thinking. But undifferentiated spirit is no more an
individual than undifferentiated matter.”35 As such, behind the ontologi-
cally questionable Cartesian dualism of res cogitans and res extensa lurks
a theologically dubious monism that negates materiality and shifts the
onus of individuation onto the generality of geometric/kinematic princi-
ples and ideas in God’s mind, which the human intellect somehow




35. Grosholz, “Descartes and the Individuation of Physical Objects,” pp. 55-56.
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C. On Leibniz’s Mental Monism
Leibniz’s theory of individuation is widely associated with his concep-
tion of substantial entities and nonmaterial monads, which are self-
individuating and therefore require neither the divine act of being (as in
Aquinas) nor the confluence of common nature and haecceity (as in
Scotus). However, in what follows I argue that Leibniz’s account requires
some kind of mental monism in order to see things as really distinct in
nature but somehow common in the mind. Not unlike Descartes’s fusion
of dualism with monism, Leibniz’s conception of individuation oscillates
between the real individuality of things and the mental unity of the
world.
Contrary to many other modern philosophers, Leibniz accords a
central place to the question of individuation. The nature of individuality
is discussed extensively not just in his Disputatio metaphysica de prin-
cipio individui of 1663 but also in his Discourse de métaphysique (1686),
the Nouveux essais sur l’entendement humain (1704), the Monadologie
(1714), and The Principles of Nature and of Grace, Based on Reason (1714).
Common to all these texts is the idea that the source of individuation is a
real, physical principle that is founded in actual things and “serves as the
foundation for the formal notion in the mind of ‘individual,’ understood
as individuation or numerical difference.”36 So configured, the ontologi-
cal principle that individuates substances is different from the
epistemological principle that enables us to know the logical sense of in-
dividuality based on predication.
Here the philosophical and theological status of substance is crucial.
Whereas Descartes’s account of individuation is closer to Scotus’s substi-
tution of representation for participation, Leibniz’s theory is in fact more
indebted to Ockham’s denial (contra the Subtle Doctor) of the presence
of real universals in actual things and also to Suárez’s emphasis on self-
individuating substances. Indeed, Leibniz rejects what he calls the ex-
treme realism of the Scotists and instead combines Ockham’s nominal-
ism with Suárez’s transcendentalism to argue that there is no common
nature in things and no formal distinction.37 Rather, any ratio that might
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apply to individuals is an ens rationis in the mind and not a shared
fundamentum in re. As such, substantiality in things is always already in-
dividual, not universal. In this manner, he argues that substances some-
how self-individuate in virtue of their whole entity (entitas tota), consist-
ing of individuated ‘natures’ (and, in the case of composites, also of
individuated ‘matters’).38
Compared with Suárez and Descartes, Leibniz shifts the focus even
more from Aristotelian substance to the late scholastic and early mod-
ern idea of entity, stripped of any constitutive relationality. In this way,
the mind can abstract a single concept that represents a thing’s form —
independently from its actual embodiment in matter and its positioning
in relations with other beings and the source of being in God. In turn,
this allows Leibniz to reject the Scotist formal distinction between exis-
tence and essence in favor of a monist account according to which exis-
tence and essence coincide and are really identical. Since existence is al-
ways existence of some kind, it follows for Leibniz that all that exists is
always ordered to individual existence, which presupposes individuation
and therefore cannot be its principle.39 But Leibniz — like Scotus,
Suárez, and Descartes before him — fails to recognize that the divine act
of being which brings something into actuality (as in Aquinas) avoids
both the formalism of the Scotist theory and the monism of Leibniz’s
proposed solution.
Indeed, in his mature work Leibniz replaces the language of whole
entities with a grammar of monads. What underpins the latter is the un-
demonstrated claim that individual, nonmaterial substances subsist in
themselves and have an intrinsic principle of action — centers of activity
or monads consisting of appetition and perception. Not unlike Des-
cartes’s system, Leibniz’s ontology posits a quasi-cosmic consciousness
located in each mind which can apprehend the rest of the world in a sin-
gle act of perception. Since each perception contains all of its predeces-
sors and successors (and therefore forms an indivisible whole) and since
perception is coextensive with individual monads, perception is self-
individuated. Similarly, appetition as the principle of activity underlying
the generation of perceptions secures the unity of each monad and thus
405
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distinguishes it from all other monads. As such, appetition is self-
individuated. Like ‘natures’ and ‘matters’ in the earlier works, perception
and appetition are always already individuated and ensure that the indi-
viduation of monads is an intrinsic principle that does not require the di-
vine act of being.
As a result, Leibniz is forced to posit some kind of mental universal-
ism that enables the human intellect to know at the same time each
monad in its radical singularity and the unity of the world as a whole.
Here he inverts the Augustinian idea of microcosms reflecting the mac-
rocosm by suggesting that each individual monad fully contains all other
monads, thereby collapsing transcendence into immanence. In turn, this
explains why in his treatise on theodicy he equates the actuality at any
one time with the highest possibility available. As I will suggest later in
this chapter, this leads to the modern transcendentalization of the im-
manent. Before I can discuss this, I turn to the twin thematic of creation
and individuation in the work of Hobbes and Locke.
5. Being Atomized (Hobbes and Locke)
In this section, I show how both Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679) and John
Locke (1632-1704) are deeply indebted to the voluntarism and nominal-
ism of Ockham. This is significant, for it underscores the continuity be-
tween late scholasticism and (early) modern thought, notably in relation
to the tradition of social contract. Ockham’s theology is central to the
emergence of modern political philosophy for at least two reasons. First,
the erasure of God from the perceptible universe negates the patristic and
medieval idea that even after the Fall the biblical primacy of divinely cre-
ated peace over human violence is dimly reflected in the structures of the
natural and the social realm.40 Second, it establishes the primacy of God’s
absolute power (which is fideistically believed) over the divine ordering of
the universe (which is mediated through natural law).
406
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A. On Hobbes
That the thought of Hobbes is deeply indebted to late medieval nominal-
ism and voluntarism is clear from his emphasis in the Leviathan on will
and artifice rather than reason and nature as the foundational catego-
ries of political philosophy. Moreover, Hobbes’s epistemological skepti-
cism leads him to argue that human reasoning cannot provide natural
knowledge of supernatural ends in God. Instead, the nominalist denial of
real universals in particulars and the voluntarist account of both divine
and human nature — taken together — imply that individuality is more
fundamental than communality. These two philosophical commitments
also underpin his claim that modern, centralized authority of the ‘sover-
eign one’ is more clearly compatible with the individual freedom of ‘the
many’ than the ancient, patristic, and medieval idea of the rule by ‘the
few’ (Plato’s Guardians or virtuous elites) who have knowledge of the
Good.41
Even more clearly than Ockham and Suárez, Hobbes links potentia
Dei absoluta to sovereignty. First of all, the denial of real universals
means that both God and the created structures of the world remain hid-
den from human cognition. We cannot know the world as it really is. All
that we experience are the effects of the world upon our passions and
our intellect. In line with certain strands of Calvinist theology, Hobbes
believes that the postlapsarian condition is one of permanent violence.
In the ‘state of nature,’ life is “solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short” be-
cause “man is a wolf to man” (homo homini lupus) and there is a “war of
all against all” (bellum omnium contra omnes).42 Even if this original
threat of violent death does not describe an epoch in history but instead
constitutes a principle that is internal to the state (evident only at the hy-
pothetical moment of its dissolution), it remains the case that Hobbes’s
acceptance of a nominalist ontology leads him to posit violence as more
fundamental to life than peace.
Second, linked to this is the modern aporia between unalterable na-
ture and human artifice, as reflected in Hobbes’s conception of the hu-
man body as a machine and the commonwealth as an artificial human
407
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being. His distinct contribution to early modern thought is to fuse mech-
anism, materialism, and nominalism: since human emotions, thoughts,
and reasoning are the sole product of mechanical interactions, the
Christian Neo-Platonist idea of an immaterial Creator God whose spirit
permeates material creation and ordains all things to the highest Good
is ruled out. The political order does not mirror either the city, the uni-
verse, or the Body of Christ; instead, it is constructed based on a priori
first principles and a fixed material world characterized by the ‘state of
nature.’ Crucially, Hobbes’s commitment to a nominalist ontology is il-
lustrated by the absence of any naturally given moral ties or social
bonds: in De Cive, the state of nature is described in terms of “looking at
men as if they had just emerged from the earth like mushrooms and
grown up without any obligation to each other” (De Cive viii.1).
Here it is important to stress that Hobbes, unlike Locke after him, is
opposed to extreme versions of ontological atomism precisely because of
the mechanical structure of all material reality, which is not the same as
a crude determinism. Rather, it allows for the centrality of human exper-
iment — a conception that Hobbes shares in part with Boyle.43 This is
confirmed by his critique of the Aristotelian focus on separate essences
in the De corpore where Hobbes insists that intelligent beings are think-
ing bodies and that bodies or their properties are never separated from
each other.44 What binds all matter together is a set of mechanical links.
At the same time, Hobbes’s indebtedness to late scholasticism is no-
where more visible than in his endorsement of nominalism and the
mechanization of Aristotelian ontology, as Cornelius Leijenhorst has ex-
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43. Steven Shapin and Simon Schaffer, Leviathan and the Air-Pump: Hobbes, Boyle,
and the Experimental Life (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985).
44. In the word of Hobbes, “But the abuse consists in this, that when some men see
that the increases and decreases of quantity, heat, and other accidents can be considered,
that is, submitted to reasons, as we say, without consideration of bodies or their subjects
(which is called “abstraction” or “existence apart from them”), they talk about accidents as
if they could be separated from every body. The gross errors of certain metaphysicians
take their origin from this; for from the fact that it is possible to consider thinking without
considering body, they infer that there is no need for a thinking body; and from the fact
that it is possible to consider quantity without considering body, they also think that
quantity can exist without body and body without quantity, so that a quantitative body is
made only after quantity has been added to a body. These meaningless vocal sounds, ‘ab-
stract substances,’ ‘separated essence,’ and other similar ones, spring from the same foun-
tain” (Thomas Hobbes, De corpore III.4, ed. Karl Schuhmann [Paris: Vrin, 1999], p. 34 [orig.
Latin], English trans. and ed. William Molesworth [London: J. Bohn, 1839-45]).
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tensively documented.45 In short, Hobbes’s metaphysics rejects Carte-
sian dualism in favor of a material monism in which beings are linked by
mechanistic interactions alone. By stripping things of any other links, he
unwittingly paves the way for the atomism of Locke (which will be dis-
cussed in the next subsection).
Third, this ontology has important political ramifications. Since he
assumes a natural state of disorder that cannot be overcome (because
no other knowledge of the world is available to us), Hobbes can only
imagine the imposition of an artificial order. This takes the form of the
commonwealth, which merely regulates the violence of life. By contrast,
Christian Neo-Platonists like Augustine and Aquinas do not think of hu-
man fallibility and the penultimacy of politics in fatalistic terms but in-
stead see them as part of our efforts to resolve violence through peace by
way of the creative perfection of a more fundamental natural, created or-
der. Even though Hobbes distinguishes the commonwealth by free, con-
tractual institution from the commonwealth by forceful, violent acquisi-
tion, in either case the sovereign has supreme power to ‘give life’ or to
withdraw it from his subjects. Similarly, obedience to the sovereign is al-
ways for fear of a violent death.46
Fourth, since man is driven by fear of violent death and self-interested
self-preservation, peace (or rather the absence of open conflict) can only
be enforced through the absolute authority of the Leviathan. Beyond
Ockham and Suárez, Hobbes’s commonwealth does not just elevate the
state over the church but also subjects the multiplicity of the people to a
uniform social contract that purports to represent their single will:
A multitude of men, are made one person, when they are by one man,
or one person, represented; so that it be done with the consent of ev-
ery one of that multitude in particular. For it is the unity of repre-
senter, not the unity of the represented, that maketh the person one.47
As such, the ‘sovereign one’ embodies and enforces the unity of ‘the
many,’ without however offering a genuine body politic that upholds its
members qua members of a transcendent whole.
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46. Hobbes, Leviathan II.xvii-xx, pp. 109-36.
47. Hobbes, Leviathan I.xvi, p. 107 (editor’s italics).
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Fifth, because we cannot know any alternative natural order either
through reason or faith, human beings are compelled to submit obedi-
ently to the supreme sovereignty of the Leviathan. Once more, it is divine
omnipotence that legitimates this arrangement and sanctifies the exten-
sion of central power to all realms of life and to the preservation or ex-
tinction of individual existences. Here we can clearly see the modern
‘biopolitical’ imperative, as I have argued in greater detail elsewhere.48
Finally, the absence of a proper body politic also explains how
Hobbes’s nominalist ontology (and anthropology) leads him to view man
as nothing but an owner of himself, an individual who does not stand in
relations of mutuality or reciprocity with fellow human beings. As a re-
sult, Hobbes tends to define social relations in proprietary terms, largely
independent of communal bonds governed by substantive values of
peace and justice.49 Such values are unavailable to Hobbes because his
nominalist denial of real universals in the world commits him to rely on
fear and domination in order to impose an artificial order on mutually
distrustful citizens.
In summary, without an account of a transcendent Good that orders
all immanent things, Hobbes can only appeal to the unitary power of the
Leviathan who exercises absolute control through fear and submission.
Justice no longer denotes the harmonious ordering of real relations
amongst members of the body politic (as it does for Augustine and Aqui-
nas), but is reduced to contractual obligation. As such, the omnipotent
Leviathan and ‘sovereign market relations’ enforce the coexistence of in-
dividuals as rival ‘self-proprietors.’ In Hobbes, the modern model of state
and market sovereignty begins to converge and to form the nominalist
horizon that encompasses the modern dialectic between ‘the one’ and
‘the many.’ It is within this nominalist horizon that politics becomes
‘biopolitics’ and sovereign power is redefined as dominion over life.50
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centrality of ‘market relations’ in the work of Hobbes and Locke. C. B. MacPherson, The
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34-95.
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B. On Locke
In what follows, I argue that Locke radicalizes Ockham’s nominalist and
voluntarist ontology as well as Hobbes’s mechanistic materialism in the
direction of metaphysical and political atomism. Since we do not know
the real essences of things, all that is available to us according to Locke is
to infer from the sense perception of properties that these inhere in sub-
stances which act as their substrata — a relation of inherence that we
know a priori (not unlike Aristotle). In turn, we can ascertain that real es-
sences exist in substances because the former act as causes for the latter
— a relation of causation (or necessary connection) that we also know a
priori (unlike Plato or Augustine). Given Locke’s critique of innate ideas
and his skepticism about the reliance on perceptual experience, he lo-
cates the source of our knowledge in volition. It is the exercise of the hu-
man will that enables us to know the existence of necessary connections
between things. As such, nominalism and voluntarism combine to pro-
duce an ontological atomism in the work of Locke, according to which
the world is a set of observable regularities that are grounded in the ne-
cessity of causal links — not bound together and governed by the cre-
ative act of God.
As the work of Fred Wilson attests,51 Locke’s theory of individuation
of composites departs from the tradition of substance metaphysics
stretching back to Aristotle in a number of ways. First of all, he distin-
guishes man in terms of rationality and (not unlike Boethius) defines
person as “a thinking intelligent being.”52 Locke links the rationality of
man to consciousness, which implies self-consciousness. This includes
past actions (as for Leibniz) and raises the issue of identity over time.
Here the crucial difference with both the Neo-Platonist metaphysics of
relational participation and the more Aristotelian (theo-)ontology of
substance is that Locke questions the unity of individual substance by
pointing to the separateness of events in a person’s past experience that
neither reason nor memory can unify (e.g., Essay II.i.14-15, 18-19).
Second, memory is for Locke merely a contingent link and therefore
it cannot secure certain knowledge of the necessary continuity of a sin-
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gle substance. Since responsibility and consciousness do not coincide
(e.g., drunkenness), the principle of responsibility cannot provide a con-
nection between past and present events of experience either. And since
Locke rejects both the Augustinian-Thomist option of God’s transcen-
dent act of being and the Cartesian transcendental ego, he is left with ap-
pealing to a seeming endless series of events contingently linked in time.
The self is either reduced to merely causal relations cognized by reason
or else dissolved in an unintelligible flux of experience. As a result, the
Lockean theory of individuation oscillates between a residual rational-
ism more akin to the substance tradition and an impoverished empiri-
cism that lacks key elements such as social sympathy and reciprocity (as
in Vico, Genovesi, or Hume).
Third, Locke’s position is close to Ockham and Buridan in the sense
that he shares their denial of the reality of universals in things. In the Es-
say he writes that
. . . General and Universal, belong not to the real existence of Things;
but are the Inventions and Creatures of the Understanding, made by it
for its own use, and concern only Signs, whether Words, or Ideas.
Words are general, as has been said, when used for Signs of general
Ideas; and so are applicable indifferently to many particular Things;
And Ideas are general, when they are set up, as the Representatives of
many particular Things: but universality belongs not to things them-
selves, which are all of them particular in their Existence, even those
Words, and Ideas, which in their signification, are general. The signifi-
cation they have, is nothing but a relation, that by the mind of Man is
added to them.53
This indebtedness to late scholastic nominalism moves Locke’s account
away from the realist idea of primary, metaphysical relations between
particulars participating in universals towards a more mechanistic con-
ception focusing on spatiotemporal ratios. The difference with Des-
cartes’s mechanistic metaphysics is a greater emphasis on a corpuscular
kind of mechanism, which Locke, like Hobbes, takes in part from Boyle
(cf. Essay IV.iii.16). This perspective views material things as aggregates
of corpuscules, each of which has an identity of its own and is consti-
tuted by atomic particles of matter.
412
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Here Locke’s atomism is perhaps most clearly visible. Like other at-
omists, he attempts to avoid the problem of infinite regress by arguing
that all material things form bodies, defined in the Essay as a “Particle of
Matter, to which no Addition or Subtraction of Matter [is] made.” How-
ever, Locke applies the notion of ‘body’ not simply to aggregates of parti-
cles but also individual atomic particles and living organisms. As such,
the term ‘body’ cuts across the conceptual distinction affirmed else-
where in the Essay between individual things and general kinds. It is true
that the further distinction between simple and compounded sub-
stances allows him to argue that these belong to different kinds and can
therefore exist in the same place at the same time. But the smallest iden-
tifiable entity remains the atom, defined as “a continued body under one
immutable superficies.”54 So configured, each atom is always already in-
dividual and the basis for the self-individuation of things. The further
distinction between simple and compounded substances does not mod-
ify the atomic foundation of individuality. Indeed, Locke goes as far as
suggesting that compounds are series of numerically different aggrega-
tions of material particles. As a result, compounded substances are indi-
vidual because they are constituted by sequences of numerically differ-
ent individual components that are somehow coordinated, without
however relying on a transcendent first principle or final end in God. By
extension, this also applies to persons and personal identity, grounded
in self-consciousness. Indeed, the parts of human bodies are “vitally
united to this same thinking conscious self, so that we feel when they are
touch’d, and are affected by, and conscious of good or harm that happens
to them, are a part of our selves.”55 So, like his corpuscularian predeces-
sor Boyle, Locke fails to provide a philosophically compelling solution to
the question of how and why atomic particles conjoin to form bodies
and in what way this rules out individuation by an act of divine creativity.
Fourth, Locke attempts to solve the problem of the identity of things
over time and across space by appealing to spatial relations, a conception
that qualifies the primacy of substance over relationality in the tradition
from Aristotle via Scotus to Descartes and Suárez. Accordingly, bodies are
individuated by their location in a unique place, and places are individu-
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ated by distance relations to bodies — another circularity in Locke’s the-
ory. Moreover, it is unclear how Locke would account for these relations
metaphysically, for there is a circularity at work: bodies are distinguished
from each other by their mutual relations of distance in time, a process of
individuation which is the result of a world composed of individual bod-
ies always already separated by spatial distance (Essay II.xxvii.2).56
Linked to this is the problem that Locke does not simply establish a de-
pendency of modes and relations on substance but, crucially, that he
makes them like substance, spatialized (e.g., Essay III.iii.1 and 6) and end-
ing in substance: “All other things being but Modes or Relations ulti-
mately terminated in Substances, the Identity and Diversity of each par-
ticular Existence of them too will be by the same way determined” (Essay
II.xxvii.2). Following Leibniz and Spinoza, Locke posits the individuality
of modes without ever demonstrating why this might be so or how rela-
tions ontologically qualify the substantiality of things.
Finally, in the case of persons there is a tension in Locke’s theory be-
tween material atomism and his emphasis on immaterial consciousness.
Either a person’s thinking self is a unique set of immaterial, simple sub-
stances or else a single, immaterial simple substance. Even though Locke
suggests that God’s goodness ensures the nontransference of conscious-
ness among different thinking substances, he does conceptualize the
conscious activity of thinking in terms of different thinking substances
— such that the unity of personhood is undermined and perhaps fatally
compromised by the multiplicity of thinking agents. A further problem is
that only an appeal to divine goodness can prevent the dissolution of
personhood into series-beings, but in Locke’s system of atomistic mech-
anism this appeal lacks any metaphysical reality and is ultimately
fideistic. So beyond Descartes’s spiritualist monism and Hobbes’s mate-
rial mechanism, Locke’s accentuation of atomic particulars shifts ontol-
ogy further in the direction of atomism.
6. Transcendental Immanence (Wolff and Kant)
In this section, I turn to the work of Christian Wolff (1679-1754) and Im-
manuel Kant (1724-1804). My argument is that Wolff ’s rationalist ontol-
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ogy posits as the principle of individuation the notion of complete deter-
mination which is internal to individual things. This line of argument is
developed by Kant, who fuses the individuation of noumena centered on
the objective reality of ens realissimum with the individuating principle
of spatial relations for phenomena. In the Opus Postumum, however,
Kant’s account of individuation takes a radical turn towards the concept
of moving forces of matter and foreshadows a transcendental material-
ism that nonetheless remains trapped in a representational mode predi-
cated on an uncritical rejection of the Neo-Platonist theological meta-
physics of creation.
A. On Wolff
There are at least three ways in which Wolff ’s theory of individuation is
firmly inscribed in the tradition of transcendental ontology as I have
outlined it. First of all, he equates ‘first philosophy’ (philosophia prima)
with ontology (ontologia), like Clauberg or Clauvergius about seventy-
five years before him. Published in 1729, Wolff ’s book Philosophia prima
sive ontologia deals with the science of being in general whose object is
being insofar as it is being (ens inquantum ens).57 As argued at the be-
ginning of the present chapter, the shift from metaphysics to ontology
was never merely terminological but reflected the idea that being is
univocal and transcendental rather than an analogical and transcen-
dent, universal reality in which particular beings participate (as for
Christian Neo-Platonism).
Second, Wolff — like Scotus and Suárez before him — grants the
question of individuality greater prominence by discussing it prior to
concepts such as universality, truth, or relation. Indeed, successive chap-
ters of the aforementioned book address questions like identity, similar-
ity, the singular, and the universal.
Third, epistemological and methodological issues come to the fore
in Wolff, who ( following Porreta, Aureoli, and Buridan) bases his investi-
gation on principles such as noncontradiction and sufficient reason and
deploys an axiomatic method that excludes the discussion of contrary
views and responses to objections (as the quaestio method differently
415
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developed by Porreta and Aquinas). In part as a result of privileging epis-
temology over ontology, Wolff fails to address key questions such as the
ontological status of individuality in particular things.58
In accordance with the primacy of the mathematical method, Wolff
makes the curious argument that to be individual is to be completely de-
terminate (as opposed to universals in which not everything is determi-
nate or which share determinations with other things). Moreover, to be
individual means that the notion of individual can be affirmed of some-
thing. Since both determination and instantiation relate primarily to the
cognoscibility of things, they represent conditions of individuality that
are epistemological rather than ontological, as Jorge Gracia has rightly
remarked.59 Based on a mathematical definition of determination, Wolff
posits the principle that a thing’s full determination is the same thing as
its individuality. By contrast, universals can never be completely deter-
minate, for otherwise they could not be participated in by particulars.
Based on this argument, Wolff concludes that universals cannot exist in
the order of being — a conviction he shares with Ockham. The fact that
for Wolff, universality as a concept denotes some similarity among
things which the mind alone can discern, confirms his debt to nominal-
ism. On the other hand, he also describes universality as that which indi-
viduals have in common, a position that comes closer to the ‘formalist
realism’ of Duns Scotus. The sense that Wolff embraces the latter rather
than the former is reinforced by his conception of the principle that indi-
viduates a thing as “the intrinsic sufficient reason of the individual” or
this-ness (haecceitas).60
However, Wolff does not follow Scotus in claiming that haecceity is
primitive and unanalyzable. Since Wolff ’s account emphasizes the ge-
neric, specific, and numerical determination of individuals, it is also the
case that his theory of individuation comes close to the idea of individu-
ating determinations or bundles. Even though he does not express it in
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those terms in his book Ontologia, his text on logic makes the point un-
ambiguously: “The principle of individuation includes all principles,
whether numerical, specific or generic. It is the bundle of all the differ-
ences [constituting the individual].”61 As such, Wolff eschews the
Thomist account of the transcendent divine act of being in favor of im-
manent determinations combining Scotist with Ockhamist elements.
Beyond Scotus, Wolff equates the numerical difference of an individual
with a bundle of what the scholastics termed ‘accidental properties’ such
as quantity, size, or color. These can be shared with other individuals and
are neither dependent upon a thing’s essence nor contrary to it. As such,
an individual is this particular thing rather than that particular thing be-
cause of the unique combination of accidental properties that
singularizes either a simple or a compounded substance.
The most fundamental problem with this theory of individuation is
the denial that each thing has its own unique form, in the sense of di-
vinely given particular shares in common created universal being and
goodness. As I have already indicated, Wolff ’s account is ultimately
based upon the claim that being is a transcendental foundation of all
that is. The counterpart to this ontology is the affirmation that individu-
ation can be reduced to unique combinations of accidental properties
that are quasi-positivist. Since the concept of being includes both divine
and created being, it is not surprising that the onus of individuation has
shifted to individuals themselves and now seems to rule out any links
with the first cause. As such, Wolff ’s theory can be described as a variant
of precritical rationalism that qualifies the transcendentalism of Scotus
and Suárez. As I suggest in the following subsection, Kant took this
strand even further towards a transcendentalism that is paradoxically
linked to finitized reason and immanentized individuation whereby
spatiotemporal relations and rules of the mind individuate things.
B. On Kant’s Meta-Ontology
Since the work of Étienne Gilson and nouvelle théologie, we know the ex-
tent to which Kant’s philosophy is shaped by the legacy of late scholasti-
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cism, notably Ockham’s nominalist and voluntarist theology. For this
reason alone, it would be misguided to equate Kant’s project with episte-
mology and cognate fields in philosophy. While he shares the priority of
knowledge over being with Descartes (and arguably also with Scotus),
Kant radicalizes the modern tradition of transcendental ontology by
substituting the transcendental unity of the concept for the transcen-
dental unity of ens and equating individuation with objectification.62 In-
deed, substance and other categories are not simply pure concepts of the
understanding which are a priori rather than abstracted from a posteri-
ori sense perceptions; they also denote the ‘objective reality’ that struc-
tures both phenomenal and noumenal substances. Since knowledge re-
quires an intuitional grasp of things to which properties can be attached,
the formal abstraction of the transcendental unity of the concept also
raises the question of what lies beyond the concept (its dependence on
intuition).
As such, Kant reconfigures ‘substance’ in ways that depart from an
Aristotelian grammar of logical subject or metaphysical being towards a
meta-ontological concept that lies beyond the old divide between the
abstract intelligibility of universals and the concrete reality of particu-
lars. Unsurprisingly therefore, the question of the individual is central to
Kant’s meta-ontology, for “science as such is only possible if the individ-
ual can be brought under the conceptual jurisdiction of the understand-
ing in the form of an object of representation.”63 And since the self-
organization of individuals cannot be such an object, ontology is not a
science of the individual but rather a science that determines the condi-
tions of possibility for the production of individuality — or ontogenesis,
as Toscano is right to argue. The recognition that individuals self-
organize does not just introduce teleological principles into a mechanis-
tic system but, crucially, escapes the cognitive control underpinning
Kant’s own fusion of Newtonian physics with the Scotist onto-theology
of representation. This marks an interruption that destabilizes the archi-
tectonics of the Kantian system, as evinced in the Opus Postumum.
This is not to say however that Kant comes closer to a Neo-Platonist
account of individuality in terms of divine creative activity than he does
to a more Aristotelian focus on form-matter union and causality. Rather,
his redefinition of substance is a shift away from both precritical ratio-
418
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nalism and atomistic empiricism in ways that are nevertheless more
akin to late scholastic Aristotelian ontology than to the Christian Neo-
Platonist metaphysics of creation. Indeed, Kant’s meta-ontology is based
on his exposition of the substance concept as that which contains logical
relations of subject and predicate as well as relations of cause and effect:
[Substance is] something which can exist as subject and never as
mere predicate.64
Each substance (inasmuch as only in respect of its determinations can
it be an effect) must therefore contain in itself the causality of certain
determinations in the other substance, and at the same time the ef-
fects of the causality of that other. (CPR B259)
Crucially, essence or that which makes a substance a substance is intrin-
sic to things and does not depend on any transcendent cause or source
of being: “As object of the pure understanding, every substance must
have inner determinations and powers which pertain to its inner reality”
(CPR B321).
Linked to this Wolffian notion of inner essential determination is
Kant’s argument about the relations of substances to space and relations
of things themselves to appearances. Space is ideal — not real — and as
such does not require any absolute foundation for spatial relations be-
tween things (relata). As relations that are mental modify mental sub-
stance, spatial relations do not need absolute, nonrelational relata, as
Michael Radner has shown.65 Instead, the terms of spatial relations are
themselves composed of relations that can be deconstructed into their
constituent parts — substances separated by space. Unlike early modern
accounts, the individuation of substances is for Kant not the product of
spatial relations (or location within such relations). For such relations
pertain to appearances, not things in themselves: “Everything in our
knowledge which belongs to intuition . . . contains nothing but mere re-
lations; namely of location in an intuition (extension), of change of loca-
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tion (motion), and of laws according to which this change is determined
(moving forces)” (CPR B66-67).
On this basis, Kant makes the argument that only appearances are
relational and that knowing the relations which pertain between objects
does not tell us anything about things in themselves: “Now a thing in it-
self cannot be known through mere relations; and we may therefore con-
clude that since outer sense gives us nothing but mere relations, this
sense can contain in its representation only the relation of an object to
the subject, and not the inner properties of the object in itself ” (CPR
B67). Because Kant is worried about the idea of things consisting wholly
of relations (CPR B341), he subordinates all relations to a thing’s substan-
tiality in order to secure its independence. It is this accentuation of sub-
stance that lies behind the separation of appearances from genuine sub-
stances or essences. Since substances are simple and representable in
terms of ‘objective reality,’ it follows that they are pure essences devoid of
any link to prime matter. As such, Kant follows the Avicennian and
Scotist emphasis on essence at the expense of the Thomist notion of the
unity of essential form and prime matter in the divine act of being.
This is not to suggest that relations between things are eliminated
altogether in Kant’s meta-ontology. On the contrary, he is adamant that
we only know appearances qua appearances in terms of the relations
constituting them. In the Second Analogy, he applies the category of sub-
stance to physical objects in space and their causal relations, also de-
scribed as substantia phenomena in space whose “inner determinations
are nothing but relations; and it itself is entirely made up of mere rela-
tions” (CPR B321). As Radner indicates, Kant attributes the individuation
of phenomenal substances to the form of appearance “which so deter-
mines the manifold of appearance that it allows of being ordered in cer-
tain relations” (CPR B34). Since space is for him ideal (and not material),
it is best classified as a network of relations without relata, as I have al-
ready indicated. As such, the transcendental unity of infinite space pre-
cedes and grounds its finite parts — hence Kant’s transcendental ideal-
ism. The infinity of space can be represented by ideas, which are modes
or modifications of mental substance (their ontological function) and
make something known besides themselves (their epistemological func-
tion). In this manner, the representation of transcendental ‘objective re-
ality’ (rather than the participation of particular things in universal be-
ing) is the cornerstone of Kant’s meta-ontology. Just as space is “the form
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dental ground for the existence of individual substances arranged ac-
cording to spatial relations, so space is also the condition of possibility of
outer sensible intuition and therefore a representation that relates im-
mediately to the object and is singular. Put differently, it is only because
there always already is a network of spatial relations that we can know
the world of outer sense.
As for things in themselves, Kant makes the point that both rational-
ist and empiricist philosophers have failed properly to distinguish sensi-
bility from understanding. In a trenchant critique, he concludes that
“[i]n a word, Leibniz intellectualized appearances, just as Locke . . .
sensualized all concepts of the understanding, i.e., interpreted them as
nothing more than empirical or abstracted concepts of reflection” (CPR
B327, original italics). In some ways like Wolff before him, Kant argues
that real substances (the essences of things in themselves) are the prod-
uct of complete determination — a condition that surpasses identity and
difference and could restrict essential properties to mere relations of in-
ner determinations. Following Suárez, Kant deploys the notion of ens
realissimum as the representation of the whole set of possible predicates,
or “concept of an individual being. . . . Only in this one case is a concept of
a thing — a concept which is in itself universal — completely deter-
mined in and through itself, and known as the representation of an indi-
vidual” (CPR B604). Since the complete determination is a concept
whose totality cannot be exhibited but whose conditions can be thought,
there is here according to Kant an ontological and epistemological coin-
cidence of the abstract intelligibility of universals and the concrete real-
ity of particulars under the aegis of this meta-conceptual level which is
correlated with being at its most general. Paradoxically, the individua-
tion of things in themselves is for Kant synonymous with the
objectification of singularity.
C. On Kant’s Transcendental Materialism
Yet precisely at the point where all is subsumed under the meta-concept
of the represented individual, the Kantian system is almost fatally under-
mined by the irruption of the organic — the self-organization of living in-
dividuals that evades the cognitive control of both concept and intu-
ition, as Alberto Toscano’s seminal book has shown. The way in which
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from late scholasticism is key here. The claim to truth of representation
rests on “the agreement of knowledge with the object” (CPR B236), a for-
mulation that mirrors the shared Aristotelian and Thomist idea of
adequation or convenientia. But building on Scotus and Suárez, Kant re-
places res and intellectus with ‘object’ and ‘concept,’ whose relation must
be “in conformity with a rule” (CPR B238), i.e., some necessary link estab-
lishing some particular mode of connection of the object to the mani-
fold. Put differently, without necessity objects would be indistinguish-
able from the endless series of appearances and there would be no
synthesis of apprehensions. It is this onto-logic of necessity that removes
the possibility of a metaphysic of creation, as Kant himself makes clear.
The idea of object as an event in terms of an interruption of temporality
out of ‘empty time’ is inadmissible: “For if coming to be out of nothing
[creation ex nihilo] is regarded as effect of a foreign cause, it has to be en-
titled creation, and that cannot be admitted as an event among appear-
ances, since its mere possibility would destroy the unity of experience”
(CPR B251).
With divine creation excluded, Kant’s transcendental ontology seeks
to explain the singularity of things in terms of the twin logic of Newto-
nian laws of motion and Kantian rules of the mind. Since phenomena are
assumed to be divorced from noumena and “since matter has absolutely
no internal determinations and ground of determination,”66 only natural
laws of succession and mental rules structuring the flux of sensations
can secure both the unity of experience and the singularity of each
object-as-event in its unique time-position. As Toscano notes, Kant
views the mechanical causation of matter as purely external. As such, he
divides mechanistic from essential natures, with the former governed by
efficient and the latter by final causality. This partition does not however
account for the individuation of organic, self-organizing individuals, for
the reality of self-organization escapes the formality of the individuating
principle based on the correlation of transcendental subjectivity and
transcendental objectivity.
Since organisms cannot be equated with abstract entities or objects,
self-organizing individuals evade rule-bound cognition and their particu-
larity cannot be captured by the formal principle of objective individua-
tion. Real individuals are not subsumable under the concept of objectivity
422
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because for Kant himself we cannot ascertain whether the organic as ob-
ject has objective reality.67 For this reason, transcendental ontology is
over-determined by the logic of representation and undermined by the ir-
ruption of reality of which all real things are part and which is not reduc-
ible to spatiotemporal relations determined by rules of the mind or laws of
motion. Crucially, the latter two cannot account for the real unity beyond
the causal chain of ‘positionings’ in space and time. As Toscano notes, or-
ganic self-organization for Kant involves a relational unity of parts, an in-
tegrated reciprocal causality and auto-production, none of which can be
explained by the externality of both efficient and final causes.68 That is
why Kant seeks to develop an account of organic individuation beyond the
modern opposition between transcendental foundation and empirical in-
duction, an account that is nevertheless part of the modern science of
transcendental onto-theology which is predicated on rejecting — though
not refuting — the Christian Neo-Platonist metaphysics of creation.
Indeed, one can suggest with Toscano that Kant develops his theory
of causation in the direction of a psycho-vitalist theism that postulates
an immaterial principle termed ‘intelligence’ — analogous to a cognitive
power of desire — that individuates matter. Why so? First of all, material
inertia excludes the possibility of material self-individuation. Second,
his argument that matter is divisible to infinity leads him to reject
Lockean atomism. Third, given his opposition to the idea of creation ex
nihilo, Kant also rules out souls in bodies or some world-soul corre-
sponding to the aggregate of general matter. Fourth, the intelligence or
life-force (Lebenskraft) allows Kant to separate life from matter (anti-
hylozoism) and posit an immaterial ideality behind apparently self-
organizing material phenomena. Far from reintroducing the efficient
causality of a first mover, Kant stresses that life-force acts as an efficient
cause “only on the analogy with an intelligence, that is, a cause which we
can represent to ourselves in no other way.”69 So configured, efficient
causality operates neither in terms of Neo-Platonist (including Aristote-
lian) transcendent final ends nor Cartesian iatromechanics but rather in
terms of the purposive activity animating organic, material things. Ulti-
mately, the disjunctive separation of life and matter ensures that Kant
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posits individuality as an irreducible, conceptual foundation that
grounds the modalities of existence and the conditions of possibility for
our understanding. Since Kant merely argues from the logical require-
ment of individuality to its ontological basis, his philosophy of individua-
tion is in fact a philosophy of individuals grounded in a fundamentally
and irreducibly representational logic that eliminates a priori the partic-
ipation of immanent things in a transcending act of being.
My account parts company with Toscano’s reading where the latter
suggests that the introduction of the concept of ‘ether’ or ‘caloric’ marks
a fundamental change in the trajectory of modern theories of individua-
tion. Conceptualized as the unity of absolute matter which escapes ex-
perience but must be presupposed for the sake of evading the undiffer-
entiated series of apprehensions, this concept undergirds all instances
of mechanist causation and material self-organization. As Toscano con-
cludes, that is
where we see the workings of a veritable transcendental materialism,
the attempt to think the non-empirical determinations of a single
matter understood as the field of individuation for all the bodies that
constitute the objects of our cognition, a cognition that cannot expe-
rience this matter as such but must postulate it indirectly.70
However, the problem with this variant of transcendental materialism is
that it posits an entirely undemonstrated and unwarranted monism that
nonetheless masks a dualism. If a ‘single matter’ is ultimate, then it must
be self-causing and auto-generating. But what is the source of and ‘rea-
son’ for this self-causation and auto-generation? Kant’s dismissal of the
metaphysical logic of creation ex nihilo robs him of the necessary con-
ceptual resources fully to account, first of all, for the transcendental
grounding of all immanent things in an individual, single instance (ma-
terial or ideal) which is uncaused and nonrelational, and second, for rea-
son’s grasp of infinite immanence beyond the confines of finitude (in the
Opus Postumum). Kant’s material monism is deeply dualistic precisely
because it drives an absolute wedge between the one and the many and
excludes any kind of participatory mediation by ruling out the idea of di-
vine creativity which brings everything out of nothing into actuality and
sustains all beings in being.
424
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Moreover, the critical destruction of the medieval metaphysics of
creation did not of course bracket God altogether but instead replaced a
personal and relational Creator with the arbitrary intervention of an
anonymous and willful deity whose existence can be cognized but whose
essence remains wholly unintelligible to human reason reaching to in-
finity. For otherwise how can Kant explain that there is such a primary,
onto-(theo-)logical, hyper-individual instance which grounds all ontic
individuals? In other words, Kant’s post-rationalist and post-empiricist
philosophy neither corrects nor overcomes the skeptical formalism/
nominalism and fideistic voluntarism bequeathed by Scotus and
Ockham. Morever, Kant’s account of individuation in terms of single
matter radicalizes Scotus’s transcendental ontology of representation
and Ockham’s politics of divine omnipotence in the direction of an onto-
theology of auto-volition whereby divine will is the ultimate and arbi-
trary source of individuation whose origin remains wholly inscrutable by
reason and accessible to blind faith alone.
7. The Transcendentalism and Positivism of Modern Ontology
If alternatively we substitute a kind of post-theistic virtuality for the act
of a willful divinity — as the post-Kantian transcendental materialism of
Gilbert Simondon and Gilles Deleuze stipulates71 — then we are none-
theless faced with a similarly unresolved tension between the virtuality
of the one and the reality of the many. This requires rather unconvincing
appeals to a prior (vitalist) force or field of individuation that has a resid-
ually henological primacy over the actuality of ordinary individual be-
ings. As Conor Cunningham has argued, this tension between the one
and the many either plunges rational materialism into mystical nihilism
( for the One itself is nothing and as such still is).72 Or else it requires an
account of mediation whereby the ‘middle’ neither represents a tertium
quid between the one and the many nor is it ultimately obliterated by the
one or the many but instead acts as a ‘vanishing mediator.’73 This con-
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cept is championed by Slavoj áizek and builds on the work of Frederic
Jameson. It refers to the third moment of a dialectic whereby a concept
charts a passage between two opposing concepts and in this mediating
process disappears.74
Other materialist philosophers have advanced theories of media-
tion and metaxu in terms of the pan-psychic (Deleuze), the logic of ap-
pearances (Badiou), or the clone of the One (Laruelle). But none of them
can actually uphold the integrity of immanence because the latter is
equated either with the unity of the ‘objective’ exterior world or the mul-
tiplicity of ‘subjective’ interior experience — or somehow both at
once.75 By contrast with dialectical or transcendental materialism, the
Christian Neo-Platonist idea of relational participation views the medi-
ation of Plato’s metaxu as that which infinitely sustains immanence by
participating in the infinite reality of a God whose Trinitarian nature
ensures the irreducible relationality of both Creator and creation in
their analogical difference.
This points to a wider difference between theological metaphysics
and modern ontology on the question of individuation. If the ultimate
source or force of individuation is an immanent potency or virtuality,
then we are left wondering how and why it actualizes finite things, as I
already pointed out in relation to Spinoza in the previous chapter, but
the same question a fortiori arises in the ontology of Deleuze. Or if it is a
transcendent power or actuality, then we have to ask in what ways it ulti-
mately differs from the transcendent act of God and divine grace, as
Pickstock and Milbank’s deconstruction of Badiou’s ontology reveals.
Moreover, these variants of ‘postmodern’ immanentism perpetuate
the modern ontological and political complicit collusion of the one and
the many, for the monism of univocal being either dissolves into a hier-
archical dualism whereby the sovereign one holds supreme sway over
the disempowered many (à la Bodin and Hobbes) or into the mirror im-
age of an inverted hierarchical dualism whereby the many are now su-
perior to the one (à la Levinas, Badiou, or the politics of Hardt and
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Negri).76 In either case, the onto-theo-logic of representation and the
nominalist poles of the individual and the collective supplanted and
displaced the theological metaphysics of relational participation and
the primary, real relations between creation and Creator.77
Here one can also make the point that (post)modern ontology and
politics are trapped in a logic that oscillates between transcendentalism
and positivism. This argument can be traced to the work of the Russian
philosopher and theologian Vladimir Solovyov (1853-1900). Perhaps
more so than any other nineteenth-century figure, he showed that the
speculative philosophy of rationalism and the practical philosophy of
empiricism share the same conceptual basis — an ontology that seals
the exit from both theology and metaphysics and ultimately consecrates
the triumph of both transcendentalism and positivism in all areas of the-
ory and practice. This also applies to Kant’s critical onto-theology as well
as the postcritical analytic and phenomenological strands of philosophy
and theology. Solovyov identifies nine key ‘moments’ in the long transi-
tion from late medieval scholasticism to late modern nihilism.78 First of
all, separating the rationality of individual thought and the authority of
communal faith from their single source, divine wisdom (wrongly attrib-
uted to Eriugena but in reality developed by Franciscan theologians like
St. Bonaventure and John Duns Scotus); second, elevating reason over
faith and mind over nature (Ockham’s late medieval nominalism); third,
dissociating individual beings and their knowledge from the wholeness
of reality and the divine wisdom that infuses the entire created universe
(Descartes and Spinoza); fourth, bridging the gap between the internal
unity of the knowing subject and the external unity of known reality
through an ontology of representation (Leibniz, Bacon, Hobbes, Locke,
Berkeley, and Hume); fifth, dividing phenomena from noumena and re-
placing realism, rationalism, and empiricism with transcendental ideal-
ism (Kant); sixth, rethinking the Kantian knowing subject in terms of
427
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self-consciousness and the absolute subject and, concomitantly, devel-
oping critical philosophy in the direction of pure subjective idealism
(Fichte and Schelling); seventh, redefining the absolute principle of all
being as the very form of concept and overcoming the split between ide-
alism and rationalism by way of absolute pan-logism (Hegel); eighth,
positing a concept-independent reality and reconfiguring empirical phi-
losophy in the direction of materialism (Marx); ninth, reducing matter to
its atomic constituents and the human intellect to the physical brain,
thereby equating consciousness with the sensory perception of external,
material phenomena (Comte, Mill, and Spencer). As such, positivism
constitutes the end-point of late medieval scholasticism and represents
the triumph of ‘positive science’ (Comte) over metaphysical theology and
theological philosophy79 — a victory with profound consequences for re-
ligion, culture, and politics.80
Leaving aside the detail of his reading of history, Solovyov’s argu-
ment that only philosophical theology and a theological metaphysic can
guard against the separation of mind from world and the primacy of sub-
ject over object in modern philosophy outwits in advance Nietzsche’s at-
tack on Platonism as inherently dualist and Christianity as otherworldly.
It also outwits Heidegger’s charge that metaphysics is constitutively
onto-theological, Derrida’s accusation that the whole of western thought
is coterminous with Plato’s ‘phallogocentrism’ as well as Levinas’s asser-
tion that philosophy and theology are totalizing and must be overcome
in the direction of an ontology and ethics of alterity.
The significance of Solovyov’s argument becomes fully clear when
seen in conjunction with his conclusion that positivism is valid exclu-
sively in natural sciences because only “external relative phenomena as
such must be studied in an external relative manner.”81 The implication
is that the modern physical sciences, on account of their premises and
their method, always already bracket God and exclude a cosmological
metaphysics. The problem, as Solovyov already foresaw, is that positiv-
ism in the natural or the social sciences claims universal validity and ar-
rogates for itself a monopoly on truth: the whole of reality can be re-
duced to external empirical phenomena that are scientifically knowable,
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and it is the physical brain that alone can determine what is real and
how it is structured. This impoverished view has led philosophers and
natural scientists from Russell to Popper to Dennett and to Dawkins to
propound an increasingly militant form of atheism that is scientifically
questionable, philosophically dubious, and theologically illiterate.82
Thus, the mark of positivism is to enthrone the immaterial mind as the
sole source of knowledge — at the expense of material reality and the
link that might pertain between them. But rather than annulling the pos-
sibility of religion and philosophy, this opens a space for the recovery of a
theological metaphysics. For only theology can give an account of the re-
lation between subjectivity and objectivity and the ‘vanishing mediator’
that binds them together in a higher unity.
That is what Solovyov explores in his book The Critique of Abstract
Principles of 1880, where he develops a ‘critique of critiques’ of the entire
tradition of post-scholastic philosophy by arguing that modern abstrac-
tion either separates the mind from the world or reduces reality to par-
ticular aspects and as such cannot encapsulate the ‘unity-of-all’
(vseedinstvo, literally the ‘whole of things’).83 Whereas the rationalist phi-
losophy of Descartes or Hegel is ‘a system of concepts without any real-
ity,’ the empiricist philosophy of Comtean positivism is ‘a system of facts
without any inner connection.’ In consequence, neither is equal to the
unity of being.84 Solovyov’s critique is not limited to theoretical philoso-
phy but extends to aesthetics and practical philosophy, including ethics,
politics, economics, and other social sciences. Modern theories of aes-
thetics deny that beauty is objective and universal; instead, it is claimed
that “beauty in things exists merely in the mind which contemplates
them” (as David Hume wrote in his Essays, Moral and Political of 1742).
Similarly, modern accounts of ethics absolutize one element of the social
and political reality (like the law or utility) to the detriment of the rest.
429
Ontology or Metaphysics?
82. For a compelling critique of militant atheism and a defense of Christianity, see
Terry Eagleton, Reason, Faith, and Revolution: Reflections on the God Debate (New Haven:
Yale University Press, 2009); David Bentley Hart, Atheist Delusions: The Christian Revolu-
tion and Its Fashionable Enemies (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2009); and Conor
Cunningham, Darwin’s Pious Idea (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2010).
83. Vladimir Solovyov, Critique of Abstract Principles, pp. v-vi, quoted in Paul Valliere,
Modern Russian Theology: Bukharev, Soloviev, Bulgakov — Orthodox Theology in a New Key
(Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 2000), p. 121.




Monday, January 16, 2012 2:52:22 PM
Color profile: Disabled
Composite  140 lpi at 45 degrees
The same problem applies to politics: the liberal defense of individual
freedom and the socialist emphasis on collectivity represent two ex-
tremes that mirror each other and cannot meet ‘the ideal of a free
communality’ (svobodnaia obshchinnost).85 By adopting the same
positivistic approach as the natural sciences, the humanities and social
sciences reject any import from metaphysics and are therefore unable to
describe or conceptualize the integral nature of being.
Beyond Solovyov, we can also say that this is linked to the nominal-
ist and voluntarist foundation of modern ontology and liberalism and
the inability of postmodern philosophy and politics to provide an ac-
count of the one and the many that does not collapse either into mo-
nism or into dualism or both at once, as I have already indicated. Nor do
these failures validate various theories of pluralism proffered by con-
temporary postliberal thinkers as varied as Isaiah Berlin, Joseph Raz,
Richard Rorty, John Gray, or Peter Sloterdijk, who tend to view western
claims to universality as absolutist and monolithic, a fundamental flaw
that they variously trace to the Christian attempt to universalize the
monotheistic revelation of Judaism. According to this sort of reading,
the dominant forms of modern liberalism represent little more than a
secular variant of revealed religion and remain trapped in the concep-
tuality of monotheism. As a result, the only alternative to absolutism is
to break with all forms of universalism and envision a true pluralism
that can secure a peaceful modus vivendi between rival and incommen-
surable values and belief systems.86 For John Gray, both theist faiths and
secular creeds reproduce in different ways the same religious myths
about the salvific transformation of human life through apocalyptic vio-
lence. Both are hopelessly utopian and both have been dissolved by
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their shared claim to universal foundations that lack any basis in hu-
manity or the natural world. As a result, the delusion of (western) uni-
versalism must give way to a posthumanist pluralism that rejects the
quest for universals and advocates the search for a peaceful coexistence
of incommensurable values and rival ways of life. By viewing humans as
essentially the same as animals, posthumanism purports to reinscribe
man into nature.87
However, this sort of critique of the monism and dualism of modern
philosophy is caught in the irreconcilable dialectic of positivism and tran-
scendentalism. Posthumanist philosophies obliterate all essential differ-
ences among animate beings and assert that humans lack the sort of ra-
tional faculties to ascertain the categorical claims about salvation and
progress in revealed religion and the natural sciences. This skepticism
leads to similar categorical claims about the agonistic and agnostic na-
ture of human beings. Humans, like nonrational animals, are presumed to
be naturally locked into violent struggles for individual self-preservation.
Likewise, human fallibility is thought to rule out the possibility of know-
ing a transcendent corrective Good that can direct everyone to a com-
mon telos. But far from refuting the monotheistic belief in human perfect-
ibility and the natural desire for supernatural perfection, pluralist and
pragmatist accounts are little more than a secularized version of certain
Protestant and Calvinist views of the Fall and human corruption, except
that there is no saving grace by faith — let alone the gift of divine love and
goodness. For pragmatists and value-pluralists, the only way that man
can be saved from himself and his fellow human beings is by recognizing
the illusion of infinite progress based on human reason and freedom and
by accepting the pragmatic necessity to pool power and sovereignty —
without any appeal to overarching principles that are mediated through
particular practices.
What remains wholly unexplained is the existence of universal de-
sires such as individual and communal self-preservation, human civic
association, or mutually extending peace. Postliberal thinkers like Gray
correctly reject the twin delusion of violent millenarian salvation and
peaceful secular progress,88 but they dismiss it in the name of a hidden
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universality which their ontological and epistemological skepticism has
already ruled out — the shared human quest for a modus vivendi of co-
existence and peace. If peace is something like the harmonious order-
ing of diversity for the sake of guaranteeing unity in difference, then
peace must involve the universal natural desire for a supernatural com-
mon good in which all beings can participate equally according to their
particular station in the order of being. For only a transcendent good of
a personal God who is open to all can blend differences peacefully and
thus preserve and extend equality without destroying identity and
unicity.
In summary: by excluding any ontological hierarchy within the cos-
mos, postmodern pragmatism and postliberal pluralism and pragma-
tism denies humans natural knowledge of the supernatural universals
they desire. And by ruling out the existence of a transcendent God who
endows all beings with goodness and the capacity to desire the good, the
underlying skepticism about the irredeemable corruption of human na-
ture becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy. As a result, the defense of value-
pluralism amounts to nothing more than a pragmatic search for peace-
ful coexistence in order to mitigate the consequences of an irreducibly
violent state of nature. In this, postliberal pluralism and pragmatism
merely repeat the logic that underlies the liberal attempt to assert its pri-
macy over all other ideologies (albeit replacing liberal arrogance with
posthumanist humility but in this process also ignoring the truth that
something always rules). This sort of pluralism enshrines difference as
the new absolute, which eliminates the universal that is embodied in
particularity and as such reflects the unity binding us all together.
For these reasons, postmodern pluralism — like modern liberalism
— is caught between a transcendentalism that is blind and a positivism
that is empty: just as secular liberalism appeals to a nominalist and
voluntarist mode of representation (e.g., Rousseau’s volonté générale)
which is transcendentally grounded in order to legitimate positivistic
values like liberty, individual choice, or equality of opportunities, so too
value-pluralism can only secure positivistic notions of diversity by ap-
pealing to difference or alterity, both of which are residually transcen-
dental. As such, both pluralism and liberalism represent a false univer-
salism that is, first of all, predicated on abstract and disembodied
principles and categories and, second, denies the existence of a substan-
tive transcendent Good which can order conflicting freedoms and direct
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ings participate. So the more radical move is to view liberalism and plu-
ralism as mirror images of each other and to reestablish theology as the
only metaphysics and politics that can defend the universal ideals that
both liberals and postliberals variously purport to offer but fail to deliver.
8. Theological Metaphysics and Political Theology
Ontological transcendentalism and positivism are correlated with politi-
cal absolutism. Here the crucial nexus is between Ockham’s nominalist-
voluntarist theology and Machiavelli’s new science of politics.
Machiavelli fuses the late medieval nominalist-voluntarist account of au-
tonomous secular authority with a neo-pagan conception of power as
virtù (or heroic agonism). He radicalizes the early modern redefinition of
dominium as power, private property, individual rights, and absolute
sovereignty89 by divorcing the exercise of legitimate authority from no-
tions of moral goodness. In this way, his account inverts the primacy of
the good over evil (defined by St. Augustine as privatio boni) and defends a
political anthropology that is predicated on violent conflict. This inver-
sion goes back to Ockham’s nominalist erasure of universal goodness
from particular beings and anticipates the idea of a violent state of nature
in the modern tradition of the social contract from Hobbes to Kant. Con-
trary to the metaphysics of participation that views the civitas terrena as
ordered toward the hierarchical ends of the civitas Dei in which it par-
takes, transcendental ‘political ontology’ equates the kingdom and city-
republic with a competition for survival, power, and wealth.
In The Prince (esp. chap. IX), it is the use of fear and force that ulti-
mately regulates political and civic life, not the pursuit of peace or virtu-
ous practice. Connected with this is the appeal to the myth of fortuna, an
imagined existential threat to the political order that demands a violent
response — based on redefining virtue in terms of the neo-pagan hero-
ism that invests the leader with a secular sacrality.90 Just as Scotus and




89. John Milbank, Theology and Social Theory. Beyond Secular Reason, 2nd ed. (Ox-
ford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2006), pp. 7-25.
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Divine will and potentia Dei absoluta are in some sense reflected in
the monarch’s will-to-power. Arguably, one can speak of political abso-
lutism because power is now neither seen as a gift of divine grace that re-
quires righteous rule nor constrained by substantive transcendent telos
— whether an impersonal cosmic force such as Plato’s Good and Aris-
totle’s Prime Mover or the personal Creator God of the Judeo-Christian
tradition. Machiavelli’s purported realism turns out to be an extension of
Ockham’s nominalism and voluntarism that builds on Scotus’s ontology
of representation.
Taken together, the triple currents of possibilism, transcendental-
ism, and absolutism flow from Avicenna, Scotus, and Ockham through
Machiavelli through Suárez to Hobbes, Locke, and Kant. The collective
dimension of sovereign authority is reduced to an individualist mode of
power, while at the same time the citizens and corporate groups that
compose the common polity are subsumed under a collectivity whose
continued assent is no longer required. Popular sovereignty is entirely
compatible with the absolute, executive power of the sovereign. Authori-
tarian democracy — whether in its republican (Machiavelli) or its mo-
narchical guise (Suárez) — is not so much a contradiction or an oxymo-
ron as a paradox that links modern absolutism to modern liberalism.91
Here one can already see the dialectic between the ‘one’ and the ‘many’
that is coextensive with the nominalist poles of left versus right, which
govern both modern and postmodern politics.
Philosophically and politically, there are thus three fundamental
continuities from the late Middle Ages through modernity to our late
modern era. First of all, there is a twin accentuation on ‘the rule of the
one’ and ‘the rule of the many.’ The former is the sovereign center that is
either more autocratic or more plutocratic — or indeed both. The latter
is the sovereign people who are either in contracted dispersion or in col-
lective unity. The ‘one’ and ‘the many’ are dialectically related and col-
lude at the expense of the mediating role of the ‘the few,’ a notion that for
Plato, Aristotle, and Christian Neo-Platonists refers to virtuous elites
who uphold principles and practices of reciprocity and mutuality such
as the exercise of justice and charity.92
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Second, linked to this configuration is the power of the central state
and the free market. Both are constructed based on the myth of human
artifice (such as the social contract) that brings about a peaceful natural
order (beyond the violent state of nature). As such, state and market con-
verge and subsume the intermediary institutions of local and global civil
society under the hegemony of the international system of nation-states.
The logic of abstraction that governs both bureaucratic control and
commercial exchange does not just commodify labor and social rela-
tions but also subordinates the sanctity of life and land to the secular
sacrality of the market-state.93
Third, the political ‘right’ and the political ‘left’ have defined them-
selves variously either in terms of the ‘one’ and the ‘many’ or in terms of
the market and the state or in terms of the economic and the political —
or indeed all at once. All these poles are dialectically positioned and con-
verge around a shared liberalism that fuses Machiavelli’s ‘new science of
politics’ with the eighteenth-century invention of political economy.
Crucially, these three binary relations of the ‘one’ versus the ‘many,’
the market versus the state, and the ‘right’ versus ‘the left’ are all ratio-
nal, spatial constructs that combine ontological nominalism with polit-
ical voluntarism, as André de Muralt’s genealogical account shows.94
Taken together, these binary relations have redefined the nature and re-
ality of civil society that in principle enjoys primacy over states and
markets and embeds both abstract rights and formal contracts in real
relations. Indeed, modern political ontology combines ‘the sovereign
one’ associated with the right and ‘the sovereign many’ linked with the
left that are variously more authoritarian-statist or more market-
fundamentalist — or again both at once.
With this nominalist space, the primary real relations among persons
— who cooperate for both self-interest and the common, public good —
are superseded by abstract, formal links consisting of either
constitutional-legal rights or economic-contractual ties. Those links favor
activities for either commercial-market or state-administrative purposes
and therefore are to the detriment of practices that are not purely instru-
mental but might pursue wider, social purposes. As a result, modern poli-
tics is little more than a social contract between the general will repre-
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sented by the state (e.g., Hobbes, Kant, Hegel, and, more recently, Norberto
Bobbio), on the one hand, and the personal will asserted through inalien-
able individual rights (e.g., Bodin, Locke, J. S. Mill, and, more recently, John
Rawls), on the other hand. The logic of representation is the same
nominalist-voluntarist logic of transcendentalism and possibilism that
underpins both modern absolutism and modern liberalism.
The extension of popular democracy and human rights since 1848
has in some measure curtailed the arbitrary power of the ‘sovereign one’
to the benefit of the ‘sovereign many.’ However, democratization and in-
dividual rights have not just weakened the participation of the ‘few’ but
also subverted the ideal of representation. Democratic rule, especially in
its secular liberal guise, views as legitimate only a vacuous generality
such as abstract values that are drained of any substantive universal telos
embodied in particular virtues. As such, liberal democracy privileges the
spectacle of representing the general will over-above the concerns of the
represented people. Tocqueville’s observation that freedom of expres-
sion is perfectly compatible with the tyranny of mass general opinion
could hardly be more prescient in today’s ‘society of spectacle’ (Guy
Debord).
Liberalism has not only extended the three currents of possibilism,
transcendentalism, and absolutism but also fused them with the new
doctrine of positivism. The liberal belief in boundless, linear progress
was in large part founded on the scientific positivism of Comte and
Spencer and shaped both Marxism and Fascism/Nazism.95 Indeed, the
twentieth century saw an apparent bifurcation between statisms on the
far left or the far right, on the one hand, and economic-social ultra-
liberalism, on the other hand. But both were grounded in the legal-
positivist equation of ‘is’ with ‘ought’ that is nominalist-voluntarist.
Moreover, both at the end of the nineteenth century and in the twilight of
the twentieth century the collusion of the strong state with the free mar-
ket has produced “a hidden mutual complicity and reinforcement be-
tween the voluntarism of the absolute state and the voluntarism of the
self-governing, negatively choosing individual.”96 Connected with this is
the claim that only liberalism provides pluralism and diversity of choice
436
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— a ‘possibilist’ utopia that Michael Oakeshott poignantly called “the
blank sheet of infinite possibility.”97 Yet at the same time, the liberal set-
tlement is really an imposed, even coercive, consensus to ensure that no
choice other than liberalism can ever be effectively exercised. As such,
the notion of illiberal liberalism is increasingly warranted.
Much of postmodern thought seeks to overcome the transcenden-
tal foundationalism and liberal absolutism that characterize modern
‘political ontology.’ However, the shift in emphasis away from modern
dialectics toward postmodern difference (however spelled) merely re-
peats and even reinforces the pan-modern logic of dualism. By enshrin-
ing difference as the new ‘absolute,’ much of postmodern philosophy
and politics brackets the mediating relation between the unity of the
‘sovereign one’ and the diversity of the ‘sovereign many.’ As such, the
postmodern reign of difference collapses into monism — whether a mo-
nism of the ‘one’ such as the Spinozism of Deleuze or a monism of the
‘many’ like the rule of the multiple according to Hardt and Negri.98 The
problem is that post-modern monism so configured risks lapsing back
into absolutism or else hovers closely above nihilism. In either case, the
securing of difference is of a piece with the celebration of neo-pagan
agon that is variously more tragic or more heroic. Thus, post-modern
difference is ultimately reducible to modern dialectics, and both are
part of the logic of dualism that privileges nominal connections
grounded in the will — the power of the one substance or the multiple
multitude to ‘will’ themselves into actuality.
If, as I have argued, the modern redefines metaphysics as the onto-
theological sciences of transcendental ontology, then the post-modern
marks not so much an alternative to this project as an aporetic extension
of it. But there is an alternative modernity that builds on the metaphysi-
cal realism inaugurated by Plato and further developed by the Neo-
Platonist Church Fathers and Doctors in both the Greek East and the
Latin West. The triple current of participation, analogy, and universal-
ism flows through the work of Meister Eckhart, Nicolas of Cusa, the
Cambridge Platonists, and the Neapolitan and the Scottish Enlighten-
ment to the post-secular metaphysics in the work of J. G. Hamann,
Jacobi, and Schelling, who reach back beyond Kant and Hegel to renew
437
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the tradition of metaphysical realism.99 Common to these and other
modern metaphysicians is a refusal to accept absolute finite limits on
the cognoscibility of the infinite — without however returning to the
transcendentalism of Cartesian innate ideas in the mind and the
dualistic separation of the knowing subject from the known object.
Knowing infinity is also a key theme of the contemporary revival of
metaphysics associated with speculative materialism. Knowledge of the
infinite is no longer confined to blind faith or pure reason but intelligible
to both the senses and the mind because it is mediated in language and
appearances. Linked to this move beyond the nineteenth-century se-
cretly collusive opposition of rationalism and fideism (e.g., Kant) is an
overcoming of twentieth-century agnosticism that had sought to chart a
third way between naturalism and speculation.100 Similarly, the renais-
sance of metaphysical and theological ethics shifts the focus from ab-
stract, general being to the singularity of each person and the universal-
ity of truth beyond power or culture.101 Truth so configured is
perennially invariant and at the same time reflected in ephemeral, mate-
rial things. As such, truth is both universal and particular, which coin-
cide in the singular.
This account differs from critical of Hegel’s argument in the Science
of Logic on “The Absolute Relation” (which is defined as the ultimate cat-
egory and highest dialectical unity subsuming substantiality and
accidentality) and in the earlier Phenomenology of Spirit (where cogni-
tion of the individual is described in terms of participating in the Abso-
lute Knowing of the Spirit). For Hegel’s conception gives rise to the idea
of a self-related Absolute whose heterodox onto-logic of necessity has al-
ready replaced the orthodox theo-logic of gratuity and gift exchange. By
contrast, the account advanced here is much closer to the paradox of
faith first articulated in Kierkegaard’s Fear and Trembling that the “single
individual is higher than the universal,” for “the single individual relates
438
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himself as the single individual absolutely to the absolute.”102 As such,
the particular self is “a relation that relates itself to itself or . . . the rela-
tion’s relating itself to itself in the relation; the self is not the relation but
is the relation’s relating itself to itself.”103 Taken together, the horizontal,
symmetric relationality of the self to the self and the vertical, asymmet-
ric relationality of the individual to the absolute overcome the modern
dialectic of transcendentalism and positivism.
With Kierkegaard, one can also suggest that the natural desire of all
human and cosmic reality to surpass itself in the direction of the abso-
lute that is sheer and unreserved relationality is a sign that the absolute
is always already related to the universe. Such an asymmetric relation
calls forth a theological metaphysics because the freedom that is ex-
pressed in the act of self-transcendence can only be the gift of a su-
premely free God who did not need to create the world but chose to do so
out of love and goodness. And we know the Creator God because he
made himself known to us, as the living God of Israel and the incarnate
God in Jesus of Nazareth. All of which points to the truth of Christian
universalism.
Thus, common to Christian Neo-Platonism is the argument that the-
ology offers a redescription of reality that reveals the Christic orientation
of the human-cosmic realm and the triune structure of the whole of real-
ity, divine and natural. First of all, Platonist metaphysics is key to Chris-
tian theology because it demonstrates how the divine infinite is intelligi-
ble to the finite human intellect. Instances of beauty and harmony in the
world are not illusions of the mind but imperfect reflections of the per-
fect beauty and harmony that characterizes the divine Good which en-
dows all things with the natural desire for knowledge and justice. The
crucial contribution of biblical revelation is to show that the divine is a
living personal God who established a covenant with the people of Israel.
In this sense, Christianity is the fulfillment of all religions: Jesus Christ
does not merely subsume and accomplish all preexisting notions of di-
vinity; uniquely, he reveals himself as the Son of God, the divine human-
ity, the living incarnate truth, the Logos that sustains everything which
has been created out of nothing.
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Second, the form of the human-cosmic order is indeed Christic.
Solovyov argues that the history of humanity and the whole of reality are
in some sense ordered towards the Christian God:
Strictly speaking, the incarnation of Divinity is not something miracu-
lous, that is, it is not alien to the general order of being. On the contrary,
it is essentially connected with the whole history of the world and hu-
mankind. . . . This appearance of God in the human flesh is only a more
complete, more perfect theophany in a series of other, imperfect, pre-
paratory, and transformative theophanies. . . . Both these new and un-
precedented appearances [the birth of the first and the second Adam]
were prepared for in advance by all that had happened before; they
constituted what the former life desired, what it strove and moved to-
wards. All nature strove and gravitated towards humanity, while the
whole history of humanity was moving toward Divine humanity.104
Unlike the logic of necessity that governs Hegel’s rational idealism, the
Neo-Platonism of Kierkegaard and Solovyov retrieves and extends an ex-
istential Christian realism that links free divine kenotic self-
renunciation with cosmic and human self-transcendence of natural lim-
its in the divine humanity of Christ. Thus, the real event of the Incarna-
tion marks the ontological and historical coincidence of divine kenosis
and human-cosmic anagogy. The former upholds the natural order,
while the latter reveals the supernatural, transcendent outlook of all that
is. The sacramental liturgy of the Church, which weaves together the
Books of Nature, Scripture and History, testifies to God’s loving wisdom
and divine grace that deify the whole of creation. As such, the Incarna-
tion confirms and fulfills created nature, and nature discloses and de-
scribes God’s manifestation in the world. In this sense, only Christian
theology can give a rationally intelligible account of divine revelation be-
cause in and through Jesus Christ alone is God visible and able to be
known as a personal Creator God.
Thus it is not so much the case that we are seeing a ‘return of meta-
physics,’ as if the metaphysical had ever gone away. Much rather, the re-
newed concern with questions of truth and universality beyond mere
empirical validity or logical coherence points toward a theological real-
440
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ism. Key to a revivified metaphysical theology is the notion of paradox.
Philosophically, the logic of paradox concerns the realm of real relations
and the transcendent good, which infuses all things with (a desire for)
goodness in which all can share. In a quest for true knowledge that ex-
ceeds mere opinion (doxa), Socrates opposes the sophists on the
grounds that they reduce their speeches to commodities, which they sell
to the highest bidder in the marketplace of ideas. By contrast, to uncover
the paradoxical nature of speech is for Socrates to disclose the true real-
ity that language mediates. The depth and mysteriousness of reality war-
rants the use of myths, metaphors, and analogies that go beyond the cat-
egories of logic. That is why Socrates eschews merely contradiction-free,
coherent, and logically valid arguments in favor of paradox that fuses lo-
gos with mythos. The creedal theology of the Church Fathers and Doctors
and modern Christian Neo-Platonists in both East and West have devel-
oped this vision in the direction of Christ’s paradox of divine humanity
and God’s Trinitarian economy in which all can participate.
This is connected with the idea of a virtuous guiding elite — the
guardians of the republic or the Church and the corporate bodies of civil
society. The pursuit of wisdom in defense of a just political order balances
the democratic demand for the equal right of all opinions with universal
standards of truth and goodness. As such, the perennial realism of theo-
logical metaphysics from Plato to Aquinas to modern Christian Neo-
Platonists rejects the empty universalism that underpins the liberal fu-
sion of political absolutism with moral relativism under the guise of indi-
vidual freedom of choice and the tyranny of mass opinion. Crucially, a
metaphysical politics and ethics overcomes the abstract, vacuous gener-
ality of being, which is the mark of modern ‘political ontology.’
Politically and economically, the metaphysical logic of paradox up-
holds real relations by accentuating social bonds of reciprocity and soli-
darity that are based on universal sympathy and are more mutualist in
outlook (as in the modern philosophy of David Hume, Edmund Burke, or
Pierre-Joseph Proudhon). Thus, the logic of paradox views groups and
association as more primary than the individual and the collective.
Across different societies and cultures, social bonds and intermediary
institutions have traditionally been more fundamental than either
constitutional-legal rights or economic-contractual ties. The activities of
autonomous and democratically self-governing groups and associations
are for social purposes and reasons of mutual recognition that paradoxi-
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termediary institutions of civil society — whose autonomy is ultimately
upheld by the Church that embodies the universal, mystical body of Je-
sus Christ — promote the ‘good life’ in which all can share.
Taken together, Augustine’s distinction of the two cities and
Solovyov’s conception of a ‘free theocracy’ avoid the dualism and secu-
larization of power that tend to be associated with the West and the mo-
nism and sacralization of power that tend to be associated with the East.
Augustine’s emphasis on the ecclesia as the only universal polity is pre-
served and extended by Solovyov’s conception of a ‘free theocracy’
where all spheres of activity are framed and ordered by Christian princi-
ples and virtues of charity, solidarity, equality, and the pursuit of the
common good.
9. Conclusion: Relation, Creation, and Trinity
In this chapter, I have shown that modern philosophy is best theorized
as the science of ontology which collapses either into transcendentalism
or into positivism (or both at once) and is trapped in a binary dialectic of
the one and the many. By contrast, metaphysics — theologically
reimagined — offers a different account of reality. If being and life are
neither self-generated nor self-sustaining, then only something like a
transcendent God can bring beings into actuality and preserve them in
existence. If God creates all beings ex nihilo and actualizes them out of
love and goodness (not necessity), then the being of beings is both sub-
stantial and relational — a substance that is in subsistence by virtue of
being in relation to God. Just as the Creator is a mystery of substantive
relations within the Trinitarian Godhead (as Augustine already demon-
strated in the De Trinitate), so created individual things are relational
substances that mirror their creative source in God. It is the transcen-
dent Goodness of God that individuates all beings relationally. Since this
is true for the source of being in God, it also holds analogously for rela-
tions among beings.
This vision is not confined to theology and metaphysics but extends
to politics. How so? If we are created in the image and likeness of the tri-
une God, then we participate in these relations and are ourselves in a
certain way relational. The Trinitarian relations in God provide the basis
for the Christian idea of justice in terms of civic equality and
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ically egalitarian, beyond any divisions of race, class, or gender (1 Cor.
12:13). Christianity also calls for a society that promotes an ethos of ex-
cellence in all human activities, because perfection mirrors God’s good-
ness more faithfully.
As such, the Christian conception of justice differs from contempo-
rary politics. The ‘right’ reduces justice to equality of opportunity in the
marketplace, whereas the ‘left’ views justice as the redistribution of in-
come through central state taxation. By contrast, Christianity defends
an idea of justice in terms of relations that maintain each person’s
uniqueness and promotes perfection within human communities. Sub-
stantive relations establish human association at different levels — from
the family and the household via communities to a shared polity. Such
relations pursue diverse ends but they are all governed by the unity of the
common good and its manifold, diverse instantiations in different vari-
ants of the good life.
In fact, this Christian Neo-Platonist theology underpinned Christen-
dom in both East and West — a shared vision that the cosmos is sacred,
that virtues preserve and perfect natural law, and that all creatures stand
in indissoluble relations with each other and with their Creator. Even
though medieval Christendom was divided and ultimately lost, Christian
Neo-Platonist theology was never refuted. The unrealized potential of
this tradition contrasts with the crisis of liberalism in its secular or reli-
gious guise. The present essay has not further developed the theological
metaphysics of Christian Neo-Platonism in close engagement with con-
temporary philosophy and theology. Nor has it explored the wider impli-
cations for ethics and politics. This will have to be pursued elsewhere.
However, this essay argues for the futurity of the Neo-Platonist tradition.
It was in fact this more orthodox tradition that led to a revival of theolog-
ical metaphysics in the late nineteenth and the early twentieth century
by both eastern and western theologians. Beginning with J. G. Hamann,
F. H. Jacobi, and Søren Kierkegaard, Christian theologians such as Vladi-
mir Solovyov, Sergei Bulgakov, Maurice Blondel, Henri de Lubac, and
Josef Ratzinger have deepened and broadened a vision that seeks to be
universal and faithful to the true teachings of Jesus and the apostolic
church. According to this vision, there are at the heart of immanence ir-
reducible traces of transcendence, and nature is always already infused
with divine grace. In spite of historical schisms that have separated the
western and eastern churches, there is a shared theological legacy
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and philosophy and theology are all complementary and mutually rein-
forcing. This vision is framed by the recognition that the historical en-
counter between the biblical revelation and Greco-Roman philosophy
produced a unique synthesis that is genuinely catholic and Orthodox.
That perennial synthesis gave rise to an ecumenical and political unity
that has the potential to overcome the largely false theological divisions
between the Latin ‘West’ and the Greek ‘East.’
The heritage of Roman and Byzantine theology converges to produce
a vision that is metaphysical, political, and cultural. Metaphysically, it
binds together the one and the many and blends differences harmoni-
ously and peacefully. Politically, it opposes both absolutist theocracy and
arbitrary secularism in the name of an integral model that distinguishes
state and church without divorcing religion from politics. Culturally, it re-
jects postmodern celebrations of relativism and nihilism in favor of a vi-
brant civic culture based around “free associations” and their interrela-
tions, thus giving expression to the fundamentally relational nature of
man created in the image and likeness of the one and triune God. Insofar
as orthodox catholicity mediates the universal in manifold particular
ways, this vision contains the prolegomena to a truly global Christendom.
There is thus a long tradition of Christian Platonism that opposes both
modern positivism and transcendentalism without however embracing
postmodern pragmatism and pure ontology in its analytic or phenomen-
ological guise. The hallmark of the Neo-Platonist tradition is that meta-
physics is central to politics and that a properly restored metaphysics re-






Monday, January 16, 2012 2:52:24 PM
Color profile: Disabled
Composite  140 lpi at 45 degrees
CONCLUS ION
The New Imperative of Relationality
This essay has argued that only a theological metaphysic can overcome
the perennial problem of individuation — what it is that makes an indi-
vidual an individual — bequeathed by antiquity and left unresolved by
modernity. By refusing the binary opposition between the one and the
many, Christian Neo-Platonist theology provides an account that medi-
ates between unity and multiplicity by locating being in the realm of the
‘between’ (Plato’s metaxu) which is itself positioned within the relational
hierarchy of the Trinitarian Creator God.
To begin with Plato is paramount, as it subverts from the outset the
predominantly Aristotelian ‘categorial’ grammar of ancient and modern
theories of individuation. Indeed, most accounts deal with the problem
of what individuates composite things in purely philosophical terms and
within the realm of strict immanence. As a result, such treatments locate
the source of individuation in the individuality of substances or in the
links between their constituent elements — either matter or form or
both at once (as Aristotle himself does). Since the Stagirite removes the
First Mover or God from the actualization of the sublunary world and all
things therein, we can trace a genealogy to late medieval scholasticism,
early modern philosophy, and even postmodern ontologies of pure im-
manence. For all of these perspectives insist that individuals are ulti-
mately generated by other individuals and that individuality is somehow
constitutive of both being and knowing. Thus, the main dividing line of
rival solutions to the problem of individuation is between those who pro-
vide an account in terms of a transcendent source and those who limit it
to an immanent source — even if they do so for transcendent reasons.




Monday, January 16, 2012 2:52:24 PM
Color profile: Disabled
Composite  140 lpi at 45 degrees
foregrounds the severing of the Prime Mover’s actuality from the genera-
tion and evolution of all individual substances. The separation of tran-
scendent principles and ends from immanent causes and effects has
both metaphysical and political implications. Metaphysically, it assumes
the preexistence of matter and does not explain why the form-matter
realm comes into existence or why it is sustained in being. Aristotle sim-
ply presupposes a kind of drive of material potentiality towards the final
telos for which his idea of matter as pure potency offers no rationale. Pol-
itically, this account divorces action or activity, which is the prime mode
of perfecting one’s particular form, from the actuality of the final cause.
The ultimate telos is therefore eliminated from the goods that are proper
and internal to specific practical activities. Such a conception shifts the
emphasis from relation and participation to auto-generation and auton-
omy. This is why Aristotle celebrates self-sufficiency and sovereignty,
both at the level of the polis and the individual. Notwithstanding the per-
petual risk of anachronism, Aristotle’s theo-ontology foreshadows the
late medieval shift from metaphysics to onto-theology and in this sense
anticipates much of philosophic modernity.
Indeed, Aristotle’s original rejection of Plato’s ideas on relationality,
participation, and mediation — coupled with other shifts within theol-
ogy that displace Aristotle’s metaphysical language of act and potency —
reinforces the passage from a metaphysics of creation and individuation
to ontologies of generation and individuality. Here Avicenna and Gilbert
Porreta are pivotal, as chapter 4 suggests. Avicenna’s onto-logic of neces-
sity and Gilbert’s ‘mathematical Platonism’ radicalize Porphyry’s
logicized Aristotelianism in the direction of a primacy of logic and se-
mantics and a more immanentist construal of individuation. Instead of
individual substances being seen as participating in the transcendental
unity of God’s being and goodness, created being is now seen either as a
transcendentally necessary logical category or the product of divine voli-
tion — disconnected from inner divine reality and denied a limited
‘share’ of divine unity.
Duns Scotus, William of Ockham, and Jean Buridan — followed by
Francisco Suárez and Benedict Spinoza — elaborate variations on these
twin themes (as detailed in chapters 6-8). Once creation is no longer
seen as participation in the relational hierarchy of the Trinity, it is gradu-
ally reduced to efficient causality, which means that particularity is re-
garded as either a simple result of a divine fiat or as something brought





Monday, January 16, 2012 2:52:24 PM
Color profile: Disabled
Composite  140 lpi at 45 degrees
(or both at the same time). So either individuation is intelligible to blind
faith alone or else it is coterminous with being and knowing and thus ul-
timately inexplicable, because it is simply assumed that this is how tran-
scendentally everything exists and is known. Following Suárez, the ob-
ject of metaphysics is being insofar as it is, i.e., an individual ‘thing’ that
is in itself prior to any relations with other individual ‘things.’ Whether or
not it is caused by God, individuality is now seen as pertaining to essence
and not itself participating in the unity of the divine transcendent source
of being. Paradoxically, it was a series of theological shifts that brought
about the more ‘secular’ accounts of individuation, stretching from (ele-
ments in) Aristotle, Porphyry through Gilbert, to the formalist-fideistic
onto-theology of Duns Scotus and the nominalist-voluntarist variant of
Ockham. Since these accounts rest on dubious metaphysical arguments,
the theological approaches to individuation from late Antiquity to early
modern scholasticism can be questioned on objective philosophical
grounds.
The same applies to later theories. Erasing God from the internal
constitution of the world opens up a gap between the transcendent and
the immanent that continues to govern modern and postmodern
ontologies. Spinoza is first to abandon the idea of creation ex nihilo alto-
gether and invent a realm of pure immanence where the oneness of the
substance determines the diversity of finite modes. In the natural order
all finite modes are equal and there is no hierarchy. But both his ontology
of single substance and his politics of plural democracy are defined on
essentially negative grounds. The single substance is infinite and auto-
productive, but this begs the question of why it would choose to express
itself in finite modes. Likewise, democracy is a necessary consequence of
the nature of individual knowledge — the limits on human understand-
ing according to which individuals ignore their own particular station in
the communal order and fail to grasp the universal fixed laws of the eter-
nal universe. The result is that individuals confound their own self-
interest with the common sharing in the substance. In order to avoid the
formation and consolidation of oligarchic clusters of power, only a dem-
ocratic regime can diffuse power and cancel out conflicting egotism. De-
mocracy so configured seeks to regulate the opposition and conflict be-
tween ‘natural enemies’ (Spinoza). This conflict mirrors the nature of
finite modality, which is at once a necessary reality and a contingent illu-
sion. Only the sages transcend this aporetic condition and can under-
stand the commonality of the substance below and beyond the individu-
447
The New Imperative of Relationality
479
G:\Pabst\first corrections
Monday, January 16, 2012 2:52:24 PM
Color profile: Disabled
Composite  140 lpi at 45 degrees
ality of finite modes. Neither free nor good, Spinoza’s vision of politics
oscillates between a de facto autocracy of the wise and a de iure democ-
racy of the ignorant.
Other modern theories of individuation are similarly trapped in the
aporia of the one and the many and the dilemma of monism and dual-
ism. Monist and dualist elements are present in all the proposed solu-
tions by Descartes, Leibniz, Hobbes, Locke, Wolff, and Kant — none of
them can escape the transcendentalism and positivism which in the fi-
nal instance collapse into one another, as I argue in chapter 9. The shift
away from a transcendent Creator God towards an immanent absolute
principle marks the final exit from metaphysics and the rise of the mod-
ern science of transcendental ontology. However, once any objective lim-
its are removed on ontological and political individuality, relations
amongst particular things are governed exclusively by sovereign volition
(divine or human) or sheer, unmediated power — or a sinister combina-
tion of both, as in the case of the modern (not medieval) absolutism of
the divine right of kings.1 Without any transcendent objectivity that or-
ders individuals and situates them in mutual relations, there is in the
end only Nietzsche’s will-to-power.
In response, the ‘postmodern’ flight into an infinite flux promises to
unsettle the fixed foundations of rationalism, empiricism, and transcen-
dentalism. However, now that the ‘death of God’ and the ‘end of meta-
physics’ have so conspicuously failed to secure emancipation and uni-
versal prosperity, radical ontologies of pure immanence are once again
in question. The ‘postmodern’ fixation upon the ‘totally other’ is but the
mirror image of the modern turn to the solipsistic self. Thus, contempo-
rary culture hovers between a subjectivity that is absolute and an objec-
tivity that is arbitrary. Instead of pursuing the common good, politics
serves little more than the power of the market-state and private self-
gratification. Fundamentally, my argument is that the individual, under-
stood as a constitutive category in both philosophy and politics, is a
modern invention that can only be understood as a shift within theology
that eschewed the patristic and medieval vision of relationality in favor
of abstract individuality.
By contrast, Plato construes the ‘individuality’ of a thing metaphysi-
cally as its positioning in relation to other things, mirroring the mutual
448
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1. See John Neville Figgis, The Theory of the Divine Right of Kings (Cambridge: Cam-
bridge University Press, 1896).
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interlinks of forms and the Good as the form of all forms. And since the
Good is the author of all things in whose ecstatic ‘self-giving’ everything
participates, there are in Plato’s metaphysics adumbrations of horizon-
tal and vertical relationality, as the second half of chapter 1 argues. This
priority of relation within Platonism is the single most fundamental rea-
son why — as Pope Benedict has also argued in the widely misunder-
stood and misrepresented Regensburg address — the hellenization of
Christianity was never a distortion of biblical revelation but instead a de-
velopment of Jewish and early Christian ideas on creation and the Trinity
(partially intimated in the Hellenized Judaism of Jesus and the Apostles).
Indeed, the doctrine of the Trinity tends to accentuate the priority of re-
lation over substance, as evinced by the work of Latin and Greek Fathers
such as Gregory of Nyssa, Augustine, Boethius, or Dionysius the Areopa-
gite (discussed in chapters 2 and 3). Creation ex nihilo newly brings mat-
ter itself within the scope of originating asymmetrical relationality, while
the supremacy of relation over substance in the case of the Godhead it-
self is demonstrated by Augustine in the De Trinitate and further devel-
oped by Boethius.
Other Platonist elements are also present in the theology of the
Church Doctors, notably Aquinas, as chapter 5 documents in detail. For
example, ‘individuality’ is linked to transcendental unity, such that God
himself is hyper-individual in such a way that God himself is supremely
singular. Therefore, it is not the case that general being somehow creates
particular being. Instead, God’s infinite mode of united ‘definiteness’
(yliatim for Aquinas in his commentary on the Liber de Causis) imparts a
share of its singular unity to created being according to a finite mode.
Here the theological metaphysic of Christian Neo-Platonism outflanks
both monism and ‘postmodern’ pluralism based on a certain mediation
between the one and the many — already present in Plato as the inter-
play between the One and the Dyad. Moreover, the world of things re-
flects both the ‘horizontal’ participation among forms and their ‘verti-
cal’ sharing in the Good that positions everything relationally. Far from
being exclusively metaphysical, Greek and Latin Neo-Platonist theology
also offered a political vision that gave rise to Christendom in both East
and West — a shared vision that the cosmos is sacred, that virtues pre-
serve and perfect natural law, and that all creatures stand in indissoluble
relations with each other and with their Creator within the relational
and hierarchical order of God’s creation.
Even though the ecclesial and political edifice of Christendom even-
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tually dissolved, it is argued in this essay that Christian Neo-Platonist
theology was never refuted.2 On the contrary, it has provided an alterna-
tive not only to the late medieval and early modern proto-secular struc-
tures of thought and practice but also to the questionable use of theolog-
ical categories in contemporary phenomenology and political thought.
As such, the Christian theological vision of relationality outwits in ad-
vance the modern and late modern oscillation between the one and the
many in both philosophy and politics.
While the primary object of this inquiry is the metaphysical problem
of individuation, the essay has also suggested some of the political impli-
cations of the shift from a theological metaphysics of creation and indi-
viduation to a pure ontology of generation and individuation. The re-
moval of God from the political sphere is itself grounded in the
metaphysical removal of God from creation as such. Thus from Aristotle
through to Suárez, I have shown how the individual substance prior to
primary, embodied relation generates a politics of either individual or
collective autonomy, deficient in any true sense of a sharing in a com-
mon good. Only the primacy of a specific set of relations and reciprocal
duties over individual rights can prevent institutions and actors from de-
scending into a formalistic, procedural, and managerial mode whose ab-
stractness is empty and blind. A polity not acknowledging its relation to
God (in receptivity and gratitude) will prove a polity without true human
relations, bound either to disintegrate or else to submit to an enforced
tyrannical unity (in a more or less democratic guise).3 Even in the case of
Spinoza, a democracy of the many is but a desperate and second-best de-
vice designed to make the competitions of ignorant individuals balance
each other out, as I have already indicated. In various ways, this can be
extended to the Cartesian city of abstract individuals, Locke’s apology
for commercial market relations, and Kant’s case for a liberal cosmopolis
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2. As indicated in chapter 1, my argument differs from David Bradshaw’s in his very
important book Aristotle East and West: Metaphysics and the Division of Christendom
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004).
3. In addition to recent work on biopolitics (already cited), there is also a growing
literature on illiberal liberalism and authoritarian democracy. See, inter alia, Colin
Crouch, Post-Democracy (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2004), pp. 1-69; Sheldon S. Wolin, De-
mocracy Incorporated: Managed Democracy and the Specter of Inverted Totalitarianism
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008); Emmanuel Todd, Après la démocratie
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where there is an unresolved tension between individual rights, national
sovereignty, and the ius gentium.4
These arguments extend into the arena of contemporary political
theology, particularly with respect to the post-Schmittian theory of sover-
eignty and debates on democracy and capitalism. Given that secular lib-
eral democracy and unbridled ‘free-market’ capitalism have so clearly
failed to deliver universal freedom and prosperity, it is perhaps no longer
surprising — though no less significant — that Pope Bendict XVI’s argu-
ment on the impasse of modern secularism and the Enlightenment is
changing the terms of debate. This is most clearly evinced by his dialogue
with Jürgen Habermas,5 in which the latter recognizes that we have in
some sense moved into a postsecular phase of history when religious tra-
ditions should no longer be confined to the private sphere but instead be
able to intervene in the public square. For Habermas, however, the norms
that govern public, political engagement between religious and nonreli-
gious traditions must remain strictly secular and liberal (procedural and
majoritarian).6 The Pope contends that secularism brackets the substan-
tive common good out of the picture, which perpetuates the late scholas-
tic separation of pure nature from the supernatural — bequeathed by
Suárez and enthusiastically embraced by neo-liberal/neo-conservative
Catholics such as Michael Novak and George Weigel. This logic is wedded
to early modern rationalism and fideism which can be opposed on objec-
tive metaphysical grounds. Josef Ratzinger, who further develops nouvelle
théologie, argues for a new form of constitutional corporatism against
modern liberalism, which is closely connected with the fundamental
metaphysical relationality of all beings and the indelible role of basic so-
cial units above the level of the individual. Benedict’s paradoxical argu-
ment is that a post-secular politics requires a pre-secular metaphysics.
Linked to this is a recovery of the mediating role of the ‘few,’ a notion that
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4. Cf. Carl Schmitt, The Nomos of the Earth in the International Law of the Jus Publicum
Europaeum, trans. Gary L. Ulmen (New York: Telos Press Publishing, 2003).
5. Jürgen Habermas and Joseph Ratzinger, Dialektik der Säkularisierung. Über
Vernunft und Religion (Freiburg: Herder, 2004), English translation: The Dialectics of Secu-
larization: On Reason and Religion (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 2007).
6. Habermas’s distinction between procedural and substantive democracy ignores
the ontological problem of elevating representation over above participation. It also pos-
its the normative primacy of modern, abstract secular values like tolerance or the will of
the majority over nonmodern virtues embodied in civic practices such as justice governed
by notions of the good rather than merely fairness.
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for Plato, Aristotle, and Christian Neo-Platonists refers to virtuous elites
who strive to uphold standards of excellence and promote notions of
truth as a more important principle of politics than the sovereign power
of the ‘one’ or the democratic will of the ‘many’ or both at once.
Historically, the political ‘right’ and the political ‘left’ have defined
themselves variously either in terms of the ‘sovereign ruler’ versus the
‘sovereign people’ or the market versus the state or the economic versus
the political — or indeed all at once. These and other binary relations are
rationalist, spatial constructs that fuse ontological nominalism with po-
litical voluntarism. The realism of Neo-Platonist metaphysics and poli-
tics rejects the empty universalism that underpins the liberal blending of
political absolutism with moral relativism under the guise of individual
freedom of choice and the tyranny of mass opinion. A theological politics
of paradox is concerned with real, primary relations by emphasizing so-
cial bonds of reciprocity and fraternity that are based on universal sym-
pathy and mutualist in outlook.
Thus, this essay raises the question whether our politics of ‘right and
left’ remains caught within shared secular, liberal axioms — axioms that
are also those of theocratic fundamentalisms since they too deal in a poli-
tics of the indifferent will, inherited — as is equally the case in the end for
liberalism — from the theological voluntarism of the late Middle Ages.
This is not at all to search for a new political center; on the contrary, it is
to search for a way that cannot be charted on our current conceptual
map. It is to investigate again notions of fundamental relationality, of the
common good and economic reciprocity, and of principles that can deter-
mine appropriate ‘mixtures’ of government as between the one, the few,
and the many; the center and localities; political government and
prepolitical society; international community and nations; education in
time and government in space; absolute right and free decision; eco-
nomic freedom and just distribution; and finally, secular and religious au-
thorities. In short, it is to explore whether we are seeing the emergence of
a politics of paradox beyond modern, secular liberal norms.
In summary, the tradition of Christian Neo-Platonism described in
this essay retrieves and extends the legacy of theological realism and in-
tellectualism developed by the Church Fathers and Doctors and de-
fended by Aquinas against the nominalism and voluntarism of radical
Aristotelians in the twelfth and early thirteenth centuries. The empha-
sis on a hierarchical and relational ordering of transcendence and im-
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alist variants) and immanentism. In this manner, the theological
metaphysic this essay defends gestures towards a pluralist universalism
that avoids the enduring metaphysical dilemma of either monism or
dualism and the similarly enduring ethical temptation of either absolut-
ism or relativism.
Finally, the focus on relationality has a strongly contemporary di-
mension. Both the natural sciences and humanities are seeing the emer-
gence of different relational paradigms attempting to theorize the wide-
spread recognition that reality cannot be reduced to self-generating,
individual beings, and that the outcome of interactions between various
entities is more than the sum of parts (whether these be more atomistic
or more collectivist). For instance, in particle physics it has been sug-
gested that there are ‘things’ such as quarks (subatomic particles) that
cannot be measured individually because they are confined by force fields
and only exist inside certain particles (hadrons) that are themselves
bound together by strong ‘substantial’ interplay with other hadrons.7
Likewise, recent evidence from research in fields such as evolution-
ary biology and neuroscience shows that modern ontological atomism
and the spontaneous spirit of possessive acquisitiveness are at odds with
more holistic models of human nature. Indeed, the human brain is in
some important organic sense connected to the world and responds un-
consciously to the social environment within which it is embedded.
Such an account of selfhood contrasts sharply with the dominant mod-
ern conception that the self is a separate, self-standing agent that makes
conscious, rational decisions based on individual volition.8 Linked to the
naturally given social embeddedness of the self is the argument (sub-
stantiated by findings from a comprehensive, global survey) that funda-
mental moral distinctions are somehow ‘hard-wired’ in human beings
and that virtuous habits such as cooperative trust or mutual sympathy
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7. This goes back to nineteenth-century ‘field theorists’ such as Michael Faraday and
James Clerk Maxwell, whose research shaped Einstein’s theory of relativity. See Albert Ein-
stein, Relativity: The Special and General Theory (New York: Crown, 1961), Appendix V. Cf.
Einstein’s “The Mechanics of Newton,” in Ideas and Opinions (New York: Bonanza, 1954).
8. Mark Hauser, Moral Minds: How Nature Designed Our Universal Sense of Right and
Wrong (London: Ecco, 2006). This needs to be complemented by the argument that a
proper ethics surpasses the classically modern dichotomy between ‘right’ and ‘wrong’ in
the direction of an outlook towards the virtue of justice and the transcendent reality of
goodness. Such an outlook is a fusion of natural desire and supernaturally infused habit,
as Christian Neo-Platonists in East and West have tended to argue.
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precede the exercise of instrumental reason or the interplay of senti-
mental emotions.9
Relational patterns and structures are also moving to the fore in a
growing number of disciplines in the humanities and social sciences. For
example, in anthropology it is argued that the idea of a purely self-
interested homo oeconomicus in pursuit of material wealth (central to
Adam Smith’s Wealth of Nations) reduces the natural desire for goodness
to a series of vague, prerational moral feelings (as set out in his Theory of
Moral Sentiments). As such, it marks a radical departure from older ideas
of ‘political animals’ in search for mutual social recognition through the
exercise of virtues embodied in practices and the exchange of gifts — in-
stead of a mechanical application of abstract values and the trading of
pure commodities.10 For these (and other) reasons, individuals cannot
be properly understood as separate from the relations that bring them
into existence and sustain them in being. Instead, individuals are best
conceived in terms of personhood, defined as the plural and composite
locus of relationships and the confluence of different microcosms.
Similarly, in sociology, cultural studies, and cognate fields, the past
decade or so has seen a growing body of research on human coopera-
tion, creativity, and connectedness framed by the concept of relation-
ality.11 Closely connected with these themes is a renewed interest in rival
conceptions of ontology. Here the focus on social relationality in the so-
cial sciences coincides with a growing focus on metaphysical rela-
tionality in philosophy and theology. In turn, this is linked to a fresh con-
cern with a theological metaphysics that rejects the late medieval and
modern primacy of individual substance over ontological relation.12
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9. In this context, Matt Ridley’s claim in his influential book The Origins of Virtue (Lon-
don: Penguin, 1996) that human virtue is driven by self-interest and closely connected to
the division of labor uncritically accepts the modern dualism of egoism and altruism and
also the premise that morality is grounded in a purely immanent account of human nature.
10. Karl Polanyi, The Great Transformation: The Political and Economic Origins of Our
Time (Boston: Beacon Press, 2000; orig. pub. 1944), pp. 45-70; Marcel Hénaff, Le prix de la
vérité. Le don, l’argent, la philosophie (Paris: Éditions du Seuil, 2002), pp. 351-80. See my “The
Paradoxical Nature of the Good: Relationality, Sympathy, and Mutuality in Rival Traditions
of Civil Economy,” in The Crisis of Global Capitalism: Pope Benedict’ XVI’s Social Encyclical
and the Future of Political Economy, ed. Adrian Pabst (Eugene, OR: Cascade Books, 2011), pp.
173-206.
11. Pierpaolo Donati, Relational Sociology: A New Paradigm for the Social Sciences
(London: Routledge, 2010).
12. E.g., F. LeRon Shults, Reforming Theological Anthropology: After the Philosophical
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As part of this growing literature on relational paradigms, this essay
seeks to make a metaphysical intervention that moves notions of
relationality to the center of debates in philosophy and politics. The real,
true account of the human person is not about unbridled freedom in the
marketplace or about our obedient dependence on the state, but about
our social bonds which discipline us and make us the unique persons we
all are, as David Hume and Antonio Genovesi argued in the late eigh-
teenth century and as Pope Benedict has recently reaffirmed in his social
encyclical Caritas in veritate. At their best, the social bonds of family,
neighborhood, local community, professional associations, nation, and
faith help instill civic virtues and a shared sense of purpose. Concretely,
this means solidarity and a commitment to the common good in which
all can participate — from a viable ecology via universal education and
healthcare to a wider distribution of assets and other means to pursue
true happiness beyond pleasure and power. Christian conceptions of
God stress the relations between the three divine persons of the Holy
Trinity. Therefore, the belief that we are all made in the image and like-
ness of a personal, ‘relational’ Creator God translates into an emphasis
on the strong bonds of mutual help and reciprocal giving. For true Chris-
tians, charity is never about handing out alms to the poor and feeling
better about oneself. Rather, it is about an economy of gift-exchange
where people assist each other — not based on economic utility or legal
obligation but in a spirit of free self-giving, receiving, and returning by
members of a social body greater than its parts, grounded as it is ulti-
mately in the mystical union of the divine and the human in Jesus Christ.
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Turn to Relationality (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2003); William Desmond, God and the Be-
tween (Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2007).
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(trans. Jowett 1937, Vol. II, pp. 341-403)
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(trans. Jowett 1937, Vol. II, pp. 281-340)
Rep. The Republic
(trans. Jowett 1937, Vol. I, pp. 589-879)
Soph. The Sophist
(trans. Jowett 1937, Vol. II, pp. 219-80)
Symp. Symposium
(trans. Jowett 1937, Vol. I, pp. 299-345)
Theaet. Theaetetus
(trans. Jowett 1937, Vol. II, pp. 141-217)
Tim. Timaeus
(trans. Jowett 1937, Vol. II, pp. 1-68)
III. Aristotle (c. 384-322 bc)
Cat. Categories
(trans. J. L. Ackrill, in Barnes, ed., 1984, Vol. I, pp. 3-24)
De An. De Anima
(trans. J. A. Smith, in Barnes, ed., 1984, Vol. I, pp. 641-92)
De Caelo On the Heavens
(trans. J. L. Stocks, in Barnes, ed., 1984, Vol. I, pp. 447-511)
De Gen. An. Generation of Animals
(trans. A. Platt, in Barnes, ed., 1984, Vol. I, pp. 1111-1218)
De Gen. et Corr. On Generation and Corruption
(trans. H. H. Joachim, in Barnes, ed., 1984, Vol. I, pp. 512-54)
De Part. An. Parts of Animals
(trans. W. Ogle, in Barnes, ed., 1984, Vol. I, pp. 994-1086)
Eud. Eth. Eudemian Ethics
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Met. Metaphysics
(trans. W. D. Ross, in Barnes, ed., 1984, Vol. II, pp. 1552-1728)
Nic. Eth. Nicomachean Ethics
(trans. W. D. Ross, in Barnes, ed., 1984, Vol. II, pp. 1729-1867)
Peri Herm. Peri Hermeneias
(trans. J. L. Ackrill, in Barnes, ed., 1984, Vol. I, pp. 25-38)
Phys. Physics
(trans. R. P. Hardie and R. K. Gaye, in Barnes, ed., 1984, Vol. I,
pp. 315-446)
Pol. Politics
(trans. B. Jowett, in Barnes, ed., 1984, Vol. II, pp. 1986-2129)
Post. An. Posterior Analytics
(trans. J. Barnes, in Barnes, ed., 1984, Vol. I, pp. 114-66)
Top. Topics
(trans. W. A. Pickard-Cambridge, in Barnes, ed., 1984, Vol. II,
pp. 167-277)
IV. Saint Augustine of Hippo (354-430)
An. et Orig. De Anima et Eius Origine (c. 419)
(ed. Migne, in PL 44)
Beat. Vit. De Beata Vita (c. 386)
(ed. Migne, in PL 32)
Civ. Dei De Civitate Dei (c. 413-25/6)
(ed. Migne, in PL 41)
Conf. Confessiones (c. 390)
(ed. Migne, in PL 32; trans. Boulding, in Rotelle, ed., 1997)
Cont. Acad. Contra Academicos (c. 386)
(ed. Migne, in PL 32)
De Mag. De Magistro (c. 389)
(ed. Migne, in PL 32)
De Mus. De Musica (c. 390/1)
(ed. Migne, in PL 32)
De Ord. De Ordine (c. 386)
(ed. Migne, in PL 32)
De Trin. De Trinitate (c. 404-20+)
(ed. Migne, in PL 42; trans. Hill, in Rotelle, ed., 1991)
Div. Quest. De Diversis Quaestionibus LXXXIII (c. 388-96)
(ed. Migne, in PL 40)
Doc. Christ. De Doctrina Christiana (c. 396)
(ed. Migne, in PL 34)
Enchir. Enchiridion de Fide, Spe et Caritate (c. 421-23)
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En Ps. Enarrationes in Psalmos
(ed. Migne, in PL 36)
Epist. Epistulae
(ed. Migne, in PL 33)
Fid. et Oper. De Fide et Operibus (c. 412/13)
(ed. Migne, in PL 40)
Fid. Rer. De Fide Rerum Quae Non Videntur (c. 400)
(ed. Migne, in PL 40)
Gen. ad Lit. De Genesi ad Litteram (c. 405-15)
(ed. Migne, in PL 34; trans. Hill, in Rotelle, ed., 2002, pp. 168-
506)
Gen. ad Lit. Imp. Opus Imperfectum (c. 393/4)
(ed. Migne, in PL 34; trans. Hill, in Rotelle, ed., 2002, pp. 114-
51)
Gen. c. Man. De Genesi contra Manichaeos (c. 388/9)
(ed. Migne, in PL 34; trans. Hill, in Rotelle, ed., 2002, pp. 39-
102)
Grat. et Lib. De Gratia et Libero Arbitrio (c. 426-27)
(ed. Migne, in PL 44)
Immort. An. De Immortalitate Animae (c. 387)
(ed. Migne, in PL 32)
Ion. Ev. In Ioannis Evangelium Tractatus
(ed. Migne, in PL 35)
Lib. Arb. De Libero Arbitrio Voluntatis (c. 388-96)
(ed. Migne, in PL 32)
Mor. Eccl. De Moribus Ecclesiae Catholicae (c. 388-90)
(ed. Migne, in PL 32)
Nat. Bon. De Natura Boni (c. 399)
(ed. Migne, in PL 42)
Nat. et Grat. De Natura et Gratia (c. 415)
(ed. Migne, in PL 44)
Pul. et Apt. De Pulchro et Apto (c. 380-81)
(lost)
Quant. An. De Quantitate Animae (c. 387-88)
(ed. Migne, in PL 32)
Retrac. Retractationes (c. 426/7)
(ed. Migne, in PL 32)
Solil. Soliloquia (c. 387)
(ed. Migne, in PL 32)
Util. Cred. De Utilitate Credendi (c. 391-92)
(ed. Migne, in PL 42)
Ver. Relig. De Vera Religione (c. 390)
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V. Anicius Manlius Severinus Boethius (c. 480-525)
Contra Eut. Contra Eutychen
(Stewart et al. 1973 Latin edition with facing English transla-
tion, pp. 72-129)
De Consol. Philosophiae Consolationis
(Stewart et al. 1973 Latin edition with facing English transla-
tion, pp. 130-435)
De Fide Cath. De Fide Catholica
(Stewart et al. 1973 Latin edition with facing English transla-
tion, pp. 52-71)
De Hebdom. Quomodo Substantiae in eo quod Sint Bonae Sint cum non Sint
Substantialia Bona
(Stewart et al. 1973 Latin edition with facing English transla-
tion, pp. 38-51)
De Trinitate Trinitas Unus Deus ac Non Tres Dii
(Stewart et al. 1973 Latin edition with facing English transla-
tion, pp. 2-31)
In Cat. In Categorias Aristotelis
(ed. Migne 1847, pp. 159-278)
In Isag. In Isagogen Porphyrii Commenta
(ed. Brandt 1906)
In Periherm. In librum Aristotelis Peri Hermeneias
(ed. Meiser 1880)
Utrum Pater Utrum Pater et Filius et Spiritus Sanctus de Divinitate
Substantialiter praedicentur
(Stewart et al. 1973 Latin edition with facing English transla-
tion, pp. 32-37)
VI. Islamic Philosophers and Theologians
Al-F#r#bI Philosophy of Plato and Aristotle
(in Al-F#r#bI 2001)
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VII. Gilbert Porreta (c. 1085-1154)
In Contra Eut. Expositio in Boecii librum contra Euticen et Nestorium
(ed. Häring 1966, pp. 233-364)
In de Hebdom. Expositio in Boecii librum de bonorum ebdomade
(ed. Häring 1966, pp. 183-230)
In de Trin. Expositio in Boecii librum de Trinitate
(ed. Häring 1966, pp. 53-180)
VIII. Saint Thomas Aquinas (c. 1225-1274)
Comp. theol. Compendium Theologiae (c. 1273)
(ed. Leon. Vol. 42, 1979, pp. 5-191)
De anima Quaestio Disputata de Anima (1266-68)
(ed. Leon. Vol. 24/1, 1996)
De ente De Ente et Essentia (c. 1254-56)
(ed. Leon. Vol. 43, 1976, pp. 315-81)
De potentia Quaestiones Disputatae de Potentia Dei (c. 1265-67)
(ed. Pession 1965, t. 2, pp. 1-276)
De princ. nat. De Principiis Naturae (c. 1255)
(ed. Leon. Vol. 43, 1976, pp. 1-47)
De reg. De Regno ad Regem Cypri (c. 1267)
(ed. Leon. Vol. 42, 1979, pp. 417-71)
De sensu Sentencia Libri de Sensu et Sensate (1267-69)
(ed. Leon. Vol. 45/2, 1984)
De spir. creat. Quaestio Disputata de Spiritualibus Creaturis (1266-68)
(ed. Leon. Vol. 24/2, 2000)
De subst. sep. De Substantiis Separatis (c. 1272-73)
(ed. Leon. Vol. 40, 1969)
De unit. De Unitate Intellectus contra Averroistas (c. 1270)
(ed. Leon. Vol. 43, 1976, pp. 243-314)
De veritate Quaestiones Disputatae de Veritate (c. 1256-59)
(ed. Leon. Vol. 22, 1970-76)
In Boeth. de Hebd. In Librum Boethii de Hebdomadibus Expositio (c. 1256-59)
(ed. Leon. Vol. 50, 1992, pp. 231-97)
In Boeth. de Trin. In Librum Boethii de Trinitate Expositio (c. 1256-59)
(ed. Leon. Vol. 50, 1992, pp. 1-230)
In de Caelo In Libros Aristotelis de Caelo et Mundo Expositio (c. 1272-73)
(ed. Leon. Vol. 3, 1886, pp. 1-257)
In de Causis In Librum de Causis Expositio (c. 1272)
(ed. Saffrey 1954)
In de Div. Nom. In Librum Beati Dionysii de Divinis Nominibus Expositio
(c. 1256-59)
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In Met. In Duodecim Libros Metaphysicorum Aristotelis (c. 1269-71/72)
(ed. Cathala et al. 1971)
In Peri Herm. In Libros Peri Hermeneias Aristotelis Expositio (c. 1269-1272)
(ed. Leon. Vol. 1/1, 1989)
In Phys. In Aristotelis Librum de Physica Expositio (c. 1267-1268)
(ed. Leon. Vol. 2, 1884)
In Post. An. In Libros Posteriorum Analyticorum Aristotelis Expositio
(c. 1270)
(ed. Leon. Vol. 1/2, 1989)
In Sent. Scriptum super Libros Sententiarum Magistri Petri Lombardi
(c. 1252-56)
(In I Sent. and In II Sent. ed. Mandonnet 1929; In III Sent. and
IV Sent. d. 1-22, ed. Moos 1947-1956; In IV Sent. d. 23-50, ed.
Fiaccadorus 1858)
Op. theol. Opuscula Theologica
(ed. Verado 1954)
Quodl. Quaestiones de quodlibet (c. 1256-59 and 1269-72)
(ed. Leon. Vols. 25/1 and 25/2, 1996)
SCG Liber de Veritate Catholicae Fidei contra Errores Infidelium seu
Summa contra Gentiles (c. 1259-1264)
(ed. Marc et al. 1961)
Sent. de Anima Sentencia Libri de Anima (c. 1267-1268)
(ed. Leon. Vol. 45/1, 1984)
ST Summa Theologiae (c. 1265-1272)
(ed. Leon. Vols. 4-12, 1888-1906)
IX. John Duns Scotus (c. 1265/66-1308)
In Metaph. Quaestiones Subtilissimae super Libros Metaphysicorum
Aristotelis
(ed. Etzkorn and Wolter 1997-1998)
Lec. Lectura (basis for the Ordinatio)
(ed. Balic 1950-1982, Vols. 16-18)
Ord. Ordinatio (Opus oxoniense)
(ed. Balic 1950-1982, Vols. 1-6)
Quodlib. Quodlibet
(ed. Alluntis and Wolter 1975)
Rep. par. Reportata Pariensia
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X. William of Ockham (c. 1288/89-1349)




Ord. Ordinatio sive Scriptum in Libros Sententiarum
(ed. Gál et al. 1967-1984)





(ed. Boehner et al. 1974)
XI. Jean Buridan (c. 1300-1360)
Qu. Met. Quaestiones in Metaphysicam Aristotelis
(ed. Dullaert 1964b)





Tract. Sup. Tractatus de Suppositionibus
(ed. Reina 1959)
XII. Francisco Suárez (1548-1616)
Def. Fidei Defensio Fidei (c. 1613)
(ed. André 1856-1878)
Dis. Met. Disputationes Metaphysicae (1597)
(ed. André 1856-1878)
De Fide De Triplici Virtute Theologica, Fide, Spe et Caritate (c. 1614-15)
(ed. André 1856-1878)
De Leg. De Legibus ac Deo Legislatore (1612)
(ed. André 1856-1878)
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XIII. Benedict (Baruch de) Spinoza (1632-1677)
Cog. Met. Cogitata Metaphysica (1663)
(ed. Gebhardt 1972-1987, Vol. I, pp. 231-81; trans. Shirley in Mor-
gan, ed., 2002, pp. 177-212)
Ep. Epistolae
(ed. Gebhardt 1972-1987, Vol. IV, pp. 3-336; trans. Wolf in Wolf,
ed., 1928, pp. 73-366)
Ethica Ethica Ordine Geometrico Demonstrata (1661-74)
(ed. Gebhardt 1972-1987, Vol. II, pp. 43-308; trans. Shirley in
Morgan, ed., 2002, pp. 213-382)
Kor. Verh. Korte Verhandeling van God de Mensch, en des zelfs Welstand
(c. 1660-62/3)
(ed. Gebhardt 1972-1987, Vol. I, pp. 3-121; trans. Shirley in Mor-
gan, ed., 2002, pp. 31-107)
Prin. Phil. Cart. Renati Des Cartes Principia Philosophiae (1663)
(ed. Gebhardt 1972-1987, Vol. I, pp. 127-230; trans. Shirley in
Morgan, ed., 2002, pp. 108-89)
Tract. de Intel. Em. Tractatus de Intellectus Emendatione (c. 1658-60)
(ed. Gebhardt 1972-1987, Vol. II, pp. 3-40; trans. Shirley in Mor-
gan, ed., 2002, pp. 1-32)
Tract. Pol. Tractatus Politicus (c. 1675-77)
(ed. Gebhardt 1972-1987, Vol. III, pp. 271-360; trans. Shirley in
Morgan, ed., 2002, pp. 676-754)
Tract. Theol.-Pol. Tractatus Theologico-Politicus (c. 1670)
(ed. Gebhardt 1972-1987, Vol. II, pp. 3-267; trans. Shirley in
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